Plotinus' Legacy

The Transformation of Platonism from the Renaissance to the Modern Era

Edited by Stephen Gersh

PLOTINUS' LEGACY

The extensive influence of Plotinus, the third-century founder of "Neoplatonism," on intellectual thought from the Renaissance to the modern era has never been systematically explored. This collection of new essays fills the gap in the scholarship, thereby casting a spotlight on a current of intellectual history that is inherently significant. The essays take the form of a series of case studies on major figures in the history of Neoplatonism, ranging from Marsilio Ficino to Henri-Louis Bergson and moving through Italian, French, English, and German philosophical traditions. They bring clarity to the terms "Platonism" and "Neoplatonism," which are frequently invoked by historians but often only partially understood, and provide fresh perspectives on well-known issues including the rise of "mechanical philosophy" in the sixteenth century and the relation between philosophy and Romanticism in the nineteenth century. The volume will be important for readers interested in the history of thought in the early modern and modern ages.

STEPHEN GERSH is Emeritus Professor of Medieval Studies and Philosophy at the University of Notre Dame. He has published many books on authors from Cicero to Derrida, including medieval Latin and Byzantine writers.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Sussex Library, on 25 Apr 2019 at 09:02:09, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Sussex Library, on 25 Apr 2019 at 09:02:09, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019

PLOTINUS' LEGACY

The Transformation of Platonism from the Renaissance to the Modern Era

EDITED BY

STEPHEN GERSH

CAMBRIDGE
UNIVERSITY PRESS

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Sussex Library, on 25 Apr 2019 at 09:02:09, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019

CAMBRIDGE
UNIVERSITY PRESS

University Printing House, Cambridge CB2 8BS, United Kingdom

One Liberty Plaza, 20th Floor, New York, NY 10006, USA

477 Williamstown Road, Port Melbourne, VIC 3207, Australia

314–321, 3rd Floor, Plot 3, Splendor Forum, Jasola District Centre, New Delhi – 110025, India

79 Anson Road, #06–04/06, Singapore 079906

Cambridge University Press is part of the University of Cambridge.

It furthers the University's mission by disseminating knowledge in the pursuit of education, learning, and research at the highest international levels of excellence.

www.cambridge.org
Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9781108415286
DOI: 10.1017/9781108233019

© Cambridge University Press 2019

This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press.

First published 2019

Printed and bound in Great Britain by Clays Ltd, Elcograf S.p.A.

A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
NAMES: Gersh, Stephen, editor.
TITLE: Plotinus' legacy : the transformation of Platonism from the Renaissance to the modern era / edited by Stephen Gersh.
DESCRIPTION: Cambridge, UK ; New York, NY : Cambridge University Press, 2019. | Includes bibliographical references and index.
IDENTIFIERS: LCCN 2018047196 | ISBN 9781108415286 (hardback : alk. paper) | ISBN 9781108401135 (pbk. : alk. paper)
SUBJECTS: LCSH: Plotinus–Influence. | Platonists. | Neoplatonism.
CLASSIFICATION: LCC B693.Z7 P565 2019 | DDC 186/.4–dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2018047196

ISBN 978-1-108-41528-6 Hardback

Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this publication and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Sussex Library, on 25 Apr 2019 at 09:02:09, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019

Contents

List of Contributors *page* vii

Introduction 1
Stephen Gersh

PART I THE ITALIAN RENAISSANCE 17

1 Marsilio Ficino as Commentator on Plotinus: Some Case Studies 19
Stephen Gersh

2 Giovanni Pico della Mirandola on Virtue, Happiness, and Magic 44
Brian Copenhaver

PART II SIXTEENTH-CENTURY FRANCE 71

3 Jacques Lefèvre d'Étaples and Charles de Bovelles on Platonism, Theurgy, and Intellectual Difficulty 73
Richard J. Oosterhoff

4 Symphorien Champier on Medicine, Theology, and Politics 96
Guido Giglioni

PART III THE "CAMBRIDGE PLATONISTS" 125

5 Henry More and Descartes 127
David Leech

6 Ralph Cudworth as Interpreter of Plotinus 146
Douglas Hedley

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Sussex Library, on 25 Apr 2019 at 09:06:22, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019

7 John Smith on the Immortality of the Soul 160
Derek A. Michaud

PART IV GERMAN ROMANTICISM 181

8 Schelling and Plotinus 183
Thomas Leinkauf

9 Hegel's Programmatic Recourse to the Ancient Philosophy of Intellect 217
Jens Halfwassen

PART V THE TWENTIETH AND TWENTY-FIRST CENTURIES 231

10 Henri-Louis Bergson and Plotinus 233
Wayne J. Hankey

11 Plotinus and Modern Scholarship: From Ficino to the Twenty-First Century 257
Kevin Corrigan

Appendix: Chronology of Editions and Translations of Plotinus 288
Index 292

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Sussex Library, on 25 Apr 2019 at 09:06:22, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019

Contributors

BRIAN COPENHAVER is Distinguished Professor Emeritus of Philosophy and History at the University of California, Los Angeles.

KEVIN CORRIGAN is Samuel Candler Dobbs Professor of International Humanities, Middle Eastern and South Asian Studies at Emory University, Atlanta.

STEPHEN GERSH is Emeritus Professor of Medieval Studies and Philosophy at the University of Notre Dame.

GUIDO GIGLIONI is Associate Professor of the History of Philosophy at the University of Macerata.

JENS HALFWASSEN is Professor Ordinarius of Ancient Philosophy at Ruprecht-Karls University, Heidelberg.

WAYNE J. HANKEY is Emeritus Professor of Classics at Dalhousie University in Halifax, Nova Scotia.

DOUGLAS HEDLEY is Professor of the Philosophy of Religion and Fellow of Clare College at the University of Cambridge.

DAVID LEECH is Lecturer in the Philosophy of Religion at the University of Bristol.

THOMAS LEINKAUF is University Professor of Philosophy at Westfälische Wilhelms University, Münster.

DEREK A. MICHAUD is Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Maine.

RICHARD J. OOSTERHOFF is Lecturer in Early Modern History at the University of Edinburgh.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Sussex Library, on 25 Apr 2019 at 09:08:20, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Sussex Library, on 25 Apr 2019 at 09:08:20, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019

Introduction

Stephen Gersh

The almost continuous influence through two millennia of European history of Plotinus' philosophical doctrine or of the philosophical movement that he founded, Neoplatonism, is a generally acknowledged fact. The term *philosophia perennis* was introduced by the Italian Augustinian Agostino Steuco (1497–1548) as referring to precisely this tradition and was understood in the same way at least until Leibniz.[1] Acknowledgment of the continuous influence of Plotinus and Neoplatonism has often been qualified on the part of historians of philosophy by restricting that influence to specific regions and epochs – for example, early twelfth-century France or late fifteenth-century Italy – or else by assigning it rather to "non-philosophical" disciplines such as theology or literature. However, the doctrines concerned have actually reappeared in many places and times besides those most generally noted by historians, while any permanently rigid demarcation between the genres of philosophy, theology, and literature is questionable in practice.

But before proceeding further with the main topic of the present undertaking, which is to understand and trace Plotinus' legacy,[2] it may be useful to state some basic facts about the ancient philosopher himself and his re-emergence on the European intellectual scene at the beginning of the modern era. Plotinus (ca. 204/5 to 270 CE) was the author of the *Enneads,* a set of 54 philosophical treatises grouped in six sets of nine (Greek *ennea* = "nine") and prefaced by a biography of the author by Porphyry. It appears from the biography that much of the organization of the Plotinian corpus, including the assignment of titles such as "On Beauty" or "On Providence" to individual treatises, was due to Porphyry, who had been Plotinus' student in Rome, rather than to the master himself. Plotinus' philosophy is quite systematic although, since it is not

[1] On Steuco and his ideas about the history of philosophy see Schmitt (1966), 515–524.
[2] For an excellent introduction to the topic of Plotinus' legacy see O'Meara (1992).

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:20:30, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.001

constructed gradually through any organized progression within the 54 treatises but is assumed as a whole in the treatment of each individual topic, the system[3] can only be grasped through repeated readings.

Plotinus' most notable doctrine is that there are three primary substances, principles, or "hypostases": first, the One or Good, which is actually unknowable and can therefore only be named or described in a provisional way; second, Being or Intellect – a combination of Plato's world of intelligible forms and Aristotle's agent intellect or unmoved mover, which is atemporal in nature; and third, Soul, which is primarily twofold in having a higher part approximating to intellect and a lower part that animates bodies and is temporal. The three principles are linked in a causal sequence for which various conceptual models are employed, including especially that of "emanation," i.e. the diffusion of light. Since Intellect and Soul are both simultaneously unities and multiplicities, they exist on both macrocosmic and microcosmic levels as the intellect and soul of the world and as the intellect and soul of an individual human being respectively. On the microcosmic level, the human being is primarily twofold in that its higher part, which consists of intellect, reason, and higher imagination, is essentially independent of body, whereas its lower part, which consists of lower imagination, sense, and the vegetative

[3] This raises the question whether it is legitimate to speak of a "system" in Plotinus' philosophy – something that has recently been considered by Catana (2013). This author argues that there is not (as many modern interpreters – especially since Eduard Zeller – have assumed) a "system" of some kind in Plotinus' thought and that it consists rather of an exploration of philosophical problems. Despite its illumination of many interesting questions, this conclusion is mistaken. Catana adopts a very narrow view of the notion of "system" derived mainly from the eighteenth-century historian of philosophy J. Brucker. He then demonstrates quite correctly 1). that Brucker's notion of a philosophical system (a set of doctrines deduced from one or a few methodological and/or ontological principles) could not accurately be applied to Plotinus' thought; and 2). that the technical term *sustēma* and various cognate and similar terms do not occur in a philosophical sense in Plotinus. However, the "systematic" character of Plotinian thought really depends on other criteria that Catana entirely ignores: namely, on analogical, harmonic-mediative, and numerological structures (which are discovered by imaginative as well as dialectical operations) derived mainly from the Pythagorean tradition. It must be admitted that the Porphyrian version of the *Enneads* may have been responsible for shifting the original thought in this direction, but – for better or worse – this is the only "Plotinus" that we have and the only source of later Plotinian influence. The analogical, harmonic-mediative, and numerological structures that are prevalent in this Plotinus and other late ancient authors like Calcidius and Macrobius are the foundation of all medieval Platonism (which becomes thereby "systematic"), and this mode of thought continues and is expanded in Ficino, through whom it is transmitted to other Platonists of the early modern period. From late antiquity onwards this approach was massively reinforced by the Christian dogma of the Trinity – which is seen by later interpreters and probably was genetically connected with the Plotinian "systematic" doctrine of the "three primal hypostases" (to use the Porphyrian title of *Ennead* V.1) – and especially by the all-pervading structural function of the *Logos-verbum* transmitted through Origen and Augustine. On the centrality of these doctrines in Ficino see Gersh (2017), §§1.1–1.2 and 4.1–4.4.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:20:30, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.001

function, is a life emanated into the body. The true "human being" is the higher part. Its ethical goal is to distance itself from the lower and bodily state as much as possible, this process being accomplished by "conversion" of the lower faculties towards the higher, of the microcosm towards the macrocosm, and ultimately of the fully intellectualized and universalized soul to the One or Good itself. The traditional virtues are understood as types of purification.

According to Porphyry's account in the *Life of Plotinus*, the system of his master was derived in the first instance from the writings of Plato, whom Plotinus revered as his true philosophical master – and indeed there are many passages from the dialogues that appear as verbal citations or allusions in the later author. The *Timaeus* is especially prominent and provides most of the groundwork for the Plotinian system with its teachings regarding the divine craftsman, the intelligible paradigm, the world that he fashions from soul and body, the composition of the soul from various quasi-logical and quasi-mathematical elements, the delegation of certain creative tasks to secondary divinities, the providential distribution of individual souls to bodies, and the domestication of the recalcitrant force of matter. Other dialogues are the sources of specific doctrines of central importance: the *Symposium* together with the *Republic* furnishes the notion of a psychological ascent through levels of perception; the *Republic* the notion of a first principle called "the Good" that lies beyond Being itself; the *Parmenides* the notion that this same first principle can be called "the One"; the *Phaedo*, together with the *Phaedrus*, the teachings concerning the human soul's detachment from the body, its immortality, and its transmigration; and the *Sophist* the internal dialectical structure of intellection, and so forth.

According to the account in Porphyry's *Life,* the system of Plotinus was also developed through reflection on many philosophical ideas not originated by Plato himself. Porphyry notes that Aristotle's *Metaphysics* appears in a compressed form in Plotinus' writings, that all available commentaries by writers of either Platonic or Peripatetic persuasion were studied in his school, that Stoic teachings were concealed in Plotinus' treatises, and that in all these cases Plotinus always approached the ideas of others in a manner consistent with his own personal viewpoint. Porphyry does not specifically identify which Aristotelian or Stoic doctrines had the greatest impact on his master's thinking. However, it is easy to see from Plotinus' writings that the Aristotelian technical terminology of substance and accident, of formal, efficient, and final causality, and of potentiality and actuality is everywhere employed in addition to or in place of the

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:20:30, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.001

non-technical vocabulary of Plato, although with respect to the use of Aristotelian *doctrine* as such Plotinus adopts a more circumspect approach, in which – for instance – Plato's and Aristotle's views concerning the relation between the One and Intellect or between the categories of the intelligible and sensible worlds are contrasted rather than assimilated. Among the concealed Stoic doctrines to which Porphyry refers, that of the universal *Logos*, which Plotinus identifies with nature or the lower phase of the world-soul, is perhaps the most significant.

The philosophy of Plotinus' *Enneads* seems not only to have influenced the work of actual members of his school such as Porphyry but also to have had an immediate impact on the wider Greek and Latin philosophical milieux, and this fact is of particular relevance to the question of the precise form in which this philosophy was revived at the beginning of the modern era. The most prominent of the later Greek philosophers influenced by Plotinus was undoubtedly Proclus (ca. 412–485 CE). While taking his predecessor's system as a general foundation for his own thought, this writer broke new ground by producing lemmatic commentaries on specific Platonic dialogues, in further subdividing the levels of reality through the imposition of a dialectical triadic structure, and in supplementing the philosophical ascent to the higher realm with a quasi-sacramental *theurgic* one. Among Christian writers, Plotinus influenced Augustine of Hippo (354–430 CE) directly and pseudo-Dionysius "the Areopagite" (late-fifth to early-sixth century CE) at least indirectly via Proclus. Augustine mentions Plotinus by name in some of his earliest dialogues, refers to him cryptically under the rubric of "books of the Platonists" in the *Confessions*, and quotes specific passages of Plotinus' writings in the *City of God.* Important philosophical doctrines concerning the community of the angelic intellects, the ascent to the divine through successive levels of perception, the strictly active nature of sensation, and the production of natural things through seminal reasons are drawn from Plotinus by Augustine. The unknown theologian who published under the pseudonym of one of Saint Paul's converts the treatises *On the Divine Names, On Mystical Theology,* and *On the Celestial Hierarchy*, in which the theology and angelology of later Platonism are remoulded in Christian form, does not expose his own imposture by citing Plotinus by name. However, the Plotinian influence on such of his doctrines as the necessity of approaching God primarily through negative utterances and the understanding of the creator and the created world through a circular transmission of emanative energy is absolutely unmistakable. Given that some of Proclus' writings had become available in Latin translation before the end

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:20:30, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.001

of the thirteenth century, that Augustine was the most revered Western church father, and that "Dionysius" was already accessible in five medieval Latin translations, potential readers of the revived Plotinus himself in the Italian Renaissance had their minds well prepared for such a reading with an abundance of Plotinianism.

Now, it is well known that even the best educated people in western Europe during the Middle Ages were unfamiliar with the Greek language, with the result that such access to Greek philosophy as was possible for them was – at least until the twelfth century and the initial influx of Arabic versions of Aristotle – confined to that provided by a few Latin translations that had survived from the end of antiquity. This scanty remnant consisted of a translation of Plato's *Timaeus* and a version of Aristotle's logical writings, neither of which was actually complete, while if Augustine's reference to Platonic books translated into Latin by Marius Victorinus refers to Plotinus, the scope of these translations, which had been lost by the end of antiquity, is totally unknown.[4] It was therefore, at least for philosophers, a momentous event, which Marsilio Ficino (1433–99) himself describes, when he informs us that Cosimo de' Medici, the ruler of Florence who had earlier been profoundly impressed by the expositions of Plato's thought by the eminent Byzantine philosopher Gemistos Plethon at the Council of Ferrara-Florence, hired the youthful Ficino in 1463 to translate the Greek texts of the Hermetic corpus and of Plato that he had recently acquired.[5] According to the same report, Cosimo did not add a translation of Plotinus' *Enneads*, which he also very much desired, to the other assignments, wishing not to overburden the young scholar. The impulse to take up the latter project in earnest only came twenty-one years later in 1484 from another source, Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, who had arrived unexpectedly at Ficino's house in Florence in order to inquire about the progress of the Plato translation.[6]

As far as the chronology is known, Ficino began the work of translating Plotinus in 1463 on the basis of the manuscript supplied by Cosimo (the *Laurentianus 87.3*) and another one (the *Parisinus graecus 1816*) copied

[4] For example, we do not know whether all the *Enneads* or only some were translated, and whether the translations were accompanied by commentaries of any kind. For details regarding the Victorinus question see O'Meara (1992), 56 and 67.

[5] See the *prooemium* to the translation and commentary on Plotinus (Ficino [1576], 2: 1537–1538). On the historical circumstances surrounding the appearance of Plotinus in Italy see Garin (1974).

[6] An early draft of Ficino's commentary on Plotinus (dated 1484) exists in the MS Florence, Conventi Soppressi E 1. 2562. This MS has annotations that can be linked with Giovanni Pico. See Wolters (1986).

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:20:30, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.001

from it, both these extant manuscripts containing annotations in his hand. Although there is abundant evidence of Ficino's thorough mastery of Plotinus' doctrine in the original works that he published during the 1470s and 1480s, such as the *Commentary on Plato's Symposium on Love* and the *Platonic Theology,* the actual writing of a formal commentary on the *Enneads* as a complement to the translation was largely carried out during his later years. The narrative of its composition is somewhat convoluted.[7] Working in the order of the Porphyrian edition, Ficino had completed the commentary up to the first two treatises of the *Third Ennead* by 1487. Then a two-year gap intervened, in which he worked instead on translations of various works by other Neoplatonists such as Porphyry, Iamblichus, Proclus, and Synesius.[8] After this interruption, he returned to Plotinus but decided shortly thereafter to write only shorter commentaries in order to prevent the whole project from becoming too massive and too repetitive.[9] The entire commentary reached its final form and was presented together with the translation in a luxurious manuscript to its dedicatee, Lorenzo de' Medici, in the spring of 1490 (*Biblioteca Laurenziana, Plutei 82.10* and *82.11*). The printed edition appeared in May 1492.

In the *prooemium* to the translation-commentary, Ficino explains that the philosophy of Plotinus uniquely furthers – as an instrument of divine providence – a project of bringing philosophers who have strayed doctrinally back towards the true religion. In ancient times, there did arise simultaneously a certain "pious philosophy" (*pia philosophia*) – i.e. a fusion of religion and philosophy – among the Persians under the guidance of Zoroaster and among the Egyptians under that of Hermes "Trismegistus." Its teaching was brought from its infancy to adulthood among the Thracians under the tutelage of Orpheus and Aglaophemus, among the Greeks and Italians under that of Pythagoras, and finally among the Athenians under that of "divine Plato" (*divus Plato*). However, the custom of the ancient theologians was to express the divine truths as "mysteries" (*mysteria*) veiled either with mathematical numbers and figures or else with poetic fictions, and Plotinus' unique contribution to the history of this pious philosophy was that he for the first time stripped away the veils and penetrated the mysteries by dialectical means.[10]

[7] The narrative was constructed on the basis of references in Ficino's letters by Kristeller (1937), vol. I, cxxvi–cxxviii.
[8] On the interruption see Vanhaelen (2010).
[9] See Ficino, *In Ennead.* IV. 3. 33 (Gersh [2018]).
[10] On the introductory material to the Plotinus commentary see Saffrey (1996).

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:20:30, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.001

This account lays down certain premises regarding Plotinus' philosophy that will serve as points of orientation for later readers. Most importantly, Ficino stresses the novelty represented by Plotinus' thought in comparison with all earlier Greek philosophy in providing an adequate explanation – here characterized as the dialectical penetration of certain "mysteries" – of Plato's own doctrine. This adequate explanation corresponds specifically to Plotinus' conversion of mythical or metaphorical material in Plato into metaphysical doctrine articulated in strict technical language. For example, the analogy of the sun in the *Republic* turns into a philosophically argued account of the Good or One's causality of the intelligible and sensible worlds, and the image of the winged charioteer in the *Phaedrus* is absorbed into a precise conceptual analysis of the soul's structure. The Plotinian reading of Plato also corresponds more generally to the systematization of the thought believed to be lying behind the notoriously unsystematic presentations made through the dramatic form of the dialogues. At any rate, the emphasis upon the novelty of Plotinus' approach is sufficient justification for calling the latter not just "Platonism" but "*Neo*-Platonism" and, although Ficino does not himself apply this technical term to his own concept, early followers such as Francesco Giorgi (1466–1540), who introduces the term *platonici novitiores* in this context, had clearly received the message.[11] Indeed, it is quite wrong to argue in a manner that has recently become popular that the term "Neo-Platonism" and the notion that it represents are the inventions of eighteenth-century critics.

Several further aspects of Ficino's interpretation of Plotinus as an innovative figure in the Greek philosophical tradition should also be noted. Thus, the Plotinian system of thought has something that one might term a hermeneutic-historical aspect in that the explanation of Plato's doctrine is associated with an explanation of that of each of his predecessors in the tradition of pious philosophy – Pythagoras, Orpheus, Hermes, and Zoroaster – and also has indissolubly linked with this a hermeneutic-geographical aspect in that these same ancient sages are treated as the leaders of different national traditions of philosophy: Pythagoras of the Italian-Greek, Orpheus of the Thracian, Hermes of the

[11] Franciscus Georgius Venetus, *De harmonia mundi totius* II. 1 (Campanini [2010],1088). Being unaware of the Georgi reference, Tigerstedt (1974, nn. 342–343 and 490) concluded that Theophilus Gale, who in his *The Court of the Gentiles,* Oxford 1669–70 refers to the "New Platonicks," was the first writer to use the term *Neoplatonism* (or a synonym), although it becomes common only in German writers (e.g. Tiedemann) about a century later. One could add that Hegel, influenced by the more recent historians like Tiedemann and Brucker, speaks of the *Neu-Platoniker* with due recognition of Plotinus' novelty as the founder of this tendency.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:20:30, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.001

Egyptian, and Zoroaster of the Persian. The theory is derived from ancient sources such as Diogenes Laërtius, who spoke of the *magi* beginning with Zoroaster and of Aristotle's report that the *magi* were more ancient than the Egyptians,[12] Augustine, who described Hermes Trismegistus as a philosopher who preceded the wise men of Greece but was subsequent to Moses,[13] and Proclus, who spoke of Orpheus as the founder of all Greek theology who passed on his *mystagogic* knowledge to Aglaophemus, Pythagoras, and Plato.[14] For Ficino, there are definite intertextual consequences in that the various leading figures are associated with bodies of pseudepigraphic philosophico-religious literature – for example, the Orphic Hymns, the Hermetic Corpus, and the *Chaldaean Oracles* – that were mostly produced in the *post*-Plotinian milieu of late antiquity albeit held to be *pre*-Plotinian by the Florentine himself.[15]

It is not easy to trace something as subtle and variegated as the influence of Plotinus in the early modern and modern periods, and the present undertaking should be seen as representing merely the first crucial steps in such a project.[16] It will therefore be useful to provide ourselves with a few useful categorizations or "signposts." An initial overview of the empirical evidence suggests that we should distinguish at least the following: A). a Ficinian trajectory of Plotinus' reception, and B). a post-Ficinian trajectory, and within A). 1. a direct trajectory of Plotinus' reception, 2. an indirect trajectory, and 3. interactions between the direct and indirect trajectories. These should be called "trajectories" rather than "phases" because, although they are indeed time-sensitive phenomena, they often overlap or run concurrently in different national traditions or in the works of different authors.

[12] See Diogenes Laertius, *Vitae philosophorum* I, prol. 2 and 8. Plato also talks about Zoroaster as a religious teacher at *Alcibiades I,* 122a.

[13] See Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* XVIII. 39. Ficino cites this passage in the *argumentum* of his translation of the *Pimander*.

[14] See Proclus, *Theologia Platonica* I. 5, 25–26 (Saffrey and Westerink, 1968–1997). Cf. Iamblichus, *De Vita Pythagorica* 28. 151.

[15] On Ficino and post-Plotinian thought see Celenza (2002).

[16] In the present undertaking, it has not been possible to study in detail two important areas of Plotinian influence: 1). a further "trajectory" represented by the pseudonymic Arabic work *Theology of Aristotle* – published in a Latin translation in 1519 – which includes paraphrases of *Enneads* IV–VI and some chapter headings. The work influenced several generations of Aristotelian commentators and also the Platonist Francesco Patrizi da Cherso; and 2). the study of Plotinus by an entire roster of Italian intellectuals during the sixteenth century that includes such luminaries as Giles of Viterbo, Francesco Giorgi, and Giordano Bruno. Their studies would have been based entirely on Ficino before the publication of the *Enneads* in the original Greek in 1580. However, for some remarks about the *Theology of Aristotle* see the essay by Corrigan in the present volume.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:20:30, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.001

The direct Ficinian trajectory may be said to consist of the reading of Plotinus exclusively via Ficino's translation, and probably also through his commentary attached to the translation (1492 onwards), together with the continuation of the same habits of mind even after the publication of the Greek text (in 1580).[17] This trajectory was characterized by general acceptance of Ficino's hermeneutical and methodological assumptions regarding Plotinus' status as the uniquely authoritative exponent of Plato's doctrine and of the philosophical-religious tradition culminating in that doctrine. It remained strong in Italy and elsewhere during the sixteenth century and into the seventeenth, although it had broken down – primarily through the desire to find a kind of *Ur*-Plato somewhat analogous to the ambition of finding an original Christianity or scripture – by the last quarter of the seventeenth century. The beginnings of the attempt to separate Plato from Plotinus and Neoplatonism were associated first with the wider dissemination of Plato's own texts in Greek and the possibility of drawing conclusions from the stylistic variety in the dialogues, and second with increased interest in the non-dogmatic tradition of Platonism, i.e. the *New Academy* described by Cicero. Writers such as Vives and Melanchthon could be cited as examples of the former tendency,[18] with Gianfrancesco Pico della Mirandola and some of the Ramists as instances of the latter.[19] Moreover, once a plausible case has been made for separating Plato from Plotinus and Neoplatonism, it became possible to reclassify the latter not as "Platonists" at all but as "eclectics" – with all the pejorative associations of the latter term.[20] This approach seems to have been initiated in Vossius' *De philosophorum sectis* of 1657,[21] but becomes most common in German historians of the eighteenth century such as Johann Jakob Brucker (1696–1770)[22] and Dietrich Tiedemann (1748–1803).[23] The attempt to downgrade Plotinus and Neoplatonism on

[17] I am indebted to Tigerstedt's excellent study (Tigerstedt, 1974) for much of the detail in the next two paragraphs, although my classification and conclusions are different from his.

[18] See Tigerstedt (1974), 31–35. [19] See Tigerstedt (1974), 36–38.

[20] On this nomenclature and the problems attached to it see Dillon and Long (1988), Introduction, 1–5.

[21] See Tigerstedt (1974) 51–52.

[22] On Brucker see Tigerstedt (1974), 57–61. Jacob Brucker's *Historia critica philosophiae a mundi incunabulis ad nostram usque aetatem deducta* of 1742–1744 presents, according to Tigerstedt (1974, p. 61) a "rupture with a millennial tradition," i.e. of Ficinian Neoplatonism, that is "radical and final." A notable feature of Brucker's approach is a kind of historical racism, since a major component of Ficino's eclecticism is said to be its "orientalism" as opposed to the pure Hellenism of the genuine Plato that Brucker admires. On orientalism see below.

[23] On Tiedemann see Tigerstedt (1974), 63–64. On the eighteenth-century approach to Plotinus see also Catana (2013).

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:20:30, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.001

grounds of eclecticism is attacked by Hegel – who frequently cites the aforementioned German historians by name in his *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* – although Hegel *does* distinguish Plato from Neoplatonism.[24]

The indirect Ficinian trajectory consists first of the dissemination of authoritative ancient Christian works that embodied doctrines either directly or indirectly influenced by Plotinus, and especially the writings attributed to "Dionysius the Areopagite" and those of Augustine. The identification of the Dionysian writings as products of the apostolic period had enabled Ficino as an exegete to explain not only certain striking doctrinal agreements between them and Plotinus as resulting from the dependence of the latter upon the former, but even to argue that Plotinus was a uniquely authoritative interpreter of Plato because he had somehow imbibed the Christian wisdom of Dionysius.[25] However, this identification had already been challenged by Lorenzo Valla in his *In Novum Testamentum Annotationes* before 1457, when among other arguments of a more philological nature he noted the absence of references to these works in any of those by the Church Fathers, and these conclusions were subsequently confirmed by William Grocyn and by Erasmus, who published Valla's work in 1505.[26] The second component in the indirect Ficinian trajectory consists of the dissemination of ancient (or presumed ancient) authoritative works whose content can be assimilated to that of the main Plotinian tradition and can to varying degrees be held to have a "Christian" content. Here, Ficino's notion of a continuity of doctrine within a single tradition is supplemented by Giovanni Pico della Mirandola's notion of a concordance of doctrine between multiple traditions.[27] Of particular importance within this concordance are the doctrines of Hermes Trismegistus – which Ficino had already identified as one of the ancient sources of his *pia philosophia* – and those of the Jewish cabala. In a number of publications, Frances Yates underlined the importance of the Hermetic-Cabalistic synthesis within the broader context of Neoplatonism and applied the name "occult philosophy" to this

[24] See Hegel, *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* II, 400–403 (Haldane and Simson, 1892–1896).

[25] See Ficino, *De Christiana Religione,* c. 11 (Ficino [1576],1: 17).

[26] See Tigerstedt (1974, pp. 22–23) on Valla and pp. 30–31 on Erasmus. Tigerstedt supplies important further details regarding the explosion of the Dionysian myth but overestimates its effect on the Plotinian-Ficinian exegetical model itself. As we shall see below, this model continues to influence substantially the Cambridge Platonists and others even without its Dionysian component.

[27] On the similarities and contrasts between the approaches of Ficino and Giovanni Pico to philosophical syncretism see Schmitt (1966), 511–512.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:20:30, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.001

enormously influential body of doctrine.[28] However, the interpretation of the Hermetic writings as repositories of the most ancient wisdom was shattered by Isaac Casaubon in his *De rebus sacris et ecclesiastis* of 1614, in which he applied methods of textual criticism similar to those applied to Dionysius by Valla over a century earlier.[29]

Although we can say that two of the pillars of the intertextual edifice supporting the indirect trajectory of Plotinus' reception had effectively been demolished by the beginning of the seventeenth century, there is a difference between the hindsight of modern historians and the actual course of earlier intellectual history as it runs in the minds of its protagonists. In fact, the indirect Ficinian trajectory retained a sufficient hold on peoples' imaginations that one can detect during the same period a common phenomenon that might be called "interference" between the direct and indirect trajectories. Here, because the Plotinianism of a certain source – especially a Christian one – is concealed whereas that of another source – a pagan Platonist – is apparent, and a certain exegete uses the former as a refutation or corrective of the latter, the resulting situation sets Plotinus against Plotinus in a strange pseudo-historical dialectic. The most notable example of this in the Renaissance is undoubtedly Jacques Lefèvre d'Étaples, who in his commentary on Dionysius the Areopagite, not only in the name of Dionysius but in that of his ultra-Neoplatonic exegete Nicholas of Cusa, attacks Plotinus and other readers of Plato for their misunderstandings of the great apostolic author himself.[30] In accordance with the same approach, Lefèvre had published an edition of Ficino's *Pimander* (i.e. the Hermetic Corpus) together with his own commentaries that emphasized the Christian nature of the work while detaching it from the Ficinian Neoplatonic understanding of the *pia philosophia* to the greatest possible extent.[31] We find a similar exegetical situation in the Middle Ages with Thomas Aquinas, who attacks the Platonism reported in Aristotle's writings while appealing to the authority of Dionysius, and in the seventeenth century with Leibniz, who distances himself from

[28] The term "occult philosophy" was drawn from Henry Cornelius Agrippa's *De occulta philosophia*. See Yates (1979, pp. 1–2) for the definition of the term; Yates (1964, pp. 85–86, 108–110) for Giovanni Pico's marriage of Hermeticism and Cabalism; and pp. 117–129 for the Neoplatonic background and the combination with Dionysius the Areopagite.

[29] On Casaubon see Yates (1964), 398–403.

[30] See Oosterhoff's essay in the present volume.

[31] The rise of the religious Hermetic movement in France under the influence of Lefèvre's exegesis is described by Yates (1964), 169–181.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:20:30, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.001

Neoplatonic readings of Plato while maintaining an Augustinian stance with respect to ideas of cosmic harmony.[32]

Because the increasing tendency to separate Plato from later Platonism weakened the direct Ficinian trajectory of Plotinus' reception, and the demonstrations of the faux antiquity of Dionysius the Areopagite and the *Hermetica* similarly weakened the indirect trajectory, there comes a point where one has to speak of the gradual emergence of a post-Ficinian trajectory. This new phase is of interest to those desiring to trace the legacy of Plotinus as a whole not only because the Neoplatonic material becomes for the first time an important object of study in its own right, but also because the traditional material undergoes significant transformations in response to the special intellectual challenges presented during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

The post-Ficinian trajectory emerges tentatively in an important tradition of Plotinian study – now also on the basis of the original Greek text – in England during the seventeenth century. This tradition is dominated by the question of the relationship between the Plotinian tradition and the newly emergent "mechanical philosophy," of which the earliest evidence is Henry More's correspondence with Descartes. More is arguably the leading figure in the so-called Cambridge Platonist movement, and in a letter written many years later reports his purchase as a young man (in 1639) of a copy of Plotinus' *Enneads*, noting the difficulty of the work and his own pioneering role in taking up its study. Indeed, More's early *Philosophicall Poems* are saturated with Plotinian doctrines, including the notion of the three primary hypostases, the idea that nature is an emanation from intellect and the intellectual soul – where he explicitly cites *Ennead* III. 2 – and the concept of an etherial vehicle of the human soul. More might be characterized, especially in his earlier years and probably also later, as a "moderate" Plotinian in that he is wary of endorsing readings of this author that excessively stress the transcendent aspects of the Plotinian viewpoint – an approach that emerges occasionally in More's younger contemporary John Smith – or conversely its immanent tendencies – as in the writing of More's erstwhile student Anne, Countess of Conway. The thought of More and that of Ralph Cudworth, who agrees with him in many important doctrines, facilitated the wider

[32] By another curious reversal, there is at least one case where it is not that a doctrine of Plotinus is being used without acknowledgment of its author but that a doctrine is being used that is attributed to Plotinus but which is not authentically Plotinian. This case concerns the statue-making passage in the Hermetic *Asclepius* which, via an interpretation embedded in Ficino's commentary on Plotinus, becomes part of the philosophical justification for natural magic.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:20:30, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.001

dissemination of ideas originating in Plotinus not only in England but also abroad. Another incipient post-Ficinian tradition seems to have been strong in German universities during the seventeenth century, and Leibniz, who had been exposed to this way of thinking by his early Leipzig teachers Jakob Thomasius (1622–1684) and Johann Adam Scherzer (1628–1683),[33] continued to hold many of its assumptions while distinguishing Plato from his late ancient followers. In his letter to Michael Hansch of July 25, 1707 Leibniz admits partial agreement with the traditional tenets of the *philosophia perennis,* explicitly praises Plotinus' view that every mind contains a kind of intelligible world within itself, and also identifies the Platonic world of "real existents" (*ta ontōs onta*) with his own monads.[34] Moreover, the famous Leibnizian doctrine of the "pre-established harmony" cannot be understood historically and conceptually without some reference to Neoplatonic notions absorbed either directly from the Greek authors or as mediated through Augustine.[35] In the Anglo-Irish milieu several generations later, George Berkeley's *Siris* makes extensive use of the non-mechanistic notion of nature derived ultimately from the third *Ennead*, in which not only Plotinus himself but also Ficino, Patrizi, and Cudworth are explicitly quoted as authorities.

The complete post-Ficinian trajectory emerges particularly in German writers of the early nineteenth century, the new factor here being not the relationship between the Plotinian tradition and the "mechanical philosophy" but that between the same tradition and the Kantian critical project. Although the encounter between Kant and Plotinus is often an indirect one mediated through such figures as Giordano Bruno, Jakob Böhme, and Spinoza in whom certain structural affinities with Plotinus become apparent, and although – in the wake of Brucker and other historians of philosophy – a clear distinction is generally maintained between Plato and Neoplatonism, many typical features of German Romanticism, such as the blending of subjectivity and objectivity, the sense of the infinite, and the overlap of philosophy and art, are echoes of the earlier approaches. There is documentary evidence that Schelling – the initiator of the Romantic tradition of German philosophy – began his studies of Plotinus with extracts from the *Enneads* and some complete treatises provided to him through correspondents such as

[33] For the influence of Thomasius and Scherzer on Leibniz see Mercer (2001), 200–205.
[34] Leibniz, *Philosophical Papers and Letters* (see Loemker [1956]), II, 962–967.
[35] For many suggestive parallels between Leibniz and Neoplatonism see Rodier (1902) and Meyer (1971).

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:20:30, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.001

K. J. H. Windischmann (1775–1839) and Friedrich Creuzer (1771–1858). The result was that both in Schelling's early Philosophy of Nature and in his slightly later System of Identity there are pronounced similarities with Plotinus in that the Kantian notion of the subject as playing an active role in synthesizing sensations and impressions into a unitary process of consciousness allows him to transform the Plotinian One and Intellect into his own Absolute, and also to intensify the subjective element already introduced into the apparent objectivity of Nature by Plotinus. At the same time, there are disagreements between the two thinkers with respect to "emanative" causality, for Schelling to a steadily increasing degree allows the notions of freedom and willing to dominate the dynamic relation between God and creation, whereas in Plotinus these notions never played more than a subordinate role. In his later work and under the influence of the Silesian mystical writer Jakob Böhme, Schelling also rejects the reduction of evil to the status of metaphysical lack that occurs in the *Enneads* and becomes standard among the later Neoplatonists.

These are just some of the ideas and perspectives that the eleven essays of this volume concerning *Plotinus' Legacy* will invite us to explore.

REFERENCES

Allen, M. J. B. (1998) *Synoptic Art: Marsilio Ficino on the History of Platonic Interpretation*, Florence.

Campanini, S. (ed.) (2010) *Francesco Zorzi, L'Armonia del Mondo, testo latino a fronte*, Milan.

Catana, L. (2013) "Changing Interpretations of Plotinus: The Eighteenth-Century Introduction of the Concept of a 'System of Philosophy'," *International Journal of the Platonic Tradition* 7: 50–98.

Celenza, C. S. (2002) "Late Antiquity and Florentine Platonism: The 'Post-Plotinian' Ficino," in M. J. B. Allen and V. Rees (eds.) *Marsilio Ficino: His Theology, His Philosophy, His Legacy*, Leiden, 71–97.

(2007) "The Revival of Platonic Philosophy," in J. Hankins (ed.) *The Cambridge Companion to Renaissance Philosophy*, Cambridge, UK, 72–96.

Dillon, J. M. and Long, A. A. (eds.) (1988) *The Question of 'Eclecticism': Studies in Later Greek Philosophy*, Berkeley and Los Angeles.

Ficino, M. (1576) *Marsilii Ficini Florentini [. . .] opera et quae hactenus extitere et quae in lucem nunc primum prodiere omnia [. . .]*, Basel. (Photographic reprint Turin 1959, and later Lucca 2011).

Garin, E. (1974) "Plotino nel Rinascimento," in *Plotino e il Neoplatonismo in Oriente e in Occidente: Atti del Convegno internazionale (5–9 ottobre 1970)*, Rome, 537–553.

Gersh, S. (ed.) (2017) *Marsilio Ficino, Commentary on Plotinus, vol. 4: Ennead III, part 1*, Cambridge, MA.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:20:30, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.001

(ed.) (2018) *Marsilio Ficino, Commentary on Plotinus, vol. 5: Ennead III, part 2 and Ennead IV*, Cambridge, MA.
Haldane, E. S. and Simson, F. H. (trans.) (1892–1896) *Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, 3 vols., London.
Kristeller, P. O. (ed.) (1937) *Supplementum Ficinianum: Marsilii Ficini [. . .] opuscula inedita et dispersa*, 2 vols., Florence.
Loemker, L. E. (ed.) (1956) Leibniz, Philosophical Papers and Letters, 2 vols., Chicago.
Mercer, C. (2001) *Leibniz's Metaphysics: Its Origins and Development*, Cambridge, UK.
Meyer, R. (1971) "Leibniz und Plotin," *Studia Leibnitiana* Suppl. 5: 31–54.
O'Meara, D. (1992) "Plotinus," in *Catalogus translationum et commentariorum. Medieval and Renaissance Latin Translations and Commentaries 7*, Washington, DC.
Rodier, G. (1902) "Plotin: Sur une des origines de la philosophie de Leibniz," *Revue de métaphysique et de morale* 10: 552–564.
Saffrey, H.-D. (1996) "Florence 1492: The Reappearance of Plotinus," *Renaissance Quarterly* 49: 488–508.
Saffrey, H-D. and Westerink, L. G. (eds.) (1968–1997), *Proclus, Théologie platonicienne*, Paris.
Schmitt, C. B. (1966) "Perennial Philosophy: From Agostino Steuco to Leibniz," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 27: 505–532.
Tigerstedt, E. N. (1974) *The Decline and Fall of the Neoplatonic Interpretation of Plato: An Outline and Some Observations*, Helsinki-Helsingfors.
Toussaint, S. (2004), "Plotin chez les moines. En marge des *Ennéades*. Marsile Ficin dans une letter de Pietro Delfino Camaldule?," *Accademia* 6: 47–61.
Vanhaelen, M. (2010) "L'enterprise de traduction et d'exégèse de Ficin dans les années 1486–1489: Démons et prophétie de l'ère savonarolienne," *Humanistica* 5: 125–138.
Wolters, A. M. (1986) "The First Draft of Ficino's Translation of Plotinus," in G. C. Garfagnini (ed.) *Marsilio Ficino e il Ritorno di Platone: Studi e documenti*, I, 305–329.
Yates, F. A. (1964) *Giordano Bruno and the Hermetic Tradition*, London.
(1979) *The Occult Philosophy in the Elizabethan Age*, London.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:20:30, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.001

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:20:30, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.001

CHAPTER 1

Marsilio Ficino as Commentator on Plotinus: Some Case Studies

Stephen Gersh

Although his name is mentioned only once near the beginning of the *Commentary on the Symposium, On Love*[1] and then only in passing,[2] Plotinus' influence is ever present in this early work of Marsilio Ficino (1433–1499). The main purpose of the sixth of the seven speeches making up *On Love* – where the Florentine, through the persona of Tommaso Benci, undertakes commentary on Socrates' words – is to determine precisely the relation between love and beauty according to Plato. A necessary preliminary is to explain the nature of love itself, and when Ficino argues that love is both a god *and* a daemon, the underlying premises of the argument can be seen to be derived at least in part from Plotinus' *Ennead* III. 5. This is shown by Ficino's commentary on this treatise, in which love is identified with soul primarily in the sense of the Idea of soul, and where the consubstantiality of the intellectual Venus and Eros is emphasized.[3] Another necessary preliminary to determining the relation between love and beauty according to Plato is to explain the nature of beauty itself, and when Ficino argues that beauty exists on a number of different levels, the structural foundations of this account are undoubtedly derived in the first instance from Plotinus' *Ennead* I. 6. In this case, the evidence is provided by Ficino's commentary on that treatise, in which the interrelation between beauty and light is explored in considerable depth.[4] One should add that the Plotinian theory of the three levels of principle, or hypostasis, as discussed specifically in Ficino's commentary on *Ennead* V. 1, is evoked in many passages of *On Love*, not only in the sixth speech but elsewhere.

[1] The work was completed by 1469 (published in 1484).
[2] Ficino, *De Amore* 1. 1 (Laurens, 2002), 5.
[3] Ficino, *In Enneadem* III. 5. 2 (Gersh [2017–2018] – all future citations to the commentary on the *Third* and *Fourth Enneads* in the present essay will be according to this edition).
[4] See the summary at *In Enneadem* 1. 6. 18 (Gersh,in press [expected 2019]) – all future citations to the commentary on the *First Ennead* in the present essay will be according to this edition).

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:22:52, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.003

In his next work of importance, the *Platonic Theology*,[5] Ficino actually cites Plotinus by name on numerous occasions. Following a procedure that seems perfectly logical, the Greek philosopher is cited not so much for teachings in which he was in agreement with numerous other *Platonici* but for those in which he pursued a seemingly independent course. Taking perhaps the most striking example in the first four books of the *Theology*, we find Ficino citing Plotinus for his argument that God is "act of himself and in relation to himself" (*actus . . . suimet et circa seipsum*), that this act "does not lack what is enacted" (*non caret acto*), and that what is enacted is "within God and is God himself" (*intra deum . . . ipsemet deus*). As Plotinus continues to argue in this Ficinian paraphrase of his text, God "wills himself" (*vult seipsum*) and, since "willing and acting and indeed being are altogether identical" (*velle autem et agere immo etiam esse idem est omnino*), God therefore "by willing himself enacts himself" (*se volendo se agit*).[6] That Ficino is aware of the Trinitarian resonances of this theory comes out clearly in his later formal commentary on the relevant Plotinian text: namely, *Ennead* VI. 8. Here, he will suggest that Plotinus "is thinking things out in the Christian manner" (*excogitat . . . Christianorum more*),[7] although in the earlier work he prefers to conclude somewhat more cautiously: "let God himself see to the truth of these statements" (*sed haec deus ipse viderit*).[8]

It is possible to find explicit references to Plotinus or trace obvious Plotinian influences in many other works by Ficino written throughout his career, and the numerous passages in the *argumenta* ("analyses") attached to his translations of Plato's dialogues are of obvious importance. However, in the present essay we will concentrate our attention on the *Commentary on Plotinus*, on which Ficino was working for roughly a decade during his later years (the 1480s).[9] It is important to realize that this Ficinian commentary is not simply a project that attempts, in the manner of much recent scholarly work, to explain Plotinus' thought simply in its own terms together with some evaluation of its formal-logical correctness.

[5] The work was completed in 1474 (published in 1482).
[6] Ficino, *Platonic Theology*. II. 12. 6 (Allen and Hankins, 2001–2006), 1. 184–186.
[7] Ficino, *In Ennead*. VI. 8, c. 13 (Ficino [1576], 2: 1796).
[8] The other explicit references to Plotinus in books I–IV of the *Platonic Theology* are in connection with the relation between dimension and matter at *Platonic Theology* I. 3. 15 (Allen and Hankins [2001–2006], 1. 40), the description of God as understanding itself at I. 6. 6 (Allen and Hankins, 1. 84), the omnipresence of intellect at II. 6. 7 (Allen and Hankins, 1. 126–128), and the presence of motion in celestial souls at IV. 2. 5 (Allen and Hankins, 1. 300).
[9] On the programmatical aims of this commentary see the introduction to this volume, and on the circumstances surrounding its production also the essay by Corrigan (Chapter 11).

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:22:52, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.003

Despite the rise of humanism in the generations before Ficino and the influence of the humanistic style on his writing, the Florentine commentator remains firmly within the medieval tradition, according to which commentaries on Aristotle or other ancient texts include the additional project of exploring their approximation to a received metaphysical and, in certain cases, Christian, truth. The five selections from the Plotinus commentary forming the present essay have therefore been chosen in order to illustrate this feature.

Man and Animate Being

The commentary on *Ennead* I. 1 – *Quid animal, quid homo?* ("What is an animate being, what is a man?) – is an excellent example of what one might term a "typical" Ficinian commentary on one of Plotinus' treatises. It strikes a balance between on the one hand, explanation of the original text to the greatest extent on its own terms, and on the other, development of the ideas that it contains along the lines set out in Ficino's personal exegetical program. The commentary consists of two introductory sections called "summation" (*summa*) and "division of the text" (*divisio textus*) followed by the analysis proper, which proceeds chapter by chapter. The *summa* does constitute a summary of the main conclusions of Plotinus' text as opposed to an independent statement of Ficino's views – as in the case of the more independent *summa Marsiliana* appended to the commentary on *Ennead* III. 1 – while the *divisio textus* follows the chapter divisions that Ficino had himself established for his translation of Plotinus and explains the rationale for those divisions.

The *summa* begins by noting how opportune it is that the present treatise is the first that one encounters in reading the *Enneads,* since we are here directed to begin the study of philosophy by turning to ourselves – as though holding up a mirror to our faces – rather than by turning to something extraneous. This opening statement is significant in revealing the extent of Ficino's commitment to the Porphyrian edition of Plotinus' works, since he is here treating the penultimate treatise in the chronological order as the first in the methodological one. Following the same line of thought, Ficino will divide the commentary on *Ennead* VI. 9 in such a manner that it ends climactically with a series of approaches to the first principle.[10] Having stated the general significance of the first treatise, Ficino, in the course of a few paragraphs, explains how its main argument

[10] Ficino, *In Enneadem* VI. 9, cc. 3–8 (Ficino [1576] 2: 1799–1800).

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:22:52, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.003

is that 1). the "rational soul" (*anima rationalis*) is mediate between the divine and the natural forms; 2). the rational soul "is not in" (*non inesse*) the body but "is present to" (*adesse*) it; 3). it propagates from itself a "life" (*vita*) that is in the body; and 4). the "animate being" (*animal*) comes to be from the life in the body and the body itself.

In the *divisio textus*, Ficino explains that *Ennead* I. 1 consists of thirteen "sections or chapters" (*capita vel capitula*), and that in chapters 1–6 Plotinus "only raises questions" (*inquirit tantum*), whereas in the seventh chapter he begins "to define the matters to be investigated" (*quaestiones definire*), and in chapters 8–13 he equally raises questions and defines. It is not stated at the outset precisely what is meant by these distinctions, although as one reads further in the commentary it becomes clear that the questions to be raised are of various types. Some are hermeneutic, e.g. is there any difference between "the being of soul" and "being a soul" in Plotinus?[11]; some are dialectical, e.g. how does the soul use the body as an instrument?[12]; and some are a mixture of the hermeneutic and the dialectical, e.g. how does Plotinus' view of the relation between intellect and the life of the body differ from that of Averroes?[13] After reading further in the commentary, it also emerges that the definition of matters to be investigated corresponds to "the definition and introduction of Plotinus' own views" (*definire sententiamque propriam afferre*).[14]

On turning from the introductory material to the main body of the text, we find that Ficino, in his commentary on *Ennead* I. 1, devotes a certain amount of space to considering those broader philosophical questions to which he thinks the ideas expressed in the present treatise have a special relevance. These include the role of Plotinian thought in the construction of the ideal philosophical-religious synthesis described in the *prooemium* to the *Enneads'* commentary as a whole – especially the notions of Plotinus as the culmination of the ancient tradition of pious philosophy, as the revealer of the mysteries of Plato, as the transmitter of Christian philosophical insights, and as the authoritative exponent of Aristotle's doctrine.[15] In addition to this, Ficino wants to move somewhat beyond Plotinus with his own doctrine of the mediative function of the rational soul within the universe – a central idea also in his *Platonic Theology*[16] – which is explored in "Pythagorean" arguments that recall both ancient and medieval Platonism.

[11] Ficino, *In Enneadem* I. 1. 6.
[12] Ficino, *In Enneadem* I. 1. 9.
[13] Ficino, *In Enneadem* I. 1. 8.
[14] Ficino, *In Enneadem* I. 1. 13.
[15] Ficino, *In Enneades* pr. 2–3 (Gersh, in press). For further discussion of these criteria see the next section and also the introduction to the present volume.
[16] For example, see Ficino, *Platonic Theology* I. 1. 3 (Allen and Hankins [2001–2006], 1. 16).

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:22:52, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.003

The notions that the rational soul propagates from itself a life which is in the body, and that the "animate being" (*animal*) comes to be from the life in the body and the body itself, were the third and fourth points respectively mentioned in the *summa*, and Ficino turns to consider these in his discussion of the chapter where Plotinus begins to state his own theory.[17] He explains that according to Plotinus there are two lives in us, of which the second arises from the first as its image and its irradiation. The "first life" (*vita prima*) subsists as a totality in itself, is "as though a certain form of the animate being" (*quasi forma quaedam . . . animalis*), and is associated with intellection, reasoning, and sensation free of passivity, whereas the "second life" (*vita secunda*) inheres in the body as part of the latter, is the "form of the natural body equipped with instruments" (*forma corporis naturalis instrumentis praediti*), and is associated with sensation together with passivity. This doctrine is, according to Ficino, not only that of Plotinus but also that of Plato and Pythagoras according to the *Timaeus*, of the Egyptians as taught by Iamblichus, i.e. according to the "Hermetic" doctrine reported in Iamblichus' *De Mysteriis*, which Ficino had himself translated, and of Aristotle himself, according to Themistius. Moreover, a "Mosaic allegory in Plotinus' words" (*in Plotini verbis allegoria . . . Mosaica*) states that there are really "two persons" (*personae duae*) here: the man himself as though "Adam" and the human animate being derived from there as though "Eve," for the soul propagates the animate being from itself when it lapses towards natural things from its previous wakefulness with respect to God.[18] Thus, what originally seemed to be simply a doctrine of Plotinus turns out to be in various ways the teaching of the ancient sages: one of Plato's mysteries, a doctrine of Aristotle, and an allegorical reading of the book of *Genesis*.

The first and second points mentioned in the *summa* were that the rational soul is mediate between the divine and the natural forms, and that the rational soul is not in the body but present to it, and it is in developing these points that Ficino's tendency to intensify the structural or architectonic aspects of Plotinian thought becomes particularly apparent. Here, he argues that there are three levels of forms: the Ideas in the divine mind that are neither present in matter nor inherent in it; the forms of the elements and their compounds that are both present in matter and inherent in it; and between these extremes the forms of rational souls that are present to matter but not inherent in it.[19] Similarly, he speaks of three levels of

[17] Chapter 7 at Ficino, *In Enneadem* I. 1. 13.
[18] Ficino, *In Enneadem* I. 1. 20.
[19] Ficino, *In Enneadem* I. 1. 2.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:22:52, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.003

perceptual activity: the intellect that governs the wandering discursivity of reason; the imagination that judges the multiple impressions of the senses; and between these extremes the reasoning that can also be called intelligence to the extent that its discursiveness begins from intellect, and opinion to the extent that it begins from imagination.[20] Whereas the first of these passages describes a structure of extremes and mediation in which the terms are discrete, the second suggests that the mediate term itself has a structure of internal relations mirroring the external structure in which it mediates. This latter type of structuration – indicated especially by the use of the technical terms "reflection of" (*repraesentare*) and "relation to" (*referre*) – appears in Ficino's summary presentation of the complete faculty psychology of Plotinus. Here, within the first life described earlier, there is a threefold distinction between intellect, reason, and a (higher) imagination where imagination comes forth from reason, which itself comes forth from intellect; within the second life there is a threefold distinction between a (lower) imagination, the exterior sense, and nature, where the lower imagination is identified with the common sense, the exterior sense with the five senses, and nature with the source of reproduction, growth, and nutrition. The internal relationality is shown by the lower imagination's reflection of or relation to intellect, by the exterior sense's similar status with respect to reason, and by nature's similar relation to the higher imagination.

These accounts are pervaded not only by the notions of mediation and relation but also by those of numerology, in that Ficino draws attention to the fact that intellect has two relations (to the One and to itself), that the soul has three relations (as already noted), and that the life of the animate being has four relations (to its own triplicity and to bodily passions) – and that these numbers added to the One's unity make up a decad (1 + 2 + 3 + 4).[21] Given that arguments of this kind are not typical of Plotinus himself – something consistent with the relatively insignificant role played in the *Enneads* by the numerical psychogony of Plato's *Timaeus* – we can assign their prominence in the Ficinian commentary rather to the influence of post-Plotinian or medieval Platonism. It is beyond question that when Ficino first came to the study of Plato and Plotinus in Greek during the 1460s, his mind was already well prepared for the assimilation of their Platonism by his reading not only of certain Latin writers of late antiquity, such as Calcidius, Macrobius and Augustine, but also by that of medieval authors like William of Conches and Dante, whose own ideas were heavily dependent on those earlier

[20] Ficino, *In Enneadem* I. 1. 3. [21] Ficino, *In Ennead.* I. 1. 14.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:22:52, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.003

traditions. In particular, that there is some influence of Augustine on Ficino – who argued in *On Christian Teaching* that the number 10 signified God (=3 persons of the Trinity) and the creation of soul (=3 of mind, soul, heart) and of body (=4 physical elements),[22] and in *On Music* that the human soul ascends to God through successive levels, beginning in the sphere of temporality but ending in that of timelessness[23] – is always a reasonable hypothesis. In Hugh of Saint Victor's *Didascalicon* the importance of arithmetical study for Christians is also underlined with a similar numerological analysis. Here, the human soul is symbolized with respect to its originative unity by the number 1, with respect to its division into the incorporeal powers of reason, anger, and concupiscence by the number 3, with respect to its further subdivision according to its employment of bodily instruments by the number 9, with respect to its further subdivison according to its administration of external actions by the number 27, and with respect to its ultimate liberation from embodiment by the number 81 (80 = human life + 1 = original monad).[24] Irrespective of whether a direct influence of Hugh upon Ficino can be proven, there is a close alignment of the two authors' conceptual worlds, in which Plotinus' thought also can be inserted with relative ease.

The Problem of Suicide

From the *prooemium* to the commentary on the *Enneads* as a whole we learn that, according to Ficino, a certain "pious philosophy" (*pia philosophia*) arose simultaneously in the most distant antiquity among the Persians under Zoroaster and among the Egyptians under Hermes "Trismegistus," and was then developed in successive stages among the Thracians under Orpheus and Aglaophemus, among the Greeks and Italians under Pythagoras, and finally among the Athenians under Plato, and that all these ancient "theologians" (*theologi*) were accustomed to express the divine truths as "mysteries" (*mysteria*) veiled either with mathematical numbers and figures or else with poetic fictions, and therefore that Plotinus – who for the first time succeeded in stripping away the veils from theology and penetrating the mysteries with dialectic – made an absolutely unparalleled contribution to the development of philosophy.[25] Now, although this seems to summarize Ficino's methodological approach to the history of philosophy, we do not find many examples of its complete

[22] Augustine, *De Doctrina Christiana* II. 16. 25. [23] Augustine, *De Musica* VI.
[24] Hugh of Saint Victor, *Didascalicon* II. 4 (Buttimer, 1939); cf. I. 3.
[25] Ficino, *In Enneades* pr. 2–3.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:22:52, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.003

practical implementation specifically with respect to Plotinus. A notable exception is provided by the commentary on *Ennead* I. 9: *De rationali exitu ex hac vita* ("On the reasoned departure from this life").[26] Ficino explains that in this very short treatise, running to no more than one page in the Greek original, Plotinus follows "the Pythagorean and Platonic mysteries" (*Pythagorica Platonicaque mysteria*). The Platonic mysteries are primarily those that concern the soul's relation to body as expressed in the *Phaedo*, and Socrates in this dialogue is said to refer to certain precepts of Philolaos the Pythagorean that only the nature that has bound the soul to the body should release it, although the will should at least release its *intentionality* with respect to the body. Socrates is also said here to be citing the elaborate Orphic doctrine underlying these precepts, which establishes a network of causal relations linking the universal soul and body, universal and particular nature, and the particular human soul and body. Finally, Plotinus is said to have "interwoven the first sentence with a poem of Zoroaster" (*primam clausulam texens carmine Zoroastris*).[27] These remarks in the Plotinus commentary are interesting in giving us a complete doxographical genealogy running backwards from Plotinus to Plato, to the Pythagoreans, to the Orphics, and finally to Zoroaster. They also show that Ficino believed, quite consistently with his own theory and as the Byzantine scholar Michael Psellos also maintained, that the proverb quoted by Plotinus was one of the *Chaldaean Oracles.*[28]

In his commentary on this short treatise, overt intertextuality continues beyond these opening statements through the remainder of the text, since Ficino's main argument consists of juxtaposing the views of two principal non-Plotinian sources – Olympiodorus' *Commentary on the Phaedo* and Macrobius' *Commentary on the Dream of Scipio* – on the question of whether Plotinus or Plato believe that suicide is ever lawful.[29] Ficino summarizes the debate by saying that Macrobius understands the doctrine of the two Greek philosophers to be that one should not lay violent hands on oneself under

[26] Ficino uses this title as his translation of the Greek in Porphyry, *Vita Plotini* 24 (see Ficino [1576] 2: 1546), although the translation-commentary of *Ennead* I. 9 itself omits it.

[27] Ficino, *In Enneadem* I. 9. 1–3.

[28] Or "Zoroastrian" oracles in Ficino's usual terminology (influenced by that of Gemistos Plethon's collection of the fragments). The text of Plotinus, *Ennead* I. 9. 1 reads: *ouk exaxeis, hina mē exiēi* = Ficino, *Versio Plotini* (Creuzer, 1835), 163: *nemo extrudat . . . ne forte exeat* ("You shall not drive it [sc. the soul] out, so that it may not go"). With some emendation (for metrical reasons – since the *Chaldaean Oracles* were written in hexameters) as *mē 'xaxēis, hina mē ti echousa/exiēi* ("Do not drive out the soul, lest it should go having something [i.e. evil]"), this is accepted as a genuine "Chaldaean" oracle (= fragment 166) by Édouard des Places, the modern editor of the collection, although Lewy (1978, p. 474), Majercik (1989, pp. 203–204), and others have been more skeptical.

[29] The initial statement of the opposing positions is at Ficino, *In Enneadem* I. 9. 1.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:22:52, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.003

any circumstances – a position with which Porphyry also agrees in *On Abstinence*[30] – but that Olympiodorus suggests that both men's words can also be understood to mean that such action is sometimes allowable.[31] The position of Macrobius[32] is essentially the one supported by the Orphic cosmology of the treatise's opening paragraphs, and is based primarily on the notion that we should not disturb the providential order established by the gods, which includes the calculation of our natural period of life.[33] The position of Olympiodorus[34] takes account of the qualifying words "perhaps" (*forte*) and "in case of necessity" (*nisi . . . necessitas*) in Socrates' statements of the general prohibition and also introduces comparisons with certain other statements by Plato in *Republic* and *Laws.*[35] In the remainder of his commentary Ficino stages a hypothetical debate between Macrobius and Olympiodorus where additional evidence is introduced from Plotinus' treatises *On Blessedness* and *Against the Gnostics*, after which he concludes that "the dispute is still sub judice" (*adhuc sub iudicio lis est*).[36]

The "Orphic" cosmology used to reinforce Macrobius' argument takes its starting point from the reference to the four reigns in Olympiodorus' commentary,[37] although the Ficinian narrative differs in ignoring the ethical interpretation[38] in the Greek author while expanding considerably on the physical allegory.[39] The interpretation of this allegory can perhaps be divided into three stages as follows:

1. *The generation of human beings through a series of divine mediations.* Here Ficino assumes a metaphysical hierarchy discussed in detail elsewhere in his commentaries,[40] which comprises "Jupiter" as the higher phase or intellect of the world-soul; a twofold "Dionysus" as 1).

[30] Porphyry, *De Abstinentia* I. 38. 2 and 2. 47. 1 (Bouffartigue and Patillon, 1977–1979).
[31] Ficino, *In Enneadem* I. 9. 7.
[32] See Macrobius, *In Somnium Scipionis* I. 13. 5–17 (Armisen-Marchetti, 2001).
[33] Ficino, *In Enneadem* I. 9. 1 and I. 9. 6.
[34] See Olympiodorus, *In Phaedonem* 1. 8. 1–16 (Westerink, 1976).
[35] Ficino. *In Enneadem* I. 9. 7. The Plato passages quoted by Olympiodorus are *Republic* III. 407d–e and *Laws* IX. 854a–c.
[36] Ficino, *In Enneadem* I. 9. 8–9.
[37] Olympiodorus, *In Phaedonem* 1. 3. 3–14.
[38] Olympiodorus, *In Phaedonem* 1. 4. 1–1. 5. 9.
[39] The interpretation of the allegory should be compared with that at Ficino, *In Ennead.* IV. 3. 27. In the latter version, the "limbs of Dionysus" are interpreted as the reason-principles, and the whole narrative identified with the "Egyptian" version in which Osiris replaces Dionysus. In constructing these accounts, Ficino seems to be drawing freely upon the mass of "Orphic" material interpreted metaphysically in the works of Proclus, and especially the latter's commentary on the *Timaeus.*
[40] Ficino, *In Enneadem* I. 1. 1. To understand fully the metaphysical argument here, it is necessary to incorporate certain details provided by the more thorough explanation of "nature" in the commentary on *Ennead* III. 2. 37–51.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:22:52, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.003

the lower phase of the world-soul, life, or nature and as 2). the world's body; "Juno" as the processive or generative process as such; and the "Titans" as daemons that divide among themselves the functions of nature. When in the narrative imagined by Orpheus – which projects timeless relations onto a temporal sequence – the Titans are persuaded by Juno to tear Dionysus apart, they consume the dismembered Dionysus, and they are cast down to the depths by Jupiter's lightning bolt, Ficino assumes this to mean that the daemons take on different functions within nature's communal one, such as the instantiation of specific forms into individual things, that they retain the universal power within their dividedness, and that they generate individual human beings through procession of the fiery power.

2. *The proportional or "harmonic" relation between soul and body.* To Plotinus' question of how body "falls away from soul" (*desciscere ab anima*),[41] Ficino gives an answer[42] that incorporates his own more complex harmonic psychology and embryology, especially as set out in his *De Vita,* Book III.[43] He argues that "universal nature" (*universalis natura*) – the first "Dionysus" – acts more immediately and for longer on the seminal matter in an embryo than does "this particular human nature" (*particularis haec humana natura*),[44] although there is a reciprocal relation in that the particular human nature acts "within" (*in*) the power of the universal nature while the universal nature "is directed towards" (*ad . . . dirigitur*) the particular human body by the human nature proper to it. To be more precise, universal nature excites and forms the embryo by means of "a vital power" (*vitalis vis*) and also through "a certain proportionality of humors and qualities" (*proportio quaedam humorum et qualitatum*). These together function as a kind of "bait" (*esca*) through which the individual "rational soul" (*anima rationalis*) now becomes present to the embryo and the latter acquires and retains a certain life for a length of time "in harmony with the universe" (*congruum universo*).[45]

[41] Ficino, *In Enneadem* I. 9. 4.

[42] Ficino also seems to be elaborating on the suggestions of the same line of thought in Macrobius, *In Somnium Scipionis* I. 13. 11–13.

[43] The parallel account in *De Vita* III further identifies the vitality and proportionality constituting the "bait" with the notion of *spiritus.* See Ficino, *De Vita* III. 1. 1–31 (Kaske and Clark, 2002) and III. 1. 75–79. On the notions of spirit and harmony or proportionality in Ficino see Walker (1958), 3–29.

[44] Or: "the proper nature of the parents" (*propria parentum . . . natura*)

[45] Ficino, *In Enneadem* I. 9. 4. Ficino introduces as further analogy by saying that the body obtains life from the soul through "a certain proportionality" (*certa quaedam . . . proportio*) just as a piece of anointed green wood acquires a flame from the sun through the collection of its rays in a mirror.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:22:52, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.003

3. *The prohibition of suicide.* Because the life of an individual human being during a period of embodiment is generated and preserved in the manner described, anybody who in the meantime violently "breaks the bond" (*vinculum . . . abrumpit*) frustrates the orderly plan of universal nature.[46] Having been aroused against the body by a certain passion, such a man sins against Dionysus, the universal nature; against Jupiter: the world-soul; against Saturn: the divine mind; and against Caelius, the Good – for this sequence of the highest divine principles has established the providential order itself. In fact such a man sins against himself, because the soul that has produced the animate being has afterwards destroyed it, and also because the soul has deprived itself of a length of time in which its moral purgation could be further pursued. Ficino adds that the ancient theologians have spoken on these matters "among their secret doctrines concerning the return of the soul" (*in arcanis de animae reditu*).[47]

The Threefold Return to God

The commentary on the third treatise of *Ennead* I is relatively unusual in that Ficino alters the Porphyrian title: *Peri dialektikēs* ("On Dialectic") to *De triplici reditu animae ad divinum* ("On the threefold return of the soul to the divine"), arguing that the return of souls is actually the primary topic discussed in the treatise.[48] He also immediately justifies his intention of diverging in this commentary more freely from the letter of the Plotinian text by noting that, since Plotinus rejoices in the number three and leads us to God by a threefold path, it will even be appropriate to insert "a certain prelude through threeness" (*praeludium quoddam per ternarium*) before proceeding further.

Ficino's commentary on *Ennead* I. 3 is also striking for the extent to which the intertextual element is a prominent feature – at least in the *praeludium* – although this is not explicitly stated to be the case by the commentator. Moreover, the pronounced emphasis on the notion of triadicity in this commentary is not typical of Plotinus at all, but reflects the elaborate metaphysical structures of later Neoplatonism: for instance, the hierarchical distribution of the gods through the intelligible, intelligible-and-intellectual, and intellectual spheres in Proclus' *Platonic*

[46] Ficino, *In Ennead.* I. 9. 5. [47] Ficino, *In Ennead.* I. 9. 6.
[48] On the notion of return in Ficino see Robichaud and Soranzo (2017).

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:22:52, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.003

Theology, and the organization of the angelic and ecclesiastical ranks according to purification, illumination, and perfection in Dionysius the Areopagite's *On the Celestial Hierarchy* and *On the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy*. Since Ficino views Proclus as dependent on Dionysius rather than *vice versa*, this triadicity is in his eyes fundamentally Christian.[49] The equally pronounced emphasis on the notion of return in the present commentary is not in itself un-Plotinian, although Ficino here seems to take as his model the cyclic conception of causality according to remaining, procession, and reversion of Proclus' *Elements of Theology* understood in a particular way. In Proclus, the causal cycle accords a certain prominence to its *processive* moment in that the moment of stability is mostly associated closely with the procession which it precedes, whereas in Ficino – who here follows Dionysius rather than Proclus – the cycle gives greater prominence to the *revertive* moment in that the moment of stability is now more closely associated with the reversion which it follows.[50]

But when Ficino says at the beginning of his commentary that it is appropriate to insert "a certain prelude through threeness," we must understand him to mean that his prelude to *De triplici reditu ad divinum* will not merely be *about* threeness but will *be* threefold. In fact, the division of the Plotinian text by Ficino himself, and of the associated commentary, is into three chapters with a further subdivision of the third chapter into three further chapters. This arrangement presumably indicates the primary importance of the third moment in its overall triadic or "trinitarian" structure.

Ficino begins his free preamble to *Ennead* I. 3 by explaining that the higher causal principles in the universe 1). "produce or bestow being" (*producunt . . . largiuntur esse*) on the things that follow them, 2). "make them revert or preserve their being" (*convertunt . . . esse conservant*), and 3). "perfect them or remould them into a better being" (*perficiunt . . . in melius esse reformant*), and that it is from these effects – i.e. the bestowal, preservation, and amelioration of being – "which as though in their solidity are numbered by threeness" (*quasi concreti ternario numerati*) that we ascend to a "triple trinity" (*trina trinitas*): i.e. a productive, convertive, and perfective *triplicity*.[51] This trinity – and one should note the Christian

[49] The authority of Augustine, who displays a similar propensity to triadic and enneadic elaboration in works such as *On the True Religion* and *On the Trinity*, would also have been at the back of Ficino's mind.

[50] On this change of emphasis in Dionysius as compared with Proclus see Gersh (1978), 46–48 and 228–229.

[51] Ficino, *In Ennead.* I. 3. 2. Since it is difficult to keep track of the many triads and their interrelations discussed in Ficino's commentary, we will add a numerical coding in brackets [ ] to assist the reader.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:22:52, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.003

resonance of this term – is *triple* in the sense that it immediately turns into an *ennead*[52] when the productive, convertive, and perfective activities of the higher principles are each given a threefold internal articulation, which provides the framework into which all Ficino's elaborations of the various Plotinian philosophical ideas stated in the present treatise will be placed.

Ficino's discussion therefore continues first by providing some further information about these three trinities and then by concentrating on the discussion of the second grouping – the particularly important "convertive trinity" (*trinitas conversoria*) – for the remainder of the commentary. The main conclusions of Ficino's treatment of the convertive trinity [2] may be summarized as follows. In this trinity, the beginnings or efficient causes of the reversion are the planet Mercury, which holds the first rank and is assisted by mercurial daemons [2.1], the planet Venus, which holds the second rank and is assisted by venereal daemons [2.2], and the planet of Apollo – i.e. the sun – which holds the third rank and is assisted by apollonian daemons [2.3].[53] Certain aspects of the things causing the reversion are said primarily to be involved in specific cases. Thus, Mercury can operate either through his "intellect" (*intellectus*) [2.1.1], his "psychic power" (*animalis virtus*) [2.1.2], or his "body" (*corpus*) [2.1.3], Venus similarly through her intellect [2.2.1], her psychic power [2.2.2], or her body [2.2.3], and Apollo likewise through his intellect [2.3.1], his psychic power [2.3.2], or his body [2.3.3].[54] The things undergoing reversion under the influence of the convertive trinity are three classes of souls graded according to their readiness for the contemplation of divine things. Those in the first group are said to have the "natural disposition" (*ingenium*) of a philosopher and to be inspired by Mercury, those in the second group to have that of a lover and to be inspired by Venus, and those in the third group to have that of a musician and to be inspired by the sun.[55] Certain aspects of the things undergoing the reversion are said primarily to be involved in specific cases. Thus, the Mercurial intellect [2.1.1] operates on the souls' "reason" (*ratio*), the Mercurial psychic power operates [2.1.2] on their "imagination" (*imaginatio*), and the Mercurial body [2.1.3] on their "body" (*corpus*),[56] the same three operations being attributed to the

[52] The enneadic or ninefold structure is, of course, echoed by the Porphyrian arrangement of Plotinus' works.

[53] Ficino, *In Enneadem* I. 3. 2. Presumably because of other features of Ficino's interpretation, saturnian daemons also assist the planets in their exercise of causality.

[54] Ficino, *In Enneadem* I. 3. 2.

[55] Ficino, *In Enneadem* I. 3. 8–9 and *In Enneadem* I. 3. 13.

[56] This operation is said to be one of "enticing us to the same" (*ad idem alliciendum*).

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:22:52, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.003

three aspects of Venus and Apollo. Finally, the convertive trinity "is distributed into an ennead" (*in nonarium derivatur*), for Mercury makes to revert in his own right [2.1], in agreement with Venus [2.1 + 2.2], and in agreement with Apollo [2.1 + 2.3]. Venus in her own right [2.2], in agreement with Mercury [2.2 + 2.1] and Apollo [2.2 + 2.3], and Phoebus in his own right [2.3], and in agreement with Mercury [2.3 + 2.1] and Venus [2.3 + 2.2].[57]

This complex triadic organization (which we cannot pursue in all its detail here) is used to underpin the more modest tendency towards triadicity implied in Plotinus' original text – this simpler Plotinian material being discussed more in the *ad litteram* part of the commentary than in the *praeludium.* Among the issues dealt with in the former, one should note especially the passages where the commentator describes the three kinds of disposition: i.e. the things undergoing reversion under the influence of the convertive trinity that are represented by the three classes of souls mentioned above. Here, he provides the most extensive information about the philosopher[58] – in accordance with the original Plotinian treatise's emphasis on "dialectic" – making some interesting points also about the musician,[59] but avoiding a detailed discussion of the lover[60] – a topic already treated sufficiently in his own *On Love.* Although Plotinus closely follows Plato's *Phaedrus* in associating the three dispositions with three different levels of soul that have seen different amounts of truth during the disembodied phases of their lives, Ficino – who rejects any literal interpretation of pre-existence and transmigration – prefers to emphasize the possibilities of combining the three dispositions and of substituting one for another in the course of an individual human life.[61] These possibilities emerge especially in a passage where he explains that "we proceed to divinity by a triple path of reason, sight, and hearing" (*triplici ad divinitatem calle procedimus: ratione visu auditu*).[62] Since the philosophical disposition is here defined as the one devoted primarily to reason, the amatory as the one primarily devoted to sight, and the musical as the one primarily devoted to hearing, while reason, in turning towards the

[57] Ficino, *In Enneadem* I. 3. 3. [58] Discussed at Ficino, *In Enneadem* I. 3. 14–18.
[59] Discussed at Ficino, *In Enneadem* I. 3. 12.
[60] The lover is treated allusively in Ficino, *In Enneadem* I. 3. 11.
[61] These possibilities are realized with the assistance of the interior-exterior daemon, as explained by Ficino in his commentary on *Ennead* III. 4. 17–23. As we have learned from the present commentary, mercurial, venereal, and apollonian daemons assist their respective planetary leaders in guiding the human souls' reversions.
[62] Ficino, *In Enneadem* I. 3. 9.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:22:52, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.003

intellectual reason-principles that ground the entire order of the world, is said to be assisted by sight, which furnishes the mind with the power of discovery, and by hearing, which provides the mind with the power of learning, it follows that the three dispositions may be activated to different degrees in the reversion of a single individual towards his final end in the transcendent Good.

Sensation

In his commentary on *Ennead* IV. 5, *De dubiis animae vel de visione* ("On difficulties concerning the soul or on vision"), Ficino advocates something that modern scholars label the "active" theory of sensation and find most famously in authors such as Plotinus and Augustine (who follows Plotinus on this point, especially in *De Musica,* Book VI.[63] In the specifically Ficinian version of the active theory, which is highly innovative in this respect, both the sense and the sensible object – *qua* formal – exhibit activity, whereas a certain "spirit" (*spiritus*) is introduced that functions as the intermediary of sensation and is simultaneously active *and* passive. That something can exhibit the seemingly contradictory properties of being simultaneously active and passive results from the emanative character of the Aristotelian act when understood in the Neoplatonic manner.[64] Since the theory is set out in a highly compressed discussion in the present commentary, it will be most useful to simplify things by first stating what seems to be Ficino's argument in summary form and then closely paraphrasing the two most relevant passages.[65]

When an initial epistemological problem is presented by the lack of proportion or attunement between the sense and the sensible object, this difficulty is resolved by conceiving the process of sensation as consisting of several phases that occur in very rapid succession, approaching simultaneity. Thus, 1). the form of the sensible object attempts to act emanatively on the sensible subject. However, because the form is materiate, it cannot affect the sense of the perceiver, which is immaterial. A mediation on the microcosmic level (sense to sensible object via spirit) must therefore be introduced. 2). The sense extends towards the sensible object a spirit that remains in continuity with the spirit in the instrument of sense. This spirit can be passive. 3). The form of the sensible object acts emanatively upon

[63] On the background to Ficino's doctrine see Gannon (1956) and Wagner (1993).
[64] See further Gannon (1956) and Wagner (1993).
[65] On Plotinus' theory of sensation see Blumenthal (1971, pp. 67–79) and Emilsson (1988).

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:22:52, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.003

the spirit. However, because the form remains materiate, it still cannot affect the sense of the perceiver, which is immaterial. A mediation on the macrocosmic level (spirit to life of world via spiritual *Idea*) must therefore be introduced in addition. 4). The life of the world acts emanatively on the materiate form of the spirit by means of the spiritual Idea. Because the form is now rendered spiritual, it can affect the sense of the perceiver – despite the latter's immateriality. The combined mediations on the microcosmic and macrocosmic levels represent the proportion or attunement of the sense to the sensible object originally sought.

In the first actual passage of the commentary on *Ennead* IV. 5,[66] Ficino begins by contrasting two hypothetical examples of the process of "sensation": one in which the process is unsuccessful and another in which it is successful. In the first case, a "material passion" (*materialis passio*) is borne from the thing sensed into the "intermediary" (*medium*) without the contribution of any additional factor. Since the cause of sensing is not adapted to the "incorporeal nature of the sense" (*incorporea natura sensus*), the result may be the overwhelming of the latter by the strength of the former.[67] In the second case, the material passion is borne from the thing sensed into the intermediary together with "a certain spiritual entity" (*spiritale aliquid*), which rises up either in the intermediary or at least in the instrument of sense. Since this spiritual entity is "adapted to the sense" (*accommodatum sensui*), the cause of sensing does not overwhelm the sense by its strength.[68] Ficino continues by providing further details of the successful example of sensation. He explains how that which "is everywhere and simultaneously perceived and signified as a whole" (*ubique totum ... eodem momento percipitur significaturque*) by many people listening to a voice is an example of such a spiritual entity adapted to sense, and that it is not a corporeal cause that produces such a thing around each and every "subject that is at this point opportunely arranged" (*subiectum tunc opportune dispositum*) but rather the life of the world itself.[69] He adds that the life of the world brings it about that the sense opportunely arranged is aroused to "act" (*actus*) – not only in simultaneity with the act of the spiritual entity in relation to it but in simultaneity with the act of the sensible object – and that there is an "attunement" (*contemperare*) or "harmony" (*concentus*) between the sense, the spiritual entity, and the thing sensed.[70]

[66] Ficino, *In Enneadem* IV. 5. 6; cf. IV. 5. 12. [67] Point 1 in the summary above.
[68] Point 2 above. [69] Point 3 above. [70] Point 4 above .

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:22:52, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.003

In the second relevant passage,[71] Ficino argues that sensation does not take place when an extension of space is broken up or materially affected by some object. Rather, "a spiritual entity of some kind" (*nescio quid quodammodo spiritale*), which is "a certain formal act coming forth from the form of the thing sensed" (*actus quidam specialis ab ipsa speciei rei sentiendae proveniens*), acts on the sense over a great distance.[72] The act is said to arise "from the form" not because it comes to be in matter but because "it depends on a spiritual and living Idea" (*a spirituali vivaque dependet idea*); the act is said to be "formal" and "spiritual" whether it arises a). within the instrument of sense, as in the cases of touch and taste or also b). outside us in the air, as in the cases of sight, hearing, and touch or also c). comes forth from the instrument of sense itself, as in the case of sight.[73] Moreover, this formal and spiritual act arises "amidst the passion" (*inter passionem*) which, in the case of the senses lower than sight, is "also material" (*etiam materialis*) as being made in the air.[74] It also arises opportunely "through a certain power of the general life" (*virtute quadam vitae communis*), which binds not only sense to the sensible but one conformed body to another.[75]

Ficino's theory of sensation is perhaps most influenced by two sources: Galen and Porphyry. In one passage, Galen[76] interprets the theory of vision in Plato's *Timaeus* by postulating a certain relation between the outgoing visual ray, sunlight, and the air in which the intermediate air becomes sensitive through the presence of the outgoing "spirit" (*pneuma*) in the sunlight, and in which the intermediate air has the same relation to the eye as the nerve leading from the eye has to the brain. In Porphyry's *Sententiae*,[77] sensation is explained by means of an analogy between 1). a musician responding passively to the strings of his instrument as an exterior manifestation of a "separate harmony" (*harmonia chöristē*), which impassibly produces the resonance, and 2). the animate being, which responds in a passible manner to the perceived object through the senses as an exterior manifestation of the separable soul impassibly causing the sensation.[78] There are differences between Ficino's theories and those of his predecessors, for Galen does not take the organic unity that grounds sensation to be a permanent condition,

[71] Ficino, *In Enneadem* IV. 5. 4. [72] Points 1–2 above. [73] Points 3–4 above.
[74] Point 1 above. [75] Point 3 above.
[76] Galen, *De Placitis Hippocratis et Platonis* VII. 5. 5–19, 32–33 (Müller, 1874).
[77] Porphyry, *Sententiae* 18. 9. 3–13 (Lamberz, 1975).
[78] The analogy was borrowed from Plotinus. See Plotinus: *Ennead* III. 6. 4. 41–52. For a comparative analysis of this musical image in Plotinus and Porphyry, see Brisson et al. (2005), II, 485–496.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:22:52, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.003

and Porphyry makes no explicit use of the spirit as a mediation between the instrument of sense and the sensory object.[79]

Images and Celestial Favor

We know that the third book of Ficino's treatise *De Vita* was at some point understood by its author to represent a commentary on Plotinus, but that he also seems to have had some hesitation about treating it as such.[80] This ambivalence is indicated by the fact that the entire text of this book appears as an insertion in the commentary on *Ennead* IV. 3 in the manuscript of the Plotinus Commentary (Florence, *Biblioteca Laurenziana* Plut. 82.11) completed in 1490,[81] although it is not reproduced in the corresponding passage or anywhere else in the *editio princeps* of the same commentary published two years later. The dating would suggest that the treatment of the third book of *De Vita* as a Plotinus commentary was the author's earlier understanding of his own project, for in several passages of *De Vita* itself written before 1489 he refers confidently to this commentary. For instance, in the proem to Book III dedicated to the king of Hungary, Ficino states that among his recent commentaries on Plotinus there is one on the book "concerning the drawing of favor from the heaven" (*de favore caelitus hauriendo*), which he has now decided to extract and dedicate to the king.[82] Now, considering the fact that *De Vita* III is a relatively large work that contains very few references or even allusions to Plotinus' doctrines, it might seem surprising that the author could ever have seen it as a commentary on the Greek author. However, among the essays eventually published as Plotinus commentaries, some have a very extensive and digressive character: for example, the prelude to the commentary on *Ennead* I. 3 and especially the *summa Marsiliana* added as a kind of appendix to *Ennead* III. 1.

The Plotinus passage that particularly attracts Ficino's attention reads as follows in Ficino's Latin translation: "But it seems to me that any of the

[79] On Porphyry's harmonic analogy of the soul's relation to body see Gersh (2017), 207–208.

[80] Concerning the general relation between Ficino's *De Vita* III and Plotinus' commentary on *Ennead* IV and concerning the doctrinal – especially the magical – issues involved see the important series of studies of Copenhaver (1984), (1986), (1987), (1988). Among more recent studies, see especially Robichaud (2017).

[81] The insertion seems to refer to chapter 11 of the Plotinus text in the translation, although its position in the commentary is uncertain because of the confused numbering of sections of the commentary in both the MS and the *editio princeps*. See the note on the relevant passage – Ficino, *In Enneadem* IV. 3. 26 in the modern edition – at Gersh (2017–2018), 567.

[82] Ficino, *De Vita* III, *pr.* 24–28 (Kaske and Clark, 2002, pp. 236–238). See also Ficino, *De Vita* II, c. 20, 34–36 (Kaske and Clark, 2002, p. 232).

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:22:52, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.003

ancient sages who wished the gods to be present to them in their fashioning of temples and statues directed the gaze of their minds to the nature itself of the universe and consequently observed that the nature of the soul was something everywhere easy to attract, very favorably inclined, and of all things the easiest to capture and that, if anyone were to construct something that could easily be passive with respect to the nature of soul, it would be able to obtain some portion of it through this passivity. Indeed, something is passive which is in some manner suitable to imitate, just as a mirror is able to seize a certain form."[83]

In *De Vita* III, Ficino introduces a commentary on this passage – probably the original Plotinian commentary to which he refers in the passage quoted above – in order to explain how the influx of higher power into a lower recipient can be achieved.[84] He cites as analogies for such an influx a mirror exposed to somebody's face or an opposite wall exposed to somebody's voice, and notes how Plotinus himself uses almost these same examples in the passage where "in imitation of Hermes" (*Mercurium imitatus*) he says that the ancient priests or *magi* used to capture in statues and sensible sacrifices something divine and wonderful, and that Plotinus also maintains "in agreement with Trismegistus" (*una cum Trismegisto*) that the priests captured through these materials not divinities totally separate from matter but only those that pertain to the world.[85] Ficino adds that he has said from the beginning, and in agreement with Synesius, that what is meant by "pertaining to the world" in this context is a certain life or something vital stemming from the world-soul and the souls of the spheres and stars, or even a certain motion or vital presence deriving from the daemons. He also notes that Hermes "whom Plotinus follows" (*quem Plotinus sequitur*) also holds that such daemons are themselves sometimes present in the materials – these being airy and not celestial daemons, let alone more elevated ones – and that Hermes himself has from plants, trees, stones, and spices fashioned certain statues that contain within

[83] Ficino, *Vers. Plot.* (Creuzer, 1835, pp. 705–706) *atqui mihi videntur veteres sapientes, quicumque optabant sibi adesse deos sacra statuasque fabricantibus, in ipsam universi naturam mentis aciem direxisse atque inde animadvertisse naturam animae ubique ductu facilem admodum pronamque esse omniumque facillime posse capi – si quis fabricaverit aliquid quod facile ab ipsa pati possit – patiendoque portionem aliquam ab ipsa sortiri. Facile vero patiens est quod qualicumque modo imitationi aptum est, velut speculum speciem quandam arripere potens.*

[84] On this passage see Copenhaver (1986) and Gontier (2001). On the role of influx in Ficino's magical theories as expressed in *De Vita* III see especially Copenhaver (1987), Copenhaver (1988), Robichaud (2017).

[85] The reference is to *Asclepius* 37, 347. 3–38, 349. 8 (Nock and Festugière, 1946–1954); cf. 24, 326. 9–20.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:22:52, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.003

themselves – according to his own report – a natural power of divinity.[86] After a digression, Ficino urges his reader to return to Hermes "or rather to Plotinus" (*immo ad Plotinum*). He notes that Hermes was of the opinion that the priests received an appropriate power from the nature of the world and formed a blend from it, that Plotinus follows him in holding that all of this can be easily accomplished through the harmonious activity of the world-soul to the extent that the latter generates and moves the forms of natural things through certain seminal reason-principles implanted in it from the divine, and that Plotinus even calls these reason-principles gods since they are never cut off from the Ideas in the supreme mind.[87]

In the *Commentary on Plotinus,* Ficino writes more briefly about the same passage – perhaps thinking that he has already discussed it sufficiently in his original commentary in *De Vita* – and strikes a rather different tone. According to the newer reading, Plotinus is here "sporting with" (*alludit*) the magicians who construct talking statues because it is neither the souls of the statues nor of the stars who speak but only daemons, led by the star under whose rule the statues were fashioned.[88] The shift from the emphasis on the relation between the statues and the nature of the world-soul – the only idea in the original Plotinian lemma – to the relation between the statues and the daemons – an idea added by the Hermetic intertext – is accompanied by the introduction of the notions of sporting or jesting. Possibly, Ficino now has in mind the much less favorable report of the same Hermetic passage in Augustine's *On the City of God*, where the daemonic and the delusional aspects of the statue-making are the main themes.[89]

The comparison of what seems to represent two stages of Ficinian commentary on the same passage in Plotinus is important for a variety of reasons. First, the passages show that the Florentine conceives there to be an important intertextual relation between Plotinus and Hermes Trismegistus, the cofounder of the ancient philosophical tradition leading up to Plato. This intertextual relation forms the exegetical context for explaining the metaphysical doctrine of attracting the emanation of higher powers into physical objects that are suitably arranged. As Ficino says elsewhere in the commentary on the *Fourth Ennead*, the practitioner of what he terms "natural magic" can adapt these powers for his own use by implanting or

[86] Ficino, *De Vita* III, c. 26, 77–88 (Kaske and Clark, 2002), 388.
[87] Ficino, *De Vita* III, c. 26, 122–127 (Kaske and Clark, 2002), 390.
[88] Ficino, *In Ennead.* IV. 3. 33.
[89] See Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* VIII. 23 "fraudulant artifacts" (*fallacia figmenta*)... "delusive contrivances of daemons" (*ludificationes daemonum*).

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:22:52, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.003

grafting them at various times.[90] Second, the passages indicate that Ficino is at the very least shifting his emphasis from a relatively positive view of the metaphysics underlying the animation of statues to a more overtly negative one. This change of emphasis would be in line with some remarks in the *Apologia* forming the postscript to *De Vita* III, where Ficino urges his friend Piero Guicciardini to reply to certain unnamed critics who have attacked his discussion of magic and images in that work. He asks his correspondent to say that such things are not being approved by the author of the book but recounted by him "in interpreting Plotinus himself" (*Plotinum ipsum interpretans*): a fact that Ficino's own writings will make perfectly clear if they are read in a fair-minded way.[91]

The following questions now arise: First, does the animation of statues mentioned by Plotinus represent a serious metaphysical theory regarding the obtaining of favor from heaven – as *De Vita* suggests – or is it merely the result of daemonic delusion – in accordance with a more obvious reading of the Plotinus commentary *ad loc.*? Second, does Ficino as a commentator adopt a stance implying his own total or partial commitment to the doctrines stated in Plotinus' text – as suggested by his general exegetical practice – or does he maintain a distance with respect to those doctrines – according to the plea stated in the *Apologia*? It seems possible to take account of these facts and resolve these questions with a careful study of the broader context surrounding Plotinus' remarks in *Ennead* IV. 3. 9, especially if the original Plotinian argument of *Ennead* IV. 3. 9–14 as a whole is translated into more Ficinian terms and given a more Ficinian emphasis.

The main philosophical issue in these chapters is that of the soul's entry into the body. At the beginning of chapter 9,[92] Plotinus asks the question: What is the soul's manner of entering the body? This entry can be considered in terms of two possibilities: that whereby the soul changes one body for another, and that whereby the soul goes from a bodiless to an embodied state. Plotinus decides to concentrate on the latter, starting from the world-soul. Since there is no temporally prior disembodied state of the world-soul, the notion of "entry" into body in this case is metaphorical. However, even with this qualification, it is clear that the soul could not go forth from the intellectual sphere unless the body already existed. Therefore, the world-soul must produce a body for itself, this process being compared to light's informing of darkness and an architect's production of

[90] Ficino, *In Enneadem* IV. 4. 36. [91] Ficino, *Apologia* 55–58 (Kaske and Clark, 2002), 396.
[92] Cf. Ficino, *In Enneadem* IV. 3. 21–24.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:22:52, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.003

a house. Moreover, the world-soul produces by means of the reason-principle that comes forth from it, the body produced thereby being coextensive with this reason-principle. In chapter 10,[93] Plotinus considers in more detail how the world-soul produces a body for itself by means of its reason-principle, which is now identified with nature, and explains that this process of formation involves no planning or consideration. Moreover, the production of a body for itself by the world-soul can be compared to the construction of shrines for gods and dwellings for men. In chapter 11 Plotinus notes that the ancients made statues in order to make gods present to them, since they realized that the nature of soul is easy to attract. This formation by universal nature represents a first instance of the attraction of soul to body and may be compared with a second instance of the attraction of soul to body represented by the descent of particular souls. Therefore in chapter 12,[94] Plotinus shifts from the consideration of the world-soul to that of particular souls, and explains how these souls descend into bodies while their highest parts remain undescended. One cause of this descent is necessity, since the descents and subsequent ascents of souls and the exchange of one body for another are required to complete the order of the cosmos. Plotinus speaks here mythologically of the "dispensation of Zeus," who is equivalent to the divine craftsman, the intellectual soul, and the higher reason-principle. Another cause of the descent is attraction, since the particular souls see their images below them in that which may be mythologically characterized as the "mirror of Dionysus." The souls instinctively move towards these images. Moreover, given that the images towards which the particular souls are attracted have been prepared for them by the world-soul, together with the lower reason-principle or nature, the descents of the world-soul and of particular souls are seen to be mutually interdependent. Chapter 13[95] explains that the second cause of descent, attraction – now identified with spontaneity – is consistent with the first cause of descent, necessity, and that this combination is exemplified in magical powers and sexual desire. Finally, in chapter 14,[96] Plotinus explains all the processes hitherto described by means of an allegory: namely, the story of Prometheus, Epimetheus, and Pandora. Here, Zeus corresponds to the intellectual soul or the higher phase of the world's reason-principle, Prometheus to nature or the lower phase of the world's reason-principle, and Pandora to the animate beings produced. Since Pandora receives gifts from Aphrodite and the other divinities and is

[93] Cf. Ficino, *In Enneadem* IV. 3. 25–26.
[94] Cf. Ficino, *In Enneadem* IV. 3. 27–30.
[95] Cf. Ficino, *In Enneadem* IV. 3. 31.
[96] Cf. Ficino, *In Enneadem* IV. 3. 32–33.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:22:52, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.003

given voice, she clearly corresponds to the shrines and statues mentioned near the beginning of the discussion.

The conclusion to be drawn from all this is that the statue-making mentioned at the beginning of *Ennead* IV. 3. 11 is important to Plotinus and Ficino primarily because it represents a *metaphor* – together with the making of shrines and dwellings in general and the fashioning of Pandora – for the complex metaphysical process of the world-soul's and particular souls' embodiment, which grounds the possibility of extracting favor from the heaven.[97] The metaphysical process of the world-soul's and particular souls' embodiment can be compared by the two authors in this manner to the magical practice of statue-making[98] apparently because of the element of instinctive attraction, which together with the element of necessity brings both the world-soul and particular souls into conjunction with body and allows the world-soul to ground a particular soul's embodiment. Now, it is because the significance of the statue-making is primarily *non-literal* that the problem of Ficino's exegetical stance can also be resolved. In fact, Ficino can be seen as having a subtle and complicated relation to the text of Plotinus, in which he is neither simply committed nor simply detached from the material at hand. He is fully committed as a philosopher to the general theory of attracting favor from heaven that is represented by the *metaphorical* understanding of the statue-making, while being simultaneously more or less detached on religious or ethical grounds from the particular magical practices that are represented by any *literal* understanding of the same phenomenon.

REFERENCES

Allen, M. J. B. (2008) "To Gaze upon the Face of God Again: Philosophic Statuary, Pygmalion, and Marsilio Ficino," *Rinascimento, 2a serie* 48:123–136.

Allen, M. J. B. (ed.) (2015) *Marsilio Ficino, On Dionysius the Areoagite*, 2 vols., Cambridge, MA.

Allen, M. J. B. and Hankins, J. (ed. and trans.) (2001–2006) *Marsilio Ficino, Platonic Theology*, 6 vols., Cambridge, MA.

[97] There is another striking instance of Ficino's metaphorical interpretation of statue making in his *Commentary on Dionysius' Mystical Theology* 18. 1–2 (Allen, 2015, pp. 1, 52–54) where the inspiration is a passage from Dionysius himself. Since the world here is compared to statue of God, the metaphysical meaning of the metaphor is identical with that in the *Commentary on the Fourth Ennead*. On statue making in Ficino see Allen (2008).

[98] Nature is explicitly compared to a sorceress at Plotinus, *Ennead* IV. 4. 44, 29–30.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:22:52, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.003

Armisen-Marchetti, M. (ed.) (2001) *Macrobe, Commentaire au Songe de Scipion*, Paris.
Blumenthal, H. J. (1971) *Plotinus' Psychology: His Doctrines of the Embodied Soul*, The Hague.
Bouffartigue, J and Patillon, M. (eds.) (1977–1979) *Porphyre, De l'Abstinence*, 2 vols., Paris.
Brisson, L. et al. (ed. and trans.) (2005) *Porphyre, Sentences*, 2 vols., Paris.
Buttimer, H. (ed.) (1939) *Hugonis de Sancto Victore Didascalicon, De studio legendi.* Washington, D.C.
Copenhaver, B. P. (1984) "Scholastic Philosophy and Renaissance Magic in the *De Vita* of Marsilio Ficino," *Renaissance Quarterly* 37: 523–554.
(1986) "Renaissance Magic and Neoplatonic Philosophy: 'Ennead' 4. 3–5 in Ficino's 'De vita coelitus comparanda'," in G. C. Garfagnini (ed.) *Marsilio Ficino e il Ritorno di Platone: Studi e documenti*, Florence, II, 351–369.
(1987) "Iamblichus, Synesius, and the *Chaldaean Oracles* in Marsilio Ficino's *De vita libri tres:* Hermetic Magic or Neoplatonic Magic?" in J. Hankins, J. Monfasani, and F. Purnell (eds.) *Supplementum Festivum: Studies in Honor of Paul Oskar Kristeller*, Binghamton, NY, 441–455.
(1988) "Hermes Trismegistus, Proclus, and the Question of a Philosophy of Magic in the Renaissance," in I. Merkel and A. G. Debus (eds.) *Hermeticism and the Renaissance: Intellectual History and the Occult in Early Modern Europe*, Washington, D.C., London and Toronto, 79–110.
Creuzer, F. (ed.) (1835) *Plotini opera omnia [. . .]cum Marsilii Ficini commentariis et eiusdem interpretatione castigata [. . .]*, 3 vols., Oxford.
Des Places, É. (ed.) (1971) *Oracles chaldaïques*, Paris.
Emilsson, E. K. (1988) *Plotinus on Sense-Perception: A Philosophical Study*, Cambridge, UK.
Ficino, M. (1576) *Marsilii Ficini Florentini [. . .] opera et quae hactenus extitere et quae in lucem nunc primum prodiere omnia [. . .]*, 2 vols., Basel. (Photographic reprints Turin 1959, and later Lucca 2011).
Gannon, M. A. I. (1956) "The Active Theory of Sensation in St. Augustine," *New Scholasticism* 30: 154–180.
Gersh, S. (1978) *From Iamblichus to Eriugena: An Investigation of the Prehistory and Evolution of the Pseudo-Dionysian Tradition*, Leiden
(2017) "The Metaphysics of Power, *Logos*, and Harmony in Porphyry," in J. F. Finamore and S. Klitenic Wear (eds.) *Defining Platonism: Essays in Honor of the 75th Birthday of John M. Dillon*, Steubenville, OH, 198–217.
Gersh, S. (ed.) (2017–2018) *Marsilio Ficino, Commentary on Plotinus, Ennead III and Ennead IV*, 2 vols., Cambridge, MA.
(ed.) (in press) *Marsilio Ficino, Commentary on Plotinus, Ennead I*, Cambridge, MA.
Gontier, T. (2001) "La technique comme capture du ciel: La lecture de la quatrième *Énnéade* de Plotin dans le *De vita coelistus comparanda* de Marsile Ficin," *Corpus* 39: 107–132.
Kaske, C. and Clark, J. R. (ed. and trans.) (2002) *Marsilio Ficino, Three Books On Life*, Tempe, AZ. [Also includes his *Apologia*]

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:22:52, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.003

Lamberz, E. (ed.) (1975) *Porphyrii Sententiae ad intelligibilia ducentes*, Leipzig.
Laurens, P. (ed. and trans.) (2002) *Marsile Ficin, Commentaire sur le Banquet de Platon De l'Amour*, Paris.
Lewy, H. (1978) *Chaldaean Oracles and Theurgy* [new edition by M. Tardieu], Paris.
Majercik, R. (1989) *The Chaldaean Oracles*, Leiden.
Müller, I. (ed.) (1874) *Galen, De placitis Hippocratis et Platonis*, Leipzig.
Nock, A. D. and Festugière, A.-J. (eds. and trans.) (1946–1954) *Hermès Trismégiste: Corpus Hermeticum*, 4 vols., Paris.
Robichaud, D. (2017) "Ficino on Force, Magic, and Prayers: Neoplatonic and Hermetic Influences in Ficino's Three Books on Life," *Renaissance Quarterly* 70: 44–87.
Robichaud, D. and Soranzo, M. (2017) "Philosophical or Religious Conversion? Marsilio Ficino, Plotinus' *Enneads* and Neoplatonic *Epistrophē*," in S. Marchesini (ed.) *Simple Twists of Faith. Changing Beliefs, Changing Faiths: People and Places*, Verona, 135–166.
Wagner, M. F. (1993) "Sense Experience and the Active Soul: Some Plotinian and Augustinian Themes," *Journal of Neoplatonic Studies* 1.2: 37–62.
Westerink, L. G. (ed.) (1976) *The Greek Commentaries on Plato's Phaedo, vol. 1: Olympiodorus*, Amsterdam.
Walker, D. P. (1958) *Spiritual and Demonic Magic from Ficino to Campanella*, London. [Reprinted Nendeln/Liechtenstein 1976].

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:22:52, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.003

CHAPTER 2

Giovanni Pico della Mirandola on Virtue, Happiness, and Magic

Brian Copenhaver

Introduction

In the undelivered speech for which he is now famous, the one incorrectly called an *Oration on the Dignity of Man*, Giovanni Pico della Mirandola mentioned Plotinus only twice: once to marvel at his entrancing but difficult language, next to cite him as an expert on magic. But another unpublished work, incomplete and from the same period, named the philosopher fifteen times in seven passages: this was a vernacular *Commentary, Based on Views and Beliefs of Platonists, on a Poem about Love by Girolamo Benivieni*, written in 1486. Since a task of the *Commento* was to show how Neoplatonic doctrine illuminated Benivieni's poem, testimony from Plotinus was pertinent, along with insights from Porphyry, Proclus, the Areopagite and books of Kabbalah.

Although the *Commento* was not published in Pico's lifetime, he broke into print late in 1486 with a pamphlet – thirty-five leaves – listing 900 philosophical theses that he hoped to present to the College of Cardinals in Rome in the winter of the following year. But Pope Innocent VIII condemned thirteen of them, quashing the spectacular event that Pico had planned. Instead, he had to defend his condemned propositions under interrogation by a papal commission in March. Later that spring, he published a recalcitrant *Apology* that caused Innocent to extend the condemnation to all 900 theses.

Strictly speaking, Pico's most extensive and explicit statements about Plotinus – nineteen of the *900 Conclusions* printed in 1486 – were condemned by the Church. But the target of this sweeping action was really the pertinacious Count of Concordia and Mirandola, not Plotinus nor any other philosopher among the dozens of ancient and medieval authorities named in the *Conclusions*. In the *Apology* that defended a few of the theses, Plotinus appeared only in preliminaries that repeated some of

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:24:04, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.004

the *Oration*'s oratory, never in Pico's technical defenses of his propositions.[1]

One obviously outrageous thesis claimed that "there is no knowledge that gives us more certainty of Christ's divinity than magic and Kabbalah." By 1488, however, Pico had backed away from such provocations in his *Heptaplus on a Seven-Part Account of the Six Days of Genesis.* Even though this book was innovative just because of its attitude to Judaism, the author never mentioned Kabbalah.

He cited Plotinus three times in the *Heptaplus*, though only incidentally: no surprise, since the book was about biblical exegesis. A little later, in 1491, Plotinus went completely missing from Pico's unfinished tract *On Being and the One*. Considering its topic, and in light of Porphyry's titles for parts of the *Enneads* – "On the Origin and Order of the Beings Which Come After the First," "On the Kinds of Being," "On the Good or the One" and others – the absence is surprising. On the other hand, Pico disagreed with Plotinus – and Marsilio Ficino – about the issue in question, namely whether the One is above Being.[2]

By this time, Pico was no longer the reckless orator of the *Oration*. And surely he was pleased to read what Ficino wrote in the spring of 1492 to Lorenzo de' Medici about Cosimo, Lorenzo's grandfather, and also about the prince as Cosimo's spiritual heir:

> At the time when I made it possible for Plato to be read in Latin, Cosimo's heroic spirit somehow stirred up the heroic mind of Giovanni Pico della Mirandola so that he would come to Florence – without being aware of how this happened. Having arrived in Florence in the year when I had given birth to Plato, then on the very day and nearly the exact hour when I brought him into the world, he asked me about Plato as soon as he greeted me, and I answered him by saying 'Plato has just come from my house today, in fact.' Then he, in our moment of great joy and gratitude, immediately spoke words that somehow, with neither of us understanding,

[1] The first complete printing of Pico's *Oration* is in Pico (1496); I have used Pico (2007), the excellent edition by Francesco Bausi. For the *Commento*, I have used Pico (2001); also Pico (1486) for the *Conclusions*; (1487) for the *Apology*; (c. 1489) for the *Heptaplus*; and (2010) for *De ente et uno*. For mentions of Plotinus in the *Conclusions*, *Apology*, *Oration*, and *Commento*, see Pico (1486), 14–15, 38, 46–47, 49; (1487), 4, 7; (2001), 22–24, 28, 30, 56, 86, 126–128, 206; and (2007), 88–90, 112. My understanding of these texts, which departs from views established during the last century, will be explained in a new edition and translation of the *Oration* and a book on Pico, both of them finished and in production. Meanwhile, for a summary, see Copenhaver (2016), and for other information (1999), (2002a), (2002b), (2007a), (2007b), (2011), (2014), (2017), and (2018); also Bacchelli (2015) for Pico's life.

[2] Pico (1486), 57; (c. 1489), sigs. c4^{v}, d3^{v}, e3; Porphyry, *Vita Plotini* 24–26; Allen (1989), 34–48, (1995); Black (2006), 10–11, 131–132, 214–221, 235–239.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:24:04, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.004

> persuaded me that Plotinus had to be translated – or rather aroused me. The effect truly seems to have been something divine.

Behind Ficino's memory, in his favorite framework of astrological correspondences and calendrical symmetries, there may have been some such moment of inspiration: Pico was a charismatic prince. But when Ficino first met him, he was also immature, arrogant and careless, even with friends. As far as Pico's Plotinus is concerned, most of the evidence comes from 1486, and sour notes from those earlier times temper the festive music of 1492.[3]

900 Conclusions

Of the three works that Pico completed and had printed in his lifetime – the *Conclusions*, *Apology*, and *Heptaplus* – Plotinus was prominent only in the first, in nineteen of the *900 Conclusions*.[4]

Pico divided his theses into two sets and labeled their subdivisions with names of persons (Albertus, Ammonius, Averroes) or groups (Chaldeans, Jewish Sages, Pythagoreans), or with indications of subject matter (magic, mathematics, theology) or philosophical attitude (dissenting, reconciling, unusual). Using the same word *(secundum)* in both cases, he described propositions in the first set (roughly 400) as 'regarding' Albertus, the Chaldeans and so on, those in the second set (roughly 500) as 'according to' or 'following' his own views.[5]

The framework for both sets was a doctrine of philosophical concord – a kind of syncretism – proclaimed in the *Oration*: Plato and Aristotle, Avicenna and Averroes, Aquinas and Scotus sometimes disagreed in words but never on the basics. Armed with this conviction, Pico formulated hundreds of theses to prove that the fundamentals of Christian belief, the Trinity above all, could be derived from alien and heathen wisdom, including Kabbalah read in a Neoplatonic way. "Any Hebrew Kabbalist," he proclaimed, "is forced inevitably to grant precisely . . . what the Catholic faith of Christians declares about the Trinity." Among ancient Greeks, Proclus was the prince's chief guide in this project, with the Areopagite's

[3] Ficino (1580), sig. $\alpha 5^{r}$: I have used this edition of Ficino's translation and commentary in keeping with Gersh's procedure in Ficino (2017–).

[4] Pico (1486), 14–15, 38, 46–47, 49.

[5] Pico (1486), 1, 7, 12, 22–25, 28, 30, 36, 41, 51, 56. Pico planned exactly 900 theses, divided into groups of 400 and 500, but mistakes were made in getting them printed.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:24:04, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.004

piety to sanctify the pagan philosopher's extravagant mythologizing and metaphysics of triads. Pico found Plotinus helpful for related purposes.[6]

In principle, each of his 900 theses was a proposition to be disputed, not to claim or disclaim a philosophical position. Even a thesis from the second set of 500 "according to his own opinion" might be more tactical than substantive, stated in relation to another thesis or theses in such a way that the contextual or implicit point might be more salient than any explicit statement. Many theses in the first set of 400 'regarding' the opinions of others are even harder to nail down, much less to identify as Pico's own views. This is a sequence of theses on Averroes about an issue also discussed in the theses on Plotinus:

T1 In all humans there is a single intellective soul.
T2 Supreme human happiness comes when the Agent Intellect connects with a potential intellect as its form; other Latin writers that I have read have interpreted this continuation wrongly and perversely, and especially John of Jandun, who on nearly all the philosophical issues has completely corrupted and distorted the teaching of Averroes.
T3 If I hold the unity of the Intellect, it is possible for my soul after death to remain so particularly mine that I do not share it with everyone.

Averroism, a savagely contested position in Pico's day, is the topic of *T1–3,* where the key issue is the uniqueness of the Intellect. If each ensouled person also needs an intellect in order to make moral choices, and if intellects need to be immortal in order for choices to be rewarded or punished after bodies die, *T1* on its face is problematic. "Read bare," as Pico would say, *T1* makes the basic Averroist claim that all human persons share a single Intellect residing in a single Soul. Although each living person also has a soul, human individuals lack distinct intellects of their own, and if only souls equipped with intellects live forever, souls of human individuals are not immortal – hence ineligible for the "supreme human happiness" of heaven or eternal torment in hell.

Pico did not mean *T1* to stand on its own, however, as shown by *T2* and *T3*. According to *T2*, only Averroism of a certain kind – as taught by John of Jandun around 1300 – had been "corrupted and distorted." This was not the "teaching of Averroes" that Pico supported as a philosophical expression of Christian teachings on immortality and eternal happiness. Such happiness "comes when the Agent Intellect connects with a potential

[6] Pico (1486),17–22, 61; (2007), 96–98. For the Areopagite in the Renaissance, see especially Michael Allen's edition of Ficino's commentary: Ficino (2015). Of Pico's first 400 theses, 55 are on Proclus – the largest number for any individual.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:24:04, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.004

intellect as its form," again according to *T2*. The mechanism of this heavenly connection – *conjunction* with the Agent Intellect – was one side of a metaphysical psychology developed and passed on to Christians by Avicenna, Averroes, and other Muslim and Jewish interpreters of Aristotle. The other side, better known in the Christian world, was a theory of *cognition* in parallel with conjunction.

The metaphysical dynamo of both processes, conjunction and cognition, is the Agent Intellect, which acts where the Creator comes nearest to creation and human creatures. These creatures cannot cognize by intellection because they have no intellects, only lower cognitive faculties. Insofar as humans need intellective thought, such thinking happens because the Agent Intellect thinks such thoughts in each thinker, without making them immortal. Human cognitive faculties die with the body, which is a drag on the human soul's higher powers. But while the body is alive or afterward, some souls escape to be conjoined with the Agent Intellect – immortalized and divinized, in effect, since the Intellect is an activity of God.[7]

The doctrine of conjunction taught by Averroes was like what Plotinus had said long before about *assimilation* (*homoiōsis*). A directive to achieve assimilation or conjunction was also Pico's message in the *Oration*, written to introduce the theses of his *900 Conclusions*. Readers of the theses might have found it hard, however, to decide what message Pico was sending. He wrote in *T3* that he could "hold the unity of the Intellect" while also allowing "my soul after death to remain particularly mine." The banishing of individual souls to mortality by a unitary Intellect was what Christians disliked most about Averroism, and Pico's *T3* gave them little consolation.[8]

His solution, there and elsewhere in the *Conclusions* and especially in the *Apology*, was philosophical virtuosity – and sometimes sophistry of a very high order. At the end of the *Apology*, he acknowledged that some of his theses might

> offend pious and unlearned ears. . . I would not want them to be read bare, so to speak, and unexplained. . . For among them are many wicked teachings of ancient philosophy by Averroes, Alexander and others which – even though I have always stated . . . that they are no less foreign to true and

[7] Pico (1486), 7; (1487), 111; Davidson (1992), 3–126, 209–232, 258–356; Ivry (2016), 44, 74, 80, 255; for Ficino's quite different response to Averroism in his *Platonic Theology*, see Copenhaver (2009a) and the edition by Allen and Hankins in Ficino (2001–2006).

[8] Pico (2007), 54; Plotinus, *Ennead* I. 2. 3. 5–6.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:24:04, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.004

> correct philosophy than to the faith – I took up to be disputed, as a scholastic exercise, with a few learned people in a private gathering of the academic kind. . . Anyone will be able to figure out, even for teachings said to be invented by others, which ones I have found correct and acceptable.

In nineteen of his theses, Pico linked Plotinus by name with such doctrines "invented by others," which he might or might not have found "correct and acceptable."[9]

This is a thesis on Plotinus, for example, which alludes to *T1–3*:

P7 Man's utmost happiness comes when our particular intellect is joined with the first and whole Intellect.

The word 'happiness' *(felicitas)* also occurs in two other theses on Plotinus, and treatise I. 4 "On Happiness" is the main site in the *Enneads* of its Greek analog, *eudaimonia*, used dozens of times there. This much is plain to see. But a glance at *T1–3* shows that none of Pico's theses can be "read bare" – either as what he endorsed or, in the case of Plotinus, what Plotinus taught or what Pico thought that he taught.[10]

Pico left an instruction for tracking his elusive statements when he defended the thirteenth and last condemned thesis in the *Apology*:

T4 The soul understands *(intelligit)* nothing actually and distinctly except itself.

To convince his judges that *T4* did not mean what it seems to say – that the soul cognizes only itself intellectually – he directed them to a statement nearby in the same sequence:

T5 The soul always understands itself and, by understanding itself, somehow understands all beings.

T5 rescued *T4,* he claimed. But the subject of both was a "concealed understanding *(intelligere abditum)*," which "in this place I prefer not to analyze." Instead, he added that "in all my conclusions there is always a certain hidden linkage *(occulta concatenatio)*" – even though the judges missed it. The type of "hidden linkage" that connects *T4* with *T5* also leads to *P7* from *T1–3*.[11]

[9] Pico (1486), 14–15, 38, 46–47, 49; (1487), 111; also 47–48, where logic-chopping, one type of sophistry, is Pico's defense of the condemned thesis on magic and Kabbalah. Throughout the *Apology*, cornered by his own bad judgment in the condemned propositions, the prince exploited many such devices of scholastic reasoning, which provoked his opponents all the more.

[10] Pico (1486), 14; Plotinus, *Ennead* I. 4. 1. 1, 11, 13, 16 and sixty-four other instances – more than half of all uses of *eudaimonia* and its relatives in the *Enneads*.

[11] Pico (1486), 40; (1487), 109–110, referring to Augustine, *De Trinitate* X.12, XIV.12; Henry of Ghent, *Quodl.* 9.15.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:24:04, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.004

To find the knots where Pico tied them, a careful reading of his theses will examine each one in several contexts, starting with its local placement in the *Conclusions*, where fifteen of the first 400 theses are *conclusiones secundum Plotinum*:

P1 The first Intelligible is not outside the first Intellect.
P2 Not all of the Soul descends when it descends.
P3 All life is immortal.
P4 A soul that has sinned in an earthly or aerial body lives the life of a beast after death.
P5 Unreasoning soul is an image of reasoning soul, coming down from it like light from the Sun.
P6 Being, Life and Intellect converge as the same.
P7 Man's utmost happiness comes when our particular intellect is joined with the first and whole Intellect.
P8 Civic virtues are not to be called virtues without qualification.
P9 Assimilation to the divine does not happen through virtues – even in a purified soul, except to make it ready.
P10 In reason forms too are likenesses of things, in the intellect truly real beings.
P11 To cut off even original affects belongs to perfected virtue.
P12 It is wrong to say that the Intellect considers or contemplates Ideas.
P13 Things needed for living can be called necessary but not good.
P14 While accidental happiness requires awareness, lack of awareness actually strengthens substantial happiness, far from destroying it.
P15 A person who has once attained happiness will not be held back from it by delirium or lethargy.[12]

Just as *T1–3* form a group of theses or part of a group, so *P1–15* make up another group or groups. Within the first set of 400, these fifteen belong to a subset of ninety-nine on the "teaching of philosophers called Platonists: Plotinus of Egypt, Porphyry of Tyre, Iamblichus of Chalcis, Proclus of Lycia and the Arab Adelandus." This subset follows three others on six "Latin philosophers and theologians," on eight "Arabs who mainly claim to be Peripatetics" – though two of them were Jews – and on five "Greeks who profess the Peripatetic sect." Hence, by Pico's own account, the 225 theses proposed before coming to Plotinus reflect Greek, Muslim and Christian Aristotelianism. After Plotinus and the Neoplatonists, the last four groups are not presented together as a subset, only as lists of statements about the "mathematics of Pythagoras," the "opinion of Chaldean theologians," the "teaching of Mercurius Trismegistus," and the "secret teaching of Hebrew Kabbalist sages."[13]

[12] Pico (1486), 14–15. [13] Pico (1486),1, 7, 12, 14, 22–24.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:24:04, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.004

The first thesis of the second group of 500 puts philosophical concord at the head of propositions which, in some sense, Pico claimed as his own. "There is no problem of natural philosophy or theology," he declared, "about which Aristotle and Plato do not agree in meaning and substance even though they seem to disagree in words." Platonism is conspicuous in this part of Pico's project, laid out in eleven distinct sets of theses, of which the fifth is on "Plato's teaching." Aristotelian ideas are also plentiful, however, to display harmony between Peripatetics and Platonists. Plotinus appears in three of the sixty-two propositions on Platonism:

P16 The Love of which Plotinus speaks is not the heavenly Love that Plato discusses in the *Symposium* but a correct and close copy of it.

P17 By Plato's demonstration of the soul's immortality in the *Phaedrus*, the immortality argued and proved belongs not to our souls, as Proclus, Hermias and Syrianus believe, nor to every soul, as Plotinus and Numenius think, nor just to the world's soul, which is the view of Posidonius, but to any soul which is heavenly.

P18 From Plato's statement in the *Phaedrus* that a human soul would not have come into this living thing unless it had looked upon genuine reality, the understanding – if one understands correctly – is that Plato's view is not what Plotinus means by positing the migration of souls into beasts.

Thesis *P19* belongs to a different set:

P19 The manifold of beings that Archytas and then Aristotle put at ten predicaments is more correctly reduced to the five just mentioned or the five that Plotinus proposes or the four proposed by Stoics.[14]

Thesis *P19*, which refers to a previous proposition on unity, substance, quantity, quality, and relation as five categories, promotes the same novelty, replacing the usual ten categories with half that number. *P19* is one of seventy-one "unusual *(paradoxae)* conclusions ... that introduce new teachings about philosophy." Two of these novelties were condemned:

T4 The soul understands nothing actually and distinctly except itself.

T6 Saying of God that he is an intellect or intelligent is more inappropriate than saying of a rational soul that it is an angel.

Plotinus was implicated by neither condemned thesis and was not named where Pico's *Apology* defended them. This defense came in the last parts of a book written under pressure and very rapidly; they are also its shortest parts, less than four pages out of 115. Had Pico discussed *T4* and *T6* more

[14] Pico (1486), 28, 38, 44, 46–47, 49.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:24:04, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.004

extensively, he could have called on Plotinus – a connoisseur of transcendence and hypostatic remoteness – to defend these claims about an ineffable God and an autistic soul. In the circumstances, however, while planning to address an audience of scholastic theologians, he relied instead on the Areopagite, Augustine, and the Bible.[15]

At some point, Pico acquired a manuscript of the *Enneads* in Greek, though we do not know when he got it or how complete it was. He also owned Ficino's Latin translation and commentary once they were printed in 1492. But he was already aware of Ficino's project before September of 1486, when they exchanged letters about borrowed books – including the Koran in Latin. Claiming not "to press you to send Mohammed back to me," Ficino added this remark:

> About my Plotinus commentary or having it printed I shall have nothing at all to tell you until I hear that this care *(cura)* has dropped from *(excidisse)* your heart – the one that has caused Plotinus to drop away from *(excidisse)* you – and how far will this "drive a human heart"? I complained to Pier Leone about this when Mithridates was with us, never blaming your character but either your desire *(cupido)* or the outcome for me, which I rated higher than the effects on Mithridates. But I would prefer circumstances not to have mattered where one should live by reason.

Because his words were harsh, especially in light of Pico's mounting troubles at the time, Ficino dropped this part of his letter from the version published in his epistolary. Overdue books were not the whole worry, clearly, but the trouble is hard to pin down. One of the other parties named, Pier Leone of Spoleto, was a fellow physician whom Ficino kept informed about his Plotinus project and other news. He was also a friend to whom Ficino grumbled about money problems (too many nieces and nephews of marrying age). Fights about money were just one symptom of Pico's diseased relationship with Flavius Mithridates, a converted Jew whom he hired to teach him Hebrew and translate books of Kabbalah. Since the phrase about the "human heart" that Ficino took from the *Aeneid* comes just before a denunciation of "the cursed hunger for gold," following the money may be the right path. But Ficino's wish for care to drop away also suggests lighter thoughts about literary friendship inspired by Ovid.

Pico claimed not to know what Ficino's grievance was, and his reply was mostly about himself, excited about his progress in Hebrew, Aramaic and Arabic. Finally, after an ebullient advertisement for himself, he turned to

[15] Pico (1486), 36, 38–40; (1487), 108, 111; Plotinus, *Ennead* VI. 3. 3. 25–32; cf. VI. 2 . 8. 38–49; Allen (1989), 53–56.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:24:04, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.004

Plotinus and his interpreter: "I don't much understand what you write about Plotinus, but I know I haven't dropped him *(non excidisse mihi)* since I've always been convinced, as I still am convinced, that I need not only to hold him in my hands but to be taught by him." If Ficino had been grousing about him with Mithridates and Pier Leone, he, not Ficino, was the offended party since he had "never done him or his interests *(res)* any injury."

The interests could have involved money. Maybe Ficino got trapped in a transaction between an impetuous prince and a manipulative Mithridates: who knows? There the letter ended, with all best wishes for Pythagorean friendship.[16]

To pressure Pico for various rewards – including sexual services from a boy named Lancilotto – Mithridates rode him hard. Margins of books of Kabbalah that he translated for Pico are full of threats and sordid jokes, hundreds of them, about the prince's failings. The worst blunder was the thwarted abduction, in May of 1486, of a young woman, Margherita, already married to a Medici cousin. Ficino's response – a note "on the snatching of the nymph Margherita by the hero Pico" – laughed the incident off. But people died in the comedy, and the prince's credit sank. This was the situation a few months later when Ficino tweaked Pico about the "care" that caused him to "drop" Plotinus.[17]

In all likelihood, in a letter about book-borrowing, Ficino was complaining that Pico had mislaid a book – a text of the *Enneads* – because he was distracted by the incident with Margherita. Ficino had started his translation before April of 1485, and in January of the next year he told Pier Leone that he had finished. The chronology allows that Pico could have had all of Ficino's translation by the winter of 1486, but only part of the commentary that he refused to discuss with Pico in September of that year. Ficino's letters to another correspondent, just before and after the message to Pico, describe the commentary as progressing through the second *Ennead*, which was finished by the end of 1486.[18]

Since Pico's *Conclusions* were published in the last month of the same year, on December 7, the possibilities for Ficino's influence on the theses – as an interpreter of Plotinus – are clear: all of his translation of the *Enneads* and some of his commentary could have been in play. Moreover, in at least

[16] Kristeller (1937), 1. 34–5; Ficino (1975–), 7. 29–30 (24), 40–41 (31); Virgil, *Aeneid* 3. 56–57; Ovid, *Epistulae ex Ponto* 2. 4. 23–24; Kibre (1966), 186–187 (506), 252 (989), 1668; Bacchelli (2001), 1–9, 87–89; Copenhaver (2011), 180–182.

[17] Ficino (1975–), 7. 32 (27); Bori and Marchignoli (2000), 11–15; Bacchelli (2015); and Campanini (2007) for a stunning analysis of the bizarre messages sent by Flavius to Pico.

[18] Kristeller (1937), 1. cxxvi–vii; Ficino (1975–), 7. 40 (30), 42 (32).

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:24:04, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.004

one other case, Pico used a translation by Ficino to construct his propositions: all ten theses on Hermes Trismegistus replicate Ficino's Latin version of two Hermetic discourses. Would Pico not do the same with Plotinus if he could? For good reasons (to be explained further on), Ficino could not approve of the prince's *Commento*, composed in the same period, but the issues that highlight Plotinus in that work are not the main business of the theses *secundum Plotinum*.[19]

Unlike the theses on Trismegistus, those on Plotinus do not copy long stretches of Ficino's Latin. And how close they come to Ficino's Plotinus or to Plotinus himself is hard to say because Pico's terse propositions are so unlike the fluid reasoning of the *Enneads*. This is one of them, *P11*,

consum[m]atae virtutis est etiam primos motus amputare,

for which one translator has

it is the height of virtue to cut off even the first motions,

supposedly referring to *Ennead* VI. 9 on movements of the soul aligned with the Good. Two other translators do better with

è caratteristica di una virtù perfetta amputare anche i primi impulsi

and

le propre d'une vertu parfaite est de rejeter aussi ses premières impulsions.

Pico's description of *virtus* as *consummata* might reflect Ficino's Latin at *Ennead* 1. 2. 4, a treatise on virtue. Where the *Enneads* have

kai poteron en tōi kathairesthai hē aretē ē en tōi kekatharthai. Atelestera tēs en tōi kekatharthai,

MacKenna wrote,

does virtue imply the achieved state of purification or does the mere process suffice to it, virtue being something of less perfection than the accomplished pureness,

and Armstrong's version is not much different:

whether virtue consists in the process of being purified or the achieved state of purification. The virtue in the process of purification is less perfect than that in the achieved state.

[19] Pico (1486), 69; *Corpus Hermeticum* XII. 2, 11, 13–15, 18–19, 21; XIII. 6–7, 12; Ficino (1989), fol. 5; Copenhaver (1992), 45–53; (2015a), 217–224; Lelli (2007), 134–135.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:24:04, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.004

Although no word in the Greek maps on to *consummata*, Ficino's choice was justified,

> et num in purificando an potius in purificatione iam consummata consistat virtus? Imperfectior est utique virtus,

and Pico could have borrowed his terminology for *P11*. *Consummata* is not an unusual word, however: the prince could also have thought of it himself, without anyone's guidance.[20]

Moreover, his technical diction differs from Ficino's elsewhere in the same set of theses, as in *P9*,

> non fit assimilatio ad divina per virtutes etiam purgati animi nisi dispositive,

which may reflect *Ennead* I. 2 again:

> tēn dē toiautēn diathesin tēs psuchēs kath'hēn noei te kai apathēs houtōs estin, ei tis homoiōsin legoi pros theon, ouk an hamartanoi,

where Armstrong has

> one would not be wrong in calling this state of the soul likeness to God, in which its activity is intellectual, and it is free in this way from bodily affections,

agreeing with MacKenna on 'likeness' for *homoiōsis*. The static 'likeness' fits a sentence about a 'state' (*diathesis*) – not a process – of the soul: Ficino agreed, writing *similitudo*. But in *P9* Pico opted for the dynamic *assimilatio*, which was probably what Plotinus had in mind. In any case, since one project of the *Oration* and *Conclusions* was mystical assimilation – indeed, annihilation – in God, *assimilatio* was the better choice for *P9*.[21]

In the other theses on Plotinus, Pico's vocabulary sometimes matches Ficino's, as in *P11*, and sometimes differs, as in *P9*, making the sum of this evidence inconclusive for Ficino's influence on the *Conclusions*. Since the theses were published just a few months after Ficino's vague remark about 'dropping' Plotinus, the full story might weigh against any such role for him. But *P11* – read in light of Ficino's commentary, not just his translation – tells a different tale.[22]

[20] Pico (1486), 15; (1995), 36–37; (2006), 68–69; Plotinus, *Ennead* I. 2. 4. 3; cf. 6. 9. 8; Plotinus (1966–1988), 1. 137; (1991), 19; Ficino (1580), 13; Farmer (1998), 298–299.

[21] Pico (1486), 15; Plotinus, *Ennead* I. 2. 3. 19–21; Plotinus (1966–1988), 1. 135; (1991), 18; Ficino (1580), 13; Kalligas (2014), 138–140.

[22] For agreements, see *P1* and Ficino (1580), 519–520; *P4* and p. 6; *P8* and p. 13; *P12* and p. 561; *P13* and p. 33; for other disagreements *P2* and p. 476; *P3* and p. 206; *P5* and p. 6; *P6* and p. 686; *P7* and p. 32; *P10* and pp. 503–504; *P11* and pp. 13–14; *P15* and pp. 34–35; *P14* both agrees and disagrees with p. 36.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:24:04, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.004

Ficino wrote his commentary by working through his translation, "reviewing the words and using expositions *(argumenta)* to clarify the meaning – often obscure." One exposition was an introduction to *Ennead* I. 2 on virtue. Since Ficino had nearly finished commenting on the first *Ennead* by August of 1486, Pico could have seen these thoughts before Ficino needled him in September about being distracted. Although the word *consummata*, used by Ficino to translate *Ennead* 1.2, does not appear in his exposition of this treatise, the same *argumentum* includes distinctive terms of *P11 – primi motus* and *amputare*.[23]

Plotinus argued that virtues enable people to become like God by aspiring to and imitating something in or about God. However, since the purpose of virtues is to moderate or eliminate passions, God needs no virtues because he lacks passions. Hence, what virtuous people imitate in God are archetypes of virtues, not virtues themselves. This is most of Ficino's digest of *Ennead* 1.2, which

> undertakes definitions of virtue and virtues . . . so that we might understand the basis of our likeness *(similitudo)* to God. . . The soul becomes like God through virtue insofar as it receives from him a virtue that is a copy *(imago)* of a divine archetype *(exemplar)*. But then Plotinus makes distinctions between virtues while defining them. To understand this, you must understand which affects *(motus)* in us are original *(primi)* and which derived *(secundi)*. Original affects, in fact, are certain sudden impulses stirred up in our animate being *(animal)* by external forces through the sensory faculty *(sensus)* of the animate and by natural prompts from its imagining. And the rational soul, before consulting with reason about these affects, may attend to the imagining instead, whether to escape the affects, if they are frightening, or pursue them if they are alluring. But derived affects, established while pursuing original affects or turning them away, follow either the attention given to the imagining that happens first or also the counsel of reason – be it rash or considered. Therefore, a virtue that cuts off *(amputat)* derived affects involving sensation *(sensibilia)* gets the name *civic*, and this may be courage, moderation or wisdom when it deliberates *(consultans)* or justice when it decides *(conversans)* accordingly. . . However, virtues that not only cut derived affects off but root them out have the name *cleansing (purgatoriae)*. And finally, virtues that have already subdued derivative passions *(perturbationes)* and, beyond this, either eradicate the original impulses (provided a human can do so) or at least temper them with reasoning and habituation – these belong to a soul already cleansed. Of these virtues, threefold in their genus, there are archetypes in God – but not any virtues. For none of the affects and troubles that concern our virtues exists there.

[23] Kristeller (1937), 1. cxxvi.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:24:04, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.004

Ficino, an expert commentator, gave a condensed and schematic account of a longer, less clear and more nuanced statement. There are no original or derived affects in what Plotinus wrote, only "greater and lesser" (*meizous kai elattous*) virtues. Nor is there anything "cut off," only a more abstract "taking away" (*aphairesis*) or "separation" (*chōrismos*) that became *ablatio* or *separatio* in Ficino's translation.[24]

He began his commentary with *archetypes* of virtues – not virtues themselves, which are *copies* of those models – as the ultimate causes of human likening to God. Virtues are of three types – civic, cleansing, and those of a soul already cleansed. Civic virtues are the usual four: courage, moderation, wisdom, and justice. The task of virtues is to restrain or eliminate affects, both original and derived. Original affects are an embodied person's first responses to stimuli presented through sensory cognition for reason's judgment assisted by imagining. Derived affects, downstream from original affects, are more physical and damaging – the trauma of passions, repellent or attractive, felt by an embodied person. Civic virtues restrain derived affects and "cut off" the damage. Cleansing virtues eliminate derived affects entirely. Finally, the highest virtues of someone already cleansed either eradicate or moderate original affects.

Ficino's dense outline is not just clear but illuminating, since there is nothing so orderly in *Ennead* 1.2. In thesis *P11* Pico condensed Ficino's condensation, using terminology *(primos motus amputare)* that would have been hard to invent independently. Hence, he probably had the benefit of Ficino's commentary for some of his theses on Plotinus. These are more than a string of quodlibetal propositions. They develop a core doctrine of the *Oration*, about conjunction with the Agent Intellect *(T1–3)* or – in Christian terms also used by Plotinus and other pagans – divinization (*homoiōsis pros theon*) and mystical union (*henōsis*).[25]

Pico's theses on Plotinus focus, though not sharply, on virtue and happiness – on *Ennead* 1.2 and 1.4, both accessible to the prince in Ficino's translation and commentary. These fifteen propositions assert the transcendence of the highest divinity and the need for humans to join with it – hence to separate from everything lower. Metaphysics underwrites a theory of virtue and happiness. Principles of a metaphysical psychology come first (more or less) in *P1–6, 10* and 12, followed by a moral psychology in *P7–9, 11* and *13–15*. The theses are short, true to their genre, and the reasoning is telegraphic.

[24] Plotinus, *Ennead* I. 2. 4. 6, I. 4. 14. 2–3; Ficino (1580), 14, 37.
[25] Pico (2007),12–16, 44; Plotinus, *Ennead* I. 2. 3. 5–6, 20–21; VI. 7. 35. 1. 37.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:24:04, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.004

Mind is absolutely transcendent *(P1),* and although Soul remains with Mind *(P2),* all life, even in plants, is ensouled and immortal *(P3),* so it is no surprise that souls migrate from humans to animals *(P4;* also *P18)* and that souls are both reasoning and unreasoning, the reasoning Soul being prior *(P5)* where Life, Mind and Being converge *(P6).* And yet, at the level of reason, even forms are likenesses, whereas Forms in Mind are authentically real *(P10),* and Mind does not contemplate these Ideas as objects outside it *(P12)*.

Human happiness is supreme only when a person's mind joins with Mind *(P7)*. Virtues help the joining, but civic virtues are virtues only in a limited way *(P8)*. Virtues prepare souls to join the Divine but do not cause the joining *(P9)*, and when virtue is perfected, it stands apart from every affect, even the original affects that accompany a soul's basic functioning in life *(P11)*. Genuine necessities of life are needed but not good *(P13)*. Authentic happiness, weakened by the awareness required for inauthentic happiness *(P14)*, is not diminished by ailments that impair awareness *(P15)*.[26]

Blessedness can do without consciousness. Pico's asceticism was rigorous and thorough, seeking the annihilation of the self-aware individual that comes with complete assimilation to God. In broad strokes – at the level of his theses – the asceticism that he found in the *Enneads* differed from his own mainly in not being Christian. Since he hoped for philosophical concord, this difference had to be explained – as Ficino had explained it – with a theory of history: that an ancient pagan theology supported Christian doctrine. The same "poetic theology," as Pico called it, opened up resources of Greco-Roman myth and poetry for a philosophical approach to art and literature – including vernacular literature. In the land of Dante, less than two centuries after the *Commedia* was finished, this was a task worthy of an ambitious prince.[27]

Commento

As far as Plotinus was concerned, however, the results in the *Commento* were thin. Except to taunt Ficino, Pico brought Plotinus into his analysis only a few times. One use of the *Enneads* was aesthetic, to elucidate lines of Benivieni's poem. But larger patterns of mythologizing and allegoresis got most of Pico's attention, which on those topics was less focused. He also raised distinctly philosophical questions about the soul, the divine

[26] Pico (1486), 14–15. [27] Pico (2007), 110; Walker (1972), 1–21.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:24:04, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.004

hierarchy and God – in the last case taking a position soon to be condemned in thesis *T6:* that calling God "an intellect or intelligent" was somehow problematic.[28]

He began the *Commento* with ancient Platonists who "in their primary doctrine posit being in three modes ... causal being, formal being and shared being." Since causal being is the noblest, they say that God "is not being but the cause of all beings ... not intellect but the source and foundation of every intellect." This statement troubled Platonists of his own day, Pico observed, especially an unnamed but eminent expert (Ficino) who

> may have been surprised by something Plotinus said where he stated that God neither understands *(intende)* nor knows *(conosce)*. Perhaps more surprising is that he himself does not understand what Plotinus means about the way in which God does not understand ... which does not deny understanding to God but attributes it to him in a more perfect and excellent manner.

The Areopagite, an exemplary Christian, backed Plotinus up, explaining that God is not an "intellectual or intelligent nature but is inexpressibly elevated above all intellection or cognition." Ficino translated the title of *Ennead* V. 6 accordingly: "What is beyond being does not understand *(non intelligere*, *mē noein*)." But Ficino disagreed with Plotinus, and Pico – thirty years younger – contradicted the *gran platonico*, whom he called out by name later in the *Commento* for "distorting what Plato says."[29]

Pico also implied that Ficino picked the wrong side in a controversy about filling the metaphysical gap "between God and the Soul of the World." Plotinus and the "better Platonists" took the "more philosophical" position: that there was only one intermediary, the "Son of God produced directly from God." But Proclus and others proposed "a great number of creatures" – gods, angels, demons and so on. Since Ficino's theology echoed Proclus more than Plotinus on this issue, the world's most distinguished living Platonist was demoted from the "more perfect" by a brilliant upstart.[30]

The *Commento* – never finished or published by Pico – has two parts. The first chapter of the first part states general principles of metaphysics, theology and cosmology, noting mythological analogies and numerological

[28] Pico (1486), 39; (1487), 108–109; (2001), 22–24, 28, 30, 56, 86, 126–128, 206.
[29] Pico (2001), 22 (1.1), 70 (2.2); Plotinus, *Ennead* V. 6 tit.; ps.-Dionysius, *De Divinis Nominibus* 868A; Ficino (1580), 533.
[30] Pico (2001), 28–30 (1.3–4); Plotinus, *Ennead* II. 9. 1.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:24:04, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.004

symmetries. The next two chapters, adding more mythology, derive principles of aesthetics and ethics from a metaphysics and psychology of love. In its second part the book descends from generalities to examine – line by line in a *commento particulare* – the nine stanzas of Benivieni's poem.[31]

The particulars are more persuasive. But Pico called on Plotinus only once in this second and less abstract part of the *Commento*, where the shining face of Moses, after a theophany on Sinai, reminded him of Plotinus as described by Porphyry: "every time his soul was raised up in some lofty contemplation, his face had an appearance of gleaming splendor." Plotinus himself – according to Pico – drew a moral and aesthetic conclusion: "that nothing beautiful is ever wicked." He thought that "this beauty, this grace – which in a body's color and stature also often seems rather beautiful – was a most certain sign of the soul's intrinsic perfection."

In this explication of Benivieni's sixth stanza, Pico also cited a poem by Catullus, who described a woman's visible beauty *(venustas)* as shapely *(formosa)* and as also having color *(candida)* – though he thought that too much shape in too large a body detracted from beauty. Pico sensed resonance with Catullus in Benivieni's words *(formata, bella),* and the stanza's first line,

Quando formata in pria dal divin volto,

also evoked Moses, whose brilliant visage *(faccia)* was like the face *(volto)* of Plotinus. This cleared the way for a meditation on manifestations of beauty (color, shape) and its more or less embodied character. Pico, who wrote poetry himself, was – in this case – a sensitive and well-informed critic who philosophized effectively about art with help from Plotinus.[32]

But there is more Plotinus in the first part of *Commento*, where he gave Pico less to work with on issues of ethical and aesthetic value-theory. One problem was the role of embodied senses in cognizing beauty and engendering love. Thinking of *Ennead* III. 5, Pico described Plotinus as allowing "only one cognitive power, sight," and concluded that "Eros, which means *love* in Greek, is derived from the word *orasis* that means *seeing*." Since etymology was the main philosophical tool of the *Cratylus*, Plato's successors – Plotinus among them – also used this device. The *Cratylus* has not been a success philosophically, however, and worse can be said of the

[31] Allen (2008) is the best guide to the *Commento*.
[32] Pico (2001), 206 (st. 6); Plotinus, *Ennead* I. 6. 1; Porphyry, *Vita Plotini* 13. 5–8; Catullus 86.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:24:04, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.004

most far-fetched etymologies, like the *orasis* and *visione* that Pico took from Plotinus.[33]

Is this treatment of an old style of philosophizing anachronistic? Consider another case. To say that Aristotle was wrong to base monotheism on a cosmology that allowed forty-seven or fifty-five first movers in a geocentric cosmos is not an anachronism; likewise for reasoning from etymology in philosophy – and also for allegorizing. Allegories have long been prized as expressions of art. And the quality of an allegoresis, as an aesthetic item, can be assessed in a philosophical way. But it does not follow from the success of allegories in art or from the possibility of judging them philosophically that allegories are good equipment for philosophers. Plato, a literary genius, philosophized with myth in an unforgettable way. All philosophers remember the Cave, but none since Plato has invented any myth so memorable.[34]

Perhaps Plotinus sensed this challenge when he was working on *Ennead* III. 5, which studies the stories of Eros and Aphrodite in Plato's *Symposium* and also in the *Phaedrus*. What is the genealogy of Eros *(Amore* in the *Commento)* if Aphrodite *(Venere),* his mother, was the daughter of Ouranos *(Celio)*? What if her father was Kronos *(Saturno)* or Zeus *(Giove)* instead? Can the conflicting pedigrees be reconciled? Might Eros have had two avatars, one divine and one demonic? This seemed the best way out to Plotinus, who tried to make Plato's allegories fit his system but seems not to have tried very hard.[35]

[33] Pico (2001), 86 (2.9); Plotinus III. 5. 3.11–15; Ficino (1580), 288, 294. Plato (1997) is the most recent collected works in English: on pp. 101–102, introducing the *Cratylus*, the editor notes that the dialogue "figures little in our own discussions in philosophy of language. . . Readers are always puzzled . . . that Plato has Socrates devote more than half his discussion to . . . etymological analyses." Guthrie [1962–81], 5. 23–24) was even harder on the etymologies: "a bewildering and sometimes ludicrous collection. . . No one knows how seriously to take them."

[34] Aristotle, *Metaphysics* $1072^{b}13$–24, $1073^{a}14$-$^{b}38$, with Ross (1924), 2. 384: "The doctrine of the 'intelligences' which move the spheres is hardly consistent with the doctrine of the single first mover in chapter 7."

[35] Armstrong on *Ennead* III. 5 in Plotinus (1966–1988): "He does not seem to consider this kind of intellectual activity very interesting or important, and is extremely casual about the details of his interpretation. He does not really care whether Aphrodite is to be represented as the daughter of Ouranos, Kronos or Zeus. . . He finds it difficult to give an allegorical interpretation of the *Symposium* myth which will fit his own system, and his explanation of it is sometimes obscure and confusing." John Dillon in Plotinus (1991): "This late treatise is the nearest thing we have in Plotinus' work to the connected exegesis of a myth – though even this is not very systematic." Kalligas (2014, pp. 502–506), acknowledging that other commentators have been "unable to disguise their disappointment," thinks better of the treatise and describes its "exegetical character . . . so unusual for Plotinus . . . as a response . . . to other interpretative reworkings of the various myths." Ficino's enthusiasm for philosophical mythology, by contrast, was limitless: for his interpretation of *Ennead* 3.5, see Gersh in Ficino (2017–, cxxxiv–viii), improving on Hadot (1990).

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:24:04, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.004

The irrepressible Pico was ready with axes to grind, however: where it seemed that "Plato and Plotinus disagree," he seized the occasion to apply his grand theory of concord. In *P19* he said that Love in the *Enneads* is "not the heavenly Love that Plato discusses in the *Symposium* but a correct and close copy of it" – close enough for philosophical harmony. This was his detailed solution in the *Commento*:

> Just as ideas descend from Celio, or God, into the angelic mind, and through this the love of intellectual beauty is born there, so from the angelic mind the same ideas descend into the rational soul, though they are more imperfect than those in the angelic mind in that the soul and rational nature are more imperfect than the angel and intellectual nature. . . And note that Plotinus in his book on love does not talk about the first celestial Love but only this [second] one. Likewise, he does not talk about that first Venus but the second – that is, not about ideas descending from Celio into Saturn but about what descends from Saturn into Jove or into the Soul of the World. This surely makes it clear why that celestial Venus that he talks about is not said to be born from Celio, as Plato says, but from Saturn. On this it would seem to an inattentive person that Plato and Plotinus disagree, whereas one who looks at it correctly knows that total and absolute cognition of celestial Love comes from both of them because Plato deals with the one that is the first and true celestial Love, Plotinus with the second which is a copy of that one. . . And for the same reason that causes Plotinus to think that the ideas – the first Venus – are not accidental but substantial for the angelic mind, he also wants these specific reasons, which in the soul are like ideas in the mind, to be substantial for the soul, and so Plotinus will now say that the heavenly Venus is that first divine and rational soul.[36]

As philosophy, Pico's analysis is unconvincing – or perhaps indeterminate – because so much turns on resolving unresolvable differences about mythical family trees. The literary criticism is also ineffective because – unlike his comparison of Plotinus to Moses – this passage is detached from Benivieni's *Canzona*, the poem that Pico set out to interpret.

After the *Commento*, *Conclusions* and *Oration*, all produced in 1486, Pico had less to say about Plotinus in later works before moving to different terrain in the *Disputations against Divinatory Astrology* – also not published in his lifetime. That Plotinus did not matter much for the *Heptaplus* is unsurprising in light of the topic. But his absence from *De ente et uno* is remarkable. Again, Pico left this little tract unfinished, and the position endorsed by it contradicted Plotinus (and Ficino) on the

[36] Pico (1486), 46; (2001), 126–128 (3.1).

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:24:04, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.004

priority of the One: given more time, however, he surely could have addressed the disagreements explicitly.

As it happened, the unfinished work provoked a dispute with Antonio Cittadini, a conventional scholastic master, and after Pico's death his nephew, Gianfrancesco, continued the battle. Before that, while Pico himself was still fending off Cittadini's objections, he cited Plotinus twice in close succession, once to prove that Platonists said "that God is not really a being," next to show them recognizing

> that an idea is a being and is said to be such, but, since God is above beings, they contend that he is above ideas. In fact, Plotinus located all ideas in the Mind nearest to God, which he calls the first Being, first Intellect and first Life, in such a way that God is not a hiding place for ideas but their source, not a receptacle but their origin.

Plotinus testifies here along with other witnesses – Proclus, Syrianus and Plato himself: there is nothing special about his point of view. When Pico opened the *Commento* by citing Plotinus, he had said the same thing about divine fecundity – "God is not intellect but the source and origin of every intellect" – to make Ficino look foolish.[37]

Oration

Plotinus comes up by name only twice in the *Oration*, and the first mention says nothing about his thought – only the difficulty of its expression. The second calls on him for expertise about magic:

> Plotinus also mentions magic where he shows that the magus is Nature's minister, not her Artificer. This man of the loftiest wisdom approves and confirms the one magic and abhors the other so that, when he was summoned to rites of evil demons, he said it was *better that they should come to him than he to them*. And rightly so: for as the one magic exposes and enslaves man to unclean powers, the other makes him their lord and prince.

This passage alludes to the last parts of *Ennead* IV. 4 and quotes Porphyry's *Life* of Plotinus. Both references were meant to support Pico's conception of a purely natural magic that did not rely on demons or other superhuman persons. Such persons could be addressed only through the Church's sacramental, liturgical, and devotional chain of command:

[37] Pico (2001), 22–24 (1.1); (2007), 286–288; Plotinus, *Ennead* V. 3. 17. 10–14, VI. 7. 12. 20–24, VI. 9. 5. 7–20; note 27 of this chapter. The lengthy *Disputations*, lacking a good modern edition and translation, has not been thoroughly studied; Grafton (1997) is the best place to start.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:24:04, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.004

praying to Saint Michael, an archangel, for example. Otherwise, to communicate with such persons – even unintentionally – was forbidden. And prohibited messages might still be answered. Hence, demonic magic could be real and effective, in Pico's view, but was always wrong. The quotation from Porphyry expressed the correct attitude: the faithful must despise "rites of evil demons" to put unclean spirits in their place – in submission to the truly divine powers honored by Plotinus.[38]

A good magician who abhors demons, according to Pico, serves Nature, according to Plotinus, because Nature and her powers are always already there and need no magical artifice to produce them. The magus has only to find Nature's sympathies and antipathies and know how to use them – like knowing which button will switch on the current in an electrical circuit. Even among Christian conceptions of magic, Pico's idea was not original, but it was durable – once Ficino made the basic distinction part of his own more cautious theory, which shaped the philosophical magic of the Renaissance and was also closer to *Ennead* IV. 4.

"The primal mage and sorcerer," according to Plotinus, is Nature, whose powers humans discover and then "turn these same ensorcellations and magic arts upon one another." If a magician were "to stand outside the All," however, "evocations and invocations would no longer avail to draw up or to call down." The magus needs access to natural "patterns of power" to which "even the celestials, the demons, are not on their unreasoning side immune." Demons who live closest to humans in the lower world are the likeliest to "accept the traction of methods laid up in the natural order." Plotinus, who advised the sage to "stand outside," saw magic as a harmful distraction because its real effects kept their users within Nature. Demons lurking there might also "accept the traction" of natural magic.[39]

Ficino, told by Proclus that that "all things are full of gods and demons," worried that they could not be kept out of natural magic, even if a magus tried to avoid them. Wherever a wizard waved a wand, a demon might respond. Ficino stated his fears at length, if evasively, in the final chapter of his treatise on medical and philosophical magic, *On Arranging Life by the Heavens,* which was an excursus from his commentary on *Ennead* IV. 4. *De vita coelitus comparanda* gave magic the status of philosophy and provided students of magic with a coherent and respectable theory. The

[38] Pico (2007), 88–90, 112; Plotinus, *Ennead* IV. 4. 40–45; Porphyry, *Vita Plotini* 10. 33–39.

[39] Plotinus, *Ennead* IV. 4. 40. 6–9, 14–19; 43. 12–16 (MacKenna adapted); Copenhaver (2015a), 55–68, 245–264; (2015b), 261–269, 288–304, 337–340, 372–374: Pico published his *Conclusions*, but not the *Oration*, in 1486, three years before Ficino finished *De vita coelitus comparanda*.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:24:04, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.004

book went through many editions and was still being printed in the seventeenth century, when Europe's leading thinkers finally repudiated magic.[40]

When Descartes, Galileo, Hobbes and others made this breach possible, they brought Europe closer to Enlightenment. Others – including Henry More, a prominent party to their debates – were not so sure about disenchantment. Moreover, without Pico's pioneering of Christian Kabbalah, More could not have constructed his own original theosophy (he coined the English word 'theosophical' in 1642) with Kabbalah as a component. In More's time other students of Kabbalah also remembered Pico, but his advocacy of natural magic in the *Oration* caused little concern to promoters of the new atomist and mechanical philosophies.[41]

After Pico died in 1494, almost no one cared about his canceled speech or remembered its words about magic. The Church had already condemned his *900 Conclusions* in 1487, and nearly half a century passed before the theses were printed again. Once the *Conclusions* were republished, however, and after Johann Reuchlin was persecuted for Judaizing, Pico's 119 theses on Kabbalah were studied by opponents and proponents of Christian Kabbalah. Pico put most of these propositions in the part of his book that also proposed twenty-six theses on magic – the "unprohibited and legal natural magic" that he identified with "natural science" and attributed to Plotinus in the *Oration*. Although he did not mention Plotinus in the theses on magic, he said that no magic could be effective without Kabbalah. Hence, the magical theses in the *Conclusions* were of interest to Christian students of Kabbalah, who had to turn only a few pages to check other theses on Plotinus.

How many were that curious? There was little room in Europe's memory, within a century of Pico's death, for his encounter with Plotinus. The prince's star kept fading until late in the Enlightenment when Kantian philosophers discovered insights of their own (not Pico's) in the *Oration*, eventually inspiring Jacob Burckhardt to transform him into humanism's herald of human freedom and dignity. Burckhardt published his magnificent essay in 1860, but Pico's stock stayed low for quite some time. In 1911 the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* ignored the *Oration* and wrote him off as a "gay Italian nobleman . . . whose works cannot now be read with much interest."

[40] Proclus, *De sacrificio* 149. 28 (Bidez); Copenhaver (2015a), 91–94, 231–232, 245–247, 256–264; (2015b), 368–371.

[41] Copenhaver (2015a), 363–427; (2015b), 551–555; Oxford English Dictionary, s.v. "theosophical."

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:24:04, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.004

Before the Great War ended, however, fortune turned again for the prince and his speech. Ernst Cassirer, Eugenio Garin, Giovanni Gentile, Paul Kristeller and their followers in the new field of Renaissance Studies soon made Pico a global celebrity. Once Garin and others edited and translated his works, they could be studied in detail. The results put the *Oration* at the center of Pico's fame, motivating art historians, historians, philologists, philosophers, theologians and other experts to examine and debate the speech in detail, as they have done now for more than a century.[42]

These close readings of the *Oration* help us see through one of Pico's stranger devices – strange for a modern philosopher, anyhow: esoteric writing. He told his audience of learned prelates that God's command was "to keep secret from the populace what should be told to the perfect," and he followed this rule throughout the *Oration*. Hence, when he named Proclus in only one uninformative phrase, he was not suggesting that the renowned Platonist was unimportant for the speech that introduced the *Conclusions*, where fifty-five theses were *secundum Proclum*. In fact, the elaborate metaphysical theology of this pagan sage was absolutely crucial for Pico's equally flamboyant trinitarian Kabbalah, as the speech shows when read alongside the 900 theses.[43]

Likewise, the presence of Plotinus in the *Oration* went farther than Pico's two explicit mentions of him – most obviously when the prince argued for natural magic by starting with a distinction between *goēteia* (sorcery) and *mageia* (magic) – see *Ennead* IV. 4. 40, where the difference is not really so obvious. Then see Pico's account of magic that "probes deep into that universal accord that the Greeks more tellingly call *sumpatheia* and examines how natures are kin to one another."

Elsewhere in the speech, Plotinus helped the prince at least three times: once when he conflated Calypso with Circe to symbolize human transformation and metempsychosis; once when he repeated the "ancient teaching" about "practicing death" that the dying Socrates passed on to his students; and once when he quoted Porphyry on his teacher's wish "to join his spirit's divinity to the divinity of a greater world." All these moments are crucial in the *Oration*.[44]

[42] Pico (1486), 56–58; Anon. (1910–1911); Copenhaver (2016) and the other items by me cited in note 1 of this chapter.

[43] Pico (1486), 17–22; (2007), 90, 118–124.

[44] Pico (2007), pp. 16–18, 44, 60–62, 104–106, 114–116; Plotinus, *Ennead* I. 6. 6. 1–16, 8. 17–21; IV. 4. 40. 1–29, 41. 1–8; Porphyry *Vita Plotini* 2. 25–27; Plato, *Phaedo* 69c.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:24:04, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.004

On the whole and over the long haul, considering the give and take between the two philosophers, it looks like Plotinus did more for Pico than Pico did for Plotinus, whereas for Ficino it was a different story. The results are also different for us.

From Pico's engagement with Plotinus, we can see how theses in the *Conclusions* sometimes worked together – as in *P1–15,* where the focus was on happiness as assimilation and on virtue as a means to that end. Since the orator's two explicit statements about Plotinus in the *Oration* suggested nothing like this, we can also be sure that the speech was not meant as a clear and forthright guide to the *Conclusions* or to the author's aims when he wrote the two works. Finally, since he kept silent about a key transition in the theses – from *T1–3* to *P1–15,* linking ancient ideas about assimilation with God to medieval discussions of conjunction with the Agent Intellect – we may conclude that the prince wanted his secretive method to conceal sacred truths of the very greatest importance.

REFERENCES

Allen, M. J. B. (1989) *Icastes: Marsilio Ficino's Interpretation of Plato's Sophist: Five Studies and a Critical Edition with Translation*, Berkeley, CA.

(1995) "The Second Ficino-Pico Controversy: Parmenidean Poetry, Eristic and the One," in *Plato's Third Eye: Studies in Marsilio Ficino's Metaphysics and Its Sources*, Aldershot, 417–455.

(2008) "The Birth Day of Venus: Pico as Platonic Exegete in the *Commento* and the *Heptaplus*," in M. Dougherty (ed.) *Pico della Mirandola: New Essays*, Cambridge, UK, 81–113.

Anon. (1910–1911) "Giovanni Pico della Mirandola," in *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 11th ed., New York, 21: 584–585.

Bacchelli, F. (2001) *Giovanni Pico e Pier Leone da Spoleto: Tra filosofia dell'amore e tradizione cabalistica*, Florence.

(2015) "Giovanni Pico, conte della Mirandola e Concordia," *Dizionario Biografico Italiano* www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/pico-giovanni-conte-della-mirandola-e-concordia_%28Dizionario-Biografico%29 (accessed 15 November 2018).

Black, C. (2006) *Pico's Heptaplus and Biblical Hermeneutics*, Leiden.

Bori, P. C. and Marchignoli, S. (2000) *Pluralità delle vie: Alle origini del Discorso sulla dignità umana di Pico della Mirandola*, Milan.

Campanini, S. (2007) "Guglielmo Raimondo Moncada (alias Flavio Mitridate), tradutorre di opere cabbalistiche," in M. Perani and L. Pepi (eds.) *Guglielmo Raimondo Moncada alias Flavio Mitridate: Un ebreo converso siciliano; Atti del Convegno Internazionale, Caltabelotta (Agrigento), 23–24 ottobre 2004*, Palermo, 49–88.

Copenhaver, B. (ed. and trans.) (1992) *Hermetica: The Greek Corpus Hermeticum and the Latin Asclepius*, Cambridge, UK.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:24:04, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.004

Copenhaver, B. (1999) "Number, Shape, and Meaning in Pico's Christian Cabala: The Upright *Tsade*, the Closed *Mem*, and the Gaping Jaws of *Azazel*," in A. Grafton and N. Siraisi (eds.) *Natural Particulars: Nature and the Disciplines in Renaissance Europe*, Cambridge, MA, 25–76.
(2002a) "The Secret of Pico's *Oration*: Cabala and Renaissance Philosophy," *Midwest Studies in Philosophy*, 26: 56–81.
(2002b) "Magic and the Dignity of Man: De-Kanting Pico's Oration," in A. Grieco et al. (eds.) *The Italian Renaissance in the Twentieth Century: Acts of an International Conference in Florence, Villa I Tatti, June 9–11, 1999*, Florence, 295–320.
(2007a) "Maimonides, Abulafia and Pico: A Secret Aristotle for the Renaissance," *Rinascimento*, 47: 23–51.
(2007b) "Chi scrisse l'*Orazione* di Pico?," in F. Meroi and E. Scapparone (eds.) *La Magia nell'Europa moderna: Tra antica sapienza e filosofia naturale: Atti del convegno (Firenze, 2–4 ottobre 2003)*, Florence, 79–105.
(2009a) "Ten Arguments in Search of a Philosopher: Averroes and Aquinas in Ficino's Platonic Theology," *Vivarium*, 47: 444–479.
(2009b) "A Grand End for a Grand Narrative: Lodovico Lazzarelli, Giovanni Mercurio da Correggio and Renaissance *Hermetica*," *Magic, Ritual and Witchcraft*, 4: 207–223.
(2011) "Studied as an Oration: Readers of Pico's Letters, Ancient and Modern," in S. Clucas, P. Forshaw, and V. Rees (eds.) *Laus platonici philosophi: Marsilio Ficino and His Influence*, Leiden, 151–198.
(2014) "Pico Risorto: Cabbalà e dignità dell'uomo nell'Italia post-unitaria," in F. Lelli (ed.) *Giovanni Pico e la cabbalà*, Florence, 1–18.
(2015a) *Magic in Western Culture from Antiquity to the Enlightenment*, Cambridge, UK.
(2015b) *The Book of Magic: From Antiquity to the Enlightenment*, London.
(2016) "Giovanni Pico della Mirandola," *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pico-della-mirandola (accessed 15 November 2018).
(2017) "Dignity, Vile Bodies and Nakedness: Giovanni Pico and Giannozzo Manetti," in R. Debes (ed.) *Dignity: A History*, Oxford, 127–179.
(2018) "Against Humanism: Pico's Job Description," in A. Ossa-Richardson and M. Meserve (eds.) *Et amicorum: Essays on Renaissance Humanism and Philosophy*, Leiden, 198–241.
Davidson, H. (1992) *Alfarabi, Avicenna and Averroes on the Intellect: Their Cosmologies, Theories of the Active Intellect and Theories of the Human Intellect*, Oxford.
Farmer, S. A. (1998) *Syncretism in the West: Pico's 900 Theses (1486); The Evolution of Traditional Religious and Philosophical Systems*, Tempe, AZ.
Ficino, M. (1580) *Plotini platonicorum facile coryphaei rerum philosophicorum omnium libri liv in sex enneades distributi [. . .] cum Latina Marsilii Ficini interpretatione et commentatione*, Basel.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:24:04, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.004

(1975–) *The Letters of Marsilio Ficino, Translated from the Latin by Members of the Language Department of the School of Economic Science*, London.
(1989) *Corpus Hermeticum I–XIV, versione Latina di Marsilio Ficino, Pimander*, ed. S. Gentile, Florence.
(2001–2006) *Platonic Theology*, ed. and trans. M. J. B. Allen and J. Hankins, 6 vols., Cambridge, MA.
(2015) *On Dionysius the Areopagite*, ed. and trans. M. J. B. Allen, 2 vols., Cambridge, MA.
Ficino, M. (2017–) *Commentary on Plotinus*, ed. and trans. S. Gersh, 1 vol. + 5 vols. [projected], Cambridge, MA.
Grafton, A. (1997) "Giovanni Pico della Mirandola: Trials and Triumphs of an Omnivore," in A. Grafton, *Commerce with the Classics: Ancient Books and Renaissance Readers*, Ann Arbor, MI, 115–132.
Guthrie, W. K. C. (1962–1981) *A History of Greek Philosophy*, 5 vols., Cambridge, UK.
Hadot, P. (ed. and trans.) (1990) *Plotin: Traité 50 (III.5)*, Paris.
Ivry, A. (2016) *Maimonides' Guide of the Perplexed: A Philosophical Guide*, Chicago.
Kalligas, P. (2014) *The Enneads of Plotinus, A Commentary*, trans. E. Fowden and N. Pilavachi, Princeton, NJ.
Kibre, P. (1966) *The Library of Pico della Mirandola*, New York.
Kristeller, P. O. (1937) *Supplementum ficinianu, Marsilii Ficini florentini philosophi platonici opuscula inedita et dispersa*, Florence.
Lelli, F. (2007) "Hermes Among the Jews: Hermetica as Hebraica from Antiquity to the Renaissance," *Magic, Ritual and Witchcraft*, 2: 111–135.
Oxford English Dictionary https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/theosophical (accessed 15 November 2018).
Pico della Mirandola, G. (1486) *[D]e adscriptis numero noningentis*, Rome [British Library: IB.18857].
(1487) *Apologia*, Naples [British Library: IB.29535].
(c. 1489) *Heptaplus [. . .] de septiformi sex dierum Geneseos enarratione [. . .]* Florence [British Library: IB.27535].
(1496) *Commentationes [. . .] in hoc volumine contenta, quibus anteponitur vita [. . .]*, Bologna [British Library: IB.29063–4].
(1995) *Conclusiones nongentae: Le novecento tesi dell'anno 1486*, ed. and trans. A. Biondi, Florence.
(2001) *Kommentar zu einem Lied der Liebe*, ed. and trans. T. Bürklin, Hamburg.
(2006) *Neuf cents conclusions philosophiques, cabalistiques et théologiques*, ed. and trans. B. Schefer, Paris.
(2007) *Discorso sulla dignità dell'uomo*, ed. and trans. F. Bausi, 2nd ed., Parma.
(2010) *Dell'ente et uno, con le obiezoni di Antonio Cittadini e le risposte di Giovanni Pico della Mirandola*, ed. and trans. F. Bacchelli and R. Ebgi, Milan.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:24:04, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.004

Plato (1997) *Complete Works*, eds. J. Cooper and D. Hutchinson, Indianapolis, IN.
Plotinus (1966–1988) *Enneads*, ed. and trans. A. H. Armstrong, 7 vols., Cambridge, MA.
(1991) *The Enneads*, trans. S. MacKenna, ed. J. Dillon, London [= abridged version of MacKenna's translation].
Ross, W.D. (ed.) (1924) *Aristotle's Metaphysics*, 2. vols., Oxford.
Walker, D. P. (1972) *The Ancient Theology: Studies in Christian Platonism from the Fifteenth to the Eighteenth Century*, London.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:24:04, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.004

CHAPTER 3

Jacques Lefèvre d'Étaples and Charles de Bovelles on Platonism, Theurgy, and Intellectual Difficulty

Richard J. Oosterhoff

In 1514 the learned physician Jerome of Pavia recalled long, difficult travels over the Alps to Paris to meet the French humanist Jacques Lefèvre d'Étaples (c.1455–1536). He found him with Charles de Bovelles (1479–c.1567), "a young man . . . follower and former student of Lefèvre, whom you would suppose another Alcibiades to Socrates, Dion to Plato, or Theophrastus to Aristotle".[1] They talked, Jerome reported, of Lefèvre's own travels to Italy, and Lefèvre told of meeting Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, Ermolao Barbaro, Poliziano, and Marsilio Ficino, "the first right proponent of the Platonic philosophy among the Latins".[2] The conversation wound its way through natural philosophy, metaphysics and ultimately theological questions, about which Lefèvre "put Aristotle in harmony with many of Plato's teachings".[3] Indeed, Lefèvre was exceptionally generous, for

> although he most favours Aristotle, he is in no way sworn to the master's words, so sometimes he mingles certain Platonic teachings with Aristotelian ones, in order to avoid cheating either of their proper praise. But he holds to both philosophers in such a way that he delights to be called neither Platonist nor Aristotelian, but entirely apostolic and the whole *symistes* [systema?] of faith overflows in holy teaching, the whole abounds, the whole is rapt up to the ambrosia of Dionysius himself, to the holy sources of that nectar.[4]

[1] Champier (1519), a iii v: *adstabat illi circunque fovebat latus Carolus quidam iuvenis elegantissimus satis liberali forma studiorum ipsius Fabri sectator et alumnus, quem quasi putasses alterum Alchybiadem Socratis, Platonis Dionem, aut Aristotelis Theop[h]rastum.*

[2] Jerome, in Champier (1519), a iiii r: *Marsilium illum Ficinum Platonicae philosophiae inter Latinos primum legitimumque propagatorem.*

[3] Champier (1519), a iiii v: *qualiterque in pluribus Platoni concordem faceret Aristotelem.*

[4] Champier (1519), a iiii v: *Et cum is Aristoteli plurimum faveat, in nullius tamen iuratus verba magistri ita miscebat interdum platonic aquaedam cum peripateticis ut suis quemque propriis haud defraudaret laudibus. Sic autem utrique philosophorum est addictus ut neque platonicus neque peripateticus appellari gaudeat, sed apostolicus totius fideique symistes totus exundat in doctrina sacra, totus exuberat, totus raptatur ad Dionysii ipsius ambrosiam ad sacros illius nectaris fontes.*

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Sussex Library, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:25:36, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.006

This passage refracts Lefèvre's voice through several filters – Jerome was writing to Lefèvre's follower Symphorien Champier, who published the letter in 1519 – but it still offers a grainy snapshot of his (and Bovelles') views.

The letter also supports a distinctive intellectual genealogy: Lefèvre and Bovelles as the French heirs to Ficino and other Italian humanist philosophers. Indeed, Lefèvre himself travelled to Italy three times, in 1491, 1500 and 1506–1507; Bovelles also travelled as far as Rome in 1507.[5] Lefèvre's first trip was especially important in setting him up to take the humanist (and Platonist) baton from Italy; within a couple of years of his return, he had offered brief commentaries on Ficino's translation of the Hermetic Corpus, offering Ficino the traditional epithet of a revered teacher, *tamquam pater*.[6] In the mid-1490s Lefèvre wrote a *De magia naturali*, which bears many similarities with the astral magic of Ficino and the cabbalistic interests of Giovanni Pico della Mirandola.[7] There were further links. The Ganay brothers, Jean and Germain, were an important political family at court who patronised both Lefèvre and Bovelles into the 1510s. Jean accompanied the French invasion of Italy in 1494 as a royal counsellor; Ficino met Jean and promised him copies of his Platonic translations, and Jean was possibly the vehicle for Ficino's translation of Athenagoras in 1498.[8] The Ganays seem to have worked towards a *translatio studiorum* from Italy to Paris, a substantive connection between Lefèvre, Bovelles and the Italian Platonisms of the previous generation. Such facts have often swept Lefèvre and Bovelles into the basket of Renaissance Neoplatonists.[9]

Yet despite sharing so much with the Florentine physician, Lefèvre and Bovelles pursued a very different intellectual project. Rather than operating within the fluid structures of a Medicean *accademia*, they were arts masters at the Collège du Cardinal Lemoine in the University of Paris. Lefèvre and Bovelles met in the countryside during a university holiday from the plague in Paris, and Bovelles immediately left his former college to join Lefèvre at Lemoine, where he himself soon became a regent master.[10] Within this context, they aimed to renovate the university curriculum – retaining

[5] On Lefèvre's life, see Renaudet (1953), 136–145, 381, 389–393, 498–499, and entries around those dates in Rice (1972). On Bovelles' travels, see Victor (1978), 13–19; Margolin (2002).
[6] Lefèvre d'Étaples (1494), e iii r. Republished with additions in 1505: see Pantin (1988).
[7] For bibliography, see Mandosio (2013).
[8] Kristeller (1956), 51–54.
[9] Mönch (1936); Walker (1954), e.g. at 206–207; Boisset (1960); Joukovsky (1979), (1981) and (1982).
[10] This meeting is recounted in Bovelles (1511), 168v.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Sussex Library, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:25:36, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.006

Aristotle as the foundational authority of the arts course. Between 1492 and roughly 1506, Lefèvre and his close-knit circle of students redefined the entire cycle of the arts course with new editions, commentaries and handbooks for Parisian students. First a student studied the logic of Aristotle's *Organon*, along with arithmetic, geometry, music and astronomy. These set the foundation for the suite of texts that make up Aristotle's natural philosophy (from the *Physics*, *On the Heavens,* to the *Parva naturalia* and *On the Soul*), leading to a smattering of moral philosophy (the *Ethics* and the *Politics*) and some of the *Metaphysics* in preparation for the MA – required for all those beginning studies in one of the higher faculties of Law, Medicine or Theology.[11]

Jerome of Pavia's account of Lefèvre as an Aristotelian who was friendly to Plato is mirrored in modern scholarship, but in a limited way. Study of Lefèvre's Aristotelianism has largely been confined to his voluminous editions of Aristotelian textbooks, whereas the Platonism has been traced through his editions of the Hermetic Corpus, biblical commentaries and Nicholas of Cusa (and, to a very small degree, his mathematical studies).[12] Similarly, older scholarship on Bovelles was prone to setting him in the shadows of either Cusanus or Ficino.[13] More recent studies reveal him as a creative pedagogue and metaphysician.[14] Drawing on these insights, this chapter considers the extent to which Lefèvre and Bovelles accommodate the Plotinian strand of the Platonic tradition within the Aristotelian cycle of the arts, ultimately presenting the university as the site of seeking wisdom. By considering the difficulty of attaining wisdom, we will be able to differentiate Lefèvre and Bovelles from other heirs of Plotinus.

Plotinus and the Arts Cycle

Lefèvre and Bovelles inspired their students with reformist ideals of learning that built on the university arts *cursus*, and especially on Aristotle. But in hindsight we can see their reform leaned heavily on broadly Platonist sources, with bright flecks of Plotinian influence. One measure can be taken from a list of authors Lefèvre recommended to would-be scholars. Much of the list sets in place the emerging humanist canon, including Niccolò Perotti and Baptista Mantuanus within grammatical studies, the

[11] An overview of this programme can be found in Kessler (1999); Lines (2007); Oosterhoff (2015) and (2018).
[12] E.g. Heller (1972). Exceptions are Vasoli (1959) and Rice (1970).
[13] See note 9.
[14] Faye (1998a); Ferrari and Albertini (2011); Klinger-Dollé (2016).

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Sussex Library, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:25:36, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.006

books of Aristotle "drunk from a pure source" in the arts course, and finally a series of Church Fathers and biblical studies recommended at the higher level, to round out this "liberal and noble education".[15] Several aspects of the list are unusual. One is the prominent profile of mathematics, connected to the authority of Boethius, Euclid and Ptolemy. Boethius features as the paraphraser of Nicomachus' *Arithmetica*, the author of the *Musica* and also as the only interpreter of Aristotle's logical works that Lefèvre cares to name. Also unusual are the two names with which the list culminates: Nicholas of Cusa and (Pseudo-) Dionysius. "If a more generous mind should strive for more elevated contemplations, let it rise little by little from the books of Cusanus, Dionyius and any who are similar."[16] Plotinus – and Proclus and other Platonists – are conspicuously absent from the list, at least in name. But Boethius and Dionysius represent a late antique Christian appropriation of Plotinian Platonism, and Cusanus is the most marked fifteenth-century representative of that tradition. In hindsight, the privileged place of these names makes it possible to speak of a more diffuse influence of Plotinus on Lefèvre and Bovelles.[17]

It was an influence they themselves rejected. The reason was historical: they accepted Dionysius not as the sixth-century synthesiser of Platonism and Christianity, but as Saint Paul's convert on the Areopagus at Athens, and therefore the voice of a true Christian philosophy. In his edition of Dionysius' works (1499), Lefèvre adduced the witness of Ficino and some (spurious, as it turned out) patristic letters to argue for Dionysius' authenticity, while remonstrating with his beloved Cusanus for having been deceived on the matter. From their standpoint, Lefèvre and Bovelles could espouse certain apparently Platonist teachings as being in fact Christian, and merely stolen from Dionysius by the Platonists. Meanwhile, Lefèvre became quite wary of the sorts of Platonism that motivated some of his Florentine contacts. This account of the French humanists is well known, not least due to Tigerstedt's account of the discovery of the true origins of the Dionysian corpus.[18] Its implications are harder to untangle, however.

[15] The list emerges in a commentary on Aristotle's *Politics*, Lefèvre d'Étaples (1506), 124r: *hanc proculdubio liberalem et ingenuam putaverim esse institutionem.*

[16] Lefèvre d'Étaples (1506), 124r: *si mens generosior elevatiores contemplationes affectet, paulatim ex libris Cuse surgat et divini Dionysii et si qui sunt similes.*

[17] On the high esteem for Cusanus and Dionysius especially, see Heller (1972) and Emery (1984). On Boethius, see Moyer (2012),

[18] Tigerstedt (1974); Monfasani (1987).

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Sussex Library, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:25:36, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.006

If Dionysius was not Platonist, what was? And what did Lefèvre and Bovelles do with doctrines typically associated with the Plotinian tradition?

One place where Lefèvre's account of the Platonic tradition seeped into his actual teaching was at the beginning of the arts course, in the *Isagoge* of Porphyry, a student of Plotinus. As we shall see, Lefèvre was sharply aware of Porphyry's Platonism, and kept a sharp eye out for where Porphyry might mislead. Like most arts teachers, Lefèvre and Bovelles introduced their first-year students to logic.[19] But their approach was slightly different from the usual practice in late mediaeval Paris. In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the normal textbook of logic was Peter of Spain's *Summulae*, often augmented with commentaries and digests.[20] The *Summulae* was the only logic textbook named in the University statutes as updated in 1452, and in the 1490s it is clear that Lefèvre's colleagues in the arts faculty were using the *Summulae* as the basis for their own teaching.[21] The *Summulae* presented six topics, organised into domains often identified as the *ars vetus* and the *ars nova*:[22]

Sources of Peter of Spain's Summulae

	Peter of Spain	*Aristotle*	*Commentaries by Boethius*
Ars vetus	1. De enunciatione	De interpretatione	Two
	2. De universalibus	Isagoge Porphyrii	Two
	3. De praedicamentis	Categoriae	One
Ars nova	4. De syllogismo simpliciter	Analytica priora	Two
	5. De locis dialecticis	Topica	
	6. De fallaciis	De sophisticis elenchis	
	7. Parva logicalia	–	

The *ars vetus* first gave a preliminary account of sentences or propositions, then turned to specific terms in sentences, focusing on universals and categories. It was an "old art" because it depended on works that had been continuously part of Latin philosophy ever since Boethius had translated Aristotle's basic textbooks. Since well before the works of the *ars nova* became available in the twelfth century, and the *Summulae* was

[19] Unusually, the Fabrists also taught mathematics in the first year, as I argue in Oosterhoff (2018).
[20] Copenhaver, Normore and Parsons (2014).
[21] Denifle and Châtelaine (1889), IV: 728; cf. Bricot (1495); Tataretus (s.d.).
[22] This table is based on Ebbesen (1977), 105.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Sussex Library, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:25:36, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.006

introduced in the thirteenth century, Porphyry's *Isagoge* had been the student's first introduction to philosophy.

Lefèvre reinstated the old tradition of reading Porphyry first. This was partly a humanist move *ad fontes*, as he exhorted on the title page of his edition of Aristotle's logical works: "Now, therefore, O youths, draw up and taste the purest waters from the enduring font of Aristotle's works." The "purest waters" in this case were Boethius' translation, with occasional commentary on the new Greek edition of Aristotle. Boethius himself, after all, was an authority: to him, Lefèvre exclaimed, "the school of Latin philosophy owes as much as the school of rhetoric owes to Cicero".[23] But the philological choice had philosophical implications. For one thing, the order of the *Summulae* presented universals and categories purely as a matter of analysing sentences, in line with late mediaeval trends. By encountering Porphyry's *Isagoge* and Aristotle's *Categories* first, a student met logic not by manipulating propositions, but by deciding which words and categories fit the world.

Although a Platonist and a close student of Plotinus, in the *Isagoge* Porphyry wore these affiliations lightly. He presented the brief work as a handbook for giving students the basic terms they needed to read Aristotle's *Categories*.[24] Porphyry therefore explicitly "avoids deeper inquiries", only introducing the "five words" (*quinque voces*) as mediaevals knew them: genus, difference, species, property and accident.[25] Porphyry explicitly says he will avoid controversial questions about how universals such as genera and species exist, whether in thought or in corporeal form, and so on.

This matched Lefèvre's own stance. In the prefatory letter to Germain de Ganay, Lefèvre claimed he had kept partisan philosophy out of the book, having "moderated my style, so that that no one should question or distrust about matters of knowledge – except perhaps he who is cast into the camp of barbarians, still languishing sick in miserable captivity".[26] He agreed with Porphyry that questions of the ontological status of universals should be left aside: "these are metaphysical, and for that reason should be ejected from

[23] Lefèvre d'Étaples (1503), 6v: *Boetius tamen cui latine philosophie schola tantum debet quantum Tullio rhetorice.*

[24] Late antique Platonists habitually taught Aristotelian texts within a larger Platonic cycle of learning, e.g. P. Hadot (1990), I. Hadot (2005).

[25] Barnes (2003), 3 (§0).

[26] Lefèvre d'Étaples (1503), a i v: *Stilum ita temperavi, ut nullus de intelligentia (si nomen mea fallit opinio) aut queri, aut diffidere debeat, nisi forte qui in barborum castra deiectus adhuc misera sub captivitate languet infirmus.*

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Sussex Library, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:25:36, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.006

this teaching."[27] Squabbling over such things in elementary logic should be left, he hinted with a knowing glare, to the "sophists". This is not a refusal to engage with such topics, for he emphasises that those things should be reserved for the advanced end of the arts course, "namely, metaphysics".[28]

Notwithstanding his and Porphyry's claim to do no metaphysics in the *Isagoge*, it is clear that such thoughts are never far from Lefèvre's own mind. He sets out with the observation that Porphyry does not wear Platonist colours in this work: "for even though he is a Platonist, here he mostly wishes to imitate the Aristotelians".[29] Yet throughout his commentary, Lefèvre was vigilant to Porphyry's Platonism. When explaining how "species" is used, Porphyry gives the example of man as a species belonging to the larger genus of rational animal. The text highlights the fact that it is "a Platonic and gentile teaching about the rational animal." In the scholium, Lefèvre explained his worry: "this saying follows the opinion of the Platonists, but not truth: certain members of the gentile rite believed that the heavens and stars were gods and that daemons were fiery, airy, earthly and watery gods, and that all of those animate beings were capable of reason. Porphyry appears to have favoured Plato more than Aristotle."[30] Platonism veers towards idolatry, on Lefèvre's view, because Platonists deify natural powers.

Lefèvre detected another aspect of Platonism when Porphyry uses the language of participation to describe how the diversity of people relate to the one species "human". Porphyry says that "by participation in the species the many men are one, and by the particulars the one and common man is many". Lefèvre observed that the notion of participation suggests that "there exists the one common species 'man' in many men, that is resolved in the singular notions of particular and single men".[31] As Lefèvre notes, Porphyry here adopts a "mode of speech" that conforms rather to the Platonic "manner of speaking".[32]

[27] Lefèvre d'Étaples (1503), a ii r: *que methaphysice sunt et iccirco ab hac institutione reiiciende.*
[28] Lefèvre d'Étaples (1503), a ii r.
[29] Lefèvre d'Étaples (1503), a ii r: *Nam tametsi platonicus sit, hic summopere imitari vult peripateticos.*
[30] Lefèvre d'Étaples (1503), 6r: *Id dictum est secundum opinionem platonicorum non autem secundum veritatem: quiquidem ritu gentilium credebant celos et astra deos esse et insuper demones quosdam igneos, aereos, terrenosque et aqueos, et omnia illa animalia esse et ratione vigentia. Et Porphyrius magis Platoni quam Aristoteli fuisse videtur addictus.*
[31] Lefèvre d'Étaples (1503), 6v: *Est speciem communem 'homo' in plures homines, particularium et singulorum hominum singularibus notionibus resolui.* Lefèvre is in good company here: many of Porphyry's modern commentators have thought this a particularly Platonist, even Plotinian, passage. See the discussion in Barnes (2003), *Introduction*, 136–141, with references.
[32] Lefèvre d'Étaples (1503), 6v: *Et sermonis modus quo Porphyrius hoc in loco usus est magis secundum Platonicorum loquendi consuetudine quam Aristotelicorum tractatus est.*

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Sussex Library, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:25:36, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.006

Lefèvre's last concern about Porphyry's Platonism is sparked by Porphyry's claim that being susceptible to learning is an inseparable difference between the human species and other species. Learning is innate to humans, according to the Platonists, Lefèvre points out, "because [the Platonists] suppose that the disciplines are set within us, consubstantial from our origin, as can be found in Priscian and the *Meno* of Plato".[33] By claiming that knowledge is somehow inseparable from humans, Porphyry seems to hint at the Platonic doctrine of innatism. In contrast, the Aristotelian sees learning as a habit, something acquired and therefore separable.

This brief examination of Lefèvre's commentary on the *Isagoge* offers us a perspective on what Platonism might mean around 1500. In sum, a fresh student in Lefèvre's classroom encountered Platonism as a dangerous affair. First, Platonists deify nature, and therefore call up the spectre of idolatry. Second, Platonists are realists about species, resulting in a particular language of participation. Third, Platonists teach that knowledge is not learned, but innate to the human soul. Doctrines about participation and innatism could be associated with worrying views of the human soul – but the threat of idolatry was most dangerous of all.

In fact, Lefèvre very likely had contemporary Platonists in mind. Certainly Lefèvre was aware of the daemonology underlying Ficino's reading of the "fatal number" governing the transition of regimes – in *De numero fatali,* Lefèvre devoted the longest scholium of his commentary on Aristotle's *Politics* to that number, analysing Ficino's account even as he omitted daemonology.[34] Lefèvre certainly would have known of *De vita libri tres*, a book of magical self-care that began as Ficino's commentary on Plotinus, *Ennead* IV. It is hard to imagine that he was unaware of Ficino's commentaries on the *Enneads* of Plotinus (1492), and particularly *Ennead* III. 4, where Ficino harmonised Plotinus with Iamblichus, presenting daemons both as allotted to the soul and as a series of mediating rational beings that explain the elemental powers from the Earth through the aetherial regions.[35] In *De vita* and on *Ennead* III. 4, Ficino presented precisely the set of worries that bothered Lefèvre.

We might suppose Lefèvre's warnings about Platonists were concessions to teaching – perhaps he bowdlerised introductory texts for tender ears.

[33] Lefèvre d'Étaples (1503), 9v: *quod disciplinas nobis consubstantiales a principio inditas opinentur, ut ex Prisciano Lydo cognosci potest pariter et ex Menone Platonis.*
[34] Lefèvre d'Étaples (1506), 86v–89r. Allen (1994); on Lefèvre's account, see Oosterhoff (2018).
[35] See the introduction to Marsilio Ficino in Gersh (2017); Saffrey (1996), 502–504.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Sussex Library, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:25:36, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.006

Porphyry was after all the first taste of philosophy. But we encounter a similar strategy when we consider the other end of the arts course in the elevated teachings of metaphysics or "supersubstantial" philosophy. This was how Lefèvre presented Dionysius the Areopagite in 1499. In *On the Divine Names*, Dionysius repeated a rather Plotinian version of the teaching that the one divine is ineffable, beyond naming. After explaining how Nicholas of Cusa's *De docta ignorantia* might elucidate the issue, Lefèvre found it necessary to ward off the claim that this was a particularly Platonist view. Instead, he suggested that Plotinus and others dreamed up the whole thing as a weak imitation of Dionysius:

> For this trumpet [i.e. Dionysius] is divine, the supersubstantial trumpet of Christ and the Holy Spirit – not Platonist or Aristotelian. Let us leave divine matters to the divines, and human matters to humans. Our times should be warned off the platonic faction that began at the time of Origin, a hundred years or more after the most blessed father [Dionysius]. They should be warned so that men know that Plato neither said, thought or knew of these things, but a certain group of the gentiles, such as Plotinus, Iamblichus, Porphyry and Proclus, roused by imagination from a few things of Plato, tried to make a fuss about the highest mysteries of the superdivine trinity through their threefold one, calling themselves interpreters of Plato.[36]

In fact, Lefèvre went on to claim most of this was a corruption of John 1, *in principio erat Verbum*. Those Platonists had usurped the name of wisdom (i.e. Christ) to refer to "their Ideas", while they had transformed the various names of the Holy Spirit into the overflowing *anima mundi*, and

> then that gloomy and impious philosophy sneaks in daemons, and attributes to them – who have a divided kingdom and are mixed by perversity – an order that is owed to the angels, and the highest things are mixed with the lowest, and the lowest with the highest.[37]

[36] Lefèvre d'Étaples (1499), 49v: *Divina enim hec tuba est, tuba supersubstantialis Christi, et Spiritus Sancti, non platonica aut aristotelica. Ut divina relinquamus divinis, et humanis humana. Et tempora nostra a factione platonica que tempore Origenis cepit per centum annos et supra post beatissimum patrem summopere cauta esse debent, et ut homines sciant, illa neque Plato dixit neque cogitavit, neque novit, sed coniurati quidam gentilium, ut Plotinus, Iamblicus, Porphyrius, Proculus altissima superdivine trinitatis mysteria per suum triplex unum ex paucissimorum platonis phantasia excitati interturbare moliti sunt, se dicentes Platonis interpretes.* Lefèvre tended to dissociate the *auctores* themselves from uncomfortable views. Cf. his account of those who "dream" about Pythagoras as the originator of all manner of Platonist beliefs, which he criticises as unreliable, since Pythagoras did not leave any writings (Lefèvre d'Étaples, 1506, p. 98r).

[37] Lefèvre d'Étaples (1499), 49v: *Tunc nomina eterne dei sapientie (que Christus Ihesus autor vitae est, mortisque destructor) fecerunt sue idee nomina; tunc Sancti Spiritus nominibus et in sacris eloquiis expressis beneficis proprietatibus, anima mundi dives facta est; tunc tristis et impia de demonibus irrepsit*

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Sussex Library, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:25:36, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.006

Here Lefèvre and Ficino agreed on much, even that Dionysius was the authentic representative of a Pauline philosophy, and that he passed on a vision of the universe as inhabited by myriads of soulish beings who mediated the one God and the multiple creation. What worried Lefèvre was the daemonology that such Platonist interpretations opened up. A pressure point was the idea that some angelic or daemonic beings might be corporeal in some sense. Dionysius raised the possibility when discussing how angels might have originally become evil when departing from God, arguing that bad angels (daemons) retain a desire for the good from which they fell. Commenting on this passage, Ficino expanded by reflecting on "three acts in the angelical mind, to speak Platonically", which – since they can have desires – must also include desire for composite bodies, making them animate beings. He buttresses his view with authority: "That the daemons are animate beings is the view not only of the Platonists but of the ancients, and, among Christians, of the Greek doctors. And Aurelius Augustine does not gainsay it."[38] Lefèvre, in his own commentary on the *Divine Names*, at this point could have simply omitted any discussion of corporeality, since Dionysius did not raise the topic. But – without mentioning Ficino by name, though clearly responding to Ficino's perspective – Lefèvre chose to raise the issue, arguing that "to suppose and believe daemons are corporeal is characteristic of gentiles and of those who prefer to call themselves gentiles and Platonists rather than Christians".[39] The looming danger is always idolatry, and Lefèvre tacitly, steadily holds Ficino at arm's length.

In hindsight, nevertheless, Lefèvre's deep respect for Dionysius as the summit of metaphysical insight keeps him firmly within the Plotinian view of the world. In this sense, Françoise Joukovsky's summary is correct at a general level:

> The Neoplatonism of these originators is eclectic: Lefèvre and Champier [or indeed Bovelles] owe as much to Hermes, Dionysius the Areopagite or to Ficino as to the author of the *Enneads*. But they remain faithful to the metaphysical inspiration of Plotinus, for they crown the rational exercise of definition and classification, based in dialectic, with the intuition of the transcendent One, the principle which the soul discovers in itself.[40]

philosophia, et iis que regnum in se divisum habent et que perversitate confusa sunt, ordinem (qui angelis debitus est) tribuerunt, et summa confusa sunt in imis et in summis ima.

[38] Allen (2015), 2: 54–55.

[39] Lefèvre d'Étaples (1499), 64v: *Est suspicari et credere demonas corporeos esse gentilitium est, et eorum qui se potius gentiles et platonicos quam christianos dici malunt.*

[40] Joukovsky (1982), 17.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Sussex Library, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:25:36, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.006

Even while agreeing with this overall judgement, the foregoing account of Lefèvre's wary view of Platonism should help us to discern distinctive emphases. Ficino tended to assimilate Plotinus with the theurgical projects of students such as Porphyry, Iamblichus and Proclus. Therefore, in Plotinian offshoots such as *De vita*, Ficino offered a care of the self oriented around a modified theurgy. Lefèvre, in his lists of Platonists, made many of the same associations. But he strenuously avoided the identification of nature's operations with daemons – not because he was incredulous, but because dwelling on the corporeal power of daemons presented readers with a dangerous temptation to pray to daemons. As a result, we may find in Lefèvre a version of Plotinianism that was careful to eschew overt association with occult powers. Instead, it placed a focus on the intellectual vision of God.[41]

Lefèvre and Bovelles: Difficulty and Wisdom

The metaphysics of a layered universe around basic principles – for Plotinus, the One, Intellect and Soul – is easily found in Lefèvre and Bovelles. Germain de Ganay answered Bovelles' account of a layered metaphysics around the number five with the suggestion that "Plotinus offered another philosophy about the same thing."[42] As I suggested above, even though they rejected the genealogy, Lefèvre and Bovelles were likely to share a general Plotinian framework since they chose as their intellectual heroes Dionysius the Areopagite, Nicholas of Cusa, and even Victorinus. In fact, one might wonder whether Lefèvre's stout focus on the intellectual vision of God brings him closer to Plotinus than Ficino came, since Lefèvre avoids the Proclian approach to the One through invocations of daemons, but instead pursues the One through contemplation of the intelligible. So how Plotinian were the French Renaissance philosophers?

One way to test this is by comparing them to Plotinus on the difficulty in doing philosophy in order to become wise. Plotinus offers a famously rarified account of wisdom. Recent scholarship does note that Plotinus offers a practical ethics, and even presents an account of contemplation that entails civic engagement.[43] Yet the core responsibility of the sage remains a movement of the self upward to vision of the One, confirming

[41] Ironically, this may bring Lefèvre closer to Plotinus himself than to more overt Plotinians of the day.

[42] de Bovelles (1511), 173r: *quamquam et Plotinus de eodem aliam affert philosophiam.* See Klinger-Dollé (2016), 196–197. Bovelles may well have overseen the text through the press, and therefore bears some responsibility for the fact that Plotinus' name is printed in the margin, highlighting the comparison.

[43] E.g. Song (2009), Smith (2005).

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Sussex Library, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:25:36, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.006

John M. Dillon's judgement that Plotinus retains an ethics that is "an uncompromisingly self-centred and otherworldly one".[44] Evil is identified with matter, so one becomes wise by ascetic self-removal from the physical world. Porphyry famously used this sagely asceticism to defend Plotinus' haphazard Greek: the words of Plotinus remain rough because polishing his writing would have drawn him unnecessarily into the matter of words, not to mention papyrus, pens and ink.[45] Such a life of wisdom has implications for intellectual difficulty, in at least two ways. First, such wisdom seems somewhat elitist, since the moral effort of such self-care seems beyond the reach of those without a taste for philosophical asceticism. Second, at the same time, for the happy few with ascetic impulses, there is a certain confidence that nevertheless it is *possible* for the soul to draw itself upwards. The soul must have some part that supplies the agency needed to disentangle itself from worldly affairs – like a pearl, this part can be scraped clean and freed from its earthly matrix and relate to the transcendent One. The sage only needs his intellect.

Plotinus' early disciples offered alternatives. Porphyry and especially Iamblichus offered theurgy as a way to invoke help in drawing the soul upward, democratising access to perfection. John Rist has argued that it was these concerns that troubled Augustine, who instead emphasised divine grace in supplying what the soul needed to ascend.[46] Augustine, Marius Victorinus and Dionysius the Areopagite can be read as finding an alternative to theurgy in the church's liturgy, where God gives believers the grace to lift heavy souls through the church's hierarchy and worship.[47]

The philosophical reform that Lefèvre and Bovelles carried out in the arts course at Paris around 1500 set wisdom as its goal.[48] Recall that the *cursus artium* was capped with ethics as well as metaphysics: Lefèvre and Bovelles both order their metaphysics around the formation of the *sapiens*. We can sample this approach in a list of sixty-two theses on metaphysics written down by their student Beatus Rhenanus. The first few sum up the metaphysical task:

1. The wise man is he who makes himself man.
2. To become man is the greatest wisdom.
3. Each thing born within one is made in oneself.
4. Out of this is understood the mystery of the Trinity.
5. The end of man is that he should make himself man.[49]

[44] Dillon (1996), 331. [45] Porphyry, *Life of Plotinus* 8. [46] Rist (1996), 405–408.
[47] Rist (1992). [48] The theme permeated their letters. See Rice (1958).
[49] These notes have been edited by Faye (1998b), 423–424.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Sussex Library, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:25:36, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.006

These propositions seem to harmonise with a Plotinian account of wisdom as generated within the philosophical soul, with only proposition four hinting at Christianity – and even there the Trinity does no work in elevating the soul. Wisdom is seen as the proper attribute of humanity, which occurs by bootstrapping itself into being; the very activity of becoming human is only explained by causes within the human.

These propositions also roughly follow the first of Lefèvre's *Dialogues on Metaphysics*, where we find an account of wisdom that reflects and contrasts with Plotinus in significant ways.[50] First published in 1492 together with a brief *introductio* to the first six books of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, this set of four dialogues purports to introduce metaphysics as a domain of study. Aristotle's opening line to the *Metaphysics* hums in the background: "All men by nature desire to know." But wisdom cannot just be any knowledge: it must be a particular kind of higher knowledge. Here the work's outline bears hints of Plotinian themes. The first dialogue defines metaphysics as the activity of the *sapiens* in the task of understanding first causes and first principles, "those supreme and most honourable entities in nature".[51] In the second dialogue, these principles turn out to involve a supertranscendent *ens maximum* who looks quite similar to the Plotinian One. The third dialogue unfolds an emanationist order of things in which the *summum ens* produces all things just as light (*lux*) flows into rays of light (*lumen*). Here Lefèvre is happy to use Platonist witnesses to support Aristotle's view of the human soul as the meeting point between higher intellectual entities and lower physical ones: Zoroaster, Hermes Trismegistus, Plato and the "magi" all teach that the soul is a coupling of heavenly mind with heavy body.[52]

But there are also sharp differences with Plotinus. The fourth, final dialogue largely reviews the previous ones – while introducing one big contrast between Aristotle and Plato. A student asks how Plato's Ideas differ from the central topic of the *Metaphysics*, Aristotle's account of separated substances. Lefèvre's response addresses the senses. For him, Platonists say that when seeing a lion, the eyes do not present the "true"

[50] Porphyry already observed that Plotinus especially responded to Aristotle's *Metaphysics* (Porphyry, *Life of Plotinus* 14. 4–7).

[51] Lefèvre d'Étaples and Clichtove (1502), 417 (¶5): *Que prime cause et prima principia? . . . Suprema illa et honorabilissima in natura entia.*

[52] Lefèvre d'Étaples and Clichtove (1502), 427v.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Sussex Library, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:25:36, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.006

lion: rather, the sight of a lion allows the viewer to recall the true Idea of the lion. Lefèvre's tone lightly mocks Platonists:

> Although you can go over the intelligible model of the world in your intellectual eye, and you might see this whole frame and all the species of things in truth and their wondrous, scarcely speakable beauty, and take this to be a true human, a true lion, a true plant, or a true heaven – yet what you touch upon with your bodily eyes is not true, even though they seem to be true and we judge them as such.[53]

The account reviews Platonic forms and the doctrine of reminiscence, leading to a note on Platonic signatures and seeds of things innate within the soul.[54] The account is not terribly nuanced – rather, its point is to set Lefèvre firmly within the *mos Aristotelicus*, where the senses are crucial to true knowledge. There is little space for a Plotinian pearl of divine self within, which can draw the knower up.

In fact, the *Dialogues on Metaphysics* teach a knower composed of body and soul to become wise not through self-reliance but by managing inputs: the senses and, implicitly, divine grace. Here the role of theology is ambivalent. In line with Dionysius, Boethius and Cusanus, metaphysics for Lefèvre deals ultimately with separable substances, of which God is the most perfect example, so theology is never far away. Nevertheless, the *Dialogues* present a philosophical domain of study within a methodologically and socially set curriculum for students of the arts faculty (methodologically and socially – this is not formally a part of theology).

Yet theological motifs pierce the philosophical surface of the text at several points. Two of these concern the Trinity, and deserve more discussion elsewhere.[55] Here I will focus on three prayers, which seem to

[53] Lefèvre d'Étaples and Clichtove (1502), 431v: *[Aiunt. . .] quemquidem intelligibilem et exemplarem mundum si intellectuali oculo circunlustrare posses, hanc totam machinam et omnes rerum species in veritate et sua mirifica, et haud dicibili pulchritudine conspiceres, illicque verum hominem, verum leonem, veram plantam, verum celum deprehenderes; quae autem corporeis oculis circunlustrando attigisti, vera non sunt, quamquam vera videntur et talia esse iudicamus.*

[54] Lefèvre d'Étaples and Clichtove (1502), 431v: *Voluntque Platonici semina quedam et omnium idearum sigilla nostris animis esse ingenita, quibusquidem a rebus sensibilibus excitis notiones specierum et generum (quarum obiecta sunt divine mentis species et Idee) effingimus.*

[55] The first dialogue culminates in the idea that by reflecting on the desire to know we encounter the Augustinian triad of intellect, memory and will. The student in the dialogue exclaims at the wondrous way these in turn reflect other triads, such as line, surface, body and, ultimately, the threefold "maker of all things". Looking within reveals the image of God. Lefèvre d'Étaples and Clichtove (1502), 420v: *Id ipsum ut qui longe videre sim ineptus haud percipiebam, totum totiusque appetitum suo pulchro ternario consurgere perfectum, itaque naturam immo vero ipsum nature opificem perfectum omne suo ternario complere.* The theme returns at the end of the third dialogue, with the *mysterium* of the Augustinian triad of unity, equality and connexion. See the suggestive comments

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Sussex Library, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:25:36, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.006

suggest key moments of intellectual ascent around the difficulties of intellectual vision. In the first dialogue, Lefèvre begins his analysis of the natural desire to know with a brief prayer of thanks for the sense of sight. He first addresses his intellectual eyes as

> the most blessed and best citizens and inhabitants of this most shining of places, who cannot approach with these dying eyes. I give thanks to the highest creator of all nature, above all thought, and above you yourselves, who bestowed on me these other eyes blinding you so far to what I desire. Now illumine me, I pray with outstretched arms and clasped hands, so that I might happily see, contemplate, praise and love you.[56]

This striking passage relates the Aristotelian value of physical sight, and swiftly adopts the Augustinian emphasis on intellectual vision. It also implicitly starts the process of sapiential knowing with prayer, invoking God's help to lift the mind heavenward. Indeed, a similar prayer occurs at the point where the next dialogue reaches the *summum ens*. The chain of efficient causes leads the mind upward, and once we have reached the summit, we find a prayer: "O being of beings, one, best, truest, fullest, most powerful, highest necessity, wisest, immortal and eternal: open for us the path and gateway to you, and help that natural desire which you have set within us."[57] Here the sage needs more than his intellect, turning to Christian worship as the theurgy needed to lift his soul.

This second prayer arises just at the point where Lefèvre addresses the difficulty of metaphysical knowledge. The question is explicit: in the case of metaphysics, "is truth easy or difficult?"[58] It should be easy, since true causes are perfectly clear and pure, just as the sun is clearer and purer than similar or reflected lights on Earth. But the knowledge of the sage turns out to be difficult due to "the weakness of our intellect".[59] The problem is that even intellectual vision is not strong enough. "For just as the night

in Faye (1998b), 442–443. A suggested line of enquiry may be found in Oosterhoff (in press); excellent background is found in Albertson (2012) and (2014).

[56] Lefèvre d'Étaples and Clichtove (1502), 419v: *O vos beatissimi et optimi huius lucidissime regionis cives et incole, qui his moribundis oculis adiri non potestis, gratias ago vestro, totiusque nature omniumque supra cogitatum omnem optimo parenti vobisque ipsis, qui michi alterum oculum impartiti estis quo vos cecutiens adeo ad quos aspiro. Hunc michi (tensis brachiis, manibusque complosis vos oro) illuminate: quo vos feliciter videam, contempler, laudem, et amem.*

[57] Lefèvre d'Étaples and Clichtove (1502), 423v–42[4]r: *O ens entium, unum, optimum, verissimum, plenissimum, potentissimum, summe necessarium, sapientissimum, immortale, atque sempiternum, pande nobis ad te viam et accessum, et adiuva quod nobis indidisti naturale desiderium.* Distantly, perhaps, we can hear an echo of late mediaeval debates over *quod in se est*, the bit of the sinner's will that seeks God. See e.g. Oberman (1983).

[58] Lefèvre d'Étaples and Clichtove (1502), 423r*: an veritas sit facilis an difficilis?*

[59] Lefèvre d'Étaples and Clichtove (1502), 42[4]r: *a nostri intellectus imbecillitate.*

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Sussex Library, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:25:36, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.006

raven's eyes relate to the daylight, so our intellect is in relation to the clearest, best and truest entities of nature."[60] The *infirmitas* and *debilitas* of the intellect mean that one who would be wise must rely on the helps and similitudes of the senses, as medicines of the mind. In fact, when a student asks what sort of helps he will need, Lefèvre's response transforms into a third prayer. "May God give you," he says,

> a good instructor who will provide you with true and beautiful precepts; may he give you teachability to let you learn from a benevolent teacher; may he give you the ability to receive everything according to its rightful place; may he give you a lofty mind and a sharp judgement; may he give you a mental edge for the very activity of contemplation – complete, unhindered, and unshaken."[61]

The response to intellectual difficulty includes a teacher. Learning does not happen by solitary reflection, but requires other minds, other bodies. God ultimately gifts the student, but not only with mental qualities: he is called upon to supply a community too, and the virtues to navigate it.

Material and intellectual aids similarly define the sapiential philosophy of Lefèvre student and colleague Charles de Bovelles. His most widely read book is *De sapiente*, which is often read on its own.[62] But it actually serves to culminate a series of treatises that follow this order: *De intellectu, De sensu, De nihilo*, *Ars oppositorum* and *De generatione*. As Anne-Hélène Klinger-Dollé has shown in careful detail, these treatises each offer elements that support Bovelles' account of the sage; in particular, Bovelles takes special care to account for the role of the senses in learning and ultimately in forming the sage.[63] Like the student Lefèvre prays for, Bovelles' sage is far from solitary, but active in conversation.[64] As I suggested with the theses found in Beatus Rhenanus' notes, Bovelles offers a vision of wisdom quite similar to that of Lefèvre. For both, the sage is the "complete and true human" (*homo perfectus ac verus*) who has full knowledge of universals

[60] Lefèvre d'Étaples and Clichtove (1502), 42[4]r: *Nam sicut oculi Nycticoracum sese habent ad lucem diei, ita est noster intellectus ad manifestissima, optima, et verissima nature entia.*

[61] Lefèvre d'Étaples and Clichtove (1502), 42[4]v: *Det igitur [deus] tibi o fili qui iuventa flores, sanum preceptorem qui veris et pulchris te instituat preceptis; det tibi docilitatem qua recte docenti benivole acquiescas; det unumquodque pro dignitate recipere; det altam mentem et acre iudicium; det integrum, inoffensum, illabefactumque ad ipsum contemplandum mentis acumen.*

[62] E.g. Joukovsky (1981). This narrow focus is partly the fault of modern editions and translations. A critical edition was republished with the German edition of Cassirer (1927), then translated into Italian by Eugenio Garin and into French, twice, by Pierre Magnard (1982) and Pierre Quillet (1983). See Ferrari (2011).

[63] Klinger-Dollé (2016).

[64] On the sociability of the Bovillian *sapiens*, see Faye (1998a) and Klinger-Dollé (2016).

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Sussex Library, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:25:36, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.006

or true causes. For both, this goal is achieved through the senses. Lefèvre spends much of his dialogues on how the intellect directs its desire to know through the eyes and other senses, gathering knowledge from the world in conjunction with memory and will. Likewise, Bovelles explains the task of the sage as one of collecting (*colligere*) an encyclopaedic experience of the world, which transforms him into a microcosm, a "little god" in God's image.[65] For both, the university arts course is an encyclopaedic platform for becoming human.

But can Bovelles' sage transform himself by his own intellectual power, as Plotinus would suggest?[66] Or does this process require help – whether the theurgy of Porphyry and Ficino, or the prayer of Lefèvre? The underlying similarities with Lefèvre would suggest that Bovelles' commitment to the embodied nature of the knower precludes a Plotinian view of wisdom. In fact, part of Bovelles' own fascination is his heroic effort to hold these two together.

This can be seen in the suite of treatises leading to *De sapiente*. The upshot of the first treatise, *De intellectu*, is that human intellect is *properly* linked with body (whatever might be said about angels or God). As a result, Bovelles constructs the next treatise, *De sensu*, on the axiom that all knowledge comes through the body, either directly from nature or from a teacher. Either way, there is no knowledge except through the body's senses.

This comes into tension with Bovelles' full commitment to a Christian universe, in which God creates all things from nothing. This means that matter came from somewhere, while knowledge ultimately resides in God and is therefore eternal. The overall framework of Bovelles' metaphysics therefore remains vaguely Platonic in structure, as we see in the next three treatises, where Bovelles uses Dionysius (and Cusanus) to reconcile his commitment to the senses with an intellectualist framework. *De nihilo* rehearses the distinction between the one creator and the pluriform creation, ending with an introduction to the Platonist distinction between positive and negative theology (which Bovelles finds in Dionysius). Negative theology respects the fact that God is infinitely distinct from creation, and therefore cannot be identified with it. This means that "the truest and highest theology is divine ignorance, which is called 'learned ignorance'".[67]

[65] A superb account is by Bocken (2011). [66] This is the view of Faye (1998a) and elsewhere.
[67] Bovelles (1511), 74r: *unde fit ut verissima et summa theologia sit divina ignoratio, que docta ignorantia nuncupatur.* Bovelles only mentions Dionysius, but is nowhere more clearly inspired by Cusanus. For a similar use of Cusanus, see Lefèvre d'Étaples (1499), 49r.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Sussex Library, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:25:36, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.006

Once the lessons of negative theology have been learned, however, it should be possible to reconstruct a new positive theology that transcends the limits of the old one. Here Bovelles quite directly borrows from Cusanus in the next treatise in the sequence, *Ars oppositorum*, which explores the possibility of thinking about ultimate unities and intellectual entities by using similitudes: diagrams and figures – especially, but not only, from mathematics.[68] The treatise *De generatione* applies these intellectual tools to the material world. *De generatione* is perhaps the most difficult treatise of Bovelles' *oeuvre*, precisely because in it Bovelles attempts to square the philosophical circle of harmonising Aristotle and Plato (or Pythagoras). He attempts to identify how the flux of physical nature in fact evinces the generative powers God has set in nature – powers that are ultimately mathematical and therefore susceptible to the intellectual analysis of opposites.

The outline I have just sketched has many implications for the next treatise, *De sapiente*, but here we will only consider an aspect of the problem of intellectual difficulty for the would-be *sapiens*. Whereas for Plotinus difficulty increases the more the soul is entangled in matter, this is not an option for Bovelles, since he is committed to the senses, and indeed matter, as the only source of knowledge. Rather, difficulty must emerge in the knower's biography, collecting and coming to terms with the world. Therefore it is not surprising that Bovelles begins *De sapiente* with vice and virtue – the wise man must possess virtue. The difficulty of becoming wise is also the difficulty of overcoming the vices in order to become virtuous.[69]

What power helps one gain the virtue necessary to be wise? Bovelles sets out the problem as four-layered schema, in which man rises from simply being (*est*), through living (*vivit*) and sensing (*sentit*), to understanding (*intelligit*), where he becomes *verus homo*. The lowest level helps us understand the problem of difficulty, for at that level our would-be *sapiens* is subject to the vice of *acedia*, or listless melancholy.[70] "For just as minerals sitting on the bottom end of the scale scarcely relate to anything else, without the ability to exist, to perform any natural operation, or to move by themselves – so also *acedia* sits as a portentious omen for everyone, and they constantly seek stupefaction in dreams, ceasing all

[68] It should be noted that this commitment to the senses and to sensory similitudes of higher concepts is precisely why images and writing are so interesting to Bovelles and the visual culture of the printed page is so striking in his works.

[69] Bovelles (1511), cap. I, 119r, lists the seven deadly sins.

[70] For useful accounts of *acedia* more generally, see Theunissen (1996) and Wenzel (1966).

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Sussex Library, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:25:36, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.006

motion and activity."[71] The problem to be overcome is a defect of (intellectual) virtue. *Acedia* is not defined actively, as a perverse choice – rather, it and the other vices consist of a lack. What resources does Bovelles relate for lifting the soul out of its inertia? In the many pages setting out the correspondences between the twin orders of the universe and the human mind, Bovelles leaves the agency within the soul. On the one hand, he sets wisdom in relation to God: "the wise man continually depends on, and is gathered and elevated to, the undivided unity of himself with God, in his mind. For he overcomes the tickling prickles of fleshly enticements by means of a great power." On the other hand, the next sentence leaves all the agency within the soul itself: "Outside of himself he cannot gain or come into possession of his mind."[72] A crucial chapter in *De sapiente* argues that "only reason is the adult, perfect daughter of nature", setting the uplifting intellectual power of the soul firmly within the realm of nature.[73] The *sapiens* can attain divine knowledge, but relies only on natural powers to get there. The student learning to be wise from Bovelles has no recourse to the prayers of Lefèvre. Instead, he must rely on reason to overcome the temptations, pride or inertia that drag him down – and, as for Plotinus, if he cannot find within himself an unstained pearl of will and desire for the good, he may simply not belong to the happy few of the *studiosi* who can claim the perfection that belongs to *veri homines*.

Conclusion

The fact that a variant of Plotinian principles constantly structured the view of the world taught by these French humanists has led some historians to see them as straightforwardly Plotinian. Yet Bovelles and Lefèvre absorbed the legacy of Plotinus at second hand – like many other readers of Proclus, Dionysius, Cusanus and so on – and so their commitment to that legacy is difficult to untangle from other commitments. This is all the more challenging because Lefèvre systematically warned students off from

[71] Bovelles (1511), cap. I, 119v: *Sicut enim mineralia que in extremo sedent gradu, haud aliud aliquid habent, quam ipsum esse nullaque naturali operatione exerceri aut per seipsa dimoveri illis indultum est, ita et quoscumque portentosum Acedie monstrum obsederit, assiduo ferme somno consopescunt, ab actu omni et operatione remittuntur.*

[72] Bovelles (1511), cap. VIII, 12[3]v: *At sapienti proprium est iugiter ad individuam et suiipsius et summi opificis dei unitatem feliciter niti, colligi, mente elevari. Carnalium namque illecebrarum titillantia spicula magna vi perdomuit. Extra seipsum nulla necessitudine elici aut incompos fieri potest mentis.*

[73] Bovelles (1511), cap. V, 121v–122r: *Quod sola ratio sit adulta et perfecta nature filia.*

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Sussex Library, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:25:36, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.006

the followers of Plato, evidently worried that they might encourage prayer to daemons. As a result, neither Lefèvre nor Bovelles saw themselves as heirs of Plotinus, even as they drew on him.

This makes it necessary to ask in what significant ways they might have differed from Plotinus. To do this I have selected a topic that mattered enormously to Lefèvre and Bovelles as well as to Plotinus: the attainment of wisdom. Like him, they were intellectualist in their account of wisdom – how far did this similarity go? The difficulty of using one's own intellect to "unstick" oneself from the struggles of daily life worried Plotinus' own students. In fact, this seems to have led Plotinian Platonists to adopt the theurgical motifs that so worried Lefèvre. While Plotinus pursued a more ascetic account of the soul's upward movement to the One, theurgy offered outside aid to the student hungry for wisdom.

Lefèvre and Bovelles' responses to this problem differed, I have argued, at least in emphasis. Both adopt a fairly similar account of wisdom from Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, an account that would have been recognisable to Plotinus. But unlike Plotinus, marked by an absence of biographical interest, Lefèvre and Bovelles begin with the embodied life of the *sapiens*, in which the senses are necessary to acquiring knowledge and virtue. Unlike Plotinus, Lefèvre and Bovelles are committed to the gritty particularity of teaching in the Renaissance university. It is in publishing books, communal prayer, eating and the dialogue of college life that students find the helps they need to become wise. Within this context it is Lefèvre who steps furthest away from Plotinus. His worries about Platonist theurgy suggest that he sympathises with the need for intellectual help – he more closely follows Dionysius the Areopagite in finding the resources for overcoming intellectual difficulty in Christian liturgy. Bovelles may have found this solution appealing, but remained closer to Plotinus by theorising a more elite, ascetic vision of wisdom.

REFERENCES

Albertson, D. (2012) "Achard of St. Victor (d. 1171) and the Eclipse of the Arithmetic Model of the Trinity," *Traditio* 67: 101–144.

(2014) *Mathematical Theologies: Nicholas of Cusa and the Legacy of Thierry of Chartres*, Oxford.

Allen, M. J. B. (1994) *Nuptial Arithmetic: Marsilio Ficino's Commentary on the Fatal Number in Book VIII of Plato's Republic*, Berkeley, CA.

Allen, M. J. B. (ed. and trans.) (2015) *Marsilio Ficino, On Dionysius the Areopagite*, 2 vols., Cambridge, MA.

Barnes, J. (ed.) (2003) *Porphyry: Introduction*, Oxford.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Sussex Library, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:25:36, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.006

Bocken, I. (2011) "The Pictorial Treatises of Charles de Bovelles," *Intellectual History Review* 21: 341–52.
Boisset, J. (1960) "Les 'Hecatonomies' de Lefèvre d'Étaples," *Revue Philosophique de la France et de l'Etranger* 150: 237–240.
Bovelles, C. de (1511) *Que hoc volumine continentur: Liber de intellectu, Liber de sensu, Liber de nichilo [. . .]De geometricis supplementis*, Paris.
Bricot, T. (1495) *Expositio Magistri Georgii [i.e. George of Brussels] super summulas*, Paris.
Cassirer, E. (1927) *Individuum und Kosmos in der Philosophie der Renaissance*, Leipzig and Berlin [English translation by M. Domandi, 1963].
Champier, S. (1519) *Duellum epistolare: Galie & Etalie antiquitates summatim complectens*, Lyon.
Copenhaver, B. P., Normore, C. G., and T. Parsons (eds.) (2014) *Peter of Spain: Summaries of Logic*, Oxford.
Denifle, H. and Châtelaine, E. (eds.) (1889) *Chartularium universitatis Parisiensis*, 4 vols., Paris.
Dillon, J. M. (1996) "An Ethic for the Late Antique Sage," in L. P. Gerson (ed.) *The Cambridge Companion to Plotinus*, Cambridge, UK, 315–335.
Ebbesen, S. (1977) "Ancient Scholastic Logic as the Source of Medieval Scholastic Logic," in N. Kretzmann, et al. (eds.) *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy*, Cambridge, UK, 101–127.
Emery, K. (1984) "Mysticism and the Coincidence of Opposites in Sixteenth- and Seventeenth-Century France," *Journal for the History of Ideas* 45: 3–23.
Faye, E. (1998a) *Philosophie et perfection de l'homme: De la Renaissance à Descartes*, Paris.
(1998b) "Nicolas de Cues et Charles de Bovelles dans le manuscrit 'Exigua pluvia' de Beatus Rhenanus," *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge* 1998, 415–450.
Ferrari, M. (2011) "Introduction to Bovelles' Liber de Sapiente," *Intellectual History Review* 21: 257–265.
Ferrari, M. and Albertini, T. (eds.) (2011) *Charles de Bovelles' Liber de Sapiente, or Book of the Wise* [Special issue of *Intellectual History Review*], London.
George of Brussels (1495) *Expositio Magistri Georgii super summulas Petri Hispani*, Paris.
Gersh, S. (ed. and trans.) (2017) *Commentary on Plotinus, Volume 4: Ennead III, Part 1*, Cambridge, MA.
Hadot, I. (2005) *Arts libéraux et philosophie dans la pensée antique: contribution à l'histoire de l'éducation et de la culture dans l'Antiquité*, Paris.
Hadot, P. (1990) "The Harmony of Plotinus and Aristotle According to Porphyry," in R. Sorabji (ed.) *Aristotle Transformed: The Ancient Commentators and Their Influence*, Ithaca, NY, 125–140.
Heller, H. (1972) "Nicholas of Cusa and Early French Evangelicalism," *Archiv für Reformationsgeschichte* 63: 6–21.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Sussex Library, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:25:36, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.006

Joukovsky, F. (1979) "Thèmes plotiniens à la Renaissance: Lefèvre et Champier commentateurs de textes néo-platoniciens," *Studi di letteratura francese* 5: 5–24.

(1981) "Thémes plotiniens dans le *De Sapiente* de Charles de Bovelles," *Bibliothèque d'Humanisme et Renaissance* 43: 141–153.

(1982) *Le regard intérieur: thèmes plotiniens chez quelques écrivains de la Renaissance française*, Paris.

Kessler, E. (1999) "Introducing Aristotle to the Sixteenth Century: The Lefèvre Enterprise," in C. Blackwell and S. Kusukawa (eds.) *Philosophy in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries: Conversations with Aristotle*, Aldershot/Brookfield, 1–21.

Klinger-Dollé, A.-H. (ed.) (2016) *Le De sensu de Charles de Bovelles (1511): conception philosophique des sens et figuration de la pensée*, Geneva.

Kristeller, P. O. (1956) *Studies in Renaissance Thought and Letters*, Rome.

Lefèvre d'Étaples, J. (ed.) (1494) *Mercurij Trismegisti Liber de potestate et sapientia dei per Marsilium Ficinum traductus ad Cosmum Medicem*, Paris [republished with additions 1505].

Lefèvre d'Étaples, J. (1499) *Theologia vivificans, cibus solidus. Dionysii Celestis hierarchia. Ecclesiastica hierarchia. Diuina nomina. Mystica theologia. Undecim epistole. Ignatii Undecim epistole. Polycarpi epistola una*, Paris.

(1503) *Libri logicorum*, Paris.

(1506) *Contenta. Politicorum libro octo. Commentarii. Economicorum duo [. . .] Explanationis Leonardi in Oeconomica duo*, trans. L.eonardo Bruni, Paris.

Lefèvre d'Étaples, J. and Clichtove, J. (1502) *Totius philosophiae naturalis paraphrases, adiecto commentario*, Paris.

Lines, D. A. (2007) "Lefèvre and French Aristotelianism on the Eve of the Sixteenth Century," in G. Frank and A. Speer (eds.) *Der Aristotelismus in der frühen Neuzeit: Kontinuität oder Wiederangeignung*, Wiesbaden, 273–290.

Mandosio, J.-M. (2013) "Le *De magia naturali* de Jacques Lefèvre d'Étaples: Magie, alchimie et cabale," in R. Camos Gorris (ed.) *Les Muses secrètes: kabbale, alchimie et littérature à la Renaissance*, Geneva, 37–79.

Margolin, J.-C. (2002) *Lettres et poèmes de Charles de Bovelles*, Paris.

Mönch, W. (1936) *Die italienische Platonrenaissance und ihre Bedeutung für Frankreichs Literatur- und Geistesgeschichte (1450–1550)*, Berlin.

Monfasani, J. (1987) "Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite in Mid-Quattrocento Rome," in J. Monfasani, J. Hankins, and F. Purnell (eds.) *Supplementum Festivum: Studies in Honor of Paul Oskar Kristeller*, Binghamton, NY, 189–219.

Moyer, A. E. (2012) "The Quadrivium and the Decline of Boethian Influence," in N. H. Kaylor and P. E. Phillips (eds.) *A Companion to Boethius in the Middle Ages*, Leiden, 479–517.

Oberman, H. A. (1983) *The Harvest of Medieval Theology: Gabriel Biel and Late Medieval Nominalism*, Durham, NC.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Sussex Library, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:25:36, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.006

Oosterhoff, R. J. (2015) "Jacques Lefèvre d'Étaples," in E. N. Zalta and J. Kraye (eds.) *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/lefevre-etaples/ (accessed 23 November 2018)
(2018) *Making Mathematical Culture: University and Print in the Circle of Lefèvre d'Étaples*, Oxford.
(2019) "Nicholas of Cusa and Boethian Theology in the Early French Reform," in S. Burton, J. Hollmann, and E. Parker (eds.) *Nicholas of Cusa and Early Modern Reform*, Leiden, 339–366.
Pantin, I. (1988) "Les 'commentaires' de Lefèvre d'Etaples au Corpus Hermeticum," in A. Faivre (ed.) *Présence d'Hermès Trismégiste*, Paris, 167–183.
Renaudet, A. (1953) *Préréforme et humanisme à Paris pendant les premières guerres d'Italie, 1494–1517*, 2nd ed., Paris.
Rice, E. F. (1958) *The Renaissance Idea of Wisdom*, Cambridge, MA.
(1970) "Humanist Aristotelianism in France: Jacques Lefèvre d'Étaples and His Circle," in A. H. T. Levi (ed.) *Humanism in France*, Manchester, UK, 132–149.
Rice, E. F. (ed.) (1972) *The Prefatory Epistles of Jacques Lefèvre d'Étaples and Related Texts*, New York.
Rist, J. M. (1992) "Pseudo-Dionysius, Neoplatonism and the Weakness of the Soul," in H. J. Westra (ed.) *From Athens to Chartres: Neoplatonism and Medieval Thought: Studies in Honour of Edouard Jeauneau*, Leiden, 135–161.
(1996) "Plotinus and Christian Philosophy," in L. P. Gerson (ed.) *The Cambridge Companion to Plotinus*, Cambridge, UK, 386–413.
Saffrey, H.-D. (1996) "Florence, 1492: The Reappearance of Plotinus," *Renaissance Quarterly* 49: 488–508,
Smith, A. (2005) "Action and Contemplation in Plotinus," in A. Smith and K. Alt (eds.) *The Philosopher and Society in Late Antiquity: Essays in Honour of Peter Brown*, Swansea, 65–72.
Song, E. (2009) "The Ethics of Descent in Plotinus," *Hermathena* 187: 27–48
Tataretus, Petrus (s.d. [1490s?]) *Expositio in Summulas Petri Hispani, una cum textu*, Paris.
Theunissen, M. (1996) *Vorentwürfe von Moderne: Antike Melancholie und die Acedia des Mittelalters*, Berlin.
Tigerstedt, E. N. (1974) *The Decline and Fall of the Neoplatonic Interpretation of Plato: An Outline and Some Observations*, Helsinki.
Vasoli, C. (1959) "Jacques Lefèvre d'Etaples e le origini del 'Fabrismo'," *Renascimento* 10: 204–259 [republished in C. Vasoli, *La dialettica e la retorica dell'Umanesimo: "Invenzione" e "Metodo" nella cultura del XV e XVI secolo*, Milan 1968].
Victor, J. M. (1978) *Charles de Bovelles, 1479–1553: An Intellectual Biography*, Geneva.
Walker, D. P. (1954) "The Prisca Theologia in France," *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes* 17: 204–259.
Wenzel, S. (1966) "'Acedia' 700–1200," *Traditio* 22: 73–102.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Sussex Library, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:25:36, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.006

CHAPTER 4

Symphorien Champier on Medicine, Theology, and Politics

Guido Giglioni

> *Studium cunctorum mortalium praecipuum esse debet ut noscant atque declinent quae mala cernantur et noxia, asciscant et amplexentur quae bona sunt et salutaria.*
>
> Symphorien Champier, *Practica nova in medicina*, 1517

The key role played by Plotinus' metaphysics in shaping the Platonic project undertaken by Marsilio Ficino (1433–99) is now recognised by historians of Renaissance philosophy.[1] This is particularly evident in Book III of *De vita libri tres* ("Three Books on Life," 1489), where Ficino established a discipline that we could dub "medico-theology." In sixteenth-century France, especially in Lyon, the physician and polymath Symphorien Champier (1471?–1538) had a prominent place in articulating the principal guidelines of this Plotinian-Ficinian project. As witnessed by such texts as *De quadruplici vita* (1507) and *De triplici disciplina* (1508), Champier wished to present this discipline as an integral part of the university curriculum, to be added to the system of the seven liberal arts (trivium and quadrivium). His main contribution in embedding Plotinus' philosophy in Renaissance culture lay in popularising and making accessible to a wider public certain aspects of Plotinian metaphysics. This occurred especially in three areas: the Christianisation of Plotinus' philosophy, through paying special attention to the afterlife of the soul and its undergoing cycles of purification and expiation (Hell, Purgatory and Paradise); the emerging of a more robust sense of the individual self; and, finally, the attempt to free a set of characteristically late Platonic notions (such as the Soul of the World, sympathetic attractions, astral divination and demonic influences) from their most troublesome implications of magic and theurgic rituals.

[1] Among the most representative studies, see Garin (1974); Copenhaver (1986); Allen (1992); Muccillo (1996), 195–289; Saffrey (1996); Celenza (2002), 71–97; Gersh (2017).

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:26:54, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.007

Introduction: Champier and the Arrival of Plotinus in Lyon

Symphorien Champier, a typical example of a humanist physician with strong interests in theology and antiquarianism, was a pugnacious and quarrelsome writer who during his life became embroiled in various controversies spanning a wide range of different subjects, such as the value of Arabic science and medicine (with special reference to Avicenna and Averroes), the need to restore the classical sources of European learning (Hippocrates, Plato, Aristotle and Galen) and the relationship between Italian and French literature. Medicine, including its epistemological status and progress, was one of his major preoccupations. More specifically, though, he was also interested in investigating the links that connected medicine to Platonism and theology. The immediate precedent for this kind of enquiry was, of course, Ficino, whose *De vita* represented at the time one of the most illustrious examples of Platonic medico-theology. However, it would not be too much of an exaggeration to say that the interdependence of medicine and theology goes to the very core of Platonic philosophy.

In this chapter, I will explore the place of Plotinus' philosophy in Champier's medical theological investigations by concentrating on texts that are particularly representative of Champier's position. I will sketch the background metaphysics underlying his treatment of the super-celestial level of life, which is the subject of Book IV in the *Liber de quadruplici vita, videlicet de vita sana, longa, caelitus comparanda et supracaelesti* ("Book on the Four Kinds of Life, That Is, the Healthy Life, the Long Life, the Life to Be Obtained from Heaven and the Super-Celestial Life," 1507). It is significant to note that this treatise on life ends with a few pages in which Champier provided an aphoristic compendium of Plotinus' *Enneads* (in Ficino's Latin translation). It is a typical assemblage of borrowed material in the spirit of Champier's cultural bricolage, which is nevertheless significant as a striking instance of the early modern reception of Plotinus and Platonic philosophy. If Book III of Ficino's *De vita* originated like a commentary on Plotinus's *Ennead* IV, book 3, chapter 11, Champier's Book IV of his *De vita* was Plotinus – *ille philosophorum maximus* – read (and this is also especially interesting) in the light of the late Platonist Numenius of Apamea.

The chapter ends with a section examining the political underpinnings of medicine in Champier's medical theological project. For Champier, it was precisely at its most theological and Platonic that medicine demonstrated its crucial role in promoting human life in an orderly society. His

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:26:54, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.007

notion of *salus* advocated the importance of being safe and sound in the broadest sense (physical wholesomeness, moral fulfilment and religious salvation). *Non sat est vivere* was the motto that Champier appended to his opening letter to *De quadruplici vita*; that is to say: it is not sufficient to be alive, for a meaningful life demands engagement with philosophy and theology.

Champier's way of piecing his treatises together by reproducing sentences and phrases taken from his favourite authors has been characterised as motivated by the "crude hope" of "generating philosophy from the mere accumulation of citations."[2] I would argue that Champier, who liked to call himself *aggregator* – that is, a compiler who collects and organises material taken from different sources – was quite aware of the limits of his authorship. His main aim was to facilitate the understanding of a vast and complex tradition: "since the works of all medical writers – Greek, Latin, Arab and Persian – are numerous and of various kind, and in many cases they are rather in contrast with each other, it would be no less difficult than tedious to read them all."[3] His major contributions are in the field of early modern trends in cultural assimilation and dissemination, like the various manuals and compendia he aimed at university students, such as his first treatise *Janua logicae et physicae* (1498). As a figure of cultural impresario, Champier and his work of derivative polymathy can be studied as an intellectual barometer of the time.[4] This is also the case with the penetration of Plotinus' thoughts in early Renaissance France, where Lyon was a crossroads of ideas in both literal and metaphorical terms. In the second half of the fifteenth century, the city had become one of the most vibrant economic centres in Europe. Commercial and financial prosperity depended on the annual fairs established by kings Charles VII and Louis

[2] Copenhaver (1978), 165.

[3] Symphorien Champier, *Prologus aggregatoris Lugdunensis*, in Champier (1517), fol. 3^{v}: . . . *Quorum omnium et Graecorum Latinorumve et Arabum et Poenorum ac recentium opera cum varia sint et multa valde in multisque prope inter se dissidentia, quae omnia non minus difficile esset legere quam tediosum. Lugdunensis aggregatoris nomine insignire placuit, ut sic ego ex Lugduno antiquissima Galliae Celticae urbe oriundus ibique educatus sum, hunc nostrum laborem ex antiquissimorum auctorum mentibus collectum*. . . Under the entry "*aggregator*", the Latin Lexicon of du Cange significantly refers to the book by the Padua physician Jacopo Dondi dell'Orologio (1290–1359), *Aggregator sententiarum doctorum omnium de praeservatione et curatione pestilentiae* (1355). See du Cange (1883–1887), I, 140. Nowadays, an aggregator is a computer program that collects and connects items from various online sources.

[4] On Champier, the principal monograph, apart from the study by Copenhaver cited in note 2, remains Allut (1859). On the various aspects of his literary production, see Antonioli (1974); Copenhaver (1977); Cooper (1988) and (1998); Silver (1993); Hunkeler (2007).

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:26:54, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.007

XI starting in 1420, which acted as powerful catalysts for the thriving of textile, printing and banking industries throughout the Renaissance.[5]

The Development of Ficinian Medico-Theology

As a practicing physician open to philosophical ideas, Champier was particularly concerned with medicine, including its epistemological status and progress. More specifically, though, he was also interested in exploring the links that could be established between medicine, Platonism and theology. In his *De quadruplici vita*, Champier distinguished between four stages in the process of life: physical, mental, celestial and eternal (which intersects the other fourfold division mentioned above into healthy, long, celestial and super-celestial lives). He presented the four stages as mutually entwined, for physical well-being would be pointless (*non sat est vivere*) without the ability to use judgement in the many circumstances of one's life, without a correct attitude towards the incessant flow of energy coming from the stars and, finally, without a sincere spirit of religious devotion: physical life, moral life, celestial life and religious life.[6] Building upon the cosmological divisions articulated by Ficino in his *De vita libri tres* (1489), Champier distinguished four kinds of life: celestial, purgative, earthly and infernal.[7] To support his understanding of celestial life as the summit of transcendent bliss, Champier took an (unacknowledged) extract from the *Platonic Theology* by Ficino, who in turn had quoted from the *Epinomis* (992 bc), a dialogue attributed to Plato. In it, the peak of intelligible concentration for the purged soul was said to reside beyond the light of the intellect, for that was a union with God which left behind any vestige of self-identity.[8] Not surprisingly, Guichard de Lessard, Augustinian monk and professor of theology in Paris, enthusiastically endorsed this programme in one of the dedicatory letters affixed to the beginning of *De quadruplici vita*. He congratulated Champier on having dealt with the topic of "healthy life" in a "sound way", with long life in a "prudent

[5] On Lyon as a cultural and economic centre in the Renaissance, see Saulnier (1958); Wadsworth (1962); Martin (1973).

[6] Symphorien Champier *Epistola prohemialis,* in Champier (1507), sig. b1^{rv}.

[7] Champier (1507), sig. e4^{v}: *In universo genera vitae quattuor sunt: coelestis, purgatoria, mundana, infernalis.*

[8] Champier (1507), sig. e4^{v}: *Summum vero beatitudinis concludit in Epinomide, ubi ait Animum purgatissimum omni tum mutabilitate firmata, tum multiplicitate collecta sese in propriam unitatem intellectu superiorem omnino conferre, perque bene in unitatem divinam intelligibili mundo superiorem iam transferre, deoque potius vivere quam seipso, cui certe mira quadam super intelligentiam ratione sit coniunctus.* See Ficino, *Platonic Theology* XVIII. 8 (= Allen and Hankins [2001–2006], VI, 130–133).

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:26:54, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.007

manner", with the life to be absorbed from the stars following the laws of the heavens and, finally, with "super-celestial life" remaining within the confines of faith (*fideliter*).[9]

Comparisons with Ficino's *triplex* life were to be inevitable. Champier's *De quadruplici vita* has often been described as a scarcely original compilation of themes excerpted from Ficino's book on life. Aware of the accusations, in the dedicatory letter to François de Rohan (1499–1532), Bishop of Angers and then Archbishop of Lyon, Champier addressed those who had charged him with plagiarising Ficino (they were saying that Champier "turned not a little part of Ficino's *lucubratio* into his own work" and that he "wanted to catch glory by relying on the work of someone else"). To them Champier replied that he had nothing to hide, for he had been the first to salute Ficino as his teacher and model (*eum namque hoc in negotio praeposui ducem atque insecutus sum*). He then added that his original contribution lay in theological considerations concerning bliss (*de animae felicitate*) drawn from Christian theologians and ancient philosophers.[10] One might say that Ficino's book on life is about *animae felicitas* as well. And yet we cannot deny that Champier's theological preoccupations were different from Ficino's. Although they both believed in the common origin of *prisca sapientia* and Christian universal revelation, and in the possibility that the recovery of the most ancient wisdom could lead to religious peace, the traits of Champier's theological were more orthodox.[11] In his treatise on the fourfold degrees of life, the emphasis on the after-life destiny of the human soul was more pronounced than in Ficino's *De vita*. In addition, as a man who in his life had pursued military and civic duties together with a career in the *litterae humaniores*, Champier regarded physical well-being, moral soundness, religious salvation and political safety as parts of one integrated notion of human happiness.

There is a disciplinary area where medicine and religion overlap. We may call this area medico-theology. Champier shared with Ficino the belief that Plotinus embodied the spirit of this philosophical tradition, for they both adopted the *Enneads* as their methodological and metaphysical template. They focused, in particular, on those sections where Plotinus had engaged with the notion of philosophy as a cathartic activity at different levels: religious atonement, aesthetic contemplation and cognitive

[9] Guichard de Lessard to Symphorien Champier, in Champier (1507), sig. a4^{r}.
[10] Symphorien Champier, *Epistola prohemialis,* in Champier (1507), sig. b1^{r}v.
[11] On the relationship between *prisca sapientia* and Christian orthodoxy in Champier, see Walker (1954) and Jodogne (1972), 48–49.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:26:54, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.007

cleansing. In line with a number of canonical Platonic loci, especially *Phaedo* (67e–69d) and *The Republic* (X. 619cd), Plotinus had described virtue as a habit of mental purification through which the soul became gradually able to withdraw from the world of sense to reach the contemplation of the One. Plotinian virtues were ways of being assimilated to the order of intelligible beings by following the hierarchical structure of the cosmos. In this scheme, civic virtues and purifications represented the first step towards the achievement of mental tranquillity.

In *Charmides*, Plato had already made clear that there could not be cure of the body without care of the soul (155e–157b). By characterising human souls as 'amphibious' (*Ennead* IV. 8. 4), that is to say, hybrid substances whose health and happiness depended on cognitive purification and the virtue of temperance (*Ennead* II. 9. 14), Plotinus accentuated Plato's emphasis on the medicine of the mind as a means of cleansing bodily passions. The discussion concerning the mutual implications of soul and body is present in various parts of the *Enneads*. Plotinus had also discussed the proximity of magic and medicine, a theme that Ficino would develop in his works. He had cautioned theurgists against writing magical chants and impairing "the inviolate purity of the higher powers" (*Ennead* II. 9. 14).[12] In a cosmos in which everyone "should rather calmly and gently accept the nature of all things" (*Ennead* II. 9. 13), humans were reminded that "one thing is benefitted and harmed by another because it is naturally so disposed, and by the arts of physicians and magicians one thing is compelled to give something of its power to another" (*Ennead* IV. 4. 42).[13]

Given these premises, it is easy to understand why Champier's philosophical investigations follow a pattern whose coordinates are distinctively medical and theological: "Four are the leading lights among the philosophers: Hippocrates, Plato, Aristotle and Galen."[14] The latter, in particular, has a significant place in Champier's eclectic construction, for Galen is the author who in his work managed to produce a synthesis of theological, metaphysical and therapeutic protocols: "In Galen," he says, "we find Plato's metaphysics, Aristotle's philosophy and Hippocrates' medicine."[15] Champier's belief in the importance of medicine for human life is epitomised in a short sentence from his *Practica nova in medicina* (1517): "The

[12] Plotinus, *Enneads* (Armstrong, 1966–1988), II, 277–279.
[13] Armstrong (1966–1988), II, 275; IV, 267. [14] Champier (1516), fol. 3^{r}.
[15] Champier (1516), fol. 3^{v}: *Erat in Galeno Platonis metaphysica, Aristotelis philosophia, Hippocratis medicina.*

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:26:54, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.007

principal endeavour of all human beings should be to know and avoid what is judged to be bad and harmful, and to recognise and assimilate what is good and healthy."[16] For Champier, this activity of mental discernment directed at pursuing the good and avoiding the bad in life transcends the level of natural survival and has moral connotations from the very outset, for life, in its most elementary manifestations, already throbs with a sense of awareness and self-direction which is then expanded by human behaviour and its highest achievements: religious and political life. Following a renowned Aristotelian locus, Champier styles medicine as the pupil of natural philosophy (*quasi alunna est naturalis philosophiae*).[17] In his opinion, however, it was Plato who had a deeper insight into the type of relationship that ties medicine to philosophy, for the close proximity between the soul and the body explained why medicine could be closer to theology than to physics.

The merging of medicine and theology is therefore a recurrent theme in Champier's philosophical and pedagogical production. In the dedicatory letter to the Canon of Saint Jean Cathedral in Lyon, Charles d'Estaing, which Champier prefixed to the treatise he devoted to the first principles of being (the *Periarchon*), Alcinous' *Handbook of Platonism* (c. second century AD) is introduced – a bit unexpectedly – to defend the idea of philosophical investigations based on the intermingling of Aristotle's and Galen's viewpoints through the idea of Platonic oneness. "Why did God wish to be invoked everywhere through four letters?" Champier wonders while discussing the power of the four Hebrew characters in the famed Tetragrammaton. He answers that the reason is God, the one principle of everything, who arranges all things "according to four degrees: essence, being, power and action."[18] This statement, however, is the umpteenth snippet lifted from Ficino, in this case the short summary (the *argumentum*) that the latter had prefixed to his translation of Plato's *Cratylus*. In it, relying on the testimonies of Moses, Hermes Trismegistus, Plotinus, Iamblichus and Origen, Ficino had maintained that "holy names" enclosed an extraordinary power (*miranda vis*):

> Certain divine properties are distributed through words that are combined following some kind of celestial likeness, and this takes place in accordance

[16] Champier (1517), fol. 5[r]: *Studium cunctorum mortalium praecipuum esse debet ut noscant atque declinent quae mala cernantur et noxia, asciscant et amplexentur quae bona sunt et salutaria.*
[17] Champier (1533), sig. b3[r].
[18] Champier (1533), p. 5: *Sed cur voluit deus quatuor ubique literis invocari, forsitan an quia et ipse per quatuor gradus cuncta disponit, scilicet essentia, esse, virtute, actione componens.*

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:26:54, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.007

> with God's providence, so that, every time it is demanded by a particular situation, we can call upon divine help in line with the religious rites. They say that this is what was observed by Pythagoras and even Apollo, who apparently had extraordinary ways of healing diseases of the mind and the body only by using certain divine words. And we clearly understand that Zoroaster's entire wisdom lay in this ability. In the *Alcibiades*, Plato called this wisdom "divine", and in the *Charmides* he said that it healed mental and bodily illnesses.[19]

These are Ficino's words, and this is the place from where Champier excerpted his statement concerning the four levels of divine life in the universe. We can assume, therefore, that when in the *Periarchon* Champier recalls "the principles of both philosophies", he is referring to a type of *sapientia* where medicine and theology converge. Here, too, Galen meets Plato.

Anticipating possible objections against his tendency to conflate medicine with theology, Champier insists that one should not refrain from engaging in medical enquiries into the nature of the soul and in philosophical investigations about the body, for man had been created equipped with a unique ontological constitution that is a paradoxical blend of body and soul. Once again, we are confronted with the Plotinian soul as the "amphibious" creature. In the treatise *De triplici disciplina* ("The Threefold Discipline"), whose subtitle reveals the pedagogical intent of many of Champier's texts ("Whose Parts Are Natural Philosophy, Medicine, Theology and Moral Philosophy, by Which the Quadrivium Is Completed"), he expounded the main rationale behind this research programme:

> if someone were to ask me why I mix the study of medicine with that of theology, as theology goes beyond my sphere of competence, it will be very easy for me to reply that this is the case because nature joined in us the soul with the body through the mediation of the spirit.[20]

It should be said that in Champier's pneumatological framework the theological connotations of *spiritus* are more evident than in Ficino, whose distinctively Galenic, Stoic and late Platonic understanding of *pneuma* was less liable to be interpreted as an incorporeal substance. Champier

[19] Ficino (1576), I, 304: *Verbis autem ad coelestem quandam similitudinem temperatis divinae quaedam dotes distribuuntur, et id quidem providente Deo, ut quoties res ipsa postulat, rite possemus divinum auxilium invocare. Quod quidem ab ipso Phoebo atque Pythagora observatum fuisse tradunt, quos ferunt divinis quibusdam duntaxat verbis tam animi quam corporis morbos mirifice curavisse. Qua quidem in re compertum habemus totam Zoroastris sapientiam constitisse, quam Plato in Alcibiade divinam appellat, et in Charmide morborum animi et corporis curatricem.*

[20] Champier (1508), sig. C7. See Copenhaver (1978), 54.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:26:54, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.007

distinguished, for instance, between *spiritus supremus* ("that is God") and *spiritus infimi bestiarum* ("which did not always exist nor will always exist"), while *vita spiritualis* was synonymous with disembodied contemplation of divine realities.[21] In his fourfold order of life, *spiritus* was the word that Champier had deliberately chosen to denote a variety of related notions: the thin material substance flowing inside animal bodies, the human self, the eternal minds of the angels and the third person of the Holy Trinity. As was to become dramatically evident with Miguel Servet (1509/1511–53), one of Champier's protégés in Lyon, tinkering with *spiritus* could have unpleasant theological repercussions.[22]

In spite of all semantic ambiguities surrounding the word *spiritus*, Champier was nevertheless unambiguous in his Platonising divisions between the intelligible and sensible domains of reality.[23] In *De quadruplici vita*, he extolled the power of the mind by showing that it was able to connect the functions of bodily life to its innermost divine roots. The shadowy reality of the body and nature derived in fact from that inexhaustible reservoir of energy that was the intellect, as explained through an unacknowledged passage from Ficino's *Theologia Platonica*:

> No doubt, great is the dominion (*imperium*) of the mind, which by its own virtue releases itself from the fetters of the body; large are the resources of the mind, which, every time it likes digs out the precious treasures of God and nature not from the depths of the earth, but from its own bosom.[24]

For Champier, one way of tying up the "resources of the mind" with the "treasures of God and nature" was to follow the laws of harmonious proportions, which good physicians apply to the study and treatment of natural bodies. In keeping with the principles of Galenic medicine, Champier explained health – both physical and spiritual – in terms of proportion and harmony. The body shared with the soul a proportional measure of variability underlying the notion of balance (*temperies*), a balance of humours in one case, and a balance of passions in the other.[25] The fact remained though, that precisely because matter was, in Platonic

[21] Champier (1507), sig. e3^{r}b, b1^{v}. [22] On Champier and Servet, see Friedman (1978), 137–139.
[23] On *spiritus* in Champier, see Copenhaver (1978), 105.
[24] Champier (1507), sigs. b3^{v}b–b4^{r}a: *Magnum certe est mentis imperium, quae virtute sua e compedibus corporis solvitur. Ingens opulentia mentis quae quotiens voluerit preciosos dei et naturae thesauros non ex terrae visceribus, sed ex proprio eruit sinu.* Champier plagiarised the whole section from Ficino, only changing *cupit* in Ficino's original with his *voluerit* (the ways of a pedantic mind are mysterious, perhaps a tad bigot). Cf. Ficino, *Platonic Theology* XIII, 2 (Allen and Hankins, 2001–2006), IV, 124.
[25] Champier (1507), sig. b2^{v}a.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:26:54, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.007

and Plotinian terms, the domain of multiplicity and division, the body represented a constant source of infection and pollution for the mind.[26]

Bodily influences as contaminants of the soul is a characteristically Plotinian trope in Champier's model of medico-theology. Champier characterised the contagion derived from the material world as an assault that is launched on us every day by "eight" monsters. This analogy sounds like a more dramatic reinterpretation of the traditional six non-naturals of Galenic medicine (the prophylactic agents that help preserve human health), but most of all, it is an expanded version of Ficino's three "monsters"[27]: air (including the climatic dispositions that affect individuals and nations); excessive rest; phlegm (*pituita*, i.e. not fully digested food); black bile (at the origin of several melancholic disorders); sex (*venereus coitus*); excessive eating and drinking (*vini cibique satietas*); staying up late at night after dinner; and the passions of the soul (*accidentia animi*).[28]

Of these eight monsters, melancholy is unsurprisingly described as one of the most pernicious. In this case, too, Champier follows Ficino's account in *De vita*, and characterises black bile as being present in one's body in two states.[29] By contrast, a celebrated authority in this field that Champier unhesitatingly rejected is Avicenna, for Avicenna's system of medicine represents for him a lapse into radical naturalism and the antithesis of a genuine medico-theological programme. As is well known, one of the cornerstones of Avicenna's therapy was the power assigned to the imagination, as a force of both intellectual growth and material transformation.[30] Champier, who had no problem recognising the effects of people's imagination over their own bodies (*omnes medici concedunt et sapientes non negant*), dismissed as completely implausible Avicenna's idea that the soul of individuals endowed with special powers – "prophets, heroes and demigods" – was able to alter the bodies of other people and even the environment surrounding their minds. That for him meant to grant too much power to nature, with disastrous consequences for the religious and political fabric of human communities.[31]

It is therefore evident that Champier's harmonic and harmonious ensembles – his various *symphoniae* – are a strictly Greco-Roman and

[26] Champier (1507), sig. e4^{v}a.

[27] On the six "non-naturals", see Cavallo and Storey (2013). On Ficino's three "monsters", see Ficino, *Three Books on Life* (Kaske and Clark, 1989), 122–124: *Primum quidem monstrum est Venereus coitus… Secundum monstrum est vini cibique satietas… Tertium denique monstrum est ad multam noctem, praesertim post coenam, frequentius vigilare, unde etiam post ortum solis dormire cogaris.*

[28] Champier (1507), sigs b2^{v}–b5^{v}.

[29] Ficino, *Three Books on Life* (Kaske and Clark, 1989), 116.

[30] Champier (1507), sig. b5^{r}b.

[31] Champier (1507), sig. b5^{r}b.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:26:54, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.007

Christian affair. While the contribution of Jewish wisdom is recognised every time the Mosaic element in the *prisca theologia* needs to be brought to the fore, the room allowed to Arab voices and instruments in these "symphonic" gatherings is extremely narrow. Champier's harshest criticisms are reserved for Avicenna and Averroes. In a short treatise in which Galen is compared to Hippocrates, and Cornelius Celsus to Avicenna (*Symphonia Galeni ad Hippocratem, Cornelii Celsi ad Avicennam*, 1528), Champier makes no mystery of his intention to banish all corrupting influences from alleged Arabic distortions: "I have composed this harmonious piece (*symphonia*) to prevent Avicenna and Averroes, that impious apostate, from deceiving Christian physicians with their vain and barbaric philosophy."[32]

Apart from the typical humanist preoccupations with translation and style, Champier's major concerns about Avicenna and Averroes were of a theological and metaphysical order. Even in a treatise that he primarily designed as a medical contribution – the *Symphonia Galeni ad Hippocratem* just mentioned – the Avicennian and Averroan worldviews were differentiated first of all in noetic terms. Once again, Champier's argument looks like a pastiche of borrowed material, in this case a mash-up of sentences from Ficino and Bessarion (1403–72):

> Almost the whole world occupied by Hippocratic and Galenic physicians is largely divided into two sects: the Avicennian and the Averroist. Avicenna's followers believe that there is a chain of intelligences and souls, and they say that from the first intelligence only the second derives, and that the second, when it understands while turning itself to the first, produces the third, and then again, by understanding itself, it creates the soul of the first sphere; and the Arabs say that this pertains to the system of creation. The Averroists, on the other hand, maintain that there is one intellect in all human beings. Both sects destroy any form of religion, especially because they seem to deny that divine providence takes care of human beings.[33]

[32] Symphorien Champier, prefatory letter to François Dubois, in Champier (1528?), 5: *hanc Symphoniam scripsi, ne Avicenna et Averrhous ille impius apostata Christianos medicos per inanem ac barbaram philosophiam decipiant.*

[33] This is a typical intarsia *à la Champier*. To have an idea of his technique, compare the text by Champier with the corresponding pieces from Ficino and Bessarion. Champier (1516), 8–9: *Totus ferme terrarum orbis ab Hippocraticis et Galienicis occupatus, in duas ut plurimum sectas divisus est, Avicennicam et Averrhoicam. Illi quidem catenam intelligentiarum ac animarum esse existimant, et a prima intelligentia secundam solum prodire asserunt; secundam autem cum ad primam se convertens intelligit, producere tertiam; tum deinde eandem seipsam intelligendo, animam primi orbis creare, quod ad creationis rationem pertinere affirmant Arabes; Averrhoistae vero unicum esse intellectum in omnibus hominibus contendunt. Utrique religionem omnem funditus aeque tollunt, praesertim quia divinam circa homines providentiam negare videntur.* Cf. Ficino (1576), II, 1537: *Totus enim ferme terrarum*

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:26:54, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.007

To the intellectual turmoil that the diffusion of Avicennian and Averroan medicine had allegedly spread across the Western world, Champier could only propose the antidote of a reliable humanist physician:

> Today few people, apart from our Leoniceno, Linacre, Ruel, Cop, Alessandro Benedetti from Verona (a fellow Platonist), interpret Galen's position with that care and respect which were used by Paul of Aegina, Alexander of Aphrodisia and recently Theodore Gaza.[34]

The list of authorities that Champier recommends as keepers of the old, genuine medical tradition is worthy of note. Niccolò Leoniceno (1428–1524), Thomas Linacre (c.1460–1524), Jean Ruel (1474–1537), Guillaume Cop (Wilhelm Kopp, c.1460–1532) and Alessandro Benedetti (1450?–1512) were all humanists driven by the task of recovering the corpus of Greek and Roman medicine. They were all open to a moderate reformation of the university curricula, while sometimes motivated by new religious ideas.[35] And yet Champier was convinced that the damage inflicted by Avicenna and Averroes was too great to be simply fixed by resorting to the tools of philology and rhetoric. A "philosophical reason" was also needed, not to mention the necessity of a broader, theological approach, all the more so because, in Champier's eyes, the return of Hippocrates in the Western world was clearly a sign of divine providence.[36] In this sense, the grafting of the Plotinian medicine of the

orbis a Peripateticis occupatus in duas plurimum sectas divisus est, Alexandrinam et Averroicam. Illi quidem intellectum nostrum esse mortalem existimant, hi vero unicum esse contendunt: utrique religionem omnem funditus aeque tollunt, praesertim quia divinam circa homines providentiam negare videntur, et utrobique a suo etiam Aristotele defecisse, cuius mentem hodie pauci, praeter sublimem Picum conplatonicum nostrum ea pietate qua Theophrastus olim et Themistius, Porphyrius, Symplicius, Avicenna et nuper Plethon interpretantur. Cf. also Bessarion (1503), fol. 32[r]: *a prima intelligentia secundam solum prodire asserit; secundam autem cum ad primam se convertens intelligit, producere tertiam; tum deinde eandem seipsam intelligendo, animam primi orbis creare.* On these specific passages from Bessarion and Ficino, see Saffrey (2001), 287–290; Kessler (2011), 23–24.

[34] Champier (1516). 8–9: *[Avicenna and Averroes] utrobique a suo etiam Galeno defecisse, cuius mentem hodie pauci, praeter Leonicenum nostrum, Linacrum, Ruellium, Copum, Alexandrumque Benedictum Veronensem, complatonicum nostrum, ea pietate qua Paulus Aegineta, Alexander Aphrodisaeus et nuper Theodorus Gaza interpretantur.*

[35] On Champier's lists of the most illustrious physicians of his time, see Roger (1973), 262. On the relationship between Champier and Benedetti, see Siraisi (2007), 137–140.

[36] Champier (1516), 9: *Si quis autem putat tam divulgatam barbariem tamque acribus munitam ingeniis sola quadam simplici sermonis elegantia apud homines posse deleri, is a vero longius aberrare, palam re ipso proculdubio convincetur. Maiore admodum hic opus est potestate: id autem est philosophica quadam ratione, philosophis eam libentius audituris quandoque persuasura. Placet autem divinae providentiae his saeculis paeoniam artem, authoritate Hippocratis Galenique, ac ratione philosophica confirmare, quod statuto quodam tempore verissimam Romani sermonis speciem, ut olim quandoque fecit, manifestis per omnes Latinos confirmet Latinis sermonibus.*

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:26:54, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.007

mind onto the body of Galenic prophylaxis, as had already been envisaged by Ficino, could act as a timely corrective to any medicalising temptation.

Champier's Theology: *Prisca Sapientia* as Platonic Bricolage

From what has been said so far, it is therefore safe to say that Plotinus played a significant role in Champier's medico-theological project. Not surprisingly, in the treatise *Speculum Platonicum de naturali historia* ("Platonic Mirror on Natural History"), an anthology of passages dealing with medical subjects excerpted from Plato's dialogues, Champier added at the end a philosophical coda taken straight from the *Enneads* (II. 9. 14), all in Ficino's Latin (and all duly unacknowledged).[37] As already noted, a recurring motif in this recovery of Plotinian themes was the idea of philosophical knowledge as an experience that would cleanse and purge the soul from all its sensible accretions and cognitive pollutants.

A clear Platonic declaration of epistemological and theological intent can be found in Champier's *Periarchon*, the *opusculum Platonicum* mentioned above. Dedicated to Albert Dupuy, physician to King Louis XII and Anne of Brittany, the treatise sets out to demonstrate that, from an ontological point of view, knowledge and action correspond respectively to the domains of the soul and the body:

> Contemplation is the act of the mind that understands intelligible objects, while activity is the act of the rational soul performed through the body. The contemplating soul, therefore, is said to experience divine things and the intellections of the divine things; and this experience (*passio*) is called prudence, which is nothing but a disposition to be assimilated to divine things.[38]

In many respects, Champier belongs to the spiritual climate characteristic of fifteenth-century religious devotion, in which faith is perceived as a

[37] Symphorien Champier, *Speculum Platonicum de naturali historia*, in Champier (1516), fols 151^{v}–152^{r}.

[38] Champier (1533), sig. $a1^{rv}$: *Studium igitur philosophiae (ut Platoni placet) tribus in rebus esse videtur, in eorum scilicet quae sunt speculatione atque noticia. Item in rebus gerendis quae bonae sunt. Item in ipsa rationis speculatione. Quae in noticia rerum versatur speculativa est, quae in rebus gerendis practica est. . . Est igitur contemplatio actus mentis intelligibilia intelligentis. Operatio autem animae rationalis actus per corpus confectus. Anima igitur contemplans res divinas atque rei divinae intellectiones tum bene pati dicitur, quae quidem passio prudentia nuncupatur; quod nihil aliud videtur esse quam rei divinae assimilari, quamobrem res eximia est ac veneranda, cum acquisibilis sit nobisque propriissima, nec ullo modo prohibita, sed penes nos iacet atque causa nobis est propositi finis. . . Tertium vero genus doctrinae versatur circa rationem et dyalectica vocatur. Haec autem doctrina dividitur in divisivam, diffinitivam, inductivam et sillogisticam.*

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:26:54, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.007

result of private introspection and personal experience.[39] He recognised this trait in the philosophy of Plato, who maintained that "divine light is not demonstrated by the finger of reason, but is grasped through the clear serenity of a pious life (*perspicua piae vitae serenitate*)".[40] Champier's definition of faith combined the determination necessary for the will to be effective with the need for human action to rely on divine intervention. Although different from reason, faith contained a core of reasonable propensities enlightened by God's love: "faith does not consist in reason, but rather in a certain tendency (*inclinatio*) through which human beings are directed by rational appetite to their specific end with the help of divine light."[41] Once again, the tendency embedded in nature towards assimilating the good and rejecting the harmful, which Champier had discussed in the *Practica nova in medicina* as life's original drive, had a clear metaphysical counterpart in the Platonising concept of the Good. This was another way of reconciling Galen with Plato.

It is a metaphysical angle that is evident in Champier's reception of Plotinian and post-Plotinian ideas. Champier opens his *Orphic Theology* with a letter to the Archbishop of Lyon, François de Rohan (1479–1536), in which he cites the sources of his theological melange: "Zoroaster, Orpheus, Mercurius Trismegistus, Plato, Plotinus, Amelius, Numenius, Philo, Origen and Augustine."[42] Against this background of Platonic and Ficinian references, Champier describes philosophy as an exercise in mental purification whose terms are purification (*purgatio*) and atonement (*expiatio*). Unlike *purgatio*, with its links to medical practice, *expiatio* denotes a kind of purification in which feelings of penance and reparation are designed to assuage guilt and sin. Philosophy is therefore a hybrid activity situated between natural cleansing and moral purification.

More specifically, the Latin verb *expiare* means for Champier the act of knowing the sacred bounds of philosophy (*sacri philosophiae limites*), and this, in the final analysis, is what *theologia* stands for him. The Trinity, in particular, is one of those "sacred bounds" against which the mind struggles in its attempt to define the scope of its investigations. In Champier's opinion, human reason will never be able to grasp the unity of the three divine Persons or the mystery of God's incarnation.[43] This is also a point that differentiates Champier's way of recovering Plotinus from

[39] For a still valuable source of information on this subject, see Renaudet (1916).
[40] Champier (1507), sig. e4^{v}a. [41] Champier (1507), sig. e2^{r}b.
[42] Symphorien Champier to François de Rohan (13 July 1507), in *Theologiae Orphicae aurei libri tres*, in Champier (1508), fol. aa5^{r}.
[43] Champier, *Theologia Orphica* (Champier, 1508), fol. aa4^{rv}.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:26:54, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.007

Ficino's. The author of the *Liber de quadruplici vita* never tires of reminding his readers of the Christian sense of caducity and the transitory nature of all earthly accomplishments. Significantly, worldly life is introduced through the words of the Epistle of James: "For what is your life? It is even a vapour, that appeareth for a little time, and then vanisheth away." To stress his point even more clearly, Champier embosses in his argument (without providing any acknowledgement) a portion of text from the three "golden" books on *patientia* written by the Italian Carmelite Baptista Mantuanus (1447–1516).[44] The result is an elaborate mosaic assembled through the juxtaposition of fragments coming from pagan and Christian sources: "When one explores himself attentively, and considers what he is and how worth he is, he will keep saying with Horace: 'We are dust and shadows.'"[45]

The emphasis on the contrast between transience and eternity is particularly evident in Champier's *Platonica medicina de duplici mundo* ("Platonic Medicine on the Double World"), published in 1516. Here he presents his "Trismegistic" theology (*theologia nostra Trismegistica*) as a compendium of principles coming from Timaean cosmology, Mosaic physics and Philo's interpretation of Genesis.[46] In *Platonica medicina* the element that mediates between the fleeting appearances of the created world and its underlying foundation is the imagination. While reasserting the Platonic division into two levels of reality (*duplex mundus*), Champier also insists that there has to be a correspondence between reality (*archetypus mundus*) and its representation (*hic imaginarius mundus*).[47] Combining Ficinian humanistic motifs with the Hermetic divinisation of human nature, Champier's "Trismegistic" theology rests on the macro-microcosmic analogy as a device that allows philosophers and theologians to read the universe as a network of kindred and matching sequences.[48]

Following Plato in the *Timaeus* and drawing on Ficino's commentary without having any scruples about plagiarising it, Champier argues that three principles are needed in order for a world to be created: an ideal plan

[44] Epistola Jacobi, IV, 14: *Quae enim est vita vestra? Vapor est ad modicum parens.* Originally published in Brescia in 1497, *De patientia aurei libri tres* can be seen as another example of early modern medico-theology. Here I am referring to the 1505 edition, published in Paris by Josse Bade. This edition is prefixed by a letter of Bade to the Carmelite Laurent Bureau and Arnold Bost dated 20 June 1498 in Lyon, fol. 31^{r}.

[45] Champier (1507), sig. e5^{r}. See Horace, *Odes*, IV, 7: *Pulvis et umbra sumus.*

[46] *Platonica medicina de duplici mundo*, in Champier (1516), fol. 100^{v}. On Champier's Hermeticism, see Vasoli (1960), 235–247.

[47] *Platonica medicina de duplici mundo* (Champier, 1516), fol. 107^{v}.

[48] Champier (1516), fol. 102^{v}.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:26:54, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.007

(*idea*), a material substratum (*materia*) and a creative transcendent principle (*opifex deus*).[49] Against this cosmological setting, Champier reiterates the four central metaphysical notions championed by Plato and Ficino: essence, being, power and action.[50] Likewise, the creation of the world and the propagation of life occurs following the development of mathematical and geometrical associations linked to the number four, thus reflecting the numerological preferences of the Pythagoreans, who were therefore right, Champier goes on, to apply the fourfold template (*quaternitas*) to the understanding of the world.[51] This gives Champier the opportunity to repeat – word by word – the whole system of correspondences and interrelations outlined by Ficino in his Commentary on the *Timaeus* (chapter 22):

> The metaphysician deals with four elements: essence, being, power and action. The mathematician is concerned with mark, line, surface and depth, the natural philosopher with the seminal virtue of nature, the natural sprouting, the fully developed form and the compound. Let us show how all of these principles correspond to each other.[52]

In genuinely Platonic terms, the language of life is therefore geometrico-mathematical. As such it is inherently moral, due to the emphasis placed on the concepts of balance and proportion (*temperamentum* and *temperantia*). For Champier, the fourfold template of metaphysical notions is the key to understanding the life of the universe. The geometrical categories are behind the processes of growth and generation in nature, while, at a deeper level, they are the instantiation of forces and actions that stem from forms and intelligible substances.

The fourfold patterning of Timaeic physics is the metaphysical framework that supports Champier's treatment of the fourth level of life, super-celestial bliss, which is the subject of Book IV in *De quadruplici vita*. In Champier's words, super-celestial life is "the beatitude (*beatitudo*) of the celestial paradise", which the pagans called the "Elysian Fields". Champier is aware that, arrived at this point, it is almost impossible to describe the nature of paradisiac joys (*paradisi gaudia*) and that words would inevitably desert him. Invoking the prophet Isaiah, he dwells on the specific difficulty

[49] Champier (1516), fol. 100[r].
[50] Champier (1516), fol. 107[r].
[51] Champier (1516), fol. 106[r].
[52] Marsilio Ficino, Commentary on Plato's *Timaeus*, in Ficino (1576), II, 1447: *Quatuor apud metaphysicum sunt elementa: essentia, esse, virtus et actio. Quatuor apud mathematicum: signum, linea, planum atque profundum. Quatuor apud physicum: seminaria naturae virtus, pullulatio naturalis et adulta forma atque compositum. Redde vero singula singulis.* Champier plagiarises the whole section in *Platonica medicina de duplici mundo* (Champier, 1516), fol. 106[rv].

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:26:54, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.007

of expressing with words that which could not even be thought. Champier decides therefore to add what the ancient philosophers – Aristotle, but above all Plato and the Platonists – had written about the Elysium. Ample sections from *Phaedo* and *The Republic* are here interlaced with passages from the Psalms, Isaiah and the Gospels (especially Matthew). He also refers to Augustine and Bernard to shed more light on that "immense pleasure" that is open to the intellective part of the soul.[53]

In this theological mosaic, teeming with multiple references and quotations, philosophers, physicians and divines all stress the role of the intellect, will and memory at the moment of corporeal death: the intellect will be perfected through a beatific vision, face to face, of God; the will will be infused with superabundant infinite love; memory, finally, will be given the strongest power to retain knowledge.[54] In this – at times, farraginous – exercise in scholarly harvesting, Plotinus is given a place of honour. The *Liber de quadruplici vita* ends with a "final and comprehensive chapter", which epitomises all that has been said up to that point on the subject. The summary is presented as an anthology of "golden propositions excerpted from the theology of the Platonists and above all of Plotinus".[55] The chapter is in fact a potpourri of quotations taken from Ficino's commentary on Plotinus' *Enneads*, in particular on *Ennead* VI. 4. In his selection, Champier does not hesitate to appropriate even some of the short titles that Ficino had affixed to the various sections of his commentary. The aphoristic compendium of Plotinus' *Enneads* is therefore a true Ficinian cento.

And yet, beyond all the plagiarism, Champier's operation tells us about some of the key directions taken by the reception of Platonic ideas in sixteenth-century France. Champier's remarks on super-celestial life, albeit fraught with Ficinian unacknowledged borrowings, testify to the penetration of Plotinian and post-Plotinian themes in the philosophical landscape of the time, especially the growing relevance of the One for contemporary Christian theology. The fourth level of life in Champier's *De quadruplici vita* is sheer paradisiac bliss, in which the soul becomes empowered with sufficient energy to pierce though the husk of material appearances and intuit the essences of things in a direct way. For Champier, the most convincing proof that human souls are immortal is their ability to know

[53] Champier (1507), sig. d7^{v}a. [54] Champier (1507), sig. d7^{r}a–d8^{r}a.
[55] Champier (1507), sig. e5^{r}: *Aureae propositiones ex Platonicorum et praecipue Plotini theologia excerptae. Capitulum ultimum et universalem omnium iam dictorum contentivum.*

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:26:54, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.007

"without the instrument of the body".[56] This unmediated vision of being by the human mind, however, rests on a theological postulate: God is absolute coincidence of subject and object of knowledge and there is no other reality apart from God. Here Champier is ventriloquising Ficino's *Platonic Theology* (II, 9): "God sees things not in themselves, but in Himself; not through their images, but through His own essence. He does not divide Himself into innumerable particulars, but looks at everything as if it were one."[57] Being the supreme reality (*summum est rerum omnium*), God is absolute unity (*summa unitas*), the highest truth (*summa veritas*) and infinite good (*summa bonitas*).[58] Given the compelling series of increasingly closer identities, the risk of pantheism always looms in Champier's metaphysics. "God is in all things because all things are in Him," he writes in his book on the four levels of life, and he continues: "if all things were not in Him, they would be nowhere and would not exist at all."[59]

To avoid any lapse into pantheism and reaffirm the transcendent reality of God, Champier combines Plotinus with Numenius of Apamea, the Platonist who flourished in the second century AD, exercised a considerable influence on Plotinus and was highly regarded by some of the early Church Fathers. That Champier relies on Numenius' *De bono* in his discussion of the Plotinian notion of God is not entirely surprising. As already said, Champier's book on life is more theological in spirit than its source of inspiration – Ficino's *De vita* – ever was. Champier knew Numenius' fragments on *De bono* from Eusebius' *Praeparatio evangelica*, a source in which Plotinus had already been associated with Numenius. More specifically, Champier pieces together a few fragments from Book V of *De bono* (frs. 11, 12, 13 and 14), where Numenius had discussed the existence of three ontological principles: the First, the Second and the Third God.[60] As with other philosophical materials from Plotinus, Orphic Hymns, Chaldaic Oracles and Sibylline poems, the crucial point for Champier is to show that the Plotinian hypostases are in fact philosophical precursors of the Christian Trinity. The significance of Numenius' philosophy in Champier's handling of Plotinus lies in using Numenius as a switchboard that helped connect Platonic themes (such as the Good, the One and the Demiurge) to various contributions from

[56] Champier (1507), sig. e4^{v}a.
[57] Champier (1507), sig. d8^{v}b: *Deus res non in seipsas, sed in seipso; non per earum imagines, sed per suam essentiam intuetur. Non distrahitur circa plurima, sed cuncta conspicit tanquam unum.*
[58] Champier (1507), sig. d8^{v}a.
[59] Champier (1507), sig. d8^{v}b.
[60] Champier (1507), sig. e1^{v}ab. On Numenius' metaphysics, see Langseth (2013) and Karamanolis (2013).

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:26:54, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.007

Christian thinkers (Origen and Eusebius, in particular). In this sense, Numenius played a prominent part in Champier's Christianisation of the Plotinian One.

In the passages from Numenius' *De bono* quoted in Eusebius' *Praeparatio evangelica* (XI, 10; XV, 17), God was presented as an eternal and incorporeal identity, only understandable through reason (*logos*). "Numenius the Pythagorean", influenced by Philo's attempt to harmonise Jewish scripture with Greek philosophy in first-century Alexandria, had famously characterised Plato as "Attic" Moses (IX, 6). For Eusebius, Plato's view of God as the ruler of all things derived from the doctrines of the Hebrews. In Book 11, Chapter 17 of the *Praeparatio*, Eusebius referred the reader to Plotinus' discussion of how the Mind and the Soul emanated from the One. The triadic rhythm of Plotinian emanation could therefore be seen as being appropriated from the Christian Trinity. Eusebius quoted directly from the *Enneads* (V.1. 8): "This is the reason why Plato says that all things are threefold 'about the king of all', that is to say, the Good, the Mind and the Soul." Plotinus made clear that "these statements of ours are not new; they do not belong to the present time, but were made long ago, not explicitly, and what we have said in this discussion has been an interpretation of them, relying on Plato's own writings for evidence that these views are ancient."[61]

Eusebius (XI, 18) had thus supported Plotinus through Numenius' ontology of the ineffable and incomprehensible Good. God was one, for the cause of everything can only be one, but He could also be understood as a creative principle, and therefore distinguished into the Father and the Demiurge. Numenius' God did not work or operate in order to make a world; rather, the world emerged and stayed alive as a result of the overflowing life of God. These were the arguments that in his *De quadruplici vita* Champier had taken from Eusebius, Plotinus and Numenius. He then adjusted them to his apologetic attempt to advocate the reality of a non-pagan super-celestial life. Crafty and furtive as it may have been, Champier's pirating attitude was a radically literalist way to interpret the ancient Platonist doctrine of the *prisca sapientia*. If the progress of wisdom was in fact the "emanation" of the never-changing One, Renaissance *sapientes* were legitimised to recycle knowledge. Their investigations were inherently a cento of the most ancient sages. In Champier's republic of letters, everyone was a plagiarist.

[61] Plotinus, *Enneads* (Armstrong, 1966–1988), V, 39–41.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:26:54, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.007

Medicine of the Mind and Medicine of the Body Politic

In one of Numenius' excerpts quoted in Eusebius' *Praeparatio evangelica* (XI, 22), the Good – the ultimate foundation of reality – is characterised as something that cannot be represented in the mind of human beings, for it is a summit of perfection that is completely remote from the senses and the bodies. Numenius recommends therefore to reach a state of complete seclusion from the world – "a particular condition of divine solitude that cannot be described and is immense" – in order to get closer to the Good. The communion of the Good presupposes indefatigable application to the study of mathematics and complete dedication to the most abstract kind of contemplation.[62] It is the path of super-celestial bliss described in Champier's *De quadruplici vita*. As already mentioned, spiritual purgation, i.e. catharsis through philosophical meditation (*per philosophiam purgati*), is the guiding thread in his book on the four levels of life; above all, it is the path that leads to Paradisiac vision.[63]

One of the original ways in which Champier Christianised the system of Platonic and Plotinian "purgative" virtues was by intertwining his philosophical analysis with traditional views concerning Paradise, Purgatory and Hell. The life of purgation (*purgatoria vita*), for instance, was seen by Champier as perfectly in line with Plato's doctrine of the soul, in spite of several "heretics" – past and present – denying the reality of this stage in the otherworldly life. Here again, Champier kept silently excerpting from Ficino's *Platonic Theology* while presenting his literary theft as a direct quotation from Plato's *Symposium* (210d–212b): at the end of their cycle of purification, the divine souls would plunge into the "divine sea" of intelligible beauty and would fill other souls with the knowledge they have already achieved.[64] Champier went so far as to say that here Plato meant the Purgatory when he spoke of "purged souls".[65] He added that in *Phaedo* Plato had distinguished between Purgatory and Hell as places and conditions where the soul respectively purified itself from curable sins (*sanabilia*) and paid the penalty for incurable sins (*insanabilia*).[66] No wonder, therefore, that Champier often looked at Socrates' philosophical exercise in

[62] des Places (1973), 44. [63] Champier (1507), sig. d4^{r}b.

[64] Champier (1507), sig. e4^{v}b: *Purgatas animas, quae divinam prae ceteris pulchritudinem amaverunt, tandem in ipsum divinum pulchritudinis pelagus sese prorsus immergere, divinosque ibi liquores non tamen bibere, sed etiam in alios tam ex seipsis effundere.* Ficino, *Platonic Theology* XVIII, 8 (Allen and Hankins [2001–2006], VI, 130).

[65] Champier (1507), sigs e4^{v}–5r. [66] Champier (1507), sig. e5^{r}.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:26:54, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.007

dying as an example of how to engage in metaphysical and theological pursuits.

Furthermore, given his all-encompassing notion of *salus* as both a medical and soteriological condition, Champier deemed natural and physical remedies (*medicinae et remedia terrena*) to be inadequate to secure humankind's mental and spiritual well-being.[67] In his ideal disciplinary organisation, practical philosophy was not only supposed to deal with the health of individual bodies (moral philosophy), but also with the health of the body politic:

> the part that is concerned with practical philosophy examines the mores, the family or the state, and it investigates the health of the political community. Of these disciplines, the first is called ethics, the second household management and the third civil philosophy.[68]

In this case, too, Plotinus (mediated through Ficino) represented a decisive asset in this comprehensive plan. Plotinus had pointed out how social and political life was exposed to the effects of magical spells and to the possibility of falling ill, for the soul that was involved in practical affairs could always lose the ability to be self-directed:

> the practical actions which are caused by our passionate spirit (*thumos*) are the result of an irrational impulse (*epithumia*), as are in the same way those caused by our carnal desires; political activity and the pursuit of office have the desire of power in us provoking them. And the activities which are undertaken to avoid suffering have fear (*phobos*) as their origin, and those for the sake of getting more, carnal desire (*epithumia*). Those undertaken because of necessary requirements, since they seek to satisfy a need of nature, obviously have the force of nature behind them making survival our own essential concern.[69]

Physical and mental balance – a premise to social and political stability – could only derive from careful control of the primal tendencies to life and survival: *thumos*, *epithumia* and *phobos*. Rather interestingly, in a short treatise devoted to the diagnosis and care of bodily and mental diseases, Champier mentioned Plotinus' therapy as one of the best remedies to cure bulimia (*boulimos*, *bulimus*) or "canine hunger" (what the theologians, he added, call the "vice of gluttony"):

[67] Champier, *Epistola prohemialis*, in Champier (1507), sig. b1^{v}.

[68] Champier (1533), sig. a1^{v}: *Quod practicae quidem partis, aut de moribus, aut de re familiari, aut de civili, de civitatisque salute speculatur. Horum quod primum est morale vocatur, alterum domesticum, postremum civile.*

[69] Plotinus, *Enneads*, IV (Armstrong, 1966-1988), 273.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:26:54, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.007

> And in treating this disease, sobriety provides an excellent cure. For, as pointed out by Plotinus, sobriety and temperance allow us not to take anything which we may later regret and not to overstep the bounds of moderation, while teaching us how to tame desire under the yoke of reason. No doubt, we need to eat in order to live; we don't need to live in order to eat, as animals do.[70]

Plotinus, it is true, had differentiated between civic and purifying virtues (*Ennead* I. 2. 2–3). What is presented by Champier as a quotation from Plotinus, though, is not a direct reference to the *Enneads*. Rather, it is a Platonic and Ciceronian argument read through Macrobius' reinterpretation of the Plotinian virtues in his Commentary on the *Somnium Scipionis* (I, 8). In that particular section of the work, Macrobius had identified various shades in one's ability to self-restraint, distinguishing between *virtus politica*, *virtus purgativa* and *virtus exemplaris*, and in the end defining *temperantia* as a *virtus politica* (*nihil appetere poenitendum*).[71]

As someone who in particular moments of his life had been involved in the political events of his country (the Italian wars of Louis XII and Francis I) and contributed to the life of his local community (Lyon), Champier was especially concerned with the institutional function and moral dignity of medicine.[72] In the short primer of university logic and physics that he published at the end of the fifteenth century (*Janua logicae et physicae*), Champier told Jean Rabot, Counsellor of the Parliament of Grenoble, that, among the reasons that led him to become involved in the debate over the immortality of the rational soul and its perpetual existence (*perpectuatio*), was to provide Rabot's sons and his readers with a better knowledge of medicine – above all, a knowledge to be acquired by paying due attention to the theological underpinnings of a physician's job.[73]

[70] Champier (1506), fol. 24^{v}: *De canino appetitu et bolismo animi dicto, vicium gulae apud theologos. . . In quo morbo curando sobrietas optimam curam affert optimumque iuvamentum. Etenim sobrietatis et temperantiae (Plotinus auctor est) est nil assumere poenitendum, in nullo moderatione excedere, sub rationis iugo cupiditatem domare. Comedendum profecto est ut vivamus, non vivendum ut comedamus brutorum more.*

[71] On Plotinus' view about virtues, see Dillon (1996, p. 320), to be compared with Schniewind (2003) and Emilsson (2017), 300–305. On the transformation of the notion of "purgative virtue" from Plotinus to Macrobius through Cicero, see Eliasson (2015), 30–31. On Ficino and Plotinian virtues, see Catana (2014).

[72] See Roger (1973) and Siraisi (2007), 139.

[73] Champier (1498), sig. A2^{r}. Jean Rabot, who accompanied King Charles VIII in his Italian expedition and for a very limited time held the office of Chancellor of the Kingdom of Naples, was a political figure of a certain standing.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:26:54, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.007

Here is therefore another area where Champier's medico-theology differs from Ficino's original model, for Champier's reflections on life, its nature and the various ways of purifying and preserving it resonate with political overtones. There is an element of civic commitment in *De quadruplici vita* that is missing in Ficino. Even in the discussion about super-celestial health (which is an attempt to shed light on the problem of salvation), Champier does not miss the opportunity to point out the subtle interplay between material and intelligible reality. In this Champier is genuinely Platonic. After having quoted a long excerpt from *The Republic* dealing with the story of Er, the man from Pamphylia who died in battle, came back to life and reported what he had seen during his journey in the afterlife (X, 614–621), Champier asks the crucial question: "Is this history (*historia*) or fiction (*fabula*)?" The question gives him the opportunity to demonstrate that Plato used stories and real events as allegorical representations of philosophical truths. Myth creates the meditational conditions that allow the imagination to fuel the task of contemplation.

Champier expands on this point by involving in the conversation the early Christian apologist Justin Martyr (100–165 AD) and Olympiodorus the Younger (c. 495–570), the late Platonist commentator active in Alexandria during the sixth century. Justin thinks that Plato's story is history, while Olympiodorus argues that Plato often called both historical events (*historiae*) and arguments (*rationes*) "fables" in order to allegorise the most abstract truths. In Champier's opinion, the line that divides history from myth should be kept fine, because the materiality of historical experience blurs the vision of the intellect. It is for this reason that Champier recognised an allegorical – and therefore philosophical – element in Plato's "tales". But more than the metaphysical allegories, it was the political uses of the tales that intrigued Champier, who seemed to be aware of the extent to which human action depended on images, symbols and stories in order to be effective and capable of transforming the reality of things. In *De quadruplici vita*, he maintained that citizens were stimulated to justice through examples and works rather than through words. Plato had well understood that by bringing to the fore a man coming back from the dead he could make immortality and the practice of justice more persuasive.[74]

It should be said that Champier's blend of philosophical truth, historical experience and political imagination was not that far from Plotinus' creative use of myths and images as tools of meditation. This aspect of Plotinus'

[74] Champier (1507), sig. d6[r]b. See *Phaedo*, 114d.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:26:54, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.007

philosophy has long been recognised by scholars in the field.[75] In the specific case of the Myth of Er, here discussed by Champier, Plotinus had hinted at that particular Platonic tale in different sections of the *Enneads* (II. 3. 9; III. 2. 7). Among other reasons, Plotinus referred to Er to reaffirm the "amphibious" nature of human beings, who are "not only souls, but also already composite living beings". And since "All is a single living being", and animals and plants "share in reason and soul and life", the bodily parts of the universe, too, are instantiations of the rational and providential order of the universe. Plotinus could therefore conclude that it was not the mark of a "pious" mind "to censure the work by admitting that these lower parts are not excellently disposed".[76] As was the case with natural life, in political life, too, the original tendency to self-preservation testified to the providential arrangement of the cosmos. Within the universal economy of life, the division between irrational and rational impulses lost significance.

In one of the rare occurrences in which Champier acknowledged the contribution of Ficino as an interpreter of Plotinian philosophy ("The soul of the world according to Marsilio Ficino"), he compared human beings to "seeds" that develop the rational potential within the body of nature: "Plotinus says that the rational souls are the seeds of human beings, for certain kinds of specific irrational lives sprout out into the shape of bodies".[77] In the treatise on "Platonic Medicine concerning the Twofold World," Champier defined the Good as the core of intelligible reality. He also insisted that only the Good could be the one cause explaining the reality of all things, both sensible and intelligible.[78] By stressing the political underpinnings of medicine and unity underlying the two-world metaphysics of Platonic philosophy, Champier's meditation on the nature of life came full circle.

Conclusion: From the Art of Patch-Writing to the Technology of Cutting and Pasting

In his seminal monograph on Champier, Brian Copenhaver noted how Plotinus had a special place in Champier's many philosophical compendia,

[75] On Plotinus' use of myths, see Clark (2016). On Plotinus' interpretation of the Myth of Er, see Hutchinson (2018), 161: "The Myth of Er is a foundational Platonic text for Plotinus' views on destiny and necessity."

[76] Plotinus, *Enneads*, III (Armstrong, 1966-1988), 65–67.

[77] Champier (1498), sig. A6^{r}: *De mundi anima secundum Marcilium Ficinum: Plotinus dicit rationales animas esse hominum semina quia ex ipsis pullulant vitae quaedam propriae irrationales in corpora.*

[78] Champier *Platonica medicina de duplici mundo* (Champier, 1516), fol. 97^{rv}.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:26:54, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.007

and added a rather intriguing observation: "Plotinus has occasionally and undeservedly suffered the reputation of an unsophisticated and credulous occultist, and yet Champier found him critical enough of certain aspects of magic and astrology to make use of him in his attacks on the secret arts."[79] These words were written in the 1970s. In the forty years that separate Copenhaver's book from today's scholarship on the subject, Plotinus' fortunes and reputation have remarkably improved. This very companion is clear evidence that a significant change has occurred in the meantime. The association of Plotinus with Renaissance occultist trends remains a ticklish topic, but in this area, too, things have been looking up. Several studies on Ficino and Plotinus have resulted in a long-awaited reappraisal of the latter's contribution to the history of Renaissance philosophy and magic.[80]

Champier's role in the early modern reception of Plotinus needs to be situated in this context. For all his Ficinian borrowings, Champier's account of the heavenly life, the *vita coelitus comparanda*, is characterised by a stronger Plotinian tone than Ficino's astro-biological approach, for Champier discounted the role that astrology had in this area of divine emanation. And this on two levels: stars are not talismans that exercise a certain degree of influence on human actions, and, even if they were, their power is overwhelmingly held in check by God's supernatural agency. With Champier, there is certainly no danger of drifting into the realms of astrological determinism. This is the reason why he decided to divide his own book on how to capture life from heaven into two parts: one specifically devoted to the links between medicine and astrology, and the other concerned with the after-life beatitude of the soul.[81] While in Ficino's *De vita* the boundaries that divide theology from astrology are sometimes permeable (so much so that in the end he had to write an apology to dispel possible charges of heresy), in Champier the difference between the two domains is clear.

So far, so good with respect to Plotinus' legacy. A question, though, cannot be avoided at the end of a chapter that is specifically devoted to Champier's reception of Plotinus. Are we dealing with a Plotinian

[79] Copenhaver (1978), 106.
[80] See "Introduction" in Kaske and Clark (1989), 3–90; Allen (1998); Celenza (2002); Corrias (2013); Catana (2014); Gersh (2017).
[81] Champier *Epistola prohemialis*, in Champier (1507), sig. b1^{v}.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:26:54, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.007

centonist, who is interested in spreading the knowledge of the *Enneads* along the lines of a general revival of Platonic philosophy in France (where the possibility of an eclectic connectivity between the authoritative texts of Plato and Aristotle is more important than any philological or critical demarcation), or is Champier silently embedding Ficino in the medico-theological discourse of the time without deliberately recognising the latter's contribution? The fact is that while Champier seems to be reasonably open in acknowledging all the debts he incurred while poring over classical and biblical sources, he tends to be extremely cagey when the pilfered material comes from contemporary sources. More often than not, Champier's Plotinus is in fact simply Ficino caught in the act of commenting upon the *Enneads* – with Ficino's name being brutally erased from the process of knowledge transmission.

Here it should be pointed out that, even though the construction of the modern self is indebted to Ficino's work as a philosopher, translator, editor and commentator, beginning with Champier and passing through Schleiermacher, Ficino has often been treated unfairly and with a condescending air by early modern philosophers and modern historians of philosophy.[82] And yet the construction of the modern self was also a matter of authorship and copyright, which is the material side of the story of the early modern and modern cogito. Champier was well aware of the impact that the invention of the printing press was having on contemporary culture and he seemed to take full advantage of the possibilities that the new medium had opened up in the mechanical reproduction of ideas. Today, the ease with which current technology allows writers and readers to cut and paste vast amounts of information fosters forms of appropriations that – wittingly or unwittingly – blur the boundaries between authorship, copyright and open access. This, in a different context, in different proportions and with different priorities, is what seems to have happened with Champier, who, for better or for worse, was a master in the art of philosophical intarsia.[83] If Ficino was the one who paid the greater price in this episode in the early modern endeavours of cutting and pasting, Plotinus certainly profited from Champier's endeavour.

[82] On Schleiermacher and Ficino, see Hankins (2016); Robichaud (2016), (2018).
[83] On the cento as a literary genre, see Chin (2010).

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:26:54, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.007

REFERENCES

Allen, M. J. B. (1992) "Summoning Plotinus: Ficino, Smoke and the Strangled Chickens", in M. A. Di Cesare (ed.) *Reconsidering the Renaissance*, Binghamton, NY, 63–88 [repr. in Allen, *Plato's Third Eye*].

(1995) *Plato's Third Eye: Studies in Marsilio Ficino's Metaphysics and Its Sources*, Aldershot.

(1998) *Synoptic Art: Marsilio Ficino on the History of Platonic Interpretation*, Florence.

Allen, M. J. B. and Hankins, J. (ed. and trans.) (2001–2006) *Marsilio Ficino, Platonic Theology*, 6 vols., Cambridge, MA.

Allut, P. (1859) *Études biographique et bibliographique sur Symphorien Champier*, Lyon.

Antonioli, R. (1974) "Un médecin lecteur du *Timée*, Symphorien Champier," in *L'Humanisme au XVI^e siècle*, Grenoble, 53–62.

Armstrong, A. H. (ed.) (1966–1988) *Plotinus, Enneads*, 7 vols., Cambridge, MA.

Bessarion (1503) *In calumniatorem Platonis libri quatuor*, Venice.

Catana, L. (2014) "Readings of Platonic Virtue Theories from the Middle Ages to the Renaissance: The Case of Marsilio Ficino's *De Amore*," *British Journal for the History of Philosophy*, 22: 680–703.

Cavallo, S. and Storey, T. (2013) *Healthy Living in Late Renaissance Italy*, Oxford.

Celenza, C. S. (2002) "Late Antiquity and Florentine Platonism: The 'Post-Plotinian' Ficino," in M. J. B. Allen, V. Rees, and M. Davies (eds.) *Marsilio Ficino: His Theology, His Philosophy, His Legacy*, Leiden, 71–97.

Champier, S. (1498) *Janua logicae et physicae*, Lyon.

(1506) *De corporum animorumque morbis eorundemque remediis opusculum in duos tractatus sive libellos partitum*, Lyon.

(1507) *Liber de quadruplici vita*, Lyon.

(1508) *De triplici disciplina, cuius partes sunt philosophia naturalis, medicina, theologia, moralis philosophia integrantes quadrivium*, Lyon.

(1516) *Symphonia Platonis cum Aristotele et Galeni cum Hippocrate*, Paris.

(1517) *Practica nova in medicina de omnibus morborum generibus ex traditionibus Graecorum, Latinorum, Arabum, Poenorum ac recentium autorum aurei libri quinque*, Lyon.

(1528?) *Symphonia Galeni ad Hippocratem, Cornelii Celsi ad Avicennam*, Lyon?

(1533) *Periarchon, id est de principiis utriusque philosophiae [. . .] quae Galenus in demonstrativis sermonibus, et Aristoteles in libris naturalium disciplinarum, ac Timaeus Locrus et Plato in libris de universo scripserunt [. . .]*, Lyon.

Chin, C. "Cento," in A. Grafton, G. W. Most, and S. Settis (eds.) (2010) *The Classical Tradition*, Cambridge, MA, 189–190.

Clark, S. R. L. (2016) *Plotinus: Myth, Metaphor, and Philosophical Practice*, Chicago.

Cooper, R. (1988) "Humanistes et antiquaires à Lyon," in A. Possenti and G. Mastrangelo (eds.) *Il Rinascimento a Lione*, Rome, 159–174.

(1998) "Les dernières années de Symphorien Champier," *Bulletin de l'Association d'Étude sur l'Humanisme, la Réforme et la Renaissance*, 47: 25–50.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:26:54, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.007

Copenhaver, B. P. (1977) "Lefevre d'Etaples, Symphorien Champier, and the Secret Names of God," *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes*, 40:189–211.

(1978) *Symphorien Champier and the Reception of the Occultist Tradition in Renaissance France*, The Hague.

(1986) "Renaissance Magic and Neoplatonic Philosophy: *Ennead* 4. 3–5 in Ficino's *De vita coelitus comparanda*," in G. C. Garfagnini (ed.) *Marsilio Ficino e il ritorno di Platone: Studi e documenti*, Florence, II, 351–369.

Corrias, A. (2013) "From Daemonic Reason to Daemonic Imagination: Plotinus and Marsilio Ficino on the Soul's Tutelary Spirit," *British Journal for the History of Philosophy* 21: 443–462.

Des Places, É. (ed.) (1973) *Numenius, Fragments*, Paris.

Dillon, J. M. (1996) "An Ethic for the Late Antique Sage," in L. Gerson (ed.) *The Cambridge Companion to Plotinus*, Cambridge, UK, 315–335,

du Cange, C. (1883–1887) *Glossarium mediae et infimae latinitatis*, ed. L. Favre, 8 vols., Niort.

Eliasson, E. (2015) "The Late Ancient Development of a Notion of Heroic Virtue," in S. F. Rota and A. Hellerstedt (eds.) *Shaping the Heroic Virtue: Studies in the Art and Politics of Supereminence in Europe and Scandinavia*, Leiden:19–40.

Emilsson, E. K. (2017) *Plotinus*, New York.

Ficino, M. (1576) *Marsilii Ficini Florentini [. . .] opera et quae hactenus extitere et quae in lucem nunc primum prodiere omnia [. . .]*, Basel. (Photographic reprint Turin 1959, and later Lucca 2011).

Friedman, J. (1978) *Michael Servetus: A Case Study in Total Heresy*, Geneva.

Garin, E. (1974) "Plotino nel Rinascimento," in *Plotino e il Neoplatonismo in Oriente e in Occidente*, Rome, 537–553 [repr. in Garin, *Rinascite e rivoluzioni*].

(1975) *Rinascite e rivoluzioni: Movimenti culturali dal XIV al XVIII secolo*, Bari.

Gersh, S. (2017) "Analytical Study of the Commentary on Ennead III," in S. Gersh (ed.) *Marsilio Ficino, Commentary on Plotinus*, Cambridge, MA, xi–ccxxxi.

Hankins, J. (2016) "Iamblichus, Ficino and Schleiermacher on the Sources of Religious Knowledge," *Erudition and the Republic of Letters*, 1: 1–12.

Hunkeler, T. (2007) "Symphorien Champier: Logique(s) du compilateur," in A. Carlino and A. Wenger (eds.) *Littérature et médicine: Approches et perspectives (XVI^e^-XIX^e^ siècles)*, Geneva, 49–63.

Hutchinson, D. M. (2018) *Plotinus on Consciousness*, Cambridge, UK.

Jodogne, P. (1972) "La correspondance de Symphorien Champier avec Jérôme de Pavie dans le 'Duellum epistolare' 1519," in G. Verbeke and J. Ijsewijn (eds.) *The Late Middle Ages and the Dawn of Humanism Outside of Italy*, Leuven and The Hague, 45–56.

Karamanolis, G. (2013) "Numenius", *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/numenius/ (accessed 16 November 2018).

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:26:54, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.007

Kaske, C. V. and J. R. Clark (eds.) (1989) *Marsilio Ficino, Three Books on Life*, Binghamton, NY.
Kessler, E. (2011) *Alexander of Aphrodisias and His Doctrine of the Soul: 1400 Years of Lasting Significance*, Leiden.
Langseth, J. L. (2013) *Knowing God: A Study of the Argument of Numenius of Apameia's On the Good*. Dissertation. University of Iowa.
Martin, J. (1973) "Le rôle de l'imprimerie lyonnaise dans le premier humanisme français," in *L'Humanisme français au début de la Renaissance: Colloque international de Tours*, Paris, 81–91.
Muccillo, M. (1996) *Platonismo, ermetismo e 'prisca theologia': Ricerche di storiografia filosofica rinascimentale*, Florence.
Renaudet, A. (1916) *Préréforme et humanisme à Paris pendant les premières guerres d'Italie (1494–1511)*, Paris.
Robichaud, D. J.-J. (2016) "Platonic Questions: Ficino's Latin and Schleiermacher's German," *Historia Philosophica: An International Journal*, 14: 159–174.
(2018) *Plato's Persona: Marsilio Ficino, Renaissance Humanism, and Platonic Traditions*, Philadelphia.
Roger, J. (1973) "L'humanisme médical de Symphorien Champier," in *L'Humanisme français au début de la Renaissance: Colloque de Tours*, Paris, 261–272.
Saffrey, H.-D. (1996) "Florence 1492: The Reappearance of Plotinus," *Renaissance Quarterly*, 49: 488–508.
(2001) *Le néoplatonisme après Plotin*, Paris.
Saulnier, V. I. (1958) "Lyon et la médicine aux temps de la Renaissance," *La Revue Lyonnaise de Médicine* 7: 73–83.
Schniewind, A. (2003) *L'Éthique du sage chez Plotin: Le paradigme du spoudaios*, Paris.
Silver, I. (1993) "Plato and Ficino in the Work of Symphorien Champier," *Bibliothèque d'Humanisme et Renaissance*, 55: 271–280.
Siraisi, N. G. (2007) *History, Medicine, and the Traditions of Renaissance Learning*, Ann Arbor, MI.
Vasoli, C. (1960) "Temi e fonti della tradizione ermetica in uno scritto di Symphorien Champier," in E. Castelli (ed.) *Umanesimo e esoterismo*, Padua, 235–247.
Wadsworth, J. B. (1962) *Lyons 1473–1503: The Beginnings of Cosmopolitanism*, Cambridge, MA.
Walker, D. P. (1954) "The *Prisca Theologia* in France," *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes*, 17: 204–259.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:26:54, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.007

CHAPTER 5

Henry More and Descartes

David Leech

The Cambridge Platonist Henry More (1614–87) believed that he may have been the first person in Cambridge to buy a copy of Plotinus' *Enneads*. He is also often regarded as the first person to introduce the new Cartesian philosophy into England.[1] However, after an initial period of strong admiration for Descartes More would quickly take issue with the main lines of Cartesianism. In reality More was never a great admirer of Descartes' metaphysics but rather of his natural philosophy, although even here he would vehemently oppose panmechanism, insisting on the need for appeal to an *anima mundi* (which he variously terms "plastic nature", "spirit of nature", "hylarchic principle" – henceforth "plastic nature"), even where he grudgingly conceded that mechanism could perhaps explain some simple physical phenomena. But he especially rejected the new Cartesian metaphysics, in particular its definition of spirit as essentially inextended (*res cogitans*) and matter as essentially extended (*res extensa*).

More's rejection of Descartes' metaphysics may seem surprising given that More identified as a Platonist, and within the constellation of contemporary philosophical positions Descartes' stance might well have seemed congenial. More than one scholar of Descartes has seen close affinities between the new Cartesian philosophy and Plotinian Neoplatonism,[2] while More's reverence for the "Platonick philosophy" and especially Plotinian metaphysics is well established. Certainly the young More was an especially great admirer of Plotinus, regarding him as a reviver (via Plato) of the Mosaic Cabbala.[3] But clearly More thought of himself as a Platonist in metaphysics *over and against* Descartes, and this is also how he was

[1] More's words (in a letter to Edmund Elys) are: "I bought one [copy of the *Enneads*] when I was Junior Master for 16 shillings and I think I was the first that had either the luck or the courage to buy him." See [Edmund Elys] (1694), 27. For a defence of the claim that More was one of the earliest English writers (if not the earliest) to discuss Descartes see Gabbey (1982), 171–249. More first mentions Descartes in his 1646 poem *Democritus Platonissans* (More, 1646), 178–179.

[2] See e.g. Menn (1998). [3] See e.g. More (1659), 247–248 and (1660), 10.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:28:20, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.009

perceived by Joseph Glanvill (1636–80), who has the distinction of being the first to provide a contemporary account of More's (and other Cambridge Platonists') thought. In an essay entitled 'Anti-Fanatical Religion, and Free Philosophy, in a Continuation of the New Atlantis' (1676), written after the fashion of Francis Bacon's utopian novel, Glanvill presents a thinly disguised account of unnamed Cambridge Platonists and second-generation "Latitudinarians".[4] Conveniently for the purposes of this chapter, he also sets out the chief differences between More's and Descartes' metaphysical stances, so I will cite from it here in order to set the stage for what follows. Through the mouthpiece of the governor of the "Stranger's House", Glanvill says the following about these men's metaphysical commitments:

> in this sort of *Metaphysicks*, the *Science of Spirits*, they were not all of one Opinion; For some were for the Doctrine of *Plato*, making *Spirits*, *extended, penetrable, indiscerpible, self-motive* substances: Whereas *others* thought with *Descartes*, that *extention, motion*, and the like Attributes, belong'd only to *Bodies*, and had nothing to do with *Spirits*, which could be *defin'd* by nothing, but *Thinking*, and the *Modes* of it. . .[5]

Here Glanvill alludes to a set of metaphysical disagreements within the group, and possibly he may have Ralph Cudworth (1617–88) in mind among those 'others' who sympathised with Descartes' new *res cogitans/extensa* doctrine.[6] But in any case it is very clear that he has More's spiritual extension doctrine in mind when he speaks about those who were "for the Doctrine of Plato".[7] However, he notes that these figures agreed on the following:

> As for the Doctrine of the common Schools of *Tota in Toto* – Both sides esteem'd it *contradictious*, and *vain*: And knew, that this was one great

[4] See Crocker (2003), 80. As Crocker notes in the same place, a manuscript version of the essay exists in which Glanvill identifies the moderate divines he speaks of as "Cupri-Cosmits", namely: "Chudvoret" (Ralph Cudworth); "Uotheci" (Benjamin Whichcote); "Pratci" (Simon Patrick); "Retus" (George Rust); "Ottomar" (William Outram); "Sithim" (John Smith); "Meor" (Henry More); "Ilegon" (Nathaniel Ingelo); "Tonsillo" (John Tillotson); and "Stenfegill" (Edward Stillingfleet). See also Cope (1954). As Lewis et al. have noted, omitted by Cope from this list are "Jcambo" (Samuel Jacombe) and "Cardo" (Samuel Cradock?). See Lewis et al. (2017).

[5] Glanvill (1676), 53.

[6] Although strictly speaking Cudworth is agnostic concerning the extension of spirit: "We would not be supposed ourselves dogmatically to assert any more in this point than what all incorporealists agree in, that there is a substance specifically distinct from body. . . But whether this substance be altogether unextended, or extended otherwise than body, we shall leave every man to make his own judgement concerning it," Cudworth (1678), preface. See also Sailor (1962), 134.

[7] More identifies extension, penetrability, real indivisibility and self-motion as the principle properties of spiritual substances (see also below).

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:28:20, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.009

> occasion of the *Sadducism*, and disbelief of *Spiritual Beings*, which was so much the Mode of that age.[8]

This (as we shall see) somewhat muddies the waters, since the scholastic teaching that spirit is present to body as a whole in the whole and as a whole in each of the parts of said body (*tota in toto et tota in qualibet parte corporis*) has a Platonic – indeed a Plotinian – pedigree.[9] But leaving this aside for now, Glanvill's narrator further enquires about additional metaphysical commitments within the group:

> I desir'd [additionally] to know, whether those Gentlemen entertain'd the conceits, that the *old Platonists*, and *our Cartesians* did, in *their Hypotheses*? . . .That the *Platonists* held, There was an *Anima Mundi*; and the *Praeexistence* of *particular* Souls. . . And the *Cartesians*, on the *other* side, taught, That all things were *Mechanical*, but *Humane thoughts*, and operations; and that the *Beasts* were but meer *Automata*, and *insensible machins*. . .[10]

The answer indicates a further metaphysical disagreement along Platonic versus Cartesian lines:

> As to these Opinions replyed he, They had different thoughts. . . *Some* of them supposing that the *Platonical* Opinions are very fit to be admitted, to give assistance to the *Mechanical* Principles; which they think very defective of themselves. And *Others* judging, That the *Cartesian Hypotheses* are *probable*, and *Mechanism* sufficient to account for the *Phaenomena*; and that there is no *need* of introducing so hopeless, and obscure a Principle, as the *Soul* of the World.[11]

Again, More is clearly in his sights here as a (or the) lead proponent of the "Platonical Opinions", although the addition of "to give assistance to" indicates how More and other proponents of these views accommodated mechanism – at least sometimes – rather than outright rejected it. Again, I will return to this point later.

Finally, the narrator notes that in matters of providence similar metaphysical disagreement could be found:

> As to the Opinion of Praeexistence of souls: . . . some believe, It will give a very plausible, and fair solution of the main, and most difficult things in Providence: . . .Though, added He, I affirm nothing positively of it; And

[8] Glanvill (1676), 53.
[9] I will refer to this position henceforth as 'holenmerism', from the Greek *holos* (whole) and *meros* (part). For an excellent analysis of the position, see Pasnau (2011), 337–349.
[10] Glanvill (1676), 53. [11] Glanvill (1676), 53

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:28:20, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.009

> I suppose many of the persons I describe, were dispos'd to like thoughts with these, in reference to that Hypothesis.[12]

Glanvill's account no doubt has its own biases, and his 'Cupri-Cosmits' include a number of second-generation "Latitudinarians".[13] More work also needs to be done in clarifying which of these figures fall on which side of this Platonic/Cartesian dividing line and in which respects. But it seems unlikely that a devoted follower of More's like Glanvill would have been very wide of the mark in his recounting of this group's basic metaphysical differences and their relationship to Cartesianism. Nor, I think, would he err in his sense of what the chief metaphysical stakes were. So here we have a portrait of two camps within Cambridge Platonism, the one camp – headed by More – aligning with spiritual extension *pace* the Cartesian *res cogitans/extensa* distinction; plastic nature *pace* Cartesian panmechanism; and pre-existence. And the other camp aligning, or at least having sympathies with, the *res cogitans/extensa* distinction, panmechanism and being silent about pre-existence.

To what extent do these chief "anti-Cartesian" Morean doctrines – 1). spiritual extension, 2). plastic nature and 3). pre-existence – derive from his early Plotinism? In order to shed light on this I will firstly outline the young More's indebtedness to Plotinus in his early philosophical poems of the 1640s. However, although the legacy of Plotinus in More's *juvenilia* was massive, the poems had no international (and even only a limited national) impact or independent reception, either in More's own time or later, and in a volume like this the more interesting question is whether More's Plotinism was mainly restricted to a brief and inconsequential flowering in the 1640s, or whether the Plotinism of the poems lives on through his mature philosophical prose works, and especially whether it does intellectual work for him in his critique of Descartes.

I will therefore focus on the chief Morean doctrines that are Plotinian in inspiration but also have an important career after the poems and are put to use against (but also forced to adapt to) Cartesianism in interesting ways.[14] I will argue that More's Plotinism is 1). not just restricted to his poems but that, 2). much of it is so restricted and 3).

[12] Glanvill (1676), 54. [13] Crocker (2003), 80.

[14] The emphasis here is on Plotinian influence on More's metaphysical claims. Plotinus also remained influential on More in other ways, for instance, his philosophical mysticism served as a model for More's doctrine of inspiration or "true enthusiasm" (e.g. More [1655], preface), especially its focus on the primacy of practice. Throughout his career More was particularly fond of citing Plotinus as having said "If thou beest it, thou seest it," which is presumably a reference to *Ennead* I. 6. 9 (e.g. More [1660], 407; and passim). Plotinus' metaethical doctrine of the boniform faculty may exhibit

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:28:20, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.009

those Plotinian-inspired doctrines that are not restricted undergo modification to one degree or another – in some cases so much so that we may ask whether it is still appropriate to speak of them as recognisably Plotinian in their final form.

In particular, I argue that firstly, spiritual extension was meant as a revision of the Plotinian holenmerism of his early poems, adapted to the need to resist the new Cartesian substance dualism, but that its attribution of extension to souls and its identification of God and space diverges from Plotinus in insisting on the principle that every existent is located, and (a corollary of this) denying the absolute transcendence of the One.

Also, secondly he preserves throughout his writings the Plotinian notion of a plastic nature, which he opposed to a purely mechanistic Cartesian account, while *sometimes* allowing some autonomy to mechanism, but departing from Plotinus in insisting on the created status of plastic nature.

And thirdly he preserves the doctrine of the pre-existent soul and its vehicles, for which he appeals to Plotinian (and other) authority. However, he goes a step beyond Plotinus in insisting on the essential embodiment of souls, abandoning his earlier support of a Plotinian pure self position in the poems. This is due to his concern that the Plotinian position that souls can sometimes exist independently of bodies was too compromised by individuation problems to lend intellectual support to a robustly Christian notion of personal survival.

More's Early Plotinism

The Plotinian influence on More's early poems (1642–1647) is extensive.[15] In the long preface to his *Opera Omnia* (1679) More mentions certain "Platonic writers" as having strongly influenced him in the years immediately preceding the composition of these poems, in particular Ficino, Plotinus, Mercurius Trismegistus and the "mystical divines".[16]

further Plotinian influence (possibly it is a preservation of Plotinus' doctrine of "intellect in love"). However I will not discuss these influences further in this chapter.

[15] For instance, there are more than forty references to the *Enneads*, including in many cases extensive block quotes, and almost fifty references to Plotinus in the 1647 *Philosophicall Poems* (mostly in the extensive notes), which republished the four philosophical poems contained in the original 1642 *Psychodia Platonica* (*Psychozoia, Psychathanasia, Antipsychopannychia, Antimonopsychia*) together with the 1646 poem *Democritus Platonissans* and an appendix to *Antipsychopannychia* entitled *The Praexistency of the Soul*. By contrast, there are eighteen to Hermes Trismegistus, and only four references to Ficino. On the importance of Plotinian influence on More, see for instance Crocker (2003), xviii; Hutton (2007), 281–296; Leech (2002); Reid (2012), 16–18.

[16] See More (1675–1679), vol. 2, Preface General, section 9, and also Crocker (2003), 4–5.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:28:20, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.009

But Plotinus clearly stands out as the chief Platonic model, as evidenced by the massive presence of references to the *Enneads*, especially in the notes appended to his poems in the 1647 second edition, his frequent use of the honorific title of "the Philosopher" for him and his insistence that Plotinus was the main restorer of Platonism. So Plotinus was not just one among other "Platonic writers" for More, but had a privileged place in his reverence for Platonic authorities.[17]

I will only summarise the main outlines of More's early Plotinism here, since my principal interest is in looking at how the key Morean doctrines picked out by Glanvill – plastic nature, spiritual extension and pre-existence – get employed in the context of the new intellectual challenge of Cartesianism.[18] The Plotinian influence on these key doctrines is straightforwardly identifiable through explicit citations from the *Enneads*, with the partial exception of the last one, Plotinian holenmerism.

Firstly, concerning the Plotinian system of hypostases, More takes it over explicitly as his model for the Christian Trinity.[19] He establishes the correspondences between the Plotinian hypostases and the persons of the Christian Trinity as follows:

first person (God the father) = the Good/One
second person (Logos/eternal life) = intellect
third person (holy spirit) = psyche

More describes the Good/One henologically as the simple and naked essence of God without any plurality. He further describes it as known by "touch" and a joining of centre with centre, which he equates with the divine love of John's gospel.[20] Intellect is also defined in standard Plotinian

[17] Of Plotinus' role as restorer of the true Platonic philosophy, see for instance: "[Plato's school] well agrees with learned Pythagore, / Egyptian Trismegist, and th'antique roll / Of Chaldee wisdom, all which time hath tore" but has been restored to its authentic meaning by "deep Plotin", More (1647), 161. Of course More's reception of Plotinus is coloured in its general outlines by the Ficinian reception, especially with respect to its theory of the primaeval origins of the true philosophy (there are also plenty of mentions of the Hermetica, Chaldaean materials and the Orphic Hymns), but it is striking how few references More makes to Ficino, both in his poems and in his later philosophical prose works. For alleged Ficinian influence on More, see Staudenbaur (1968); Jacob (1985); Hutton (2007); and Leech (2011), 301–16.

[18] For a useful overview of the poems see Crocker (2003), chapters 2 and 3.

[19] On Plotinus' authority for More on this subject, see More (1647), 14.

[20] See e.g. More (1647), 344–345. The henological emphasis disappears after the poems. However, the identification of the first person with the Good is preserved, as is the idea that the first principle is known by touch/love. Across his works More consistently acknowledged the Plotinian exegesis of the *Symposium* distinction between earthly and heavenly love, as for instance in More (1647) 14 and (1660), 81.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:28:20, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.009

terms as eternal life and true being.[21] Concerning psyche, More distinguishes in Plotinian fashion between an upper and lower aspect of the world soul: a). psyche, which remains above untouched by matter, and b). physis, which is proximate to matter and actually gives form to it.[22] Concerning matter, he follows Plotinus in regarding it as pure potentiality.[23]

More also follows Plotinus in the case of individual souls. He makes him his authority on souls' pre-existence, claiming Plotinus' soul as his muse in his poem *Praeexistency*.[24] He also follows him in distinguishing the higher from the lower man, where the higher man is defined as the "the true man" or "divine principle in us", claiming an emanative origin for souls and their embodiment in soul vehicles.[25]

Finally, concerning the nature of spirit, More follows Plotinus' holenmerism, as found for instance in Plotinus' exegesis of Plato's description of the soul in *Timaeus* 35a1–4 that soul was present to body as a whole in the whole and as a whole in each of the parts of the body (*holē en pasi kai en hotooun autou holē*). More's use of *Ennead* III. 2. 1 indicates his Plotinian indebtedness here, but other passages of the *Enneads* (not directly cited in the poems) are even more explicitly holenmerist.[26]

[21] "so saith the Philosopher ... That *Intellect* or *On,* or the Intellectuall world is the first energie of God, is the first substance from him, he abiding in himself," More (1647), 346.

[22] "*Physis* is nothing else but the vegetable World, the Universall comprehension of Spermaticall life dispersed throughout. This seminall World is neither the very Intellect it self, though it be stored with all forms, nor any kind of pure soul, though depending of both ... A kind of life eradiating and resulting both from Intellect and *Psyche,*" More (1647), 341.

[23] "*Hyle* [is] nothing else but potentiality," More (1647), 354. As Jasper Reid has also noted, post-1662 this Plotinian doctrine of matter (like henology) is progressively dropped and replaced by one in terms of physical monads. For an excellent account of this transition, see Reid (2012), chapter 3. First matter is not directly discussed in the More–Descartes correspondence.

[24] The poem opens as follows: "Aread thou sacred Soul of *Plotin* deare / Tell what we mortalls are, tell what of old we were," More (1647), 255.

[25] See for instance: "and we remain above by the Intellectuall man, but by the extreme part of him we are held below, as it were yielding an efflux from him to that which is below, or rather an energie he being not at all lessened", More (1647), 426 (the reference is to Plotinus, *Ennead* IV. 5. 7). References to a "true man" continue occasionally in the prose works; see for instance More (1653), 204.

[26] "The nature of *Intellect* and *On* is the true and first world, not distant from it self, not weak by division or dispersion, nothing defective... A part exhibits the whole, and the whole is friendly to it self, not separated one part from another, nor become another alone; and estrang'd from others ... Wherefore every where being one and perfect every where, it stands unmoved and admits no alteration." For more explicit passages not directly cited by More but surely familiar to him, see for instance: "the nature at once divisible and indivisible which we affirm to be soul is not one in the way in which the continuous is, having different parts; but it is divisible in that *it is in all the parts of that in which it is, but indivisible in that it is present in all the parts of it as a whole and in any one part as a whole*." Plotinus, *Enneads*, translated by A. H. Armstrong (= Armstrong, 1966–1988), IV. 1. 1 (italics mine).

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:28:20, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.009

The primacy More gives to Plotinus as a Platonic authority makes it highly unlikely that Plotinus' holenmerism was not More's authority for his own attempts to articulate the doctrine which he would later term "spiritual extension".

Having sketched out in general outline these early Plotinian metaphysical influences, I will now return to the three "anti-Cartesian" Morean doctrines noted by Glanvill and consider each in turn in terms of how they were employed against or adapted themselves to the new Cartesian challenge.

"Anima Mundi"

Psyche/physis is evidently the model for More's plastic nature doctrine, which he employed against Cartesian panmechanism.[27] However, More modified the Plotinian world-soul doctrine in the following ways.

Firstly, as part of his general self-distancing from Plotinus' emanationist gradualism, he clarifies plastic nature's created status. Whereas in his letter correspondence to Descartes More was still saying that he considered body to be a shadow of soul (in the sense of psyche), rather than something absolutely distinct from it, towards the end of his intellectual career he feels he needs to make explicit, *pace* (as he supposes) Plotinus, that plastic nature is a creature, not "God's body".[28]

Secondly, he sometimes restricts its scope. More was generally hostile to Cartesian panmechanism, which he thought would undermine the evidence of design in nature, but he does nevertheless acknowledge in his earlier works that *some* of the simpler phenomena could possibly be explained mechanistically. For instance, in the *Antidote* he presents creation in terms of three agencies: special divine action, plastic nature and mechanism. This represents an accommodation of the Plotinian physis doctrine to Christian orthodoxy on the one hand (special divine action rather than emanationism) and the new Cartesian mechanistic hypothesis on the other. According to this modified vitalism, God creates inert matter and sets it in motion, producing basic mechanistic behaviour. This is the concession to Cartesian mechanism. However, he adds further orderliness to this simple mechanistic behaviour by superadding the workings of plastic nature or the plastic parts of ensouled beings, which then establish

[27] His expression of it remains more or less constant throughout his intellectual career. On plastic nature, see e.g. Leech (2013), chapter 6 and Reid (2012), chapter 9.

[28] See More (1675–1679), vol. 3, 581.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:28:20, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.009

a sort of higher-grade orderliness constraining the merely mechanistic orderliness.[29]

This is a creative modification of an originally Plotinian doctrine due no doubt to More's felt need to respond to the new mechanistic hypothesis. However, it should be noted that More had an unstable relationship to his own concession of some limited mechanical behaviour in nature: already in the *Antidote* he is nevertheless inclined to appeal to the inadequacies of mechanism in explaining even simple physical phenomena, and by the time of his *Divine Dialogues* (1668) he was proclaiming that there was no mechanical behaviour in the whole of nature.[30] In this respect then More seems to have edged back towards a more purely Plotinian interpretation of plastic nature in his later years.

"Spirits [as] Extended, Penetrable, Indiscerpible, Self-motive Substances"

I now turn to More's doctrine of spiritual extension, which requires a slightly longer treatment since it has a complicated relationship to Plotinus' holenmerism and undergoes a more radical modification. As noted, Glanvill reports that the school doctrine that soul was present as a whole in the whole and as a whole in each of the parts of its body (*tota in toto et tota in qualibet parte corporis*) was out of favour with the 'Cupri-Cosmits', who supposed it led to disbelief in spiritual substances. However, any claim about a supposed incompatibility between the school doctrine and the "Doctrine of Plato" is immediately complicated by the fact that the scholastic doctrine has a Platonic (and specifically Plotinian) provenance. Holenmerism is the standard view of soul's relation to body from Plotinus through Augustine to the scholastics. Although the later prose works show More's clear unease with this doctrine, in the poems he seems to accept it.[31] Certainly the Plotinian origin of the doctrine goes some way to

[29] Indeed he supposes that God wanted to provide some simple instances of mathematical (i.e. mechanical) orderliness in nature so that humans could be "highly gratifi'd" through understanding "by a natural deduction of one thing from another" how certain simple phenomena were intelligently designed, which would not be the case if all design in nature were by divine special action or by spirit of nature (which does not exhibit mathematical orderliness). See More (1655, pp. 68–69) and the discussion in Leech (2013), 115–119.

[30] For his volte-face see More (1668), Preface: "*I am abundantly assured that there is no purely-Mechanicall* Phaenomenon *in the whole Universe*." See Gabbey (1990), 19–35 and Reid (2012), chapter 8.

[31] See for instance: "the soul is said to be in the body *tota in toto & tota in qualibet parte*; or else at least by propagation of rayes, which is the image of it self," More (1647), 433.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:28:20, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.009

explain why More would not have seen his own doctrine of spiritual extension as compromising his Platonism, since the same position was defended by Plotinus before it was taken over (inadequately, in his view) by the schoolmen. As More's thinking developed, he would come to differentiate his position from the Plotinian/school one in its details, but nevertheless this may suffice by way of explaining why the basic commitment to soul's extension looked to More (and Glanvill) like it belonged to the "Doctrine of Plato", and why it would have made sense to them to have contrasted it as such with the Cartesian *res cogitans/extensa* doctrine.

More's mature doctrine of spiritual extension emerged from his early holenmerism as follows. He initially makes fairly imprecise poetic appeals to two distinct senses of extension in his poems, as for instance in these passages from his poem *Psychathanasia*:

> [soul's] loose union [with the body is] without that grosse extension . . . extended far and wide from her non-quantity . . . [the] extension / Of [soul's] rayes [are distinct from] distrought distension[32]
>
> th'humane souls essence / Is indivisible, yet every where / In this her body . . . [the soul] present is in each part totally / Of this her body[33]

However, what clearly emerges from these verses is the sense that the extension of souls has properties (like self-contraction) which physical extension doesn't. Assuming the following model of the soul:

human soul: nous/psyche = sun (centre/essence)
eidolon psyches = sun's rays (circumference/energy)

More appeals to the analogy of light to explain how the "eidolon" of soul can dilate out from and then contract itself again into its "centre", just as rays can extend out from a light source but also contract back into it without loss of substance. This gave More a distinctive way of expressing the holenmeric structure of the soul.[34]

[32] More (1647), 113. [33] More (1647), 119–120.

[34] See also the following important passage from the entry "Energie" in the *Interpretation Generall* to the *Philosophicall Poems*: "*Plotinus. Ennead. 3. lib.6* . . .The naturall *Energie* of each power of the soul is life not parted from the soul though gone out of the soul, *viz.* into act . . . Comparing of all these places together I cannot better explain this Platonick term, *Energie*, then by calling it the rayes of an essence, or the beams of a vitall Centre. For essence is the Centre as it were, of that which is truly called *Energie*, and *Energie* the beams and rays of an essence. And as the Radii of a circle leave not the Centre by touching the Circumference, no more doth that which is the pure *Energie* of an essence, leave the essence by being called out into act, but is *energeia* a working in the essence, though it flow out into act. So that *Energie* depends alwayes on essence, as *Lumen* on *Lux*, or the creature on God."

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:28:20, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.009

As early as his poems then More is distinguishing two distinct types of extension (spiritual/physical) and attributing the following properties to spiritual extension: indivisibility and self-dilation/contraction, i.e. soul's "energy" can dilate out and contract back into its "essence".

In some respects this position simply gets formalised in his engagement with Descartes, but in other respects it is heavily adapted. More rejected Descartes' distinction between soul as *res cogitans* and body as *res extensa*, proposing in its place an alternative distinction where the essential differentia is not extension or the lack of it but rather the property of penetrability. Starting in the letters and improving on his formulations of them in his mature prose works, he defined the 'absolute' properties of spirit in a non-Cartesian way as "*Self-Penetration, Self-Motion, Self-Contraction* and *Dilation, Indivisibility,*" and the "relative" properties as "*Penetrating, Moving, and Altering . . . Matter.*"[35]

In a sense this is just a more precisely worded description of what More had already worked out in the letters on a Plotinian basis. However, in the letters More additionally presupposes the common scholastic principle that all created substances, corporeal and incorporeal (including God), essentially have location. It is a consequence of this principle that souls must somehow be essentially extended, and there are no circumstances in which they could not be in any place.[36] This, by contrast, seems to be a departure from Plotinian authority, since Plotinus does not subscribe to the location principle, at least in the case of the one/intellect, notwithstanding his occasional cosmic religious claims that the heavens are nearer to intellect.

In fact the picture is a bit more complicated than that. As Wilberding has noted, Plotinus makes the following seemingly incompatible claims:

(1) the intelligible is situated next to the heavens
(2) the intelligible is not in space at all
(3) the intelligible is everywhere.

As he notes, (2) and (3) can be parsed to mean (2) 'separate from sensible things' and (3) 'all things participate in it'; in other words, they capture the relation of the Forms to the sensible things they participate in.[37] Since it is not my concern to interpret Plotinus himself here I will not dwell on this or discuss how (1) may be parsed. However, suffice it to say that

[35] More (1655), 16. See also Reid (2012), chapter 6.
[36] I borrow the term "location principle" here from Robert Pasnau. See for instance Pasnau (2007).
[37] See Wilberding (2005), 316–317. Wilberding allows a spatial sense to these parsings, namely, "separate from sensible things" = the intelligible is not in place; "all things participate in it" = its powers are active "instrumentally" in all things.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:28:20, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.009

Wilberding's attempt to reconcile these apparently incompatible claims involves him attributing to Plotinus the view (as I think he must) that intellect/psyche can be 'instrumentally present' to spatially located bodies, in the sense that although they are omnipresent, they are actualised in specific locations because it is only in those locations that they can be used/enjoyed.[38] In other words, as we shall see in a moment, he attributes to Plotinus the same position – extension merely by virtue of power (*ratione potentiae*) – which Descartes will appeal to in the letter correspondence *contra* More's claim that souls (and God) are extended essentially (*ratione essentiae*).[39]

Fundamentally, the disagreement between More and Descartes on the nature of the human soul turned on More's assumption of this location principle. Unlike Descartes, and unlike Plotinus, he preferred to follow the scholastics in making location an existence condition for all finite substances. This meant that More could envisage no circumstances in which souls would be placeless.[40] More clearly feared from the letter correspondence onwards that Descartes' *res cogitans* conception of the self carried a dangerous implication, namely that Cartesian souls separated from their bodies at death would henceforth be essentially inextended, and therefore (assuming the location principle) not exist at all. In his response to More, Descartes accounts for souls' presence to bodies in this life by conceding to his English correspondent that they are extended, but only *ratione potentiae* (i.e. where they exercise their powers),[41] not (as More believed) *essentiae* (by essence),[42] so that it should rather be said of souls that they are in the same place as extended bodies are by virtue of their power, rather

[38] He gives the analogy of radio or television waves which are omnipresent but require radio and television sets to actualise them (Wilberding, 2005), 328.

[39] This is anti-Plotinian both with respect to God-Intellect – the intelligible world is omnipresent without itself essentially having location – and with respect to disembodied "true" human selves, since as "parts" of the intelligible world they also lack essential location.

[40] To use Wilberding's analogy again: More cannot as it were imagine that radio or television waves could exist apart from their actualisation in radio or television sets, i.e. there could be no disembodied placeless souls. By contrast, More's fellow Platonist and colleague Ralph Cudworth does not seem to have felt the need to insist on the essential locatedness of all created things. See, for example, his positive endorsement of Porphyry's position here: "the *Humane Soul* [is] *ousia amegethes*, *A Substance devoid of Magnitude*, and which is not *Locally* present, to this or that *Body*, but by *Disposition* and *Energie*, and therefore the Whole of it in every *part* thereof *Undividedly*," Cudworth (1678), 775–776.

[41] *Extensionem quae rebus incorporeis tribuitur, esse potentiae duntaxat, non substantiae; quae potentia, cum sit tantum modus in re ad quam applicatur, sublato extenso cui coexistat, non potest intelligi esse extensa.* Descartes, *Correspondance avec Arnauld et Morus* (= Lewis, 1953, p. 160).

[42] *[n]ihil nec corporeum neque incorporeum potest agere in aliud, nisi per applicationem suae essentiae,* Lewis (1953), 150.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:28:20, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.009

than their essence.[43] In this respect at least it is Descartes, not More, who is more closely aligned with the Plotinian position.

Also, More eventually applied this construal of spiritual extension to God himself. It is controversial whether More describes God in the letter correspondence as spiritually extended. Reid has suggested that More is still holenmerist about God at this time, and certainly just as Plotinus would say that intellect and psyche/physis are present to bodies holenmerically, so More does seem at least to talk in some passages of the letters about God being present holenmerically to matter.[44] Be that as it may, by his later prose works More was deeply concerned about what he called the threat of "nullibism" (nowhereism): namely, that holenmeric spiritual substances are only *non*-essentially extended in space, but they can also in principle exist without any kind of spatial extension (i.e. they can be "nowhere"). And certainly the trend is towards More insisting – under pressure of the perceived nullibist threat – that even God's spiritual substance must be said to be essentially located, otherwise it would be possible to say that God was 'nowhere' and therefore non-existent. But although More does not say this anywhere directly, Plotinus himself must by this definition be a nullibist, since like Descartes he also denies that the location principle applies universally.

The mature More's insistence on the location principle even in the case of God marks his distance from Plotinus in this respect. Driven by this felt need to avoid nullibism, More insists on the necessary existence of space, for the following reasons: if it did not exist, God could not have created finite matter, since humans must inevitably imagine an infinite space surrounding such matter, otherwise the matter they imagined would be necessarily infinite. He also insists that this infinite space must be identical with God's omnipresence, since its properties (such as unity, eternity, self-existence, etc.) are divine.[45]

Having admitted infinite space, More faced the awkward choice between either admitting that God had created (impossibly) an actually

[43] *nullam intelligo nec in Deo nec in Angelis vel mente nostra extensionem substantiae, sed potentiae duntaxat; ita scilicet vt possit Angelus potentiam suam exerere nunc in maiorem, nunc in minorem substantiae corporeae partem; nam, si nullum esset corpus, nullum etiam spatium intelligerem, cui Angelus vel Deus esset coextensus,* Lewis (1953), 158.

[44] See for instance Lewis (1953), 136–138. See also the discussion in Agostini (2006), 19–23; Reid (2008), especially 98, and (2012), chapter 5; and Leech (2013), 129–135.

[45] The full list is: "one, simple, immobile, eternal, complete, independent, existing from itself, subsisting by itself, incorruptible, necessary, immense, uncreated, uncircumscribed, incomprehensible, omnipresent, incorporeal, permeating and encompassing everything, Being by essence, Being by act, pure Act." See Jacob (1995), 57.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:28:20, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.009

infinite space, or that there was simply a self-existent infinite space which God neither created nor could have created.[46] His choice to accept neither but instead to identify God's omnipresence and space is radical, and departs from Plotinus as well as from all subsequent authorities, scholastic and non-scholastic, all of whom had defended a holenmeric conception of God's/Intellect's omnipresence.

To get a sense of the mature More's distance from Plotinus in this respect it is worth remembering here that Plotinus regarded space as the lowest in the order of beings apart from matter itself.[47] Indeed More knew this perfectly well, and includes a discussion of Plotinus' views on matter and space in his *Conjectura*.[48] It is therefore striking that he adapted his originally Plotinian commitment to holenmerism to such an extent that by the time of the *Enchiridion Metaphysicum* (1671) he is identifying God with space, understood as an immobile immaterial substance.[49]

"Praeexistence of Particular Souls"

Turning finally to More's doctrine of human souls, this again has Plotinian origins but also undergoes some substantial modifications. Here the modification is less complex than in the case of spiritual extension but equally substantial. In essence it is that More, having initially adopted Plotinus' view that human souls pre- and post-exist their terrestrial lives and inhabit soul vehicles as well as ordinary human bodies, will eventually insist additionally that souls are essentially embodied. In other words, they always enliven some body or other, and never pass entirely beyond any body whatsoever.[50] More does not spell out explicitly why his doctrine evolved in this way, but it seems likely that it was a combination of his 1). realising that Plotinus was an inadequate buttress against the intellectual challenges of Averroism; and 2). thinking through the equally problematic implications of Cartesian substance dualism for the soul's prospects of

[46] These are actually Patrizi's and Gassendi's solutions respectively. See Grant (1981) and Leech (2013), 169–171.

[47] See the discussion in Reid (2012), 83.

[48] More (1653), 183 and Reid (2012), 88–95.

[49] That More identifies space with God's omnipresence also seems clear from his response to his critic Nathaniel Fairfax (1637–90). In correcting Fairfax's attribution to him of the position that "a certain spirit distinct from God [sc. space] (although in itself not dissimilar except that it lacked life and operation) pervades all things," More clarifies that he "intended those demonstrations as certain firm and rather articulated rudiments of the divine existence" and that it is "impossible" that space is not identical with God since there cannot be a perfect being "if something eternal and necessary, even infinite and immense . . . besides Him existed by itself". See Fairfax (1674, p. 61) and More's reply in More (1671), 69. See also Reid (2012, pp. 214–215) and Leech (2013), 174.

[50] For treatments of this position, see e.g. Reid (2012), chapter 10 and Leech (2013), chapters 4 and 5.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:28:20, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.009

personal survival. I will say a few brief words first about More's prior engagement with Averroism before passing on to how the doctrine is employed in his encounter with Descartes.

In his poem *Antimonopsychia* More had opposed the Averroist doctrine of the unicity of the intellect, and indeed had enlisted Plotinus' help, especially (although selectively) his arguments in the opening passages of *Ennead* 4.9 ('If All Souls Are One').[51] However, More was also convinced that memory was a necessary condition of personal identity, and in the poems (although not later) he supposed that it could survive physical death by being at least in principle independent of body, and in this sense resembling reason.[52]

It must have become difficult for More to see how personal identity could be preserved on the Plotinian assumption that the 'true man' is an undescended intellect which is essentially unembodied. Presumably it also dawned on him that Plotinus and Averroes in some respects come close, and it is by no means evident that Plotinus defends individual immortality.

In fact, as early as the 1650s More has already distanced himself from his favourite Platonic authority in this respect by embracing a post-Plotinian doctrine of essential embodiment, since it enabled him to account for how robust personal identity of the sort Averroes denies could continue after death.[53] By the time of the *Immortality* (1659) More is claiming that essential embodiment is the Platonic orthodoxy, and even absorbing Aristotle into the ranks of those who held the doctrine.[54] By contrast, he worries that Plotinus' view that a soul can depart from a body to an "*aulotes*

[51] Cf. "[Plotinus] distinguisheth of, *all souls being one*, after this manner, *Ara gar hos apo mias e mia hai pasai*. The latter member is that, which my arguments conclude against [i.e. that all souls are one]." Apparently finding in Plotinus an unambiguous affirmation of soul's personal immortality, More explains: "This is that which Plotinus and I endeavour to destroy, which is of great moment: For if one onely soul act in every body, what ever we are now, surely this body laid in the dust we shall be nothing," More (1647), 'To the Reader.' On Averroism and More, see e.g. Hutton (2013).

[52] More (1647), 536. Plotinus, by contrast, cannot admit that the undescended intellect remembers, since time does not apply to the intelligible word. More himself would later acknowledge that memory cannot function apart from body. See for instance More (1659), 247.

[53] "The very nature of the Soul, as it is a Soul, is *an aptitude of informing or actuating a Body*; . . .[and] for mine own part, I am very prone to think that the Soul is never destitute of some *Vehicle* or other, though *Plotinus* be of another minde, and conceives that the Soul at the height is joined with God and nothing else, nakedly lodged in his arms. And I am . . . bold to dissent from him in this exaltation of the Soul . . . And I am not alone in this liberty of dissenting from *Plotinus*: For besides my own conceit this way. . . I am emboldened by the example of *Ficinus*, who is no small admirer of the forenamed author," More (1659), 222.

[54] The list includes "*Zoroaster, Pythagoras, Epicharmus, Empedocles, Cebes, Euripides, Plato, Euclide, Philo, Virgil, Marcus Cicero, Plotinus, Iamblichus, Proclus, Boethius, Psellus*" as well as "several others which it would be too long to recite", More (1659), 150–151.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:28:20, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.009

competible haply to none but God himself"[55] represents too great a discontinuity to preserve personal identity.

Returning now to Descartes, More's encounter with Cartesian metaphysics must have given him similar worries about whether Descartes' dualism could support a doctrine of personal immortality. More appears to endorse essential embodiment in the letters:

> Me vero lubentem cum Platonicis, antiquis Patribus, magisque ferme omnibus, & animas & genios omnes tam bonos quam malos, plane corporeos agnoscere, ac proinde sensum habere proprie dictum, i.e. mediante corpore quo induuntur exortum.[56]

More doesn't perhaps spell out essential embodiment here explicitly, since 'omnes' could be consistent with Plotinism if it means only that all souls have bodies *some* of the time, even if they may finally discard them entirely. However, the argumentative context – resisting Descartes' *res cogitans* doctrine of the self, which by More's criteria of personal immortality could not guarantee it – suggests that it is indeed essential embodiment More is already supporting here.[57] This reading is further supported by More's appeal to Aristotle's dictum that there can be no thinking without phantasms, *contra* Descartes' claim that souls can think without such support.[58]

Descartes for his part classed such speculation as childish imaginations which gained their plausibility through tradition alone.[59] But the Morean motivation for such speculations is plain, namely that a bare discarnate *res cogitans* would lack the identity conditions for individual post-mortem survival. Such a soul would lack sensation as well as the memory of any sensory experience, which raised questions about how any sort of robust immortality for such a purely intellectual soul might be possible.[60] More objects to Descartes that if souls and angels are assumed to be purely incorporeal they cannot properly be said to *sense*,[61] and More was increasingly persuaded that some sort of continuity of sense experience was a

[55] More (1659), 193. [56] Lewis (1953), 170–172.

[57] More quickly abandoned his view (briefly held) in the poems that memory can survive independently of body, claiming consistently thereafter that memory (like sensation and thought) was body-dependent. See Leech (2013), 102–104.

[58] "*Equidem aliquanto sum pronior in illam Aristelotis sententiam, hoti aneu ton phantasmaton ouk esti noesai,*" Lewis (1953), 172.

[59] Lewis (1953), 186.

[60] On this point, see also Thiel (1998, p. 883), who notes that Descartes' introduction of the troublesome notion of a purely intellectual memory which survives the death of the body does not resolve the issue. Cf. also Garber (1998), 767.

[61] *Quantum ad Angelos animasque separatas, si immediate suas inuicem deprehendant essentias, id non dici posse sensum proprie, si ipsos fingas penitus incorporeos,* Lewis (1953), 170.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:28:20, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.009

necessary condition for individual survival. It seems plausible to assume that More may have balked at Descartes' purely incorporeal *res cogitans* doctrine – as he also did at Plotinus' doctrine of the undescended intellect – precisely because it did not guarantee a robustly personal immortality.

Conclusion

In conclusion, we can say the following about the original Plotinian influence on More's metaphysics, the modifications it underwent over his intellectual career, and its legacy. While Plotinus' emphasis on philosophy as a spiritual practice had a deep and abiding influence on More, the particular metaphysical legacy is complicated. Firstly, the henological emphasis disappears after the poems, as does the original emanationist gradualism, and the conception of matter as pure potentiality is abandoned. In terms of the three 'anti-Cartesian' doctrines picked out by Glanvill, their trajectories are subject to different degrees of modification. In the case of plastic nature, More keeps the general outlines of the Plotinian psyche/physis account, but insists on its created status and sometimes admits that it may give order to some purely mechanical low-level physical phenomena. It is much harder to see the original Plotinian influence in the mature form of More's spiritual extension doctrine: More's insistence on the essentially extended nature of spirit takes it beyond holenmerism, and space, as immovable immaterial substance, is elevated to the status of God's omnipresence. More's defence of the essential embodiment of souls prior to and after their terrestrial existence is probably best regarded as an extension of the Plotinian position, although Plotinus' actual position ends up being treated as errant. Of the mature form of these three positions we can then conclude that they are Plotinian in the sense that they began as Plotinian positions, and they are modifications of Plotinian positions that underwent substantial modification as they 'adapted' to the new intellectual environment of Cartesianism.

REFERENCES

Agostini, I. (2006) "Henry More e l'olenmerismo," *Nouvelles de la république des lettres* 2: 73–86.

Armstrong, A. H. (trans.) (1966–1988) *Plotinus: Enneads*, 7 vols., Cambridge, MA.

Cope, J. I. (1954) "'The Cupri-Cosmits': Glanvill on Latitudinarian Anti-Enthusiasm," *Huntington Library Quarterly* 17: 269–286.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:28:20, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.009

Crocker, R. (2003) *Henry More, 1614–1687: A Biography of the Cambridge Platonist*, Dordrecht.
Cudworth, R. (1678) *The True Intellectual System of the Universe: Wherein, All Reason and Philosophy of Atheism Is Confuted; and Its Impossibility Demonstrated*, London.
[Elys, E.] (1694) *Letters on Several Subjects, by the Late Pious Dr. Henry More*, London.
Fairfax, N. (1674) *A Treatise of the Bulk and Selvedge of the World*, London.
Gabbey, A. (1982) "'Philosophia Cartesiana Triumphata,' Henry More and Descartes, 1646–71," in T. M. Lennon, J. M. Nicholas, and J. W. Davis (eds.) *Problems in Cartesianism*, Kingston, Ontario and Montreal, 171–249.
(1990) "Henry More and the Limits of Mechanism," in S. Hutton (ed.) *Henry More (1614–87): Tercentenary Studies*, Dordrecht, 19–35.
Garber, D. (1998) "Soul and Mind: Life and Thought in the Seventeenth Century," in D. Garber and M. Ayers (eds.) *The Cambridge History of Seventeenth-Century Philosophy*, Cambridge, UK.
Glanvill, J. (1676) "Anti-Fanatical Religion, and Free Philosophy, in a Continuation of the New Atlantis," in J. Glanvill, *Essays on Several Important Subjects in Philosophy and Religion*, London.
Grant, E. (1981) *Much Ado about Nothing: Theories of Space and Vacuum from the Middle Ages to the Scientific Revolution*, Cambridge, UK.
Hutton, S. (2004) *Anne Conway: A Woman Philosopher*, Cambridge, UK.
(2007) "Henry More, Ficino and Plotinus: The Continuity of Renaissance Platonism," in L. Simonetti (ed.) *Forme Del Neoplatonismo*, Florence, 281–296.
(2013) "The Cambridge Platonists and Averroes," in A. Akasoy and G. Giglioni (eds.) *Renaissance Averroism and Its Aftermath: Arabic Philosophy in Early Modern Europe*, Dordrecht.
Jacob, A. (1985) "Henry More's Psychodia Platonica and Its Relationship to Marsilio Ficino's Theologia Platonica," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 46: 503–522.
Jacob, A. (trans.) (1995) *Henry More's Manual of Metaphysics*, Hildesheim.
Leech, D. (2002) "'Plato and Deep Plotin': Cambridge Platonism, Platonicall Triads, and More's Reflections on Nature," *Dionysius* 20: 179–198.
(2011) "Ficino and Henry More on the Immortality of the Soul," in S. Clucas, P. J. Forshaw, and V. Rees (eds.) *Laus Platonici Philosophi: Marsilio Ficino and His Influence*, Leiden, 301–316.
(2013) *The Hammer of the Cartesians: Henry More's Philosophy of Spirit and the Origins of Modern Atheism*, Leuven.
Lewis, G. (ed.) (1953) *Descartes: Correspondance avec Arnauld et Morus*, Paris.
Lewis, M. et al. (2017) "'Origenian Platonisme' in Interregnum Cambridge: Three Academic Texts by George Rust, 1656 and 1658," in *History of Universities* 30: 43–124.
Menn, S. (1998) *Descartes and Augustine*, Cambridge, UK.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:28:20, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.009

More, H. (1646) *Democritus Platonissans, or, An Essay upon the Infinity of Worlds out of Platonick Principles*, Cambridge, UK.
(1647) *Philosophicall Poems. A Platonicall Song of the Soul; Treating of the Life of the Soul, Her Immortalitie, the Sleep of the Soul, the Unitie of Souls, and Memorie after Death*, 2nd ed., Cambridge, UK.
(1653) *Conjectura Cabbalistica: Or, A Conjectural Essay of Interpreting the Minde of Moses According to a Threefold Cabbala, Viz., Literal, Philosophical, Mystical, or, Divinely Moral*, London.
(1655) *An Antidote against Atheisme. The Second Edition Corrected and Enlarged: With an Appendix Thereunto Annexed*, London.
(1659) *The Immortality of the Soul: So Farre Forth as It Is Demonstrable from the Knowledge of Nature and the Light of Reason*, London.
(1660) *An Explanation of the Grand Mystery of Godliness*, London.
(1668) *Divine dialogues [. . .] the Three First Dialogues Treating of the Attributes of God and His Providence at Large*, London.
(1675–1679) *Opera Omnia*, 3 vols., London.
Pasnau, R. (2007) "Mind and Extension (Descartes, Hobbes, More)," in H. Lagerlund (ed.) *Forming the Mind: Essays on the Internal Senses and the Mind/Body Problem from Avicenna to the Medical Enlightenment*, Dordrecht, 283–310.
(2011) *Metaphysical Themes, 1274–1671*, Oxford.
Reid, J. (2008) "The Spatial Presence of Spirits among the Cartesians," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 46: 91–118.
(2012) *The Metaphysics of Henry More*, New York.
Sailor, D. B. (1962) "Cudworth and Descartes," in *Journal of the History of Ideas* 23: 133–140.
Staudenbaur, C. A. (1968) "Galileo, Ficino and Henry More's Psychathanasia," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 29: 565–578.
Thiel, U. (1998) "Personal Identity," in D. Garber and M. Ayers (eds.) *The Cambridge History of Seventeenth-Century Philosophy*, Cambridge, UK, 868–912.
Wilberding, J. (2005) '"Creeping Spatiality": The Location of Nous in Plotinus' Universe," *Phronesis* 50: 315–334.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:28:20, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.009

CHAPTER 6

Ralph Cudworth as Interpreter of Plotinus

Douglas Hedley

Ernst Cassirer (1874–1945) was a perceptive and highly influential philosopher. He wrote about the Cambridge Platonists as beacons of an enlightened European spirit amid the dark and troubling years of interwar Germany. He was nevertheless wrong in his *Platonic Renaissance in England* to judge Ralph Cudworth as an anachronistic humanist.[1] Cudworth was a thinker in the broad and liberal tradition of Erasmus and the Alexandrian school of antiquity. This tradition served as a stimulus for engagement with contemporary philosophical problems, especially those emerging from the new science. In particular, Cudworth is drawing upon Plotinus as 'the oft commended philosopher' with polemic intent.[2] Cudworth is able to harness the arguments of Plotinus against Hobbes and Spinoza. That is perhaps not surprising given the revival of Neo-Epicureanism and Neo-Stoicism in the seventeenth century. This harnessing of Plotinus involves a certain amount of revisioning of the Alexandrian.

Idealism

If we follow John Muirhead's assessment, we could say that Cudworth is the founder of British Idealism[3]:

> There are three points in Cudworth's work which may be said to be of permanent interest and to give him a claim to be the real founder of British Idealism.
>
> (1) The view of nature that he pressed against the mechanical systems both of other times and of his own;
> (2) the theory of mind as an active participant in the process of knowledge;
> (3) his view of the divine principle in the world as the action not of an arbitrary Will acting on it from without but of an immanent will to good whether conceived of as Beauty, Justice or Truth.

[1] Cassirer (1932). [2] Cudworth (1678), 159. [3] Muirhead (1927), 167.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:29:26, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.010

According to Cudworth's *epistemological Idealism*, knowledge depends upon the conformity of objects to our modes of cognition, and not the other way around.[4]

Moreover, Cudworth endorses an *ontological Idealism*, according to which all reality depends upon God's mind, and thus everything is structured by the categories of thought.

These two points are well expressed in the title of his *magnum opus, The True Intellectual System of the Universe*, where '*Intellectual*' refers not only to the intelligibility of the universe, but also to the basic structure of reality. This last aspect is also reinforced by the word '*System*', which designates not only a method, that is, a mode of presentation or exposition of philosophy, but the ontological mode of reality, comprising the totality of being.

Notwithstanding the differences with Plotinus, or even if it is anachronistic to refer to Plotinus' metaphysics as "idealist",[5] it can be said that Plotinus, like Cudworth, agrees with the three main points expressed by Muirhead, especially Plotinus' notion of Mind or Intellect (*nous*). For Plotinus, "Intellect is all things", *ho de nous panta* (*Ennead* V. 1. 4. 21). Each thing is

> Intellect and Being, and the whole is universal Intellect and Being, Intellect making Being exist in thinking it, and Being giving Intellect thinking and existence by being thought.[6]

However, in accordance with his henology, Plotinus stresses that the cause of thinking and of being is something else, they both therefore "have a cause other than themselves" (*Ennead* V. 1. 4. 29–30). This cause is the ineffable One. It should be mentioned that Cudworth paraphrases and cites from *Ennead* V. 1, *On the Three Primary Hypostases*, especially in the fourth part of the *The True Intellectual System of the Universe*, in the section on the dependence and subordination in the Platonic trinity.

Epistemology

It is indeed perhaps no accident that a Kantian like Cassirer should have been attracted to Cudworth, for Cudworth's epistemology is a rejection of empiricism. One has to reject empiricism in order to defend freedom: "knowledge is an active energy of the mind, not arising from things acting

[4] See Darwall (1995), 124. [5] See Bussanich (1994), 21–42.
[6] Plotinus, *Ennead* V. 1. 4. 26–28 trans. A. H. Armstrong (= Armstrong [1966–1988], vol. 5), 25.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:29:26, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.010

from without."[7] Moreover, he asserts that "the immediate objects of intellection are not things without the mind, but the ideas of the mind itself".

The Kantian a priori looks close to the version of the recollection endorsed by Cudworth. The reference to Plotinus is explicit:

> So when foreign, strange and adventitious forms are exhibited to the mind by the sense, the soul cannot otherwise know or understand them, but by something domestic of its own, some active anticipation or prolepsis within itself, that occasionally reviving and meeting with it makes it know it or take acquaintance with it. And this is the only true and allowable sense of that old assertion, that knowledge is reminiscence, not that it is the remembrance of something that the soul had some time before actually known in a pre-existent state, but because it is the mind's comprehending of things by inward anticipations of its own, something native and domestic to it, or something actively exerted from within itself. And thus Plotinus, when he endeavours to prove that the immediate objects of knowledge and intellection are not things without the mind acting upon it at a distance, but contained and comprehended within the mind itself, writes: *pōs de kai gnōsetai, hoti antelabeto ontōs? pōs de, hoti agathon touto ē hoti kalon ē dikaion? hekaston gar toutōn allo autou, kai ouk en autōi hai tēs kriseōs archai, hais pisteusei, alla kai hautai exō, kai hē alētheia ekei.*" Otherwise how should the mind know or judge when it had really apprehended anything that is good, that is honest or just, these things being all strangers to the mind, and coming into it from without. So that the mind could not have any principles of judgement within itself in this case, but these would be without it, and then the truth must needs be without it also."[8]

The Kantian stress upon the activity of the finite mind is buttressed by a Platonic theology. The active energy of the mind actively participating in the process of knowledge is possible only because of the mind's kinship with the Divine: "All minds partake of *One Perfect Mind* (Cudworth (1678), 210)).

Consciousness

Udo Thiel has argued persuasively that Cudworth effectively introduced 'consciousness' as self-referring awareness into the English language as a philosophical idea. The English term 'consciousness' in this specific sense of referring specifically to the *subject* of thought is rare in the seventeenth

[7] Cudworth (1678), 5.
[8] Hutton (1996), 74. Plotinus, *Ennead* V. 5. 1. 29–33 (Armstrong [1966–1988], vol. 5, p. 157).

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:29:26, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.010

century: it was generally used in a non-referential sense of shared awareness. In the usage of the period 'being conscious' simply meant being apprised of. If it is the case that Cudworth was the first philosopher to make substantial use of the term in a philosophical sense of reflexive awareness of one's own states of mind, what is striking in this context is the link to Plotinus.[9] Cudworth takes the term *synaisthesis* (literally: with sensation or perception) from *Ennead* III. 8. 4, and translates it into English as "*con-sense*" or "*consciousness*" (*True Intellectual System*, p. 159).

The profoundly modern notion of human subjectivity is placed within a broader ontology. Cudworth explores the problem within a polemic about mechanistic explanation and the desire to pick out lower natures from higher. Nature, qua 'plastic' nature, is a "living Stamp or Signature of the Divine Wisdom, which though it acts exactly according to its Archetype, yet it doth not at all Comprehend nor Understand the Reason of what it self doth" (*True Intellectual System*, p. 155). Nature does not appreciate why it acts nor is it "Clearly and Expresly Conscious of what it doth." Here consciousness is taken as the awareness of one's intentional stance and agency. Here he explicitly refers to *synaisthesis* in Plotinus. Plastic nature lacks "Express synaisthesis, Con-sense or Consciousness of what it doth."[10]

It seems to me no accident that Cudworth should draw upon one of the most remarkable of Plotinus' treatises: *Ennead* III. 8: *On Nature, Contemplation and the One*. Cudworth's plastic nature is posited in opposition to Descartes' strict opposition between *res cogitans* and res *extensa*: Cudworth substitutes extension and life as constituting the "first Heads of Being". While Cudworth maintains the immateriality of the soul, he wants to distinguish between conscious and unconscious levels of the soul. This way he thinks he can account for non-conscious mental phenomena: habitual skills like that of a musician or dreams or reflexes.

> Now if the Souls of Men and Animals be at any time without Consciousness and Self-perception, then it must needs be granted, that Clear and Express Consciousness is not essential to life.[11]

It is significant that Cudworth draws upon *Ennead* III. 8. He quotes Plotinus:

> *eite tis bouletai sunesin tina ē aisthēsin autēi didonai, ouch hoian legomen epi tōn allōn tēn aisthēsin ē tēn sunesin, all' hoion ei tis tēn kathupnou tēi egrēgorotos proseikaseie.*

[9] Thiel (1991); Lähteenmäki (2010). [10] Cudworth (1678), 159. [11] Cudworth (1678), 247.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:29:26, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.010

> If any will needs attribute some kind of Apprehension [*synesis*] or Sense [*aesthesis*] to Nature, then it must not be such a Sense or Apprehension, as it is in Animals, but something that differs as much from it as the Sense or Cogitation of one in a profound sleep differs from that of one who is awake.[12]

Cudworth interprets this passage as referring to plastic nature, as itself '*a Lover of Spectacles or Contemplation*.' It lacks clear and express consciousness but it is nevertheless intellectual and not merely mechanical, just as a sleeper remains intelligent while not conscious.

Nature

Plotinus (204–70) presents the visible cosmos as an enigmatic representation of a transcendent spiritual reality. Thus nature is both a veiling and a revelation of this spiritual source. He is not a pantheist – as is often claimed.[13] The second aspect of his view of nature that is important here is its dynamic or vital nature. The physical cosmos is suffused by spirit or mind. Plotinus claims that it is "rather impossible for a drawing together of bodies to produce life and for mindless things to generate mind (*mallon de adunaton sumforēsin sōmatōn zōēn ergazesthai kai noun gennan ta anoēta*)."[14]

Cudworth is following Plotinus when he argues that

> no Effect can possibly transcend the Power of its Cause. Wherefore it is certain that in the Universe, things did not thus *ascend* and mount, or Climb up from *Lower Perfection* to Higher, but on the contrary, *Descend* and *Slide* down from *Higher* to *Lower*, so that the first Original of all things, was not the most *Imperfect*, but the most *Perfect Being*. But ... it is certain ... that *Life* and *Sense* could never possibly spring out of *Dead and Senseless Matter*... Much less could *Understanding* and *Reason* in men ever have emerged out of *Stupid matter*, devoid of all manner of *Life*...[15]
>
> But according to those *Atheists*, who make *Matter* or *Body* void of all *Life* and *Understanding*, to be the first *Principle*, *Mind* must be a *Post-Nate* thing, Younger than the world; a Weak, Umbratil, and Evanid Image, and next to Nothing.[16]

Cudworth contends vigorously that we should not arrange the superior with the inferior, the more significant with the less. The mind must be prior to any systematic and intellectually fathomable material structures; in

[12] Cudworth (1678), 160.
[13] Though even More, sadly, comes to view him as one. See the scholia on the Critique of the Teutonic Philosophy.
[14] Plotinus, *Ennead* IV. 7. 2. 19 ff. (see Armstrong [1966–1988], vol. 4, pp. 341–343).
[15] Cudworth (1678), 728 [16] Cudworth (1678), 729.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:29:26, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.010

that science exhibits the reasoning activity of mankind, the hairless rational vertebrates are exemplifications of reason or intellect.[17] Conscious thought is a channel for the apprehension of eternal and immutable verities and values. Cudworth is claiming that mechanical physicalism cannot explain the harmony and order of the universe. The fact that the physical universe is subject to intellectual scrutiny suggests, he claims, that it already bears the impress of intelligence. Not in the sense of a crude anthropomorphic deity, but a guiding intelligence nevertheless.

Cudworth's intellectual system combines mechanistic atomism with Platonic metaphysics. Cudworth saw this as having originated with Moses, from whom it was transmitted via Pythagoras to Greek and other philosophers. Cudworth accepted the atomistic hypothesis that the created universe is constituted of particles of inert matter – indeed he regarded Cartesian mechanical philosophy as a recently revived variety of the ancient atomism of Moses.[18] But, for Cudworth, as for Plato, soul is ontologically prior to the physical world.

> A *Perfect* Understanding Being, is the *Beginning* and *Head* of the *Scale* of eternity; from whence things *Gradually* Descend downward; lower and lower, till they end in *Senseless Matter* . . . *Mind is the Oldest of all things*, Senior to the Elements, and the whole Corporeal World; and like wise . . . by *Nature Lord over all*, or hath a Natural *Imperium* and Dominion over all; it being the most *Hegemonical thing*.[19]

Since motion, thought and action cannot be explained in terms of material particles, haphazardly jolted together, there must be some guiding originator, namely soul or spirit. Part of the appeal to Cudworth of the new 'mechanical' philosophy of Descartes was the dualism that underscored it. Cudworth therefore interpreted Descartes' dualism with some latitude to explain all movement, life and action in terms of the activity of spirits operating on inert matter. Although he was critical of aspects of Cartesianism, he seized on its value for religious apologetics as instrumental in persuading materialists of the existence of spiritual agency.

In the stead of the mechanical explanation of the operations of nature Cudworth argues for "the Plastick Life of Nature"; More calls it the "Hylarchic Principle". Cudworth's plastic nature is a formative principle which acts as an intermediary between the divine and the natural world,

[17] Nagel (2012). The Cambridge Platonists subscribe to an idealism of a superior mind prior and superior to the spirit of nature and plastic nature. This fuels their critiques of contemporaries like Spinoza and Glisson.

[18] Rodney (1970), 243–249. [19] Cudworth (1678), 858.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:29:26, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.010

maintaining the mundane operations of the physical universe. Plastic nature is the means whereby God imprints His presence on his creation and makes His wisdom and goodness manifest (and therefore intelligible) throughout created nature.[20] Cudworth uses the image of the dance and the image of the myth of Pan, enraptured by Echo, playing a pipe. Nature itself "by a kind of silent melody" made the elements of the universe "dance in measure and proportion".[21] Unlike human art, which operates from without, the art in nature "incorporated and embodied in matter; acts from within",[22] since God is "inward to everything". He is referring to the great mantra of III. 8. 6, 40: *panta eisō,* "all is within."

Plastic nature is the principle of all the laws of motion, "an inward and living soul or law in it".[23] It is mirroring of the supreme Intellect: just "a stamp or a figure in water".[24] The distinctly Platonic language of the imaging of the archetype in the ectypal activity of nature is to be found throughout Cudworth's account: it is "an effulgency or irradiation" and producing a "lower kind of life".[25] Moreover, it is the joint between the intelligible world and the physical cosmos: "The divine art, the living stamp or signature of the divine wisdom."[26]

Plastic nature therefore has affinities with the Platonic *anima mundi*.[27] The hypothesis of plastic nature as a teleological principle, which accounts for the design and purpose in the natural world, enables Cudworth to account for the providential ordering of the universe without falling into the trap of occasionalism. For by it he explains God's immanence in the world, without requiring immediate divine intervention in the minutiae of day-to-day operations in the natural world. Hobbes thought that matter in motion is able to generate life. Cudworth, like Boyle, wishes to refute that frankly materialistic option.

Freedom

Ethics, for Cudworth, is based on metaphysics. Freedom must have its basis in the physical world. Cudworth's problem is as following: if the realm of nature is exclusively a domain of mechanical explanations, how can we account for human behaviour? Where is the axiological dimension of the world? If human beings are merely the products of efficient

[20] Bergemann (2012). [21] Cudworth (1678), 155. [22] Cudworth (1678), 381.
[23] Cudworth (1678), 156.
[24] Cudworth (1678), 156, with the reference to Plotinus, *Ennead* II. 3. 17.
[25] Cudworth (1678), 163. [26] Cudworth (1678), 155.
[27] Bonifazi (1978). See also Vassanya (2011).

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:29:26, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.010

causation and cannot effect right or wrong actions, wherefore punishment? In the case of "the doctrine of Democritus and Hobbian atheists" the issue is clear. The determinism of Hobbes is the consequent outworking of such a mechanistic account of agency as the source of a particular mechanistic paradigm in thought in which desire is the causal force and action is considered in a morally neutral manner as the relation between desire and intellect.[28] For Hobbes, will is "appetite" and necessitated. Human beings are best considered as mechanical structures and the actions of men as the result of *external* forces. The scientific understanding of human nature shows that there is no specifically or irreducibly ethical component.

Furthermore, the radical empiricism and materialism of Hobbes was combined with a doctrine of the State that the Platonists found deeply uncongenial. Hence purely metaphysical and ethical questions assumed enormous political importance during the turbulent English Civil War period. Henry More, in his *An Explanation of Grand Mystery of Godliness,* published in the year of the Restoration, defends liberty of conscience. But equally, it is inadequate, Cudworth avers, to present freedom as an "arbitrary contrivance, or appointment of Deity, merely by will annexed to rational creatures. . ."[29] Many Aristotelian critics of Hobbes, like Bramhall, viewed the intellect as informing the otherwise blind will (as the motivational power) and enabling the will to choose one or another option. Understanding or intellect is without power; will is without insight. Cudworth's critique rejects such an appeal to faculty psychology, which he refers to as a "vulgar psychology", and replaces it with a much more holistic and subtle view of the relationship between will and intellect. In his positive construction it is offering a profound appeal to the irreducible nature of human agency, of what he calls "a power over oneself".

Cudworth has a distinctly Platonic view of the self as a hierarchical composite within which there can be considerable discord, and with the nous furnishing a means of settling conflict by perceiving the Good. Within this framework, Cudworth looks for a view of the intelligent will as self-determining agency. In *A Treatise of Freewill*, he does not present the will as a faculty of the soul, distinct from reason. The will is rather the capacity of the soul capable of driving the soul towards the good. There is a proleptic dimension to the mind's innate hankering for goodness since "soul of man hath in it . . . a certain vaticination, presage, scent and odour of one *summum bonum*".[30] The will is quite properly inspired by the Good and this process, the "ever bubbling fountain in the centre of the soul, an

[28] Hutton (1996), 199. [29] Hutton (1996), 196. [30] Hutton (1996), 174.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:29:26, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.010

elater or spring of motion. . ."[31] This is clearly inspired by the thesis of Plotinus, *Ennead* VI. 8, that contemplation is the source of action. Insofar as the finite will is conformed to, contemplates and participates in its transcendent source, boniform, as it were, right actions follow. The goal is not so much the co-ordination of the separate faculties of will and intelligence as the integration of will and intellect as "that which is properly we ourselves".[32]

The ability to do otherwise is the necessary but not sufficient condition of Freedom for Cudworth: "There can be no just blame or dispraise, but only where the objects, being in themselves really unequal, the one better, the other worse, a man refuseth the better and chooseth the worse."[33] Cudworth thinks that this is revealed in our spontaneous and unreflective reactive attitudes: our intuitive feelings of praise or resentment towards other human beings, feelings which we do not have towards animals or machines. Hence whereas the determinist Hobbes saw punishment as grounded in deterrence, Cudworth sees its proper basis in the intuition that we are responsible for faults and deserve punishment. Praise and blame, reward and punishment, presuppose axiological freedom. When human beings are praised for "diligence, industriousness . . . and blamed for the contrary. . . [T]hese things are imputed to the men themselves, as the cause of things, and as not being determined by necessary causes as much as the notions of a watch or clock are."[34]

Human responsibility is grounded in the capacity for self-awareness: "that which . . . conscious of itself, and reflexive upon itself, may also as well act upon itself, either as fortuitously determining its own activity or else as intending and exerting itself more or less in order to the promoting of its own good."[35] Ultimately it is moral control of one's self. Yet this is grounded in the law of a rational being: as Cudworth insists we are properly a law unto ourselves. The decisive fact about ethical obligation is its intrinsic nature. To act ethically is to be true to ourselves and to be properly autonomous.

Cudworth is proposing a very significant idea about agency. He claims that to be a properly human agent, one cannot ignore the ethical dimension. Consider also the other great philosopher of the age alongside Hobbes who inspired the anxiety of Cudworth: Spinoza. It has often been noted that Spinoza is very close to Hobbes in his ethical concerns.

[31] Hutton (1996), 173. [32] Hutton (1996), 178. [33] Hutton (1996), 166.
[34] Hutton (1996), 183. [35] Hutton (1996), 201.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:29:26, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.010

Humans are mechanistically driven by the *conatus* for self-preservation and thus self-interest. Hobbes provided a view of goodness that is subjective and based upon convention, and even apparently altruistic acts like pity or charity are in fact self-regarding. Spinoza is more wide-ranging and he proposes an ethics that is a liberation from ephemeral interests and the enjoyment of eternal felicity. Yet, notwithstanding the deeper spiritual dimension of Spinoza, the parallels with Hobbes remain deep. Consider for example, self-sacrificing altruism in Spinoza. Individual agents, Spinoza claims, necessarily endeavour to maintain or preserve life (*conatus*) to their own individual advantage. Resources are often restricted and interests may be incompatible. What of an agent who instead of gaining advantage at the cost of others decides to help others at his or her own cost? Spinoza claims that since such self-denial is not evidently good for the individual, it must be the result of domination by passion. This is linked to Spinoza's rejection of Christian virtues such as humility, pity or repentance. These are versions of sadness and deficient power. For Cudworth, ethical endeavour is the test of the soul as a fallible rational agent, a gradual and imperfect transformation of the whole hegemonicon toward the transcendent and perfectly good God. Teleology rather than self-preservation is just as central for Cudworth as it is for the Aristotelians.

Cudworth, in rejecting the naturalistic paradigm (Hobbesian or Spinozistic), draws on ancient roots. The will is conceived of in Origenistic tripartite terms as the ascetic struggle by which the hegemonic core self tries to orientate itself to the good: the ruling part of the self is caught trying to steer in the precarious middle state between the brutish and the divine likeness. In the process of the development of godlikeness, there is no absolute but only limited self-determination.

The question of ethics and freedom becomes one of metaphysics: what are we? The Plotinian answer lies in the doctrine of the true or core self that exists beyond the flux of becoming. Origen is preferable to Cudworth because in the term hegemonicon he can insist upon what is right and wrong with the Plotinian view. As with Plotinus, ethics is a matter of the transformation of self. But Cudworth wishes to stress the specifically Christian virtues of humility and modesty. And as with Origen, Christ is the true "self". One of Origen's favourite biblical texts is John 1: 26, about the dwelling of Christ announced by John the Baptist. For Origen this is Christ as the hegemonicon of the soul: the ruling principle. Cudworth speaks in his Sermon to the House of Commons in 1647 of the "infant new-born Christ", and he

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:29:26, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.010

follows Origen in his emphasis upon freedom as participation in the Divine life:[36]

> the true liberty of a man, as it speaks pure perfection, is when by the right use of the faculty of freewill, together with the assistances of Divine grace, he is habitually fixed in moral good, or such a state of mind, as he doth freely, readily, and easily comply with the law of the Divine life, taking pleasure in complacence thereunto; and having aversion to the contrary; or when the law of the spirit hath made him free from the law of sin, which is the death of the soul. (pp. 196–197)

Theology

Just as the question of consciousness leads to the problem of nature, so too the problem of freedom leads to theology, and for Plotinian reasons. In the remarkable *Ennead* VI. 8 Plotinus develops a radical theory of the freedom of the One. Cudworth explicitly uses Plotinus' magnificent treatise *On the Freedom and the Will of the One*. In this remarkably theistic treatise, the causal source of the physical cosmos is the immaterial abounding transcendent cause, which is also presented through the image of the King (*ho basileus*).

In VI. 8. 15, Plotinus writes[37]:

> It is this, then, and not something else, but what it ought to be; it did not happen to be like this, but had to be like this; but this "had to be" is principle of all things that had to be (*touto oun kai ouk allo, all'hoper echrēn einai. ou toinun houto sunebē, all'edei houtōs. to de "edei" touto archē tōn hosa edei*).

Cudworth adds *Theos* to the Greek. The passage reads:

> *theos hoper echrēn einai. ou toinun houtō sunebē, all'edei houtōs. to de "edei" touto archē tōn hosa edei:* God is essentially that, which ought to be; and he therefore did not happen to be such as he is: and this first ought to be the principle of all things whatsoever that ought to be.[38]

One might legitimately object to Cudworth's resolute harnessing of Plotinus to the theistic camp, but Cudworth can draw upon a precedent in Ficino and others in identifying the supreme principle that is both transcendent and immanent in the cosmos with the Christian godhead.[39]

[36] Cudworth (1647), 34. [37] Cf. Leroux (1990), 305. [38] Cudworth (1678), 463.
[39] On Ficino's momentous synthesis of Plotinian metaphysics and Christian theology, see Allen, Hankins and Warden (2001–2006).

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:29:26, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.010

The supreme being is absolute freedom, but this is not to be understood in a crude anthropomorphic manner: "God's will is ruled by his justice, and not his justice ruled by his will; and therefore God himself cannot command what is in its own nature unjust" (*True Intellectual System*, III, 494; cf. III, 512). Indeed, the mistake of the atheists is to confuse this anthropomorphism with the genuine concept of God: "In the next place, this wish of Atheists is altogether founded upon a mistaken notion of God Almighty too, [. . .] His will is not mere will, such as hath no other reason besides itself; but it is law, equity, and chancery" (III, 494). This is not the voluntaristic power of the ultra-Calvinistic deity but "the abounding fecund energy that is the *metron pantōn* or measure of all that is both "measureless to man" while the gauge and boundary of Being (*omnia in mensura et numero et pondere disposuisti*, "Thou hast ordered all things in measure, and number and weight," *Wisdom* 11: 21).[40]

While "some fanaticks of latter times have made God to be all in a gross sense, so as to take away all real distinction betwixt God and the creature, and indeed to allow no other being besides God", there is no diminishing of the cause in its procession into the physical cosmos.[41] The Cause, while not exhausted or lessened by its procession, remains within its effect. Yet the paradigm of divine immanence, Cudworth insists, is "a very ticklish point and easily liable to mistake and abuse".[42] While it is unlikely that Cudworth would have read Spinoza's *Ethics*, with its strident *Deus sive natura,* it is most likely that he was apprised of its existence by Van Limborch, and Cudworth quotes Spinoza in the *True Intellectual System* as "that Late Theological Politician".[43] Spinoza regards the notion of the will of the Divine as an evident absurdity. Cudworth's appropriation of Plotinus' thought involves a critique of a certain theistic view of the deity. The God of Cudworth is restricted by his own goodness.

The desire to censure the voluntaristic deity of the Westminster confession dovetails with Cudworth's employment of the henology of Plotinus.[44] This is a complex narrative since it is also linked to the great controversy concerning the doctrine of the Trinity in England in this period.[45]

[40] See Beierwaltes (1969), 51–61. [41] Cudworth (1678), 306. [42] Cudworth (1678), 308.
[43] Cudworth (1678), 707; cf. Israel (2008), 152. Adrian Mihai notes that Cudworth possibly quotes the beautiful expression *ignorantiae asylum* from Spinoza's *Ethics* I, Appendix, in *True Intellectual System* II, 562 and 588. Sections of Spinoza's *Ethics* were in circulation in 1663 and a full draft by 1665 (cf. Nadler [2001], 225).
[44] Benz (1932). [45] Dixon (2003).

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:29:26, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.010

Conclusion

Cudworth's Platonism can be aptly described as Alexandrian. For Cudworth, Plotinus is – alongside Origen – perhaps the most significant guide to the nature of Platonism as a true intellectual system, i.e. in opposition to the merely visible and material aspect, of the universe. It is important to recall that Cudworth does not accept the now familiar idea of two Origens. Hence Plotinus and Origen are viewed by Cudworth as companions: two thinkers who both studied under the tutelage of Ammonius Saccas. Moreover, none of the later Neoplatonists enjoy the authority of Plotinus for Cudworth. The role of Plotinus as the model of the contemplative life can be seen in the following passage:

> And that we may here give a Taste of the mystical theology and enthusiasm of these Platonists too; Porphyrius in the Life of Plotinus affirmeth, that both Plotinus and Himself had sometimes experience of a kind of Ecstatic Union with the First of these three gods, that which is above Mind and Understanding: Plotinus often endeavoring to raise up his mind to the First and Highest God, that God sometimes appeared to him, who hath neither Form nor Idea, but is placed above Intellect, and all that is Intelligible; to whom "I Porphyrius affirm myself to have been once united in the Sixty-eigth year of my age." And again afterward, "Plotinus his chief aim and scope was, to be united to, and conjoyned with the Supreme God, who is above all; which scope he attained unto Four several times, whilst my self was with him, by a certain ineffable energy." That is Plotinus aimed at such a kind of Rapturous and Ecstatic Union with the First of the Three Highest Gods (called the One and the Good), as by himself is described towards the latter end of this Last Book [*Ennead* VI. 9], Where he calls it *epaphēn* and *parousian epistēmēs kreittona*, and *to heautōn kentron tōi hoion pantōn kentrōi . . . sunaptein*, a kind of Tactual Union, and a certain Presence better than Knowledge, and the joyning of our own Centre, as it were, with the Centre of the Universe.

Cudworth is not simply a doxographer. His enthusiasm for the great Alexandrian is grounded in a sensibility for the "kind of ecstasy and pleasing horror" of religious experience that we might otherwise associate with Rudolf Otto's The Holy.[46] Plotinus is not merely a reference point for the Cambridge don, but a source of inspiration.

[46] Muirhead (1931), 48.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:29:26, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.010

REFERENCES

Allen, M. J. B., Hankins, J., and Warden, J. (eds. and trans.) (2001–2006) *Marsilio Ficino, Platonic Theology*, Cambridge, MA.

Armstrong, A. H. (trans.) (1966–1988) *Plotinus, Enneads*, 7 vols., Cambridge, MA.

Beierwaltes, W. (1969) "Augustins Interpretation von Sapientia 11:21," *Revue des études augustiniennes* 15: 51–61.

Benz, E. (1932) *Marius Victorinus und die Entwicklung der Abendländischen Willensmetaphysik*, Stuttgart.

Bergemann, L. (2012) *Ralph Cudworth: System aus Transformation. Zur Naturphilosophie der Cambridge Platonists und ihrer Methode*, Berlin.

Bonifazi, C. (1978) *The Soul of the World: An Account of the Inwardness of Things*, Washington, D.C.

Bussanich, J. (1994) "Realism and Idealism in Plotinus," *Hermathena* 157: 21–42.

Cassirer, E. (1932) *Die platonische Renaissance in England und die Schule von Cambridge*, Leipzig and Berlin.

Cudworth, R. (1647) *A Sermon Preached before the Honourable House of Commons*, London.

(1678) *The True Intellectual System of the Universe: The First Part [. . .]*, London.

Darwall, S. (1995) *The British Moralists and the Internal 'Ought,'* Cambridge, UK.

Dixon, P. (2003) *Nice Hot Disputes: The Doctrine of the Trinity in the Seventeenth Century*, London and New York.

Hutton, S. (ed.) (1996) *Ralph Cudworth: A Treatise Concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality, with a Treatise on Free Will*, Cambridge, UK.

Israel, J. I. (2008) *Enlightenment Contested: Philosophy, Modernity, and the Emancipation of Man 1670–1752*, Oxford.

Lähteenmäki, V. (2010) "Cudworth on Types of Consciousness", *British Journal for the History of Philosophy* 18: 9–34.

Leroux, G. (ed. and trans.) (1990) *Plotin, Traité sur la liberté et la volonté de l'Un*, Paris.

Muirhead, J. H. (1927) "The Cambridge Platonists I", *Mind* 36: 326–341.

(1931) *The Platonic Tradition in Anglo-Saxon Philosophy*, London.

Nadler, S. (2001) *Spinoza: A Life*, Cambridge, UK.

Nagel, T. (2012) *Mind and Cosmos: Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature Is Almost Certainly False*, Oxford.

Rodney, J. M. (1970) *A Godly Atomist in Seventeenth Century England: Ralph Cudworth, History* 32: 243–249.

Thiel, U. (1991) "Cudworth and Seventeenth-Century Theories of Consciousness", in S. Gaukroger (ed.) *The Uses of Antiquity*, Dortrecht, 77–99.

Vassanya, M. (2011) *Anima Mundi: The Rise of the World Soul Theory in Modern German Philosophy*, Dordrecht.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:29:26, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.010

CHAPTER 7

John Smith on the Immortality of the Soul

Derek A. Michaud

Introduction

This chapter traces the influence of Plotinus in the philosophical theology of the Cambridge Platonist John Smith (1618–52) through a detailed analysis of his "Discourse of the Immortality of the Soul."[1] In the process, it offers a corrective to recent scholarship on Smith while illuminating an important moment in the legacy of Plotinus that continues to resonate in contemporary philosophy and theology. Recent historical research has portrayed Smith as a scholar employing traditional moral arguments from well-known authorities like Plutarch and Cicero while ignoring his deep engagement with Epicurean sources, his originality, and his Plotinianism.[2] Like his colleagues Henry More and Ralph Cudworth, Smith was actively engaged in the defense of rational Christian theology against the rise of early modern materialism and "atheism."[3] Of central importance in this regard was the defense of the immortality of the soul. For all "aspects of unbelief . . . implied atheism" in this period.[4] As More put it, "No Spirit, no God."[5]

Smith's is one of the first systematic treatments of the philosophical question of the immortality of the soul in English.[6] He takes up the

[1] Smith (1660a), 59–120. Smith's debts to Plotinus are particularly extensive in this discourse. For more detailed discussion of Smith's philosophical theology see Michaud (2017).

[2] See for example, Levitin (2015), 128. Sheppard (2015, pp. 156–165) acknowledges the depth of Smith's Platonism but tends to agree that Smith is simply repeating commonplaces against atheism. Both suffer from an overly selective reading of Smith's discourses.

[3] See Leech (2013),1–16, etc. and Sheppard (2015), 90–136. Unlike More and Cudworth, Smith does not reference the work of Hobbes, instead framing his discussion in terms of a return to the ancient school of Epicureanism.

[4] Sheppard (2015), 92. "Epicureanism" was the early modern equivalent of our category of materialist naturalism. LoLordo (2011), 647–664.

[5] More (1653), 164.

[6] Mijuskovic (1974), 19–27. See also Sheppard (2015), 1–10. Smith is unusual for his reliance on Plotinus. Other early discussions of the immortal soul such as Kenelm Digby's *Two Treatises in the one of which the Nature of Bodies, in the other, the Nature of Mans Soule is looked into in way of*

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Sussex Library, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:30:53, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.011

question of immortality as a logical corollary to divine reward, but it is a *living* concern because of the presence of current day "Epicureans" who, like the ancient school, affirmed the mortality of the soul based on a form of materialism.[7] In addition to "Epicureanism" Smith likely has in mind, but does not reference, the "conditional immortality" propounded by George Wither and Richard Overton among others in the 1640s.[8] If so, the threat to religion from Smith's perspective remains largely the same insofar as immortality is made doubtful.

Against the rising tide of materialism Smith borrows heavily from Plotinus.[9] However, in his treatise "On the Immortality of the Soul" (*Ennead* IV. 7) Plotinus addresses Epicureans only very briefly.[10] Most often Plotinus seeks to refute the views of Stoics. Smith, in contrast, sees an ally in the Stoics and is therefore concerned primarily with Epicurean materialism. Both Plotinus and Smith, however, are seeking to defend what Gerson has called Platonic anti-materialism and anti-mechanism with respect to the immortality of the soul.[11]

The following offers a close reading of Smith's discourse with attention to the Plotinian sources of his arguments. In the process, a window opens onto an early modern constructive appropriation of Plotinus and a bridge is illuminated from antiquity to modernity.

Smith's Premises

Smith opens his discourse on the immortality of the soul with three premises, the acceptance of which is required to fully appreciate the arguments that follow.

Discovery of the Immortality of Reasonable Soules (= Digby, 1644), Walter Charleton's *The Darknes of Atheism dispelled by the Light of Nature* . . . (= Charleton, 1652), and *The Immortality of the Human Soul* . . . (= Charleton, 1657) make no reference to Plotinus.

[7] On the growth of "Epicureanism" in Smith's period see Michaud (2017), 165–169. Smith was not, as Levitin suggests, an unsophisticated critic of Epicureanism (Levitin [2015], 346). In Smith (1660b) he references Lucretius often rather than relying on Cicero and other critics as Smith tends to do on "Atheism."

[8] Wither (1636); Overton (1644). See Mijuskovic (1974), 20–22.

[9] The influence of Marsilio Ficino on Smith appears to be limited to his editions of texts. He makes no reference to the *Platonic Theology* for example, but Smith does occasionally offer loose versions of Ficino's Latin translation of Plotinus. That said, Smith takes Lucretius to be a primary opponent just like Ficino. See Snyder (2011), 165–181.

[10] Plotinus, *Ennead*, IV. 7. 3.1–6. Quotations from IV.7 are from the translation by Fleet (2016). Other treatises are from Armstrong (1968–1988), unless otherwise noted.

[11] Gerson (2013), 10–12.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Sussex Library, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:30:53, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.011

First, Smith suggests with Cicero that the consensus among philosophers means the immortality of the soul does "not absolutely need any Demonstration" at all.[12] Since the notion is one naturally arrived at by even "the most vulgar sort of men" and since "all Nations have consented in this belief," there should be no need to answer for this article of Christian faith.[13] Far from simply an appeal to popularity, however, Smith avers that since this idea is held by all "with a kind of repugnancy to Sense, which shows all things to be mortal" it is certainly the "common dictate of Nature or Reason acting alike in all men" that "forcibly urge[s] them to believe their own Immortality."[14] Nevertheless, one should not need to argue this and yet Smith, of course, knows that in his day one must; a clear indication of how urgent the moment was for him.

Second, in keeping with the Platonic tradition, Smith suggests that one may only come "to a right conceiving [of] the force of any such Arguments as may prove the Souls Immortality" if we have "an antecedent Converse with our own Souls."[15] That is, to see that the soul is immortal one must have an immediate familiarity with one's own soul. As Plotinus put it, "let the man who has abstracted consider himself; he will then know for sure that he is immortal."[16]

Smith's third premise asserts with Plotinus "That no Substantial and Indivisible thing ever perisheth."[17] In a rare direct reference to Plato, Smith appeals to the "sober Thesis" found in the *Timaeus* (41a–b) that substances persist out of the "Benignity and Liberality of the Creator," and he draws the inference that "Plato held that the whole world, however it might meet with many Periodical mutations, should remain Eternally."[18] This he thinks "Christian Divinity doth no where deny."[19] But, as is so often the case, he backs this point not with scripture or the Fathers of the Church but with Plotinus, who "frames this general Axiom, *ouden ek tou ontos apoleitai,* that no Substance shall ever perish."[20] While Smith uses this principle to defend Platonic anti-materialism he is quick to note that even his opponents accept it as a basic premise. For even the learned Epicureans of old and his own day grant that nothing is made from nothing and nothing reverts to nothing.[21]

[12] Smith (1660b), 63, citing Cicero's *Tusculanae Disputationes*, I. 12–14. [13] Smith (1660b), 63.
[14] Smith (1660b), 64. [15] Smith (1660b), 65.
[16] Plotinus, *Ennead* IV. 7. 10. 30–31. Cf. *Ennead* V. 1. 22–35.
[17] Smith (1660b), 66. Smith cites Plotinus, *Ennead* IV. 7. 14. 14 "nothing of real being perishes" (67).
[18] Smith (1660b), 66–67, citing Plato's *Timaeus*, 41a–b. Cf. Plotinus, *Ennead* I. 8.7.
[19] Smith (1660b), 67.
[20] Smith (1660b), citing Plotinus, *Ennead* IV. 7. 14. 20. Smith's text, as is often the case, is not exact here but this is clearly his intended passage. It is the idea that matters for Smith, not the text.
[21] Smith (1660b), 66. Cf. Lucretius, *De Rerum Natura*, I. 146–328.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Sussex Library, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:30:53, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.011

Indeed, they argue that atoms are indestructible precisely because they are simple and without parts.[22] In much the same way, Smith will argue that the soul is indestructible and therefore immortal. This is what Mijuskovic has identified as the first significant English use of the "simplicity argument."[23] In this, he is clearly following the example of Plotinus. "Everything that can be broken up has acquired its being through composition of parts . . . But soul is a simple nature, a simplex, that exists in actuality through being alive. Because of this, it cannot be destroyed.[24]

But Smith will not be content to argue for the "immortality" had by mere atoms. Wilson ignores this when she criticizes Smith for his supposed favoring of the arguments offered by Descartes. The weakness of the indestructibility argument on its own is why Smith offers so many additional considerations.[25] To it, he will add epistemic reflections to distinguish the immortal soul from merely infinitely persistent matter. In the process, Smith marks a step in the modern development of what Kant would eventually call the "Achilles" argument.[26]

Drawing on both Plotinus and Descartes, Smith closes his discussion of the third premise by distinguishing substances of two basic sorts: body and spirit (including soul or mind). Body Smith says is divisible, material, and extended in three dimensions, while spirit, soul, or mind is incorporeal, immaterial, has no dimensions, and thus no parts.[27]

Arguments for the Immortality of the Soul

Smith's formal arguments for the immortality of the soul are four in number; two against the Epicureans directly and two positive Platonic arguments. Each draws from similar arguments offered by Plotinus in the

[22] Epicurus, *Letter to Herodotus*, 54.
[23] Mijuskovic (1974), 23 and 26. See also Schachter (2008), 123–125.
[24] Plotinus, *Ennead* IV. 7. 12. 12–14. [25] Wilson (2008), 241–242.
[26] Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* (Guyer and Wood, 1998), A351–A361. On this development see Mijuskovic (1974, pp. 1–18) and Lennon (2008).
[27] Smith (1660b), 68. See Descartes, *Principles of Philosophy*, I. 53 (Adam and Tannery [1964–1974], VIIIA: 25); *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes* (Cottingham, Stoothoff, and Murdoch [1991a], I: 210–211) and *Meditations on First Philosophy*, Sixth Meditation (Adam and Tannery [1964–1974], VII: 86–87; Cottingham et al. [1991a], II: 59). Smith does not conceive of soul and body as incapable of interaction. He seems to have something like Descartes' denial of the impossibility of interaction in his reply to Gassendi (Adam and Tannery [1964–1974], VII: 213; Cottingham et al. [1991a], II: 275) in mind. It is likely however that Smith is influenced here by the correspondence of More with Descartes on this question, but he does not propose a theory of extended spirit as did More (see Leech [2013], 59–71, 123–197). Smith does not address incorporeal matter (Plotinus, *Ennead* II. 8. 8–12) because he is concerned, as Plotinus often is too, with bodies that are material (e.g. *Ennead* IV. 7. 6. 37–48).

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Sussex Library, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:30:53, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.011

second treatise (*Ennead* IV. 7), either explicitly or implicitly. In fact, the sequence of Smith's discourse roughly follows that of Plotinus' throughout. Moreover, Smith's arguments follow the levels of knowledge from Plato's Divided Line and elaborated variously in the Platonic tradition thereafter.[28] Smith's "Immortality" and the next discourse on the nature and existence of God represent, therefore, a staged ascent from the sensible and material realm, through the rational soul, to the Divine.

The Anti-Materialism Argument

Smith's first argument concerns the immaterial unity of the soul.[29] He seeks "to prove That the *Soul* of man is something *really distinct* from his *Body*, of an *Indivisible* nature, and so cannot be divided into such Parts as should flit one from another; and consequently is apt of its own Nature to remain to Eternity."[30] Just as Plotinus had done early in his treatise, Smith takes up the competing materialist claim to demonstrate "*ab absurdo*" the falsity thereof.[31] As Plotinus expresses it, "first we must consider into what constituents this body which they call soul must be broken down."[32] For Epicurus and his school, including his early modern followers, the soul is a composite of atoms just like everything else.[33] On Smith's reading, this means that the Epicurean soul is a material body, composed of parts, with spatial extension. When these atoms no longer form a composite whole, the soul like the body simply ceases to exist.[34] Smith objects primarily to the absurdities that follow with respect to the central functions of the soul if one accepts the material soul theory. For no matter how cleverly one dresses up the essential thesis in the "disguise of wanton Wit" as Lucretius does, in the end, we are left with "meer *Body*, which will be recoiling back perpetually into its own inert and sluggish Passiveness."[35] It is *life* which Smith finds lacking in the Epicurean account. As Plotinus puts it, "What body could have life of itself?"[36]

Furthermore, Smith asks how the sensitive functions of the soul can be derived from mere body.[37] The Epicurean solution, known to Smith from

[28] Plato, *Republic*, 509d–511e. [29] Smith (1660b), ch. III, 68–84. [30] Smith (1660b), 69.
[31] Smith (1660b), 69.
[32] Plotinus, *Ennead* IV. 7. 2. 4–5. Plotinus is here taking aim primarily at the Stoics but conceptually the target is the same as Smith's (the idea of a corporeal/material soul).
[33] Epicurus, *Letter to Herodotus*, 39–41, 63. Cf. Lucretius, *De Rerum Natura*, III. 425–444.
[34] Epicurus, *Letter to Menoeceus*, 125. [35] Smith (1660b), 70.
[36] Plotinus, *Ennead* IV. 7. 2. 11.
[37] Smith (1660b), 71. Cf. Plotinus, *Ennead* IV. 7. 3. 1–6, Plotinus' only argument against the Epicureans in this treatise.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Sussex Library, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:30:53, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.011

Lucretius, that sentience arises through the motion of atoms through the void, just raises the additional difficulty of how to account for motion.[38] Motion, Smith contends, requires an efficient cause that is not itself a body, or as Plotinus has it, life relies on an immaterial cause or principle of organization.[39] Otherwise, we have an endless regress of physical causes.

The extreme smallness of "corpuscular" bodies (atoms) does nothing to help the Epicurean cause because as Plotinus also argues no matter their size, shape, location, etc. no combination of lifeless parts can produce life. The whole cannot have any properties not already possessed by its constituents.[40] "For indeed that infinite variety which is in the *Magnitude* of parts, their *Positions*, *Figures* and *Motions*, may easily ... produce an infinite variety of *Phanomena*, which the Epicurean philosophy calls *Eventa*... Yet cannot the Power it self of Sensation arise from them, no more then *Vision* can arise out of a Glasse."[41] The motions of atoms alone are inadequate for sensation. Thinking body in motion can account for sense is like expecting musical instruments to hear their own vibrations.[42] Rather, Smith claims, in agreement with Plotinus, that sense perception, a key function of the soul, is not motion or the impressions caused by motion but the recognition of these by an immaterial substance.[43] Moreover, Smith rhetorically asks "how any such things as *Sensation* or much less *Reason*, should spring out of this barren soil"?[44] He contends that even if perception were possible on Epicurean principles, knowledge of the world would remain impossible because we judge sensory input via categories (ideas) already present to the reasoning faculty of the soul.

> But yet if our *Senses* were the onely *Judges* of things, this *Reflex* knowledge whereby we know what it is to know, would be as impossible as he [Lucretius] makes it for *Sense* to have *Innate Idea's* of its own, antecedent to those stamps which the Radiations of external Objects imprint upon it. For this knowledge must be antecedent to all that judgment which we pass upon any *Sensatum*, seeing except we first know what it is to know, we could not judge or determine aright upon the approach of any of these *Idola* to our Senses.[45]

Smith adds this observation because he realizes, with Plotinus, that sense perception does involve the body. But, again with Plotinus, Smith argues

[38] Lucretius, *De Rerum Natura*, IV. 216–1059.
[39] Plotinus, *Ennead* IV. 7. 3. 12–16; IV. 7. 19–25.
[40] Plotinus, *Ennead* IV. 7. 2. 16–19.
[41] Smith (1660b), 72.
[42] Smith (1660b), 76.
[43] Smith (1660b). For Plotinus see e.g. *Ennead* IV. 3. 6; IV. 6. 2. 18–22; IV. 6. 3; IV. 7. 4; IV. 7. 6. See also Morel (2016), 96–112; Taormina (2016), 113–130.
[44] Smith (1660b), 70.
[45] Smith (1660b), 77.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Sussex Library, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:30:53, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.011

that we perceive and know *through* and *with* our physical senses not *by* them.[46]

Without a higher or anterior immaterial principle, we also could not know the difference between the apparent and the actual size of the sun because this rests on non-sensory mathematical reasoning (*dianoia*). Smith refers here to Proclus and Aristotle to the effect that Epicurus was wrong about distant objects being as they appear not because of a defect in our senses but a mistake in our reasoning.[47] Moreover, Smith sides with Plotinus when he says that our minds must remove themselves from the concerns of the body to "nakedly discern truth."[48] In addition, he agrees with Plotinus that sense perception requires a principle of higher unity beyond the physical. This "common sense" as Aristotle calls it "*collects* and *unites* all the Perceptions of our Several Senses."[49] Smith is arguing that, in the words of Plotinus, "if one perception comes through the eyes and another through our hearing, there still must be something single to which both perceptions come . . . a sort of hub with our perceptions reaching it from all sides like radii converging from the circumference of a circle."[50] As Mijuskovic puts it, "only an immaterial simple can serve as a 'transcendental' condition for the unity of consciousness."[51]

Smith considers our cognition of the past in memory and of the future in anticipation or "prevision."[52] Rhetorically he asks Epicurus, "What Matter can thus bind up Past, Present and Future time together?"[53] Taking his lead again from Plotinus, Smith suggests that this ability to hold the modes of time together in mind indicates that the rational soul participates in the eternity of intelligible reality. Anticipating, and probably helping to precipitate, Locke's latter concern with personal identity over time, Smith asks "if our *Souls* were nothing else but a *Complex of fluid Atomes*, how should we be continually roving and sliding from ourselves? The new *Matter* that would come in to fill up that Vacuity which the *old* had made by its departure, would never know what the *old* were, nor what that should be that would succeed that."[54] This point too comes from

[46] Smith (1660b). Cf. Plotinus *Ennead* III. 6. 1; IV. 3. 29; IV. 7. 6–7; V. 3. 2. 11–13.
[47] Smith (1660b), 79. For Plotinus see, for example, *Ennead* II. 8. Smith draws on Proclus, *In Timaeum* (Diehl, 1903–1906) I. 249. 20–250. 5 and Aristotle, *De Anima* III. 2–3 here. For Epicurus' mistaken view, see his *Letter to Pythocles*, 91 and Cicero, *De Finibus*, I. 20.
[48] Smith (1660b), 80. Cf. Plotinus, *Ennead* IV. 7. 16. [49] Smith (1660b), 82.
[50] Plotinus, *Ennead* IV. 7. 6. 8–13. [51] Mijuskovic (1974), 65. [52] Smith (1660b), 82.
[53] Smith (1660b), 83.
[54] Smith (1660b), 83–84. Smith and Plotinus identify personal identity with the (especially rational) soul. Conceptually, by the late seventeenth century it was a small step from these considerations about the soul to Locke's theory of self.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Sussex Library, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:30:53, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.011

Plotinus, who says "that new pilgrim and stranger-like Soul [composed of new atoms] would always be ignorant of What the other before it knew, and we should be wholly some other bulk of Being then we were before."[55]

Thus, if the Epicureans are correct, life, motion, sense perception, judgment, self-consciousness, and knowledge of external things are impossible. Moreover, we could have no continuing identity over time. For "meer Matter could never thus stretch forth its feeble force, & spread it self over all its own former præexistencies."[56] All the foregoing considerations show, to Smith's satisfaction, that the materialist account of soul offered by ancient and contemporary Epicureans is self-refuting and fundamentally inadequate. A material soul is not capable of doing the basic work of the soul. Only an immaterial substance can account for these functions, and by Smith's third premise such an immaterial substance is necessarily indestructible and therefore immortal.

The Anti-Mechanism Argument

Smith's second argument establishes limits for material mechanism. In so doing, he accepts the basic distinction developed by Descartes between the body as extended substance and the soul or mind as mental substance. But Smith's argument rests far more on his reading of antique philosophical tradition. In a rare appeal to Plato's pupil Smith declares that he will "take that course that Aristotle did in his Books *de Anima*, and first of all inquire, Whether it [the soul] hath *idion ti*, some kind of Action so proper and peculiar to it self, as not to depend upon the Body."[57]

Smith accepts the mechanistic operation of the body "below" or "posterior" to the level of soul via the movement of spirits, blood, and humors.[58] Such "Corporeal motions . . . seem to arise from nothing else but merely from the Machina of the Body."[59] Smith asserts that the human body and its functions are best understood via the same "course and method" we use to investigate "any other kind of Animal."[60] From this, he infers that "our Souls" have "as little to doe with any of these in our own Bodies as they have in the Bodies of any other Brute creature."[61] So Smith grants that bodily "*Actions* which arise up within us without any

[55] Smith (1660b), 84, citing Plotinus, *Ennead* IV. 7. 5. 20–21.
[56] Smith (1660b), 84.
[57] Smith (1660b), 85, referencing *De Anima* I. 1. 402a.
[58] Smith (1660b), 86–87.
[59] Smith (1660b), 87.
[60] Smith (1660b), 87–88. Cf. Descartes, "Letter to More of 5 February 1649," §5 (Adam and Tannery [1964–1974] V: 276–279; Cottingham, Stoothoff, Murdoch, and Kenny [1991b] III: 365–367).
[61] Smith (1660b), 88.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Sussex Library, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:30:53, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.011

Animadversion" are the result of physical mechanisms.[62] He is not, as he has sometimes been portrayed, an antiquarian anti-modern opponent of natural science.[63] Instead, he thinks that the applicable sphere for mechanistic explanations is limited.

Smith thinks that introspection shows our souls are not constrained by physical laws. We find ourselves free to act as we will, including overriding or ignoring bodily urges or needs. "We doe not by a naked speculation know our Bodies first to have need of nourishment, and then by the Edict of our Wills injoyn our Spirits and Humours to put themselves into an hungry and craving posture within us by corroding the Tunicles of the Stomach; but we first find our own Souls solicited by these motions, which yet we are able to gainsay, and to deny those petitions which they offer up to us."[64] Indeed, "all good men have . . . a true despotical power over their Sensitive faculties, and over the whole Body."[65] This Smith connects to the dismissal of "Astral Necessity" and astrology.[66] Smith is not here saying that things are not predetermined by God. He acknowledges "destinies . . . contained in the . . . Infinite and Almighty Mind" of God.[67] But we still find things in our power (*to eph'hēmin*) as we navigate our lives. Characteristically, Smith discusses, but is relatively uninterested in, the question of the identity of the "First Mover" in us in scholastic terms, for "whether the Understanding or the Will . . . it is originally the Soul it self whose vital acts they are."[68]

Predictably Smith dismisses Lucretius' "Motion of declination" as an explanation for apparent human "Liberty."[69] No initial "swerve" in the natural motion of atoms can explain the "Freedome of Will" that self-reflection reveals to be a central part of our lives.[70] "For how can any thing be made subject to a force and impartial debate of Reason, or fall under the Level of Free-will, if all things be the meer result either of a Fortuitous or Fatal motion of Bodies, which can have no power or dominion over themselves?"[71] All of which leads Smith to conclude that "Whatsoever Essence finds this *Freedome* within it self, whereby it is absolved from the rigid laws of Matter, may know it self also to be Immaterial."[72] That is, as

[62] See Descartes, *Principles*, I. 9 (Adam and Tannery [1964–1974] VIIIA: 7–8; Cottingham et al. [1991a] I: 195); IV. 190 (Adam and Tannery [1964–1974] VIIIA: 316–318; Cottingham et al. [1991a] I: 280–281).
[63] Wilson (2008), 236. [64] Smith (1660b), 88.
[65] Smith (1660b), 88. Smith draws here on Proclus, *In Timaeum*, I. 175. 13–177. 2.
[66] Smith (1660b), 89. Cf. Plotinus, *Ennead* II. 3; III. 1. [67] Smith (1660b), 89.
[68] Smith (1660b). 89. [69] Smith (1660b), 90. See also Lucretius, *De Rerum Natura*, II. 216–293.
[70] Smith (1660b), 90. Cf. Plotinus, *Ennead* III. 1. 1. See also Purinton (1999), 253–299.
[71] Smith (1660b), 91. [72] Smith (1660b), 91.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Sussex Library, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:30:53, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.011

Plotinus maintains, the soul is the self-moving principle of motion behind bodily motion.[73] What Smith calls "*autexousios zōē*" or a "Self-potent Life" soul lives without end, for while the soul is mixed with body "the Higher powers of Reason . . . are never so broken" that they cannot regain control over the "Corporeal motions" of our bodies.[74] Thus, he concludes his second argument:

> And if any can conceive all this to be nothing but a meer fighting of the *male-contented* pieces of Matter one against another, each striving for superiority and preeminence; I should not think it worth the while to teach such an one any higher learning, as looking upon him to be indued with no higher a Soul then that which moves in Beasts or Plants.[75]

The Reasoning Argument

Smith's third argument considers the soul at yet "a further degree of *Abstraction* . . . in these *Actions* which *depend not at all* upon the *Body*."[76] Following the pattern established by Plato's Divided Line and the Allegory of the Cave he takes up "those *logoi mathēmatikoi* or *Mathematical notions* which it [the rational soul] conteins in it self."[77] He argues that geometrical objects (points, lines, planes, etc.) and concepts (equality, symmetry, divisibility, etc.) do not depend upon the corporeal world. In fact, these do not even perfectly relate to extended objects. Mathematical and geometrical concepts are contained, Smith says, within the rational soul and cannot be properly speaking "buried in Matter."[78] Here he follows the spirit, if not the letter, of Plotinus: "Geometry and arithmetic are, we shall maintain, of a twofold character: in their earthly types they rank with sensible Quality, but insofar as they are functions of pure Soul, they necessarily belong to that other world in close proximity to the intellectual."[79]

To illustrate his point, already familiar to any "Geometrican," Smith points out how easily our rational souls perform geometrical operations despite the physical impossibility of duplicating them in the corporeal realm. Any angle or arch may be cut into as many parts as one wishes

[73] *Ennead* IV. 7. 9. 6–29. [74] Smith (1660b), 92.
[75] Smith (1660b), 92. Incredulity of this kind continues to inform debates about the relationship between traditional religion and scientific naturalism. For example, see the dialogue between Daniel C. Dennett and Alvin Plantinga in Dennett and Plantinga (2010).
[76] Smith (1660b), 93. [77] Smith (1660b), 93; Cf. Plotinus, *Ennead* III. 8. 4. 7–10; VI. 6; etc.
[78] Smith (1660b), 93.
[79] Plotinus, *Ennead* VI. 3. 16. 20–23, trans. Stephen MacKenna (= MacKenna, 1992).

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Sussex Library, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:30:53, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.011

geometrically.[80] However, "no Mechanical art can possibly so perform either" operation because where the cut is made "will detract something from the whole."[81] Some portion of corporeal extension must be lost to the cutting of a body while the mental archetypes thereof have form but no extension.[82] "For even the intelligible line would not assimilate to the sensible one," as Plotinus puts it.[83] Thus, since "no Matter be capable of any Geometrical effections, and the *Apodictical* precepts of Geometry be altogether unimitable in the purest Matter that Phansie can imagine; then must they needs depend upon something infinitely more pure then *Matter*, which hath all that Stability and Certainty within it self which gives to those infallible Demonstrations."[84]

For this reason, Smith agrees with another student of the Platonic tradition, Saint Augustine, who reasons "from these notions of Quantity, which come not by any possible Sense or Experience which we can make of bodily Being, and therefore concludes they must needs be immediately ingraven upon an Immaterial Soul."[85] Our immaterial rational souls judge the material world by the eternal perfection of arithmetic and Euclidian geometry, and as that which measures is distinct from that which is measured, our soul is necessarily distinct from the material body. That which is immaterial is without parts and therefore immortal as all simple substances must be. As if to confirm his Plotinian bona fides, Smith concludes his third argument with the observation that "our Bodies should rather be in our Souls, then our Souls in them."[86]

The Affinity Argument

Smith's final argument for the immortality of the soul draws on classic Platonic notions supplemented by Cartesian philosophy. The argument opens by making explicit the four degrees of knowledge that had served as his map from the start.[87] Smith's first argument treats the level of physical and therefore sensible reality alone. The second adds intelligible ideas to the physical, while the third deals with the realm of reason (*dianoia*). Here in the fourth argument we finally reach the level of the "naked intuition of

[80] Smith (1660b), 93. [81] Smith (1660b), 94.
[82] See Plotinus, *Ennead* IV. 2. 1; IV. 4. 1; IV. 4. 23; cited by Emilsson (1988), 146–147 nn. 3–4.
[83] Plotinus, *Ennead* IV. 4. 23. 10–11. [84] Smith (1660b), 94.
[85] Smith (1660b), 94 quoting Augustine, *De Quantitate Animae*, 13. 22–14. 23.
[86] Smith (1660b), 96. Cf. Plato, *Timaeus* 36d–e and Plotinus, *Ennead* IV. 1. 14–22.
[87] Specifically, Smith recalls the treatment thereof given by Proclus, *In Timaeum* I. 243. 26–252. 10, especially 248. 30–249. 28.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Sussex Library, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:30:53, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.011

Eternal Truth" in the form of "the *Archetypall Ideas* of *Justice*, *Wisdome*, *Goodness*, *Truth*, *Eternity*, *Omnipotency*, and all those *Morall*, *Physicall*, or *Metaphysical* notions, which are either the *First* Principles of Science, or the *Ultimate* complement and final perfection of it."[88] Plotinus of course develops this theme in many passages, but tellingly he addresses it prominently in his treatise on the immortality of the soul.[89] Being capable of the intuition of immaterial intelligibles the rational soul, the higher soul that remains united with intellect, cannot be material.[90] This is a version of the "Affinity Argument" for the immortal soul offered in the *Phaedo*.[91]

In addition to these Plotinian considerations, Smith also draws upon the Cartesian intuition of the self as a thinking thing, more easily conceived than even our notion of our own body.[92] "For whensoever we take notice of those *Immediate motions* of our own *Minds* whereby they make themselves known to us, we find no such thing in them as *Extension* or *Divisibility*."[93] But this Cartesian argument does not really do much work for Smith and he returns immediately to his true guide, Plotinus.[94] For while he believes with Descartes that "we find all Intelligible things more clear" than corporeality, his purpose is far better served by the Platonic observation that "we see all Intelligible Being concentring together in a greater *Oneness*, and all kind of *Multiplicity* running more and more into the strictest *Unity*, till at last we find all Variety and Division suck'd up into a perfect Simplicity."[95]

This use of the simplicity argument is explicitly connected to Plotinus when Smith says "that the reason of all Diversity and Distinction is (that I may use *Plotinus* his words not much differently from his meaning) *metabasis apo nou eis logismon*."[96] Although when pursued scientifically they appear distinct "in our naked Intuitions and visions of them, we

[88] Smith (1660b), 97. Cf. Plotinus, *Ennead* IV. 7. 8. 7–26. Smith's discourse then is both a series of arguments and a staged ascent to true intellection in preparation for contemplation of God in the next discourse. As is so often the case with Plotinus too, Smith is rhetorically and dialectically bearing his reader (originally hearer) "up" from the world of sense, through themselves as immortal souls, toward God as *Summum Bonum*, *Alpha* and *Omega*.

[89] Plotinus, *Ennead* IV. 7. 8. 1–7; IV. 7. 9. 26–27; etc.

[90] Plotinus, *Ennead* IV. 7. 13. 1–4 (cf. IV. 8. 8); IV. 7. 10. 1–6.

[91] Plato, *Phaedo*, 78b4–84b4.

[92] Smith (1660b), 98. Descartes, *Meditations*, Second Meditation (Adam and Tannery [1964–1974] VII: 23–34; Cottingham et al. [1991a] II: 16–23).

[93] Smith (1660b), 98.

[94] Plotinus too argues that body is characterized by "magnitude" (*megethos*) in the sense of extension and resistance: IV. 7. 1. 17–18. See also Emilsson (1988), 102.

[95] Smith (1660b), 99. Smith is employing the "one over many" argument. See for example Plato, *Phaedo*, 100c–d.

[96] Smith (1660b), 99, citing *Ennead* IV. 8. 1.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Sussex Library, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:30:53, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.011

clearly discern that *Goodness* and *Wisdome* lodge together, *Justice* and *Mercy* kiss each other: and all these and whatsoever pieces else the crack'd glasses of our Reasons may sometime break Divine and Intelligible Being into, are fast knit up together in the invincible bonds of *Eternity*."[97] Thus Proclus would have it that "the Soul partaking of *Time* in its broken and particular conceptions and apprehensions" also participates in "*Eternity* in its comprehensive and stable contemplations."[98]

Any soul that has summitted "this bright Olympus" will have no doubt about its own immortality.[99] For the soul "will then feel it self grasping fast and safely its own Immortality, and view it self in the Horizon of Eternity."[100] This is the sort of "sober ecstasies" Smith identifies with Plotinus' account of being separated from his body.[101] Unlike Patrides and many others Smith understood that the "flight of the Soul alone to God alone" is not about leaving the world for some other region but a call to become who we really are.[102]

The fourth argument closes by relating "that which breeds a true sense of" the immortal soul "True and reall goodness."[103] While arguments may convince us of the fact of our immortality, "it is onely *True Goodness and Vertue* in the Souls of men that can make them both *know* and *love*, *believe* and *delight* themselves in their *own Immortality*."[104] For God "would not raise it [the soul] up to such *Mounts of Vision* to shew it all the glory of that heavenly Canaan" only to cast it "down again into that deep and darkest Abyss of Death and Non-entity."[105] "Divine goodness cannot, it will not, be so cruel to holy souls that are such ambitious suitors for his love."[106] Here Smith the philosopher gives way perhaps to Smith the man of faith somewhat, yet these are never really to be separated for him. Nevertheless, it is revealing of the character of the man that he turns here to bring solace to "those heavy spirited Christians" of his day not with words of scripture but by offering the entire tenth chapter of a Plotinian treatise (IV. 7)![107]

After clearing certain Aristotelian objections to the immortal soul,[108] Smith concludes this discourse with an extended discussion of the

[97] Smith (1660b), 99. [98] Smith (1660b), 99 citing Proclus, *In Timaeum*, II. 124. 16–125. 9
[99] Smith (1660b), 99. [100] Smith (1660b),100.
[101] Plotinus, *Ennead* IV. 8. 1, as given in Smith (1660b), 100.
[102] Smith (1660c), 423, translating *Ennead* VI. 9. 11. 51. On the errors of Patrides see Clark (2017): 858–877, especially 861 and 863–864.
[103] Smith (1660b), 101. [104] Smith (1660b), 102. [105] Smith (1660b), 102–103.
[106] Smith (1660b), 103. [107] Smith (1660b), 103, 104–105.
[108] The eighth chapter of Smith (1660b) is given by Worthington as an "Appendix" treating Aristotle's *de Anima*. Specifically, Smith argues, with some notable textual difficulties, that for Aristotle "the Rational Soul" is "separable from the Body" and therefore immortal (107). He also

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Sussex Library, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:30:53, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.011

apparent challenge posed by the deep connections between soul and body.[109] Here he is clearly responding to what has come to be known as the Cartesian mind-body problem. Indeed, Smith cites the "late sagacious Philosopher" directly and agrees with him that bodily motions arise and return to a single "part of the Brain" (i.e. the pineal gland, though Smith does not name it).[110] It is here in the center of the brain that Smith thinks, with Descartes, the soul is moved by and causes motion in the body. Here the soul "sits enthron'd."[111] But if body is corporeal and soul incorporeal as Smith has insisted, and indeed argued for at length, how is this interaction possible?

Smith is particularly sensitive to the "strange kind of dependency which it [soul] seems to have on the Body, whereby it seems constantly to comply and sympathize therewith."[112] In search of a resolution to this "main difficulty" Smith once again turns to Plotinus.[113] Although "our Souls be of an Incorporeal nature ... they are united to our Bodies, not as *Assisting forms* or *Intelligences*, as some have thought, but in some more immediate way; though we cannot tell what that is, it being the great *arcanum* in Man's nature, that which troubled *Plotinus* so much."[114] Ultimately mysterious, Smith agrees with Plotinus that the immaterial soul is united to the body as that which governs it and the soul perceives by means of the body.[115]

Smith's primary response to the mind-body problem, however, is to say that it is no real problem at all. For "the Sympathy of things is no sufficient Argument to prove the Identity of their essences."[116] This response, while not very satisfying perhaps, rehearses one of Descartes' own. In his response to Gassendi's objections to his *Meditations* Descartes said that questions about the interaction of mind and body arise "simply from a supposition that is false and cannot in any way be proved, namely that, if the soul and body are two substances whose nature is different, this prevents them from being able to act on each other."[117] Nevertheless, Smith accepts the basic outlines of the Cartesian explanation found in the

contends with Simplicius as his main authority that Aristotle's Active and Passive Intellect are simply individual intellect either in act or considered in potentia (110). See the more extensive discussion of this in Michaud (2017), 121–125.

[109] Smith (1660b), 112–120.

[110] Smith (1660b),116. See Descartes, *Passions*, 30–36 (Adam and Tannery [1964–1974] XI: 351–357; Cottingham et al. [1991a] I: 339–342).

[111] Smith (1660b), 116. [112] Smith (1660b), 113. [113] Smith (1660b), 113.

[114] Smith (1660b), 113. [115] Smith (1660b) 113–115, drawing upon *Ennead* IV. 8. 1.

[116] Smith (1660b), 113.

[117] Cottingham et al. (1991a) II: 275; see also Adam and Tannery (1964–1974) VII: 213.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Sussex Library, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:30:53, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.011

Passions of the Soul.[118] It remains an open question exactly how Smith saw Plotinus and Descartes as offering compatible theories, but he shares this with the early Henry More.[119]

Just as Plotinus concludes his treatise on the immortal soul with references to the gods, Smith ends his discourse with a discussion of the human and divine natures of Christ.[120] This move from contemplating the soul to contemplating the savior anticipates his arguments for the existence and nature of God that follow in the next discourse.[121] This is crucial for Smith because his arguments there are not really arguments in the usual sense. They will not convince one who has not already returned to themselves in contemplation and been led to the realm of intellect. It is only here as we encounter the unchanging intelligibles that we can hope to intuit the Higher Unity from whence we come.[122] This Unity Smith prefers to name the Good, as does Plotinus in certain moods. Thus, in Plotinian style, Smith concludes his discourse on the soul with the discussion of the necessity to ascend to the intuition of Divine Goodness.[123]

Passing the Torch

While his influence was seldom definitive on its own, Smith deserves much more credit than he usually receives for his response to modern materialism. For example, his discourse on the immortality of the soul represents a "clear foreshadowing of More's enormous treatise on the subject."[124] Worthington, Smith's friend and editor, clearly saw the work of More as a continuation upon that accomplished by our author before

[118] Art. 19–38 (Adam and Tannery [1964–1974] XI: 343–358; Cottingham et al. [1991a] I: 335–343). Smith's discussion of how the "animal spirits" move through the nerves and how the pineal gland acts upon the soul and vice versa follows Descartes closely throughout (115–117).

[119] On the similarities between Plotinus and Descartes see, for example, Dillon (1990, pp. 19–31) and Ross (2000), 153–167. Suzanne Stern-Gillet perhaps offers the clearest guidance here however when she says that "Rather than the first Cartesian, Plotinus, therefore, is less misleadingly described as 'the father of the mind-body problem'." See Stern-Gillet (2016), 26. On More, see Leech (2013), 39–41.

[120] Smith (1660b), 120.

[121] Unlike the chapter divisions added by Worthington the order of these discourses is Smith's own ("To the Reader," v). He wants to lead his reader from sense, through soul, and to God.

[122] Smith (1660b), 99. Cf. Plotinus, *Ennead* VI. 9. 4.

[123] Cf. Plotinus, *Ennead* III. 8; IV. 8; V. 7. 18–26; V. 9; VI. 9. 3; etc. See Michaud (2017), 114–139, 146–158, and 184–188 for discussion of Smith's two other "principles of religion" (communication of God to humanity via Christ, and the existence and nature of God respectively), each of which is also indebted to Plotinus.

[124] Jacob (1987), xxxvi.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Sussex Library, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:30:53, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.011

his untimely death in 1652.[125] Ralph Cudworth too may have picked up the "simplicity argument" from Smith.[126] Surprisingly Smith's Plotinian arguments went on to influence not only theologians but the great Enlightenment philosopher John Locke as well.

The connection between the Cambridge Platonist and the empiricist was Damaris Cudworth, later Lady Masham, the daughter of Ralph Cudworth, and a close friend of Locke. She engaged in a long philosophical dialogue and correspondence with Locke, and among the topics they discussed were Smith's arguments.[127] Indeed, Locke was responding in part to Smith's "Immortality" when he wrote in 1682 that the "usual physical proof ... of the immortality of the soul is this: matter cannot think, ergo, the soul is immaterial; nothing can really destroy an immaterial thing, ergo, the soul is really immortal."[128] But this argument demonstrates "no other immortality of the soul than what belongs to one of Epicurus' atoms."[129] Locke notes explicitly, as Smith had implicitly decades previously, that mere immaterial and indestructible substance is no guarantee of the continuation of what actually concerns us – our sensibility and consciousness in the afterlife.[130]

With this concern foremost in his mind, Locke rejects all applications of the simplicity argument used to infer the immortal soul.[131] For example, Locke contends that we can conceive of neither how material nor immaterial substances are capable of consciousness.[132] Moreover, in the *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* Locke argues for the possibility that matter can be conscious.[133] It seems clear, therefore, that Locke rejects Smith's Plotinian project. But, perhaps, not altogether.

Locke's mature theory of personal identity rests on the consciousness of being the same self over time and across space.[134] Already on 5 June 1683,

[125] John Worthington, "To the Reader," in Smith (1660a), xxii. By the late 1650s there was a self-consciously unified movement of sorts present in Cambridge resisting the rising tide of "atheism" with Platonism.

[126] Lennon (2008), 139.

[127] Forstrom (2010), 96. See also Damaris Cudworth to John Locke, 16 February 1682 (Letter 684), Locke to Cudworth, c. 21 February 1682 (Letter 687) and Cudworth to Locke, 9 March 1682 (Letter 690) in *The Correspondence of John Locke* (= De Beer, 1976–1989).

[128] King (1884, p. 128), cited by Forstrom (2010), 13.

[129] King (1884), 128–129.

[130] Forstrom (2010), 14. See also Mijuskovic (1974), 26 and 38.

[131] Schachter (2008), 116–123.

[132] See Locke's *An Examination of Pere Malebranche's Opinion of Seeing All Things in God*, in *The Philosophical Works of John Locke* (= St. John [1906], II: 414–458, §39, II: 439; cited by Schachter [2008], 117).

[133] John Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (= Nidditch [1975], IV. III. 6, pp. 539–540; cited by Schachter [2008], 118).

[134] Locke, *Essay* (= Nidditch [1975], III. XXVII. 9, p. 335).

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Sussex Library, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:30:53, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.011

he noted that the "Identity of persons lies . . . in the memory and knowledge of ones past self and actions continued under the consciousnesse of being the same person."[135] Locke speaks of "consciousness" – Cudworth's neologism for Plotinus' *suneidēsis* – as a kind of self-awareness.[136] But, for him, this self is not necessarily immaterial or simple.[137] However, Smith's anti-materialist argument, which Locke knew well, had inferred an immaterial identity from our experience of memory and anticipation.[138] Thus, Locke accepts Smith's conclusion that the self "necessarily involves a unification of memory and anticipation," even as he denies the necessary immateriality of this self.[139] As is so often the case, Smith, and Locke too in a limited way, is following the lead of Plotinus here: "And if, as is the case with the rest of our bodily mass, something will always be ebbing away, something always being added, and none of it remaining the same, then how can we account for our memories?"[140]

Even more intriguingly, while Locke takes up a position that is in "conscious opposition to the position of Smith concerning the immortality of the soul," he found Smith's Plotinian arguments "more than plausible when applied to God."[141] Since no body is simple, a material God would be a collection of smaller bodies. However, such a collection yields not a single Deity but many "eternal finite cogitative Beings, independent one of another, of limited force, and distinct thoughts."[142] This cannot account for the conscious unity Locke thinks appropriate for God.[143] So he embraces Smith's line of thought, derived ultimately from Plotinus, that if the mind "is a body there will be no perceiving, thinking, understanding, virtue – or any noble activity."[144] But, unlike Smith, Locke denies the force of the argument where the human soul is concerned.[145] Nevertheless, behind these reflections lies the pioneering work of Smith.

[135] Quoted by Dewhurst (1963, pp. 222–223), cited by Forstrom (2010), 14.
[136] Carter (2010), 29–47. [137] Locke, *Essay*, II. XXVII. 17, p. 341. [138] Smith (1660b), 83.
[139] Schachter (2008), 124. [140] Plotinus, Ennead IV. 7. 5. 21–23.
[141] Mijuskovic (1974), 38; Schachter (2008), 125.
[142] Locke, *Essay*, IX. X. 10, p. 624, cited by Schachter (2008), 126.
[143] Locke, *Essay*, IX. X. 10, p. 626, cited by Schachter (2008), 126.
[144] Plotinus, *Ennead* IV. 7. 6. 1–2. In embracing the Achilles or simplicity argument for God but not human beings Locke is either being carelessly inconsistent or intentionally resisting the force of the Plotinian case in the name of materialism in the human realm.
[145] Locke concludes that the immortality of the soul is a revealed truth only. Locke, *Essay*, IV. III. 6, p. 542. See also IV. XVIII. 7, p. 694.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Sussex Library, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:30:53, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.011

Conclusion

Far from a sign of mere historical curiosity Smith's turn to ancient sources was motivated by contemporary concerns. With his Cambridge colleagues, he clearly saw the incoherence of materialism and the threat it posed to traditional Christian belief. In the philosophy of Plotinus as an authoritative interpreter of the Platonic tradition, Smith found the resources to defend the immortality of the soul. In the process, he passed on a living tradition of Christian Platonism that inspired future generations, including the thoroughly modern philosophy of Locke. In echoing Smith, a vestige of Plotinus found its way into the modern world.

REFERENCES

Adam, C. and Tannery, P. (eds.) (1964–1974) *Oeuvres de Descartes*,13 vols., Paris.

Armstrong, A. H. (ed. and trans.) (1966–1988) *Plotinus: Enneads*, 7 vols., Cambridge, MA.

Carter, B. (2010) "Ralph Cudworth and the Theological Origins of Consciousness," *History of the Human Sciences* 23: 29–47.

Charleton, W. (1652) *The Darknes of Atheism Dispelled by the Light of Nature [. . .]* London.

(1657) *The Immortality of the Human Soul [. . .]* London.

Clark, S. R. L. (2017) "Patrides, Plotinus and the Cambridge Platonists," *British Journal for the History of Philosophy* 25: 858–877.

Cottingham, J., Stoothoff, R., and Murdoch, D. (eds.) (1991a) *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes*, vols. I–II, Cambridge, UK.

Cottingham, J., Stoothoff, R., Murdoch, D., and Kenny, A. (eds.) (1991b) *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes*, vol. III: *The Correspondence*, Cambridge, UK.

De Beer, E. S. (ed.) (1976–1989) *The Correspondence of John Locke*, 8 vols., Oxford.

Dennett, D. C. and Plantinga, A. (2010) *Science and Religion: Are They Compatible?* New York.

Dewhurst, K. (1963) *John Locke (1632–1704) Physician and Philosopher: A Medical Biography*, London.

Diehl, H. (ed.) (1903–1906) *Proclus: In Platonis Timaeum Commentarii*, 3 vols., Leipzig.

Digby, K. (1644) *Two Treatises in the one of which the Nature of Bodies, in the other, the Nature of Mans Soule is looked into in way of Discovery of the Immortality of Reasonable Soules*, Paris.

Dillon, J. (1990) "Plotinus: The First Cartesian?" *Hermathena* 149: 19–31.

Emilsson, E. K. (1988) *Plotinus on Sense-Perception: A Philosophical Study*, Cambridge, UK.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Sussex Library, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:30:53, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.011

Fleet, B. (ed.) (2016) *Plotinus: Ennead IV.7: On the Immortality of the Soul*, Las Vegas.
Forstrom, K. J. S. (2010) *John Locke and Personal Identity: Immortality and Bodily Resurrection in 17th-Century Philosophy*, London.
Gerson, L. P. (2013) *From Plato to Platonism*, Ithaca, NY.
Guyer, P. and Wood, A. (eds.) (1998) *Immanuel Kant: Critique of Pure Reason*, Cambridge, UK.
Jacob, A. (1987) "Introduction," in A. Jacob (ed.) *Henry More, The Immortality of the Soul*, Dordrecht, i–ciii.
King, P. (1884) *The Life and Letters of John Locke, with Extracts from his Journals and Common-place Books*, London.
Leech, D. (2013) *The Hammer of the Cartesians: Henry More's Philosophy of Spirit and the Origins of Modern Atheism*, Leuven.
Lennon, T. M. (2008) "Cudworth and Boyle: An Odd Couple?," in T. M. Lennon and R. J. Stainton (eds.) *Achilles of Rationalist Psychology*, Dordrecht, 139–158.
Levitin, D. (2015) *Ancient Wisdom in the Age of the New Science*, Cambridge, UK.
LoLordo, A. (2011) "Epicureanism and Early Modern Naturalism," *British Journal for the History of Philosophy* 19: 647–664.
MacKenna, S. (trans.) (1992) *Plotinus: The Enneads*, Burdett, NY [Originally published 1917–1930].
Michaud, D. A. (2017) *Reason Turned into Sense: John Smith on Spiritual Sensation*, Leuven.
Mijuskovic, B. L. (1974) *The Achilles of Rational Arguments*, The Hague.
More, H. (1653) *An Antidote Against Atheisme, Or an Appeal to the Natural Faculties of Man, whether there be not a God*, London.
Morel, P.-M. (2016) "Plotinus, Epicurus and the Problem of Intellectual Evidence: Tr. 32 (*Enn*. V 5) I," in A. Longo and D. P. Taormina (eds.) *Plotinus and Epicurus: Matter, Perception, Pleasure*, New York, 96–112.
Nidditch, P. (ed.) (1975) *John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Oxford.
Overton, R. (1644) *Mans Mortallitie [. . .]* Amsterdam [London].
Purinton, J. S. (1999) "Epicurus on 'Free Volition' and the Atomic Swerve," *Phronesis* 44: 253–299.
Ross, D. L. (2000) "Plotinus, the First Cartesian?" *Hermathena* 169: 153–167.
St. John, J. A. (ed.) (1906) *John Locke, An Examination of Pere Malebranche's Opinion of Seeing All Things in God, in The Philosophical Works of John Locke*, London.
Schachter, J.-P. (2008) "Locke and the Achilles Argument," in T. M. Lennon and R. J. Stainton (eds.) *The Achilles of Rationalist Psychology*, Dordrecht, 115–131.
Sheppard, K. (2015) *Anti-Atheism in Early Modern England 1580–1720: 'The Atheist Answered and His Error Confuted,'* Leiden.
Smith, J. (1660a) *Select Discourses*, London.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Sussex Library, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:30:53, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.011

(1660b) "Discourse of the Immortality of the Soul," in *Select Discourses*, London, 59–120.
(1660c) "The Excellency and Nobleness of True Religion," in *Select Discourses*, London, 377–451.
Snyder, J. G. (2011) "Marsilio Ficino's Critique of the Lucretian Alternative," *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 72: 165–181.
Stern-Gillet, S. (2016) "Plotinus and the Problem of Consciousness," in S. Leach and J. Tartaglia (eds.) *Consciousness and the Great Philosophers: What Would They Have Said about Our Mind-Body Problem?*, New York, 19–27.
Taormina, D. P. (2016) "'What is known through Sense Perception is an Image': Plotinus' tr. 32 (*Enn*. V 5) I. 12–19: An Anti-Epicurean Argument?," in A. Longo and D. P. Taormina (eds.) *Plotinus and Epicurus*, New York, 113–130.
Wilson, C. (2008) *Epicureanism at the Origins of Modernity*, New York.
Wither, G. (1636) *The Nature of Man [. . .]* London.
Worthington, J. (1660) "To the Reader," in J. Smith, *Select Discourses*, London, iii–xxxi.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Sussex Library, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:30:53, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.011

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Sussex Library, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:30:53, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.011

CHAPTER 8

Schelling and Plotinus

Thomas Leinkauf
Translated by Stephen Gersh

> "If only one there were someone who had the time and the desire to publish a critical edition of this divine man's works" (Schelling to Windischmann, 5 September 1805).[1]

I

The thought of Plotinus has been of central significance for German Idealism, not only in the retrospective sense (which always gives rise to a suspicion of anachronism) but already in the assessment of contemporaries: . . . *probari quidem potest omnia fere problemata, quae ad nostros usque dies maxime philosophos exerceant, iam ab eo (sc Plotino) esse pertractata* ("it can be shown that almost all the problems that especially keep philosophers busy right up to our own times have already been discussed by Plotinus") – so said Immanuel Hermann Fichte in his dissertation *De philosophiae novae Platonicae origine*, Berlin 1818, p. 8. This point applies especially to Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling who, in direct contrast to his great rival Gottfried Wilhelm Hegel, drew more attention to Plato and Plotinus and did not address the thinking of Proclus with the same intensity as did Hegel.[2] Schelling demonstrably tried to gain a more detailed knowledge of Plotinus from 1804 onwards. Thus, in a letter of 7 April 1804 he asks his friend Carl Josef Hieronymus Windischmann to look in the Aschaffenburg Court Library and see whether the Plotinus edition of Marsilio Ficino is available there (Plitt, vol. II, p.16). Moreover,

[1] Plitt (1869) I, 73. Schelling will be cited in the following notes from Schelling, K. F. A. (1856–1861) [= SW]; Schelling-Kommission (= AA [Baumgartner et al., 1976–]); Plitt (1869); Schröter (1946).

[2] Tilliette (1970) I, 305–307, especially p. 306, note 3, which *in nuce* already anticipates the work of Beierwaltes. See Beierwaltes (1972a), 82–153; on Schelling–Plotinus pp. 100–144; on Hegel and Proklos pp. 154–187; Beierwaltes (1980a), 204–240; Holz (1970); Leinkauf (1998), 11–43; Halfwassen (2000); Tomatis (2016), 87, note. On the reception of Proclus, especially by Hegel, see Beierwaltes (1980b). See also Halfwassen (1999).

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:32:00, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.013

a study of Plotinus' philosophical approach accompanies with various degrees of intensity his philosophizing during the years following. As early as 1804–5 the exchange of letters shows that Schelling, in the extracts from different *Enneads* of Plotinus attached by Windischmann to his critical reading of Schelling's *Aphorismen zur Einleitung in die Natuphilosophie (Aphorisms Introducing the Philosophy of Nature)*,[3] saw a great affinity with Plotinus that was perhaps surprising to the latter.[4] As Werner Beierwaltes has pointed out, Windischmann's extracts show "Plotinus' conception of the world, reason, purification, enlightenment, intuition, self-knowledge and divine knowledge, nature, the all, being, eternity, God, 'emanation,' and the One itself at least in outline."[5] Through Friedrich Creuzer, the Heidelberg orientalist and student of mythology, Schelling was able to gain knowledge of Plotinus during this important phase of his thinking that is marked by the overturning of the identity-philosophical system into or via a dynamic super-system that will bear the title "Ages of the World" until his late period.[6] Creuzer had in 1805 published a German translation of Plotinus' *Ennead* III. 8: "On Nature, Contemplation and the One"[7] – that is, at the very time of Schelling's first contact with Plotinus. Later, he published a translation of *Ennead* I. 6: "On the Beautiful" (*Plotini Liber de pulchritudine*, Heidelberg 1814), and finally in 1835 the great critical edition of all the Enneads, *Plotini opera omnia*, published in Oxford. Beierwaltes already demonstrated in 1972 that excerpts can be found in the Schelling archive (Berlin Staatsbibliothek) that clearly prove Schelling's reading of treatise III. 8 in the edition of Creuzer (*Platonismus und Idealismus*, p. 103 ff.). A letter and texts by Schelling prove that in 1815 he had in person received the edition of *Ennead* I. 6 by Creuzer and at once applied himself to productive work on Plotinus' texts.[8] Windischmann, Friedrich Schlegel, Carl Daub, and also Creuzer, immediately saw the "inner affinity"

[3] *Jahrbücher der Medicin als Wissenschaft* 1/1 (1805), 3–88. See below for the argument in connection with the concept of nature, part III, 203–207.

[4] Cf. on this topic the exchange of letters in Plitt (1869) II, 72–84. On Windischmann see Dryhoff (1916).

[5] Beierwaltes (1972a), 103.

[6] On the Creuzer–Schelling relation with respect to Plotinus and Proclus see Beierwaltes (1972a), 103–106 with reprint of Creuzer's Plotinus-excerpts (from *Ennead* III. 8. 1. 22–24; III. 8. 3. 3–6 and 12 ff.; III. 8. 7. 1–3) together with the excerpts of Schelling relevant to these issues, which can be found in the Windischmann translations of Plotinus in Schelling's possession (Schelling Nachlass, Berlin Akademie der Wissenschaften, Beierwaltes 1972a, p. 202). See Beierwaltes (1972a),103, note 20.

[7] Published in Daub and Creuzer (1805–1811), vol. 1. There see Creuzer's "Plotinus, On Nature, Contemplation and the One," pp. 30–55, with a valuable section containing notes, pp. 56–103.

[8] Thus in Schelling (1815), 383. See Creuzer (1814), later in Creuzer (1835).

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:32:00, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.013

of Schelling with Plotinus and emphasized this to friends, acquaintances, and colleagues.[9] Friedrich Schlegel, in his 1804–5 lectures on "The Development of Philosophy," found the "most recent works" of Schelling, and probably before any other the work that was central and marked the phase of overturning the identity-philosophy – the *Philosophie und Religion (Philosophy and Religion)* of 1804 – to be understandable as "a supplement to the comprehension of Spinozism and the philosophy of Plotinus" (KA XII, p. 238 f). G.W. Gerlach, in particular, expresses the differences and affinities between Plotinus and Schelling with regard to the doctrine of principles in a well-informed, sober, if not entirely precise, way in his *De differentia quae inter Plotini and Schellingii doctrinam de numine summo intercedit*, Wittenberg 1811.[10] Nevertheless, it is of course also the case that Schelling had acquired knowledge of Proclus, probably only after his reading of Plotinus, although he did not study him with the same intensity as did Hegel. An early document proves that he had borrowed from the Münchner Hof-/Staats-Bibliothek in April 1809 – that is, after the *Über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit (On the Essence of Human Freedom)* and at the time of the emergence of the principles of the later system of the *Die Weltalter (The Ages of the World)*, the *Timaeus Commentary* of Proclus, as well as the latter's *Theologia Platonica.*[11]

Schelling's thinking is not only marked by Platonism from 1804 onwards, since the same point can already be demonstrated from the time of his earliest working towards his university educational qualifications. Plato had been present in his thinking since the time of his intense confrontation with the *Timaeus* (see below, in Section III on the World-Soul). Indeed, this form of his thought – dependent on Spinoza, Jacobi, Leibniz, and Giordano Bruno – is certainly not anti- or un-Plotinian. If there is little evidence of direct knowledge of the texts of Plotinus before 1804, one would expect that such knowledge that he had was probably acquired only from the standard works on the history of philosophy, such as those of Fabricius, Brucker, Tiedemann or Tennemann. Nevertheless, it is justifiable to say that "Schelling's early openness towards Neoplatonic

[9] Beierwaltes (1972a), 105. See Daub and Creuzer (1805–1811), 1, 59. Letter to Caroline Günderode, 7 Nov. 1804, in Preisendanz (1912), 35.

[10] See Tilliette (1970), 306, n. 3; Beierwaltes (1972a), 111, n. 36.

[11] See Schulte (1993), 267–277 under 20. 04. 1809. Creuzer had dedicated to Schelling as *Platonicorum monumentorum philosophiaeque interpres primarius* the first volume of his edition of Proclus' *Initia Philosophiae et Theologiae*, which included the *Alcibiades* commentary. See the letter to Creuzer of 3 May 1821, Plitt (1869), III, 4. Schelling had also received the *Elements of Theology*, which had appeared in the third volume of the *Initia* in 1822, see Plitt (1869) III, 12.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:32:00, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.013

thinking . . . is indubitable."[12] As Beierwaltes has already pointed out, it would be problematic on the basis of our knowledge of the texts of Schelling to expect any concrete evidence of this reception of Plotinus' texts that is *directly verifiable in the texts*. On the other hand, there is no doubt that there is an affinity in the matter: that is, in the objects of thought, in the problems, and above all in the form of thought. This reception can be posited already in texts before 1804 – the time of Schelling's first demonstrable interest in Plotinus – and also in the year in which the criticism of Schelling by the Würzburg church historian Franz Berg that employed Plotinus as a tool appeared.[13] The original affinity in Schelling's critical reflections on Kant and Fichte with respect to specific topics of Plotinus' thought could just as well, as it were in an inverse direction, first have triggered Schelling's demonstrable interest in Plotinus. But the same can be said of the clearly noticeable "idealization" of Plotinus through the translations and interpretations of Windischmann and Creuzer's "thorough orientation towards the ideal," to which Beierwaltes has already drawn attention with a clear critical eye.[14]

II

The main systematic points of Schelling's affinity with Plotinus and of the influence of Plotinus' thought on him, as supported by the evidence of later readings, are: the doctrine of the Absolute, the theory of the origin of being, the doctrine of the falling-away or the proceeding of the non-one from the One, the teaching on intellectual intuition and, building on that, the later notion of ecstasy as well as the theory of nature. In these main points of Schelling's system, therefore, Plotinus is reflected, but in the sense of a productive displacement or (*sit venia verbo*) of an alteration

[12] The comment in Beierwaltes (1972a, p. 109) is still valid. Schelling could have known the presentation of Plotinus in Tiedemann (1791–1797), vol. 3 since its publication in 1793. The more wide-ranging arguments of Holz (1971) (already stated in Holz [1970]) concerning an early knowledge of Plotinus on the part of Schelling will be at least reconfigured on philological ground by Beierwaltes. See Beierwaltes (1980b), especially at 205, note 4.

[13] Berg published a dialogue with the title "Sextus oder über die absolute Erkenntnis von Schelling" as an advance notice with respect to his later book (Berg, 1805). In this, Plotinus operates as the opponent of the sceptic Sextus – who adopts the standpoint of Berg – and primarily in the persona of Schelling. The Plotinus of Berg stands quite in line with the destructive and negative evaluation of Brucker as a representative of empty *Schwärmerei* ("enthusiasm"), which is also echoed in Tiedemann and Tennemann. Naturally, Schelling will be damaged by this account. On the other hand, the choice of Plotinus indicates that his starting point is already seen by authors like Berg in connection with Schelling. See also Beierwaltes (1972a), 100–102.

[14] Beierwaltes (1972a), 105, note 22.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:32:00, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.013

(see Section III). Basically, one can say that Schelling had – as Hegel had in another way – probably seen in Neoplatonism a congenial anticipation of his own insights. However, this remained in a factual and historical sense – which makes all the difference – beyond the challenges placed on the table of thought through the implications of Christian theology and above all of Immanuel Kant's transcendental philosophy. Schelling's terrain of argumentation is always already a variously laid out and variably intensive synthesis of Platonism, Neo-Stoicism, and Christianity. Even without direct knowledge of Plotinus, one can find Plotinian elements here, since Plotinus himself was indeed influenced by the Stoa in addition to Plato above all in his concept of nature, and Spinoza's system is Stoically influenced in many ways, and so forth. Affinity or congeniality can only mean that *the greatest apparent closeness is still characterized by a fundamental distance: i.e. by a difference lying in the matter of thought itself*. In an outstanding way this becomes clear in the conception of the first, absolute principle of being. Plotinus' strict claim of transcendence – namely, that the One is radically remote from everything else that is a being and non-one, and is to be thought in line with Plato's expression at *Republic*, 509b as "beyond" (*epekeina*) the being determined by multiplicity – cannot be sustained in such a manner through a thinking that stands by the tradition of Christian trinitarian theology, christology, and the doctrine of man's creation. Likewise, idealistic thinking can no longer refrain from the subjective-logical position of thought, which becomes, so to speak, the self-sustaining tenor of the thinking of the Absolute and the One. In the discussion of the elements of affinity mentioned above, the difference that idealistic thinking generally has with respect to all pre-Cartesian, and especially pre-Kantian, approaches should therefore be borne constantly in mind. Seen from the viewpoint of Platonic thinking, so to speak, between Plotinus and Schelling, above all else the philosophical approaches of Christian Patristics, of Origen and Dionysius, and then of Eckhart and Cusa must be interposed.[15] All this should be set in relation to the undeniable fundamental importance of the Christian faith and theology, which not only makes late Schelling argue from the texts of the Old Testament, and especially the New Testament – texts that, from the point of view of a positive philosophy and a historical certification of the intelligible in the context of a self-manifesting and self-reconciling God, have taken on progressively greater importance. Plato and a genuinely

[15] On Origen see Tomatis (1994, pp. 280–304) and Limone (2013); on Dionysius, Beierwaltes (1998), 44–84, 130–171; on Cusanus, Schwaetzer (2005) and Franz (2007).

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:32:00, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.013

Platonic notion of form and reasoning are rather preserved here, while Neoplatonic and – in the narrow sense of the word – Plotinian elements are above all demonstrable in the beginnings of the Philosophy of Identity,[16] although Schelling's contemporaries themselves considered him as a Neoplatonist on the basis of his thinking after the identity-philosophy.[17] This also seems factually convincing, since Schelling's Philosophy of Identity is a deliberate transgression of the limits that have been drawn into Kant's transcendental-philosophical approach and Fichte's early *Wissenschaftslehre (Doctrine of Scientific Knowledge)* in the practical form of thinking. There should no longer be an unforegraspable outgoing of the subject or "I" in the beginning, but the principle of identity which, although it can only be reached "for us" through our own individual thinking, is to be thought of "in itself." Based on this systematic prescription, Schelling had to replace Fichte's transcendental or positing "I" by 1801 at the latest by an absolute "I," which ultimately coincides with "the" Absolute, which as pure and absolute identity is the objectively seen condition of the possibility of each "I" and also of nature as an independent principle. It will not be surprising that in this context terms and arguments having affinity with Plotinus are more likely to be found than those suggesting a strictly subject-logical approach.[18] But through the direct knowledge of Plotinus from 1804–5 onwards, other Plotinian ideas enter indisputably into the purview of Schelling's thinking: above all the concept of nature, the notion of a supra-rational, ecstatic, epistemic state, the conception of the soul as a form of being drawn out through "falling-away," and restitution. Without wishing to fall short of the complexity of the two authors' respective approaches to thinking, it can be seen as the *differentia specifica* of both systems that the absolute presupposition of everything in Plotinus is always the One as one, whereas in Schelling (according to the thoroughly enduring heritage of subjectivity-philosophy), even if he speaks of the "absolutely one" (*System der gesammten Philosophie*

[16] Tilliette (1970), 306: "L'empreinte plotinienne est sensible surtout dans le cours de Würzburg et les *Aphorismes*, avec un tardif rappel dans l'introduction d'Erlangen (IV. 15), mais le Plotin que Schelling admire est lui-même indiscernible des traditions (platoniciennes, stoiciennes, philoniennes) qu'il recueille, est médiatisé à son tour par les transmissions de la gnose, de la Kabbale et de Leibniz"; and 460, "Non seulement les *Aphorismes*, tous les écrits de l'identité éveillent des résonances plotiniennes." See also 460–461 with references to specific content.

[17] For example, F. Schlegel (Behler, 1964); Wirth (1845), (1854).

[18] Beierwaltes (1972a, p. 110) likewise traces back the affinity with respect to the philosophy of identity to the fact that "Schelling's thought did not remain a pure philosophy of transcendence, but attempted to conceive, from a transcendental starting point, the whole of being as something stratified and grounded in an Absolute."

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:32:00, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.013

[System of the whole of Philosophy] 1804, §4, SW I/6, p. 143), a "synthesis" or suspension of difference in identity has already been accomplished.[19]

III

In the following and by way of illustration, central concepts of Schelling's thinking that can be found in particular in his identity-philosophy as developed between 1804 and 1807 – i.e. in the Würzburg system and in the *Aphorismen zur Einleitung in die Naturphilosophie*, then in the subsequent works, particularly in the philosophy of the *Weltalter*, inaugurated by the unfinished treatise *Philosophie und Religion* and the "*Freiheitsschrift,"* and reaching down to the Munich period – will be compared with corresponding thoughts of Plotinus.[20] It is not here a matter of direct evidence of dependences or concrete influences, but of demonstrating the affinity of the form of thought (Tilliette: *convergences*) with simultaneous emphasis on the fundamental differences.

The One, the Absolute and God

First, from an overarching perspective, Plotinus and Schelling are standing in one and the same series as metaphysical thinkers, even though their respective basic concepts of metaphysical reality – on which the physical

[19] Schelling (1799b), 397 "The *synthesis* is and thus remains the absolute presupposition"; Schelling (1800), third main section, 395–397 "the whole series of Ideas is nothing other than the evolution of that one *synthesis*," i.e. the "I"'s absolute act of reflection and positing. The unity-theoretical problem shows up for instance on p. 426: the "I" is on the one hand "absolute Identity," while on the other hand it requires a "doubleness in itself" so that it can come to the activity of positing and oppositional positing; Schelling (1804b), 25: the Absolute is "inner identity" of the absolutely ideal and the absolutely real, without the need for the one to be integrated (retrospectively) with the other. It is therefore a synthesis a priori, although it is "the simple" (p. 26). Similarly Schelling (1804b), §5, pp. 146–147, §12, p. 157 passim, when he is speaking of the "absolute Identity" as equality, means the identity-equality of *x* and *y, A* and *B* etc. However, Schelling tried to place a formless essence in itself of the Absolute even *before* this synthesis, which he also determined as "form" (Schelling, 1804b), 30. This first instance (or being) is "purity and pure ideality" *before* any difference (p. 31). This tendency will determine all the later philosophy, and here Schelling probably comes closest to the One of Plotinus.

[20] Tilliette (1970, pp. 306–307) refers to the following points of agreement: essential luminosity of the theoretical and intelligible intuition (vision), harmony of universal concord (*sympatheia*), necessity-*Adrasteia*, imagery (iconology) of the sensible world, matter as "miroir des reflets," the self-affirmation of the One, ecstasy, unity-multiplicity ("unitotalité"), the falling away and the origin of time, identity, and opposition. Yet he insistently emphasizes the mediation of Plotinus' thought through Spinozism (p. 307 "ne conviennent que moyennant") and the influence of Leibniz. Beierwaltes (1972a) discusses four areas of concept and thought: 1). the absolute (pp. 110–118); 2). the proceeding or falling way (pp. 118–129); 3). the turning back or reversion to the first principle (pp. 129–137); and 4). the concept of nature (pp. 137–143).

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:32:00, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.013

reality also strictly depends – are fundamentally different. This diversity preserves their intense engagement with the idea *that reality is grounded in a principle that is a One*. However, the form of being-one itself and consequently also the mode of self-communication of the One into the other multiple forms of being that are ontologically dependent on it are conceptualized differently by them.

If one wants to juxtapose the One of Plotinus and Schelling's concept of the Absolute, it is to be noted *first* that Schelling's Absolute is a derivative of the "I" concept of Kant and Fichte and therefore primarily conceived as "absolute I" and then only beginning with the *System des transzendentalen Idealismus* (*System of Transcendental Idealism,* 1800),[21] also terminologically as "the Absolute." Until the time when with the *Freiheitsschrift* of 1809 another concept of the Absolute – namely, as (the Christian) "God" – is increasingly posited, being and thinking or subject and object are to be thought together in this absolute unity. The unity point of the "I" in the intellectual intuition of itself is the absoluteness of this "I," although it is as the in-one of being (object) and thinking (subject) or of unity and absolutely realized thought.[22] Now, this is from Plotinus' viewpoint a feature of our conceptualizing *not* concerning the One but only concerning the hypostasis of Intellect, the *Nous*, that has proceeded from the One. The One of Plotinus "does not think" because in it the conditions of thought, i.e. difference or the distinction between at least two forms – the thinker and the object of thought – are not given. For even when thinking had only itself and along with it nothing other than itself as an object, it would therefore nonetheless be, within this act of thinking, in a

[21] Schelling (1795), §3, pp. 166–170; at p. 167: the "absolute I"; §9, pp. 182–184: the absolute "I" is "absolute unity"; §14, p. 195: absolute causality (*causa sui*), absolute power; Schelling (1800), introduction §3, p. 346; first main section 1; p. 354: the first principle "can only be one, and this is self-consciousness" – see pp. 358 ff., 365 ff. This absolute principle is "of itself the cause and the effect," – see p. 356.

[22] For example, see Schelling (1800), introduction §4, p. 350; first main section, pp. 365–376, especially p. 369; Schelling (1802a), §1, p. 339 ff., 348, 355; Schelling (1804b), §§268–269, pp. 499–500; §312, p. 561. It is from the perspective of Schelling possible and objectively necessary to abstract from the individual, subjective intellectual intuition, the subjective moment "in order to grasp the purely objective aspect of this universe" – that is, nature, so explicitly in Schelling (1801b), 87–88 – or even, as already in Schelling (1800), to abstract from both the specific moments of subjectivity and objectivity, in order to obtain the Absolute itself, pp. 342, 354, 356, 375; absolute "I," p. 533; the absolute in intelligence, p. 576 ff., 598–602; Schelling (1806b), 52: "Being – that only true being, which we know to be the Absolute or God – is, as surely as it is the true being, certainly its own affirmation; if it were not essential self-affirmation, it would not be absolute, not entirely by and for itself." It is thought as absolute in such a way, that it can "reveal itself" (Schelling [1806b], 53–54, 57), self-revelation. In fact, this abstraction from the subjective or "I" in the intellectual intuition points to ecstasy.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:32:00, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.013

self-mediating duality and difference, even given the fact that this act was to be thought of as free of time and as absolute. This difference would at the very least presuppose limitation or distinction and in accordance with this a "being-something" (*ti einai*). Plotinus however says explicitly that this being-something and being-determined in the sense of a form that differs from other forms has to be denied of the One (*Ennead* V. 3. 12. 50–52: *to de estin aneu tou ti hen. Ei gar ti hen, ouk an autoen, to gar auto pro tou ti* ["but that is one without the thing, for if it is one thing it would not be the absolute One"]).[23] If the One is not even something and therefore is nothing definite and has no form, it is even – because everything else, in order that it might be, must have something, a form, and a certainty – "nothing of everything" (*Ennead* V. 5. 6. 9 *ouden pantōn),* "different from everything" (*Ennead* V. 4. 1. 6 *heteron hapantōn*),[24] as well as "formless" (*Ennead* VI. 7. 17. 36–40, VI. 7. 32. 9, VI. 9. 3. 43 ff., V. 1. 7. 19 ff. *aneideon*) and "without limit" or "infinite" (*Ennead* V. 5. 10. 21, V. 5. 11. 4 ff., VI. 7. 32. 15 ff. *amorphon, apeiron*).[25] In this context, however, since all other being is something, the One is as this not-something also the "superessential" (*huperousion*)[26] or else – taking the cue from Plato, *Republic* 509b – the "beyond" (*epekeina*) of being and intellect.[27] In being "present but not present" (*Ennead* VI. 9. 4. 25 *paron mē pareinai*) the One is "above all things" (*Ennead* V. 5. 13. 35 *huper panta*). Although Schelling in his *Weltalter* philosophy and in later lectures will record this idea of the above-being or of the being above being, which he could also have known through Dionysius the Areopagite,[28] it does not have the strictly transcendent implications excluding any multiplicity (especially for theological reasons) that occur in the case of Plotinus – something with which Plotinus nevertheless had systematic problems,[29] as shown clearly by his reflections on the thinking and the will of the One.

[23] Beierwaltes has already indicated the most important passages. See Beierwaltes (1972a, pp. 111–113) on *Ennead* V. 3. 12, 50–52; V. 3. 13, 4; V. 5. 6. 5; VI. 8. 9. 9. Also in what follows, my comments take their starting points from this evidence.

[24] *Ennead* V. 3. 11. 8; VI. 7. 42. 13.

[25] On *aneideon* = "formless" and *apeiron* = "infinite" as determination of the absolute see Schelling (1804b), 162: "The absolute is to itself form, and in this respect also formless: that is, to the extent that the formless is identified with the infinite."

[26] *Ennead* VI. 7. 37. 30; V. 5. 13. 33–35: *huper panta ta onta*; VI. 8. 14. 43: *huperontōs*.

[27] *Ennead* III. 8. 9. 1–3; V. 4. 2. 41; VI. 2. 3. 7 ff.

[28] Schelling *Weltalter* (Schröter, 1946) I, 226, 228; Schelling (1842), 58: God as the superessential. Windischmann had in his "Passages from Plotinus" partial translations from *Ennead* V. 5 where at V. 5. 13. 33–35 *huper ta panta* can be found, and from *Ennead* VI. 8, where at VI. 8. 14. 43 *hyperontōs* can be found.

[29] One should here compare the "later" *Enneads* VI. 8 and VI. 9.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:32:00, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.013

Schelling on the other hand can only describe the Absolute as "an infinite affirmation of itself"[30] or as an active self-abolition of any difference. The Absolute is already the universal synthesis of all possibility even as an originary and unforegraspable unity[31] (that is, in the sense of the possibility of being, the *Sein-Könnende*, the *esse possibile*).[32] This will be primarily the case in the philosophy of his last period in Munich, and then in Berlin, where this aspect of the Absolute is either a part of the purely rational conceptual determinations of the absolute concept as "supreme principle" (according to negative philosophy) or will be constituted as the moment of the self-development of God as living totality of all being in ideal foreknowledge as the being of the Son (in the tradition of *mundus intelligibilis* thinking). But there is always in Schelling's thought a constant: namely that the Absolute – be it as absolute identity, as absolute self-affirmation, or as the Christian God – is *a manifold in itself* that either has sublated any difference in absolute anticipation in itself, as in the philosophy of identity, or else is itself not the fulfilled One, if it has not entered into the historically proven process of self-development, self-renunciation, and self-reconciliation (the futural aspect of the Absolute), as in the philosophy of the *Weltalter* and in the theogony-philosophy of his

[30] Schelling (1802–1803a), §2, p. 374: even if the Absolute is none "of what it affirms in particular," it is "as comprehending" (= affirming) the identity and essence of the comprehending (= affirming, affirmed, affirmation, analogous to Aristotle's *nous*: *Metaphysics* XII. 1072–1074). It is however this difference as sublated (*aufgehoben* in the Hegelian sense). At the same time it is, according to §3; p. 375, the "absolute all" and according to §4 the "absolute totality" of all being, etc. These are determinations that, from Plotinus' viewpoint, apply only to the second hypostasis or the *nous*.

[31] Schelling (1802a) §III, p. 375: the Absolute is "pure identity, and [. . .] the One, of which alone absolute Identity can be predicated." On the other hand, this sheer and pure Identity has the character of a result (see the next note). There are also metaphorical usages in Schelling's discourse concerning the Absolute: e.g. that it possesses an "inside" which is "its essence" (§V, p. 417), but with a starting point different from that of Plotinus' One.

[32] Schelling (1802a), §III, p. 376: the Absolute is neither subject/subjectivity nor object/objectivity, but "their unity in such a way [. . .] *that it utterly unifies both of these* in relation to the reflected world without itself having anything of either the one or the other" (my italics). In the philosophy of identity, the Absolute is the universe itself to the extent that "being" is always the being of identity. In the Absolute as absolute Reason, everything "is" free of time as posited in the modality of "quantitative difference": the "absolute Identity, in so far as it is (*existit*) [must] be the universe itself" Schelling (1801b), §31–32, pp. 128–129. The Absolute as universe is therefore not the existing multiplicity of individual things, but the unity of all identity which these things bring to expression in themselves (§39–41, pp. 132–133). However, expressions such as at §42, explanation, p. 134: "the existent is always only the indifference" show that Schelling from early on wanted to make a synthesis of unity and existence in the origin of everything, a rational synthesis that will later be assumed to be theologically, so to speak, the unforegraspable being of God. Schelling (1806a), numbers 60–61, pp. 152–153.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:32:00, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.013

later phase.[33] Schelling's One is always tied to the totality of the forms, ideas, and concepts as a condition of its own self-development and it is therefore similar, systematically and in its factual determination, to the mind or intellect in Plotinus – which certainly is thus factually determinate albeit without the historical component central for the Schelling of the *Weltalter*.

Now, even if Plotinus can conceive of the One as "possibility/potentiality with respect to all things" (*Ennead* III. 8. 10. 1 *dunamis tōn pantōn*; V. 4. 1; VI. 8. 9), it cannot thereby itself be dependent for its being on the realization of this totality or this multiplicity.[34] For Schelling, what is first in God himself is only the first unforegraspable and "unforethinkable" moment of his own necessary self-development – something that takes place as theogony (*praeter Deum*) and then as age of the world (*extra deum*) – and only that which yet anticipates the three Trinitarian persons as the *ground* of their unity, for it is the Son that makes through his being the Father be the Father. What is first is in God himself, in this specific perspective, a predicate-free, difference-free pure unity, and is to be thought of as A^{o} as opposed to the (conceptual-ideal) possibilities –A, +A, +/-A (in God) and the excluding powers B, A^{2}, A^{3} (besides God and outside God). Here, a non-something would be posited that comes close to Plotinus' One and also has no equivalent in the thinking of Schelling himself in his transcendental and identity philosophy. Nevertheless, even this predicate-free primal or prebeing, which could only be predicated of being and beings, remains, in Schelling's eyes, an *x* that can exist and not exist, that can be and cannot be, and as such is able or has the power to put or set down the "that" which is always already posited as possible in the "what" (essence, being, the real) – an ultimately dark and inaccessible force of existence-positing[35] of which

[33] But already in 1802 it is said about God, that he appears "himself [!] in the ideal world [. . .] in his own form (*Gestalt*) as the living form (*Form*) broken apart into essence in the imagination of form"– an identity-philosophical version of the Incarnation, Schelling (1802a), §V, p. 421.

[34] *Ennead* III. 8. 10. 28–31: the One is none of those things whose ultimate origin or source it is: rather, it is itself non-being, non-essence, non-life – that which "is above all these beings" – *to huper panta tauta einai*. Schelling approaches this way of thinking in many passages: for example, *Weltalter* I (Schröter, 1946), 20: "God, the authentic being is above [!] his being"; p. 43: "that primordial essence of purity (*uranfängliches Wesen der Lauterkeit*) [. . .] which itself is above [!] God and the deity that is in him [!]"; II (Schröter, 1946), 134. Schelling's understanding, however, of "omnipotence" (*Kraft zu Allem*), which comes close verbally to *dunamis pantōn*, is purely determined through the concept of will – see *Weltalter* II (Schröter, 1946), 134 ff. Previously, in Schelling (1800), first main section, p. 367, the sentence "I am" is to be understood as the positing of an "infinity of possible predicates."

[35] Schelling, *Weltalter* II (Schröter, 1946), 131: "For existence is active unification of a determinate existent thing with a determinate being."

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:32:00, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.013

Neoplatonic thinking has no knowledge. From Plotinus' One there do go forth in an unforegraspable process and in one moment "being" and "thinking" as inseparable unity, in which "being" is the thinkable in a factual-logical sense and "thinking" is that which thinks itself as being, but in which there is no intimation of the difference between "that" and "what." In the view of Schelling also, the unity of being and thinking is that which could be predicated of the primordial being inasmuch as it has posited this unity, but this does not mean that one thereby has the dynamics of the powers that exclude themselves not only in thought but also in being. In this dynamic, once it is initiated, the One or the Absolute also becomes involved as a "moment" in the process – something completely unthinkable for Plotinus.

Second, it is further to be noted that Schelling's "absolute system of identity" is completely removed from the "standpoint of reflection" (*Darstellung meines Systems der Philosophie [Exhibition of my System of Philosophy]* 1801, p. 113), and therefore actually presupposes throughout for its own construction the act of non-reflexive intellectual intuition. The identity system is a consequent unfolding of "absolute Reason" (*Darstellung* §1, p. 114), which Schelling himself describes as "the Absolute" (*ibid.* §2, p. 115; §9, p. 118). In this Reason or Absolute, that which "is everything" outside it is that which "is nothing" (*ibid.*), and in this Absolute as Reason again, "there is nothing but transparency" (*Bruno* 1802, p. 239), all these being formulations that Plotinus will use in a comparable way for his mind or intellect – perhaps for the first time with a speculative precision and radicality that will later fascinate Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. For Plotinus, the mind is at the same time "nothing of everything" (*Ennead* V. 5, 6, 9) and "all things in all things" or "the universe in all things" (*Ennead* V. 9. 6. 8; V. 9. 8. 2; V. 8. 4. 4–8); it is that in which everything is "transparent" as well as illuminating reciprocally with light (*Ennead* V. 8. 4. 4 ff.). In addition, Schelling thinks of his Absolute Reason as pure identity, which is "the only being" that is posited by itself in knowing and intuition. As later in the *Freiheitsschrift* (pp. 341–347), Schelling concentrates his thoughts on what the Absolute is, and on its identity, and therefore from the formal viewpoint on the equal sign as symbol of identity: A = A (*Über den wahren Begriff der Naturphilosophie [On the True Concept of Natural Philosophy],* §4–7, pp. 116–118).[36] From the viewpoint

[36] Schelling (1802a), §2, p. 368: the "absolute unity or the equal absoluteness of essence and form [. . .]. The absolute unity of thinking and being, of the ideal and the real, is the eternal form of the Absolute not distinct from its essence, the Absolute itself."

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:32:00, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.013

of Plotinus, this approach cannot be transferred to the One, since "identity itself" as an identity always implies what it identifies. That, as Schelling says, "Reason is One in an absolute sense" (*ibid.,* §3, p. 116) only means that it is just a pre-reflexive, pre-predicative, pre-propositional identity of that which is posited-in-unity through it, and *not* that it is an absolutely pure One without any determinateness. Thus, it is said in the *Philosophie der Kunst (Philosophy of Art*) 1805: "God [= the Absolute] is the universe viewed from the side of identity. He is everything, because he is the only real thing, except that everything is nothing in him (*Philosophie der Kunst,* Einleitung, p. 366). From the viewpoint of Schelling's philosophy of identity, the law of identity constitutes the "being of reason" and thus of the Absolute (*Fernere Darstellungen aus dem System der Philosophie [Further Exhibitions from the System of Philosophy],* §5, pp. 412–423) – a thought to which Plotinus could never have agreed, since for him being, as *Ennead* VI. 7 above all shows, begins only *extra* or *praeter unum.* According to Schelling, this law of identity corresponds – absolutely – to the fact that the Absolute, as indifference, is the active and eternal abolition of opposites or of differences in the unity of the One.[37] The intensity and insistence with which Schelling dwells on the basic idea of the unity of the first principle is a clear common feature shared with Platonic and Neoplatonic thinking. However, as shown by the development of Schelling himself in the period subsequent to the first sketches of the *Weltalter*, and then in Erlangen, Munich, and Berlin, this communality in fact corresponds rather to that which Christian (Neo-) Platonism displayed in relation to Plotinus.

Third, on the other hand, another key difference with respect to Plotinus' One is the fact that the Absolute (One) of Schelling is to be thought as *existing in an extra-conceptual and concrete sense* (as reality, existence, the "that"). This is not so true with respect to the development of his thought up to 1807/8 where, under the influence also of Spinoza (*Fernere Darstellungen*, §1, p. 354), being is a part of the essence of the Absolute or of the "absolute identity" (*Über den wahren Begriff der Naturphilosophie*, §11, p. 119), and did not come into being; it is a-historical, eternal, and did not "really come out of itself" (*ibid.* §14, pp. 119–120). But beginning with the writing of *Philosophie und Religion* in 1804, in which Schelling places next to the doctrine of the Absolute that of "the eternal birth of things"[38] and consciously sets philosophy against religion and faith as a "temporary form" of happiness, enlightenment, and

[37] Schelling (1802–1803a), I, §1, p. 373: God = the Absolute is "the unmediated affirmation of itself."
[38] Schelling (1804a), introduction, p. 17.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:32:00, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.013

revelation,[39] an increasing "theologization" of his thinking can be confirmed with the ever more consistent adoption of creation-historical and salvation-historical implications. At the latest with the *Freiheitsschrift* of 1809, these implications demand a real, extra-conceptual existence of the Absolute, so that eventually not only Christology and the doctrine of the Incarnation will be shifted into the focus of attention, but most importantly in the ontological sense the "That" of God will anticipate his "What."[40] The "eternal birth of things" can still be understood under the conditions of the philosophy of identity, and later under those of purely rational philosophy, as a process within the horizon of the Absolute understood as eternal and conceptual-ideal.[41] Thus, the factual manifestation and revelation of the Absolute as God (Lord of Being), which proves itself as and in history – the main theme of the philosophy of the *Weltalter* and of his late philosophy[42] – is something quite different. But always already present is the insight gained first in 1804, that the finite, real world is conceivable "only as a complete breaking off of absoluteness": namely, "by a leap" or a "descent" (*Philosophie und Religion*, p. 38). In fact, there is here a closeness to Plotinus' notion that there has been a descent of the soul from the All-Soul and from the ideality of the noetic sphere through "daring," "overbearing" (*tolma*), or hubris – an act which, as also in Schelling's case, is connected with the idea of freedom (Schelling, *ibid.*, p. 39 ff.; *Freiheitsschrift*, pp. 336–338, 371 ff.; "falling away" pp. 382–387). The difference, however, lies in the fact that for Plotinus first, "falling away" does not take place on the highest ontological level (and not in and out of the One), and second, the noetic core of the soul remains "above" and does not fall on its own.

Fourth, a further parallel contrast between Plotinus' concept of the One and Schelling's Absolute lies in the idea of self-origination (*causa sui*) and, to be seen in connection with this, in the presupposition, self-sufficiency,

[39] Schelling (1804a), introduction, pp. 19–20.

[40] On the process of becoming God, in which the "that" (*Dass*) of the beginning, that is the pure existence as self-positing or self-founding (*causa sui*), is not yet and cannot yet be what the fulfilled "what" (*Was*) should and will be at the end: see Tomatis (1994).

[41] Schelling (1804a), 33: "But in the Ideas are the pure possibilities of the differences and no real difference [!], for each Idea is a universe for itself and all the Ideas are as one Idea" – this unity-multiplicity that is pre-historical and pre-factual recalls the intellect of Plotinus. However, the notion that in the ideal production of the Ideas these coincide with the "original unity" (*Ureinheit*) and the "Absolute" is not Plotinian (p. 35). The production of the Ideas, which remains in the Absolute, is a "transcendental theogony" that the "ancient world in its sense-bound manner could only express through the image of procreation (*Zeugung*)." This reappears later, as part of his direct critique of Hegel, in Tomatis (2016), 518–522.

[42] Kasper (1965).

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:32:00, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.013

and freedom of the One.[43] To the extent that for Schelling the One is to be thought of as a principle, it is also – even in the early phase of his thinking that gradually turns away from transcendentality (*Vom Ich als Prinzip der Philosophie [On the "I" as Principle of Philosophy]* 1795) – pure, unassailable self-power, absolute power, "durch sich selbst gesetzt" (AA 1/2, pp. 101, 111, 147), and thereby *causa sui* (*System des transzendentalen Idealismus*, 1. Hauptabschnitt §4, p. 368: act of freedom). This self-origination is also assigned to the "I" as the "image" of the Absolute or God, and is the core of its "subjective" act of positing. Self-positing in the transcendental-logical sense on the one hand and freedom in a radically philosophical and later theological sense on the other hand are the consequences of this self-origination, which is unforegraspable to the "I" itself. Out of this also arises the possibility of self-overstepping or self-transcendence, i.e. of "ecstasis." Even the "I" of the transcendental phase emerges out of itself in the act of transcendental intuition,[44] and in the philosophy of identity the knowledge of God "emerges from the annihilation of all subjectivity." [45] Schelling reflects on the ecstasis above all in his Erlangen lectures of 1820–21 and their Munich sequels.[46] Even in the *Philosophie der Offenbarung [Philosophy of Revelation]* (original version 1831–2), ecstasy is taken to be *vox anceps*, which means a). a subject is "set apart from its nature" and "alienated from itself," and b). a subject is "alienated from itself and returned to itself," the latter from a Christian viewpoint being the "better ecstasy."[47]

Here also, in addition to clear differences, one can detect factual affinities with Plotinus' thought that *could* also go back to a partial reading of Plotinus. Windischmann had in the selection of the *Enneads* partially translated by him (the extracts of *Ennead* I. 4, I. 6, II. 2, II. 4, II. 5, II. 9, III. 7, V. 1, V. 3, V. 5, V. 7, VI. 4, VI. 5, VI. 8, VI. 9, also in *Ennead* VI. 9 "On the Good or the One" [*Peri tagathou ē tou henos*], where passages concerning ecstasis are found [*Ennead* VI. 9. 7. 17 ff.; VI. 9. 10. 13 ff.;

[43] Leinkauf (2015), 7–8. On Plotinus' notion of *causa sui* and its reception see Narbonne (1993).

[44] Schelling (1802b), 240; Schelling (1802a), 361: the "subjective" knowledge of the Absolute and the "objective" Absolute are "one and the same." See above, note 22.

[45] Schelling (1806a), numbers 42–54, here number 48, p. 149.

[46] Schelling (1821), lecture 7, pp. 228–233; Fuhrmans (1969), 38–43, 40 [Schelling (1821), 230]: the knowing "I" posits itself "outside itself"; lecture 8, p. 47 [Schelling (1821), 233]: the "I" posits the "absolute subject" through its "not-knowing (in that ecstasy)." On this point see Schulz (1975),123 ff.; Leinkauf (1998), 31–43.

[47] Ehrhardt (1992), I, p. 29; cf. also Schelling (1841–1842), 162–163: *Selbstaufgegebenheit*, being posited outside yourself, etc.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:32:00, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.013

VI. 9. 11. 22 ff. – see also VI. 7. 35])[48] assumed that Plotinus' ecstasis (*Ennead* VI. 9. 11. 23) is a state of the soul to the extent that it seeks to grasp the One in a self-concentrating and self-knowing motion of unification between itself and the Intellect (*Ennead* VI. 9. 3. 38 ff.; VI. 9. 8. 35 ff.). Given that the One transcends any concept, and any binding to an "is" or a "something" is to be excluded, the soul that wishes to know the One must "go together with its intellect in a motion of ascent to this origin" (*Ennead* VI. 9. 3. 21–22: *epi tēn en heautōi archēn anabebēkenai*), and into an unknowing looking, not being distinguished from what is seen (*Ennead* VI. 9. 3. 10–14). In this ecstatic being-one with the One, this one of the soul is not accessible as the object of its knowledge. For Schelling, too, such a knowledge of principles is a primordial "non-knowing knowledge" or a knowledge that knows nothing about itself.[49] The ecstasy, as a successor concept of intellectual intuition whose freedom-theoretical impulse receives it, is "free intellectual achievement" and establishes an absolute beginning (*Initia philosophiae universae [Beginnings of Universal Philosophy],* lecture 7, p. 38; *Über die Natur der Philosophie als Wissenschaft [On the Nature of Philosophy as Science]*, p, 228).[50] In this beginning of thinking and of philosophy, the Absolute can be known only in a non-representational way, or a not-knowing, as the One is known for Plotinus. A form of knowledge beyond any kind of objectivization, or a not-knowing: that is ecstasis for Schelling. Philosophical knowledge which goes towards the Absolute is "*in us* the Absolute's knowledge of *itself*" (Leinkauf, *Schelling as Interpreter*, p. 34). But this is only possible where the knowing subject as "I" completely ceases and abstains from itself, and where it does not will itself but is willing non-willingly the Absolute (*Initia philosophiae universae,* lecture 7, pp. 38–40; *Über die Natur der Philosophie*

[48] On what follows see Leinkauf (1998), 31–43. The reduction of Plotinian thought to *ecstasis* and – a negatively seen – *enthusiasmus* are clearly documented in the history of philosophy of the early modern period, cf. Brucker (1742–1744), vol. II, part I, book I, §10, p. 229–230: *Nihil vero magis pseudo-philosophum fuisse Plotinum prodit, quam ipsi ab ipso Porphyrio tanquam summa ei felicitas attribuitur enthusiasmus, qui et totum eum saepissime occuparit, et totius philosophiae eius finis atque scopus fuit, eoque tandem progressus est, ut laxatis imaginationis effervescentis habenis ad ecstases raperetur.* Also in Tiedemann (1791–1797), whom Schelling certainly knew, the same fanfare is sounded, see vol. III: *From the New Academy to the Arabs*, p. 281, on Plotinus pp. 263–433. For further details see Leinkauf (1998), 37–38.

[49] Ehrhardt (1989),107: knowing of the not-knowing, *ignorando cognoscitur*, cf. Peetz (1995), 236 ff. with reference to *Weltalter* [Schröter (1946), I, 103; II, 213–214].

[50] Ehrhardt (1992), lecture 5, vol. I, p. 29: Ecstasis as "*vox anceps*" means "primordial emergence of being" – the ontological side so to speak – which arises through being's going out of itself, and restitution to being – the epistemological side – in which the being out of itself "makes restitution to itself."

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:32:00, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.013

als Wissenschaft, pp. 229–230).[51] A self-willing knowing of the Absolute with intentionality towards an objectified concept would be for Schelling, as any knowledge of the One would be for Plotinus, already a "lapse" (*apostasis*) from the One (*Ennead* VI. 9. 4. 4), because knowing determined through opposition, difference, and multiplicity "misses" (*parechetai*) the One (*Ennead* VI. 9. 4. 6).

Schelling here shares with Plotinus the fundamental conviction that the "last" step of knowledge that stands away from propositionality and posits a "beginning" (*initium*) must be a free perfective act performed through the "I" itself. Its conditions are: 1). that the "I" or individual – that is, the person who is in the process of ecstatic "ascending" (*anabainein*) – must himself be or become a one and "a one that is separated from everything and is alone" (*Ennead* VI. 9. 4. 34 *apostas pantōn monos einai*); 2). that the "I" or individual must himself be "without quality" (*apoion*) and "without form" (*aneideon*) (*Ennead* VI. 9. 7. 13–15; VI. 9. 9. 51–53); and 3). that the "I" or the individual must "renounce the knowledge of all others and of himself" (VI. 9. 7. 19–21; *agnoēsanta ta panta . . . agnoēsanta de kai hauton*). There is however the difference that for Plotinus the ecstasis understood in this way is the *ending* in which the one (as the self or the "I") is with the One, whereas for Schelling the ecstasy is the first *beginning*, whether this be a theogonic process concerning being (*Weltalter* and later theory of principles) or else an epistemological process concerning the subject as knower and a not-knowing knowledge. However, common to the two approaches is the fact that ecstasy and ecstatical being signify no absolute loss of that which turns up in the ecstasy. In the case of Plotinus, the self-being that transcends the self remains and – as we know from Porphyry's *Life of Plotinus* – one can retrospectively even report concerning the union. With Schelling the self as subject in the ecstatic process is elevated into another potency of itself. However, a more fundamental difference within the affinity of approaches resides in the fact that for Schelling the One or the Absolute will itself be "ecstatic" in its self-revelation or in its positing of being. But this can in no way be said of either the One or the Intellect of Plotinus, where the ecstasy remains consistently a phenomenon of the psychic, so to speak. Again, one can see in Schelling's case that the idealistic taking-in of subjectivity into the Absolute (or God) leads to serious

[51] Fuhrmans (1969), lecture 8 (= Schelling [1821], 233): "I posit the absolute subject through my not-knowing (in that ecstasy)."

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:32:00, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.013

consequences: the ecstasy is indeed also the "*initium* of a process in which the Absolute itself will be entangled and involved."

Intellect (Nous) and the Absolute

Plotinus determines the intellect as the absolute "one-many" (*hen-polla*) and thinks the structure of this immediate mediatedness of unity and multitude dialectically as simultaneity of identity and difference, of rest and motion, of sameness and otherness (cf. Plato, *Sophist* 253b–257a, especially 254a–d), as all in all, as that which is expressed paradoxically as an "undifferentiated yet again differentiated multiplicity" (*Ennead* VI. 9. 5. 16: *plēthos adiakriton kai au diakekrimenon*), and as "at the same time all and again, not all" (*Ennead* V. 9. 6. 8: *homou panta kai au ouch homou*). For these reasons, it can be shown – and not only in a historical and evolutionary way – that a large part of the Christian movement of thought following immediately upon Plotinus and Neoplatonism had understood this *nous*-structure as a *moment of the inner determination of God,* insofar as the Logos or Word was regarded as the second Trinitarian person, as God's self-understanding and self-expression, and as the "intelligible world" (*mundus intelligibilis*): that is, as the absolute ideal plenitude of everything thinkable and as the ideal archetype of the "real world" (*mundus realis*). It can also be shown that this very tradition of Christian Platonism had upheld these doctrines even down to the time of Schelling and indeed had further developed them in differentiated and heterodox ways through Schelling himself and through Hegel. If the Absolute of Schelling in the philosophy of identity is conceived as absolute Reason, as existing indifference of any difference and thereby as "universe,"[52] similarly many convergences with the *nous*-dialectic of Plotinus can be found in this determination that is also thought as the "archetypal" unit (*Fernere Darstellungen* 1802, §1, p. 347).[53] The fact that the Absolute "thinks" and that

[52] Schelling (1801b), §§31–34, pp. 128–130.

[53] When Schelling here and in other places in his System of Identity distinguishes between "archetypal" and "conceptual," we seem to be given a foretaste of the later distinction between "positive" and "negative" philosophy. But this is deceptive. Although Schelling with the first distinction wishes to differentiate the conceptual-reflexive grasp that has to do with limited and finite objects from the ideal and intuitive grasp whose objects are purely ideal and identical contents, one must say from the viewpoint of the later approach that both archetypal and conceptual grasping still remain part of the purely rational philosophy – so also does that which was cut off as speculative thought (identity of identity and difference) from purely conceptual-reflexive thought-operations in the earlier phase by the idealists – these kinds of grasping can only be considered as part of the conceptual-logical side of our grasp of reality from the viewpoint of the late Munich and Berlin period. The archetypal context is also precisely an a-historical and especially pre-individual one. See

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:32:00, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.013

it thinks itself in this thinking as absolute totality or as the universe of the intelligible can from the viewpoint of the philosophy of identity be characterized as the "self-affirmation" of the Absolute (*Philosophie der Kunst* 1802–3, §§1–4, pp. 373–375; *System der gesammten Philosophie* 1804, §§22–25, pp. 172–175). The Indifference-Identity of the Absolute as the totality of ideal determinations can therefore be understood by Schelling as the immediate expression of the timeless act of the Absolute's thinking. The "all in all" (1 Corinthians 15:28.) is therefore also the "result" of the absolute act of thinking[54] and not only – as in his later philosophy – the result of the *historical* process of salvation.[55] This is where there is a clear structural similarity with the intellect of Plotinus, for this intellect is the "first otherness" (*Ennead* V. 1. 1. 4: *prōtē heterotēs*) and, with respect to the One *in itself,* it is the totality of being differentiated into ideas. It "*is*" this act as thought and indeed as thought of itself, for its being is the being of the intelligible beings or ideas within it[56] and at the same time its being-thought through itself. The intellect is the totality of ideas as the unity of identity and difference of the ideas (*Ennead* V. 4. 2. 9; VI. 2. 21. 56), although Plotinus insists – in contrast to Schelling's concept of indifferentiation of ideas in the act of "cancellation" (*Aufhebung*) by the absolute Reason (= the Absolute, the One) – on the "particularity" or "peculiarity" (*idiotēs*) of the ideas (*Ennead* V. 1. 4. 42 ff.; V. 9. 6. 8; V. 8. 4. 10 ff.),[57] which are nevertheless retained as a unity in the overarching unity of the *nous* – hypostasis (*Ennead* V. 4. 2. 47 ff.). The preservation of

Schelling (1802a), 364–365: "Reflection is based by its nature on the opposition of thinking and being." There he says also that "intellectual intuition" is "speculative" cognition.

[54] Schelling (1802a), §4, p. 395; from the perspective of cognition and intuition see Schelling (1802b), 291: to recognize the Absolute in its complexity and entanglement [!], is only possible for someone "who realizes that and how all things are included in all things and that the fullness of the totality is laid down in the particulars." This can of course also, as in many other passages of this work and of this phase of his thought, refer to Spinoza's absolute substance, as long as the latter is disrupted by speculative thought and not described only from the outside by dogmatic and rational thinking.

[55] Tomatis (1994), 424–443.

[56] Plotinus, *Ennead* V. 5: the being of the Ideas is "not outside" intellect. Plotinus here as elsewhere explains the inner dialectical-noetic structure of intellect through the analogy of a circle, cf. *Ennead* II. 2. 1. 12 ff., II. 2. 3. 20–22, III. 7. 4. 31, III. 8. 8. 36 ff., IV. 3. 17. 12, V. 1. 11. 13 ff., VI. 8. 18. 18–22. This objective correlation also occurs in Schelling, e.g. at Schelling (1802a), 414, 442; Schelling (1802b), 269 ff.; Schelling (1806a), number 71, pp. 155–156; Ehrhardt (1992), lecture 8, I, p. 46: "The mathematical point which I may be allowed to consider as a circle of infinitely small diameter is considered as a center not circumference and as a circumference not a center, yet it is still one". Tomatis (2016), 492. On this point see also Leinkauf (1987), 71–75.

[57] This point is emphasized by Beierwaltes (1972a, p. 116) who however also concedes that the unity aspect of intellect "prevails" against the proper state of the Idea in the sense of an "always achieved" synthesis of the Ideas.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:32:00, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.013

difference or of otherness in the unity is for Plotinus exclusively the theme of the doctrine of the intellect, for in the One no difference – not even as "sublated" (*aufgehobene*) – is posited. In the psychic sphere difference is already the condition of unity and not its self-expression, for it is only in thought as the eternal perfect act of self-reflection that ideas and individual intellectual or thought-acts coincide. "Every individual idea is intellect," and every act of thought, as something individual, is an idea and all of these acts are to be thought – speculatively – as a "partless whole" (*Ennead* V. 9. 8. 2–4; V. 9. 6. 9 ff.: *holon ameres*). By contrast, in Schelling's Absolute as absolute Reason, the individual or specific is not "posited" (*gesetzt*) as individual or specific, but is posited *itself* as absolute or as absolute Indifference-Identity (*System der gesammten Philosophie* 1804, §51, p. 207). Only in this Identity is the different not posited as different (or thought thus through the reason in intellectual intuition), but is itself posited as an identity (with itself *and* with the Absolute).[58] The expression "each is all" in the Absolute indicates that each individual – for example, a plant – *is* the Absolute or the universe (*Fernere Darstellungen* 1802, §4, pp. 392–395), although it is not an individual in the sense of *esse singulare* but only in that of the *esse particulare* of the idea. This notion, however, is also found in Plotinus, who can say that in the intellect – albeit not in the One – "every star is the sun and every sun is a star" because "each thing is everything" (*Ennead* V. 8. 4. 4–10). Hence Beierwaltes' remark that "the individuality or differentiation of the individual sustains itself in the whole."[59] On the other hand, for Schelling, the individual itself in the Absolute (or absolute Reason) is the Absolute and each individual *is rendered absolute in an equivalent way* (*Philosophie der Kunst* 1802–3, §30, p 393). From the viewpoint of this theorem regarding the "all in all" and the absoluteness of the movement of thought where everything is simultaneously timeless, it follows that for both authors, Plotinus as well as Schelling, a "not yet" can in no way be admitted in the intellect or the absolute Reason. Here, everything is given as perfect with a single stroke, and nothing can stand out in the sense of possibility or of the incomplete, and no real sequentiality can obtain there (Plotinus, *Ennead* III. 7. 3; IV. 3. 10. 2–6; IV. 3. 6. 25; IV. 4. 1. 33: *homou panta*, with no *ephexēs*; Schelling [*Bruno,* 1802], pp. 250, 291; *Vorlesungen zur Philosophie der Kunst*

[58] Schelling (1801a), §§1–3, pp. 114–116; Schelling (1804b), §18, pp. 161–168: "each thing is for itself the totality"; §24, p. 174: "God is immediately through the self-affirmation of his Idea the absolute totality [. . .] so that the infinite wells up from the infinite and pervades itself"; p. 175: in this absolute Identity "everything is one and one is everything"; see also §§25–33, pp. 175–187.

[59] Beierwaltes (1972a), 117.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:32:00, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.013

[1802–1803], §§30–31, pp. 393–395). Reason is the "antitype" (*Gegenbild*) of the Absolute and its perfect "revelation": only in it does the individual as an idea and form at the same time bring the absolute essence to expression. Nature, on the other hand, is the imperfect revelation of the Absolute: here, its highest power, the organism, is only "specific power," form, antitype (*Philosophie der Kunst* 1802–1803, §§10–11, p. 378; *Philosophie und Religion* 1804, pp. 34–35: antitype, pp. 39–41: freedom).

Nature

If the previous comparative analyses are to be understood not as establishing direct and demonstrable reference on Schelling's part to Plotinus but as disclosing an objective affinity between their approaches to thinking, we can with respect to the concept of nature assume direct influences – as we can also with respect to the related concept of matter as he had developed it in the *Aphorismen zur Einleitung in die Naturphilosophie* of 1806 and in passages of the later *Freiheitsschrift* (1809) and *Weltalter* philosophy (1810–1828).[60] I have shown earlier (see above, Section I) that Schelling had after 1805/6 acquired knowledge of Plotinus from individual works, this being mediated through Windischmann's excerpts and translations and especially through Creuzer's translation and commentary on the important *Ennead* III. 8: *On Nature, Contemplation, and the One*. Schelling's philosophy of nature arises in a context that can be called "Romantic" and "idealistic" and in which writers like Goethe, Novalis, Steffens, and artists such as Philipp Otto Runge, had played a significant role – authors with whom Schelling either had been in personal contact or regarding whom he had demonstrably at least some knowledge of their works and opinions.[61] The natural philosophy of Schelling is from the time of its earliest approaches inseparable from the idea of a *natura naturans*, a nature that is productive out of itself and articulates the active "interconnection" or the "bond" (see below, in the section on bond, world-soul) between things.[62]

[60] Beierwaltes (1972a), 117.

[61] On this point see Beierwaltes (1972a), 87–100, 137–144; Leinkauf (1987), 173–246 and (2015), 3–24, especially 13–23.

[62] To the extent that thinking is situated in the perspective of nature, nature is – for thinking from the perspective of the "I" or of thinking itself – "nothing other than the pure objectivity of intellectual intuition," Schelling (1801b), 90. That nature which is in itself the "total absolute Identity of the real and the ideal," i.e. as the "creative and productive Idea itself," and only "considered according to its exponent (*Exponent*)" appears as "unconscious creating" – as also in Plotinus – as "sleeping" (see *Ennead* III. 8. 4. 24–25: *tēn tou <kath'> hupnou <tei> tou egrēgorotos proseikaseie*), and in both cases as *natura naturans*, is explained by Schelling (1804b) in his last great System cf. the section

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:32:00, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.013

This was an idea which had been known to him not only through Spinoza, but also through Giordano Bruno as mediated to him by Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi, through Jakob Böhme, and other early modern authors.[63] The concept of "sacred physics," which Novalis saw to be realized in the "intellectualizing" approach taken by Plotinus with respect to Plato's *Timaeus*[64] – that is to say, the theologically and idealistically derived theory of nature and its inner and imaginative self-realization of the divine – or Goethe's reflections on nature, which more often go back from 1805 onwards to Plotinus (in Ficino's translation available in the Creuzer edition) and which understand nature as "contemplation" – probably translating *theōria* – and as creative activity: all these appear at the same time or shortly before Schelling's independent observations. The influence of III 8 is particularly of significance: here, Plotinus introduced the notion of an actively contemplative nature, which in turn is "soul" or rather "image of the soul," just as the soul is the image of the mind.[65] However, this notion is time and again turned around – against Plotinus – in a subjective-psychological direction and into a system of immanence or presence.[66] This depends in a systematic sense on the fact that Schelling had from early on developed his concept of nature, with reaction to Fichte, in clear parallelism with his concept of the "I." Nature and the human mind are, as he says in 1796–7, "both equally immutable and eternal in their laws"(*Abhandlungen zur Erläuterung des Idealismus der Wissenschaftslehre [Treatises explicating the Idealism of the Doctrine of Science]*, part I, p. 346)[67]. However, there is also

"Special Philosophy of Nature," Basic propositions I, 278–279. On *natura naturans* see also Schelling (1806a), numbers 25–33, pp. 202–204. On "Connection" cf. Leinkauf (1987),15–43, on Schelling, 41–43.

[63] On *natura naturas* see Leinkauf (2011a), 103–118. Schelling (1799b), 272, 275, 284–285: "Nature as productivity (*natura naturans*) we call nature as subject (all theory goes to this alone)"; Schelling (1804a), 35; Schelling (1804b), §44, p. 203; Schelling (1806a), 293; Schelling (1812), 28.

[64] Novalis (1929), vol. III, p. 469 (number 1096); III, pp. 129, 179, 443, 448; Beierwaltes (1972a), 87–93.

[65] *Ennead* III. 8. 4. 15–16: *phusis psychē ousa, gennēma psychēs proteras.*

[66] At its core there also live on determinations of the early modern magus, who was understood as a "priest" or "high priest" of nature, implying the pursuit of magic as a divine service; see Novalis (1929), vol. III, p. 469; Schelling (1806a), number 9, p. 141. On the concept of magic, to which Plotinus also refers in detail in *Ennead* IV. 4 in the last four chapters, see Leinkauf (2017), II, p. 1498–1516. On presence and immanence see the clear statement – at least before the *Freiheitsschrift* and the approach in *Weltalter* – of Schelling (1806c), 376–378, 378: "Nature is not merely the product of an incomprehensible creation, but this creation itself; not only the appearance or disclosure of the eternal, but at the same time this same eternal itself."

[67] Schelling (1796–1797), II, 368: the simultaneity of the infinite and finite constitutes the essence of an "individual nature" (the "I"); III, 386–390: organism, self-movement, life. Philosophy is "natural science of the mind" (Schelling, 1797), 39; the theory of nature is conversely spiritualization of natural processes: "The system of nature is at the same time the system of the mind" (Schelling,

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:32:00, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.013

interwoven in Plotinus' notion of the contemplative nature as simultaneously unconscious, "sleeping," and resting in itself a component that is thoroughly "subjective" or analogous to the self or the "I." Nature is "contemplating" and active in itself, as it were (*hoion*), with the awareness or consciousness of somebody half-asleep, and its inner image is the "contemplation" (*theōrēma*) of the internal forces and processes of nature (*Ennead* III. 8. 4. 22–27).[68] The resulting product is, in opposition to this unconscious, a "peripheral product" (*akolouthēma*) and "without its own power" (*asthenes*). If the world is a product of nature, to the extent that the latter can be understood as a "creative" principle, Schelling was able to link up directly with Plotinus' notion that "physis" is a product and image of the intellect in the world-soul, and even that nature posits the cosmos or world outside itself through "intuition" or "imagination": that is, in the sense of the formation and impression of the rationality of *logoi* in the materiate substrate (*Ennead* III. 8. 7. 18–22, including *Ennead* II. 4 *passim*). Plotinus establishes nature as an independent agent which indeed is an explication or unfolding of the hypostasis of soul, but in this unfolding of itself it maintains the central psychic activities of perception and intuition as a "means of production." Nature is, as it were, the contemplative unconscious soul. And that nature which is commonly "thought of as existing without imagination and reason" (*Ennead* III. 8. 1. 22: *hēn aphantaston phasi kai alogon)* is yet to be conceived, according to Plotinus, as a principle that "possesses contemplation in itself and makes what it makes for the sake of contemplation" (*Ennead* III. 8. 1. 23–24: *theōrian te en hautēi echei kai ha poiei dia theōrían poiei*) – here, Schelling has been excerpting relevant passages from the Creuzer edition of *Ennead* III. 8.[69] The world as "product" (*theōrēma*) of

1797). "Nature must be the visible spirit, the spirit, the invisible nature." There is within us an "absolute identity" of the spirit within us and nature outside (Schelling, 1797), 56.

[68] See Creuzer (1835), Remarks, pp. 72–73: "her (sc. nature's) concepts are not the products of a discursive thinking but expressions of her inner essence."

[69] *Ennead* III. 8. 1. 22–24; III. 8. 3. 3–6 and 12 ff.; III. 8. 7. 1–3. Here every time it is a question of "consideration" (*Betrachtung* in Creuzer's translation) of nature as a constitutive act. Schelling is on one occasion particularly interested in the difference between active consideration and concept: "Nature has not derived consideration from a concept" = *Ennead* III. 8. 3. 12–13 (excerpts – after Beierwaltes [1972a], 104, note); on another occasion he is interested in the productive transitivity of consideration: that which is produced from consideration is itself consideration, everything "truly" existing is (from) consideration = *Ennead* III. 8. 7. 1–3 (excerpt in Beierwaltes, 1972a). Creuzer (1835) introduces into his section of remarks a short excursus on "consideration" and places it in proximity to "speculation," n. 16, p. 63: "Consideration. The ideal sense, in which this concept is here understood, probably also permits the translation: 'speculation'; in view of the great variety of the relations of doing and suffering in which the term is taken here, I found that nomenclature to be more suitable. However, I preferred consideration to viewing, this last word being eminently suitable to express the dealing with ideal things that is opposed to reflection." These

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:32:00, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.013

the "intuition" (*theōria*) of *phusis* is in a substantial sense the "image" of the "intelligible world" (*kosmos noētos*) as a "sensible world" (*kosmos aisthētos*). The essential structuration or connection in this world is for Plotinus produced by the "rational principles of form" or *logoi* (*Ennead* III. 8. 7. 18–22) which soul – this "animating invigorator" – as a mediating principle between mind/intellect and nature mediates on the different functional levels of the material serving as their substrate.[70] It is only these *logoi* in nature that the human intellect can recognize and know; they are, as *logoi*, consubstantial or co-essential with the *logoi* of the rational soul. From this perspective, the inherent transitivity of the act of *theōria* of nature as quasi-subjective agent goes over directly into human rationality as subjective epistemic agent, the principle of "the same out of the same" being in the background (*Ennead* III. 8. 5. 23–25: *homogenes, homoion*). The speculative nature-philosophy of Schelling, which explicitly subscribes to the "victory of the subjective over the objective" (*Darstellung des philosophischen Empirismus [Presentation of Philosophical Empiricism]*, 1836, p. 231), considers the active nature (*natura naturans*) in the way that the speculative dialectic of transcendental philosophy considered the "I" – Schelling introduced this parallelism as a constant at the latest in the *System des transzendentalen Idealismus* of 1800.[71] "Nature was never a something distinct from its laws, being constituted only from their unalterable course of action, or rather being itself nothing but this one eternal course of action" (*Allgemeine Übersicht der neuesten philosophischen Literatur [General Overview of the latest Philosophical Literature]* 1797–1798, p. 79). Therefore, Plotinus' dynamic concept of nature based on Plato's *Timaeus*, the Aristotelian notion of *dunamis*, and the Stoic *logos* doctrine (with its *logos spermatikos*) fits in with Schelling's intentions in its most fundamental assumptions. It fits in with the turn against a "mechanistic" understanding of nature,[72] with

assignments – speculation and also a relation to the ideal opposite to reflection – are very relevant to Schelling and are also not irrelevant to the understanding of Plotinus. Schelling (1806a), number 11, 142; number 17, p. 143.

[70] From the perspective of Plotinus therefore, all thought is at the same time also all life, a kind of weaker thinking, graded according to degrees of intensity. Cf. *Ennead* III. 8. 8. 16–30; III. 8. 8. 17: *pasa zōē noēsis tis*. A by-product of this living intuition and thinking is that which exists (in the sense of the individual beings that are present in physis), thus III. 8. 8. 25–26: *hoti palin au ho logos parergon endeiknutai theôrias ta panta onta.*

[71] Schelling (1799a), preface, p. 3: "natural philosophy or speculative physics"; I, p. 12: "The natural philosopher treats nature as a transcendental philosopher treats the 'I'"; pp. 13–16 on active, productive nature; Schelling (1799b), §§2–3, pp. 273–275 .

[72] *Ennead* III. 8. 2. 3–15 against the *koroplathai*, the puppeteers and the mechanics of pushing and leverage; Schelling (1799a), 30–51; Schelling (1804b), §79, Schelling (1796–1797), 232 .

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:32:00, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.013

the notion that nature has a stand-alone productivity,[73] and with the premise that nature is equal to the unity of soul preceding it as a principle and therefore is an *eidos* and an active force which exhibits in itself an "innermost" (like an "I"), a "persistency" (stability, *menein*) and a principle of form-production.[74] Moreover, it fits in with the thesis that nature is a self that is intellectually productive (= contemplative) and communicates the intelligible-rational forms to the sensible (e.g. as *spermatikoi logoi*) as an expression of its power (in Plotinus usually *poiein* or – in Stoic terminology – *to poioun* as at *Ennead* III. 8. 3. 18).[75]

Bond, World-Soul

Another basic idea of Plato's cosmology and psychology that Plotinus has taken up on several occasions is the one stating that the whole world is permeated throughout by the constitutive activity of a soul whose constant expression is the "bond" (*desmos*) or "continuity" (*sunecheia*) that first of all makes the multiplicity of beings, and of the material substrate form a whole that is unitary in itself and complex or is an organism (Plato, *Timaeus* 31b, 41b; Plotinus, *Ennead* II. 1. 4. 14 ff.; II. 9. 7. 12).[76] That bond, as well as the world soul of Plato, remains a presence throughout Schelling's entire work from the early debates with the *Timaeus* until the late period, and especially in the treatise *Von der Weltseele [On the World-Soul]* of 1798 and the later work *Über das Verhältnis des Realen und Idealen in der Natur [On the Relation between the Real and the Ideal in Nature]* of 1806 (published along with the new version of the *Weltseele*: see below): "the essence of the bond is in itself eternity, the being of the bound is for

[73] *Ennead* III. 8. 2. 28–30: *kai tēn phusin einai logon, hos poiei logon allon gennēma autou* – Nature as rational form produces in matter as her substratum (*hupokeímenon*) a formative power going forth which produces, life, quality, the inner. Schelling (1799b), 34, 40, 41: "We call nature as bare product (*natura naturata*) nature as object (all empiricism is concerned with this). We call nature as productivity (*natura naturans*) nature as subject (all theory is concerned with this)"; Schelling (1804b), §§62–65, pp. 215–217: everything in the universe is ensouled or the direct expression of the affirming, i.e. positing (*positio*), and determining power.

[74] *Ennead* III. 8. 2. 22: *eidos*; III. 8. 2. 11–15: *menein*; III. 8. 3. 2–3: *ei menōn poiei kai en autōi menōn [kai] esti logos.* Schelling (1806c), 370–371.

[75] *Ennead* III. 8. 3. 12–23: *theōria, poiein*. Plotinus especially raises the issue that nature's consideration is her mode of activity and of bringing forth: III. 8. 3. 20–23. Creuzer (1835), Remarks, number 26, p. 78: "this idea of nature as a creative concept (*logos poiōn*) is dominant throughout the *Enneads* of Plotinus"; Schelling (1797),103: "Spirit, thought of as principle of life, is called soul"; Schelling (1804b), §§64–65, p. 217.

[76] Here also the factual basis of the notion of sympathy is to be seen, cf. *Ennead* IV. 4. 32. 13–14: *sympathes de pan touto to hen, kai hōs zōon hen, kai to porrō dē engus*; on this point see now Leinkauf (2018).

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:32:00, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.013

itself duration" (SW I/2, p. 365).[77] The concept of "bond" (or of the equivalent Latin expression *copula*) is found, after previous use of the terminology "connection" (SW I/3, p. 29; I/4, p. 390, 422 ff.), "organism" (SW I/3, p. 199 ff.) "brazen ring" (SW I/4, p. 258), "harmony" (SW I/5, p. 305 ff., 345 ff.), to be used in this manner to an excessive degree in the essay accompanying the second edition of the *Weltseele* in 1806: namely, *Über das Verhältnis des Realen und Idealen in der Natur*. Here, the bond indicates – in distinction from Plotinus – the *immanence* of the Absolute in reality and the "real" setting of the infinite in the finite (SW I/2, pp. 361, 366, 376 ff.), or the "full and extended *copula* in progressive development" (SW I/2, p. 362). However, it is in the sense of Plato and Plotinus that the bond represents unity in multiplicity (*ibid.*) and is an indication of the animation of matter,[78] and in the wake of this presence affinities with many passages from texts of Plotinus are given, although direct knowledge of this material is provable only with difficulty. But in any case, Schelling here stands in a tradition in which Platonic elements, probably together with Plotinian ones, Stoic components (especially mediated by Spinoza and Kant) and Christian elements, are ever-present in various blends with one another.[79] However, the world-soul is for Plotinus *not an immanent* principle. Although it is everywhere, it at the same time remains in itself, and it is especially the case that the psychic has not "fallen out" (*ouk exepesen*) from its intelligible being but rather "stays up there" (*menei ekei*, *Ennead* III. 8. 5. 11; cf. II. 9. 4. 6: *ou neusai phamen*).[80] The multiplicity unified in itself of the world as a "cosmos" is the *action* of the soul as a principle causing life, movement, unity and coherence in the multiplicity. But for Plotinus, Porphyry, and the later Neoplatonists, it is basically the case that the world is in the soul as in its principle rather than that the soul is in the world – as is the individual soul, more or less. The soul is a transitive, active, and self-communicating

[77] On the *Timaeus,* which Schelling ambivalently sometimes treats as authentic and sometimes as inauthentic (Timaeus of Locri) see Buchner (1994); Franz (1996), part III, 237–282. An important text is Schelling (1804a, pp. 36–40) with both negative (p. 36 ff.) and also positive relation to the *Timaeus* (p. 39): "The steward of the all, as the *Timaeus* expresses it in metaphorical language, was good. Since with the good there arises nothing of envy because of anything or at any time, he wished everything to be as much like him as possible." Cf. *Timaeus* 29e.

[78] Schelling (1806c), 364: "In which, by an inevitable necessity the bond of the whole is connected by the essence of the single connected beings; it is animating this being immediately; animation is the imagination (*Ein-Bildung*) of the whole in an individual thing."

[79] On the concepts of "connection," "bond," and "world-soul" in the discussion around 1800 see also Leinkauf (1987), 15–43, 221–245.

[80] On the difference between soul and nature Plotinus also expressed himself in a text of outstanding importance for Schelling: namely, *Ennead* III. 8, especially chapter 6.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:32:00, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.013

principle, but is not communicated in the way that it itself has its being. Its "inner" essential being is eternal, and its action as "outer" productive being is in time and, in dependence on that, in space (*Ennead* II. 1. 4; II. 3. 7; III. 3. 5–6; IV. 4. 32 and 41; IV. 5. 1; VI. 7. 14). Schelling's world-soul shares with that of Plotinus the ordering, articulating, structuring, and enlivening type of activity and also the function as the basis of "sympathy" and "analogy." The bond – certainly drawn originally from Plato – which plays a central role, especially in the philosophy of identity and maintains this derivation up to the late writings, is on the one hand thought by Schelling in the tradition of Plato and Plotinus as a direct expression of the activity of soul, and on the other hand adopted with a dialectical conceptuality which, from the perspective of Plotinus, fits more with the One or intellect.[81] Therefore, this soul-principle projects the forms of being typical of the One and the Intellect into the immanence of the natural, and is at the same time everything, everywhere yet not grasped, identity in totality, and totality in identity.[82] Similarly, Schelling has already in 1799 determined the productivity of nature (or the positing in nature) – which is analogous to the bond and the psychic in the speculative-dialectical manner – as "that which is everywhere and in everything (. . . [and]) for that very reason nowhere." [83] So the bond, like the soul, relates to nature or to the being that is determined materially just as the One/the Absolute relates to intelligible being and to Reason: that is, as transcendent and immanent all at once.

Matter

A further point of contact in the present context concerns the concept of matter.[84] Here, Schelling explicitly recognizes his indebtedness to Plato as well as to the "Neo-Platonists" in works such as the *Philosophie und Religion* of 1804 (pp. 36–37),[85] the *Freiheitsschrift* of 1809 (p. 355), and

[81] Beierwaltes (1972a), 143 has already drawn attention to this.

[82] Schelling (1804b), §§62–65, pp. 215–217; Schelling (1806c), 363, also 370: "in each of these two lies the eternal bond; each is absolutely for itself; but they themselves are so swallowed up again by the same bond that they themselves make up that through which they are united as only one and the same indissoluble Absolute."

[83] Schelling (1799b) at §6, III, p. 298.

[84] See Beierwaltes (1972a), 139–141.

[85] Schelling (1804a), 37: recognition that the Neoplatonists "already from the very fact that they excluded the alleged matter of Plato (that is, of the *Timaeus* here treated as inauthentic) completely from their systems . . . explained matter as nothingness and called it that which is not (*ouk on*)." Schelling praised here the true Platonic thought, in order to negate any connection between the ideal and the material, and to exclude all "crude realism" and any dualism (e.g. the Persian); p. 47: "the doctrine concerning the origin of matter belongs to the highest mysteries of philosophy."

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:32:00, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.013

in the *Weltalter* fragments of 1811–13 (Schröter p. 258–259).[86] He has arguably read Creuzer's comments, for the latter writes as follows: "One comes to know the most remarkable ideas of Plotinus on 'matter' (*hyle*) especially from the important passage at III (8), 6–7, and likewise at 9. 10, with which the passages in Plato *(Philebus* p. 233 ff. and *Timaeus* p. 345 ff.) should be compared" (Daub and Creuzer, *Studies*, p. 77, note 24) – Schelling had listed in his extract exactly the same references (see the excerpt "*Ennead.* III. 6–7, 9. 10, Plato, *Phileb*. p. 233 ff."). Matter as "almost nothing" in Augustine's phraseology or as pure formlessness had always been a genuine problem of thinking in the metaphysical tradition, in particular in its conceptual proximity to the first principle, since both matter and the first principle appeared to be equally ungraspable, inexpressible and incomprehensible: "matter is the darkest of all things, indeed, darkness itself according to some."[87] For Schelling, Plotinus' dialectical determination of matter appeared as the "unapproachable deep" (*Weltalter*, p. 259 ff.): "as when he (sc. Plotinus) says that matter flees someone wishing to grasp it and when someone does not grasp it, matter is to some extent present. Reason likewise becomes something other and a non-Reason in contemplating matter, just as when the eye goes from the light to see the darkness and afterwards does not see the darkness" (*ibid.).* The difference is, this clear and respectful recognition notwithstanding, that Plotinus always understands matter as deficiency and absolute lack and indeterminateness, it being nothing more than remoteness from the One and the intellectual. In itself, it is nothing, pure negativity.[88] Schelling, however, especially in the period between the system of 1804 and the *Freiheitsschrift* – since before that matter was pure non-being, the principle of non-ideality, the product of the falling-away of the "I" from the unity of

[86] On the construction of matter in the philosophy of identity cf. Schelling (1804b), §§76–117, pp. 224–277; §76, p. 224: matter is "the real or the indifference in the affirmed," i.e. "the impenetrability or the general body of things" (p. 226).

[87] Schelling (1806c), 359.

[88] *Ennead* II. 4. 5. 6–7: *skoteinē pasa*; II. 4. 10. 2–5: *aoristia*; II. 4. 10. 26–32: *amudrōs*; II. 4. 12. 21–23: *esti ti hupokeimenon kan aoraton kan amegethes hyparchēi*; II. 4. 13. 24: *ou morphē*; or II. 4. 13. 30–31: the "only-other" (*monon allo*); and, most of all II. 4. 16. 18–28: *kakon, ouk on*. Plotinus distinguishes in the manner of a scholastic treatise the various instances of matter (II. 4. 1–2: corporeal-incorporeal etc.), in which the core element is something undetermined (*aoriston*) and hence "dark" in relation to a determining (form): thus II. 4. 3. 1–8 (also II. 4. 15. 33–37: *apeiron par'autēs*); in this sense, "indeterminacy," as also in Schelling, is not in every respect "to be despised" (II. 4. 3. 2: *atimasteon*). It exists even in the intelligible world (II. 4. 4. 5–10). Here in his translation Windischmann made extracts – possible sources would also be the paraphrases in Tennemann (1798–1819), vol. VI, p. 122 and Tiedemann (1791–1797), vol. III, pp. 295–297.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:32:00, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.013

the rational[89] – sees in matter *a proper principle*: namely, that of a beginning that is "posed/posited" (*gesetzt*) through form or mind as "the past" (*Vergangenheit*). Thus matter is, as an originary active principle and a force that is unthinkable for Plotinus, in the process of the world's coming-to-be, "reduced" to a principle of possibility, to a suffering and receptive principle, of which there will always remain a "residue." Comparably to how Schelling in his earlier view in the *System des transzendentalen Idealismus* (1800) conceived the relation between "nature" and the "I": through the coming to consciousness of the "I," nature is downgraded to a mere past of the "I" and to its otherness. Matter is therefore, in the way that nature as an agent especially is, the object of what Schelling calls "speculative physics": it is the non-being that appears and "the full imprint of the whole of being." For Greek thought also and especially for Plotinus matter is ultimately a dialectical object,[90] for on the one hand, it is pure formlessness or indefiniteness[91] and on the other, it is to have the determinateness of the determinable and a receptivity and disposition to form which is not itself without form, this intelligible "form" of matter being "otherness" (*heterotēs*) and "motion" (*kinesis*): i.e. the two *megista genē* that spring up out of non-being in Plato's *Sophist* (Plotinus, *Ennead* II. 4. 5. 29–31; *Sophist* 250a, 254d–255a). Schelling, instead, situates matter, starting from Spinoza and probably inspired by Giordano Bruno,[92] as the "summation" of all the attributes of the infinite essence (the absolute substance) and as the "bond" that has a "duality" of finite and infinite that is original and foundational for it and posits it eternally and unforegraspably in unity (*Über das Verhältnis des Idealen und Realen in der Natur,* 1806, pp. 359–360). This internal complexity of matter as a bond (see above, *Bond, World-Soul*) is not comparable with Plotinus' concept of matter but rather with that of Anaxagoras, which is criticized by him as a "blend" (*migma, Ennead* II. 4. 7. 2 –13). Also not comparable to Plotinus' concept

[89] Schelling (1804a), 37, 47, 49–50. [90] Cf. Happ (1971).

[91] *Ennead* III. 5. 9. 1–4 and III. 5. 9. 30–57. The Logos is "Abundance" (*poros*), matter on the other hand "lack" (*penía*) – thus 9, 49–51: *hulē de hē penia, hoti kai hē hulē endeēs ta panta, kai to aoriston tēs tou agathou epithumias*, with reference to Plato, *Symposium* 203b–d. Windischmann in his paraphrase of VI. 9. 9. 25 ff. also refers to this (also mentioned by Beierwaltes [1972a], p. 141, n. 182).

[92] This was conveyed to him via Jacobi, but also became known to him through Brucker's depiction in his *History of Philosophy*, see Leinkauf (2011b), on matter, especially pp. 24–25. In the spirit of Bruno is the idea that matter can not be "a general, informal or unfertilized" negativity or an abstract, conceptual counter-principle to form, but that it is established "together with the living nature of form," as plenitude or totality of forms, cf. Schelling (1806c), 371. In the background stands the idea (also already well known from antiquity) that "all forms, that are possible according to the nature of the Absolute [. . .] (must) also exist" (Schelling, 1806c).

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:32:00, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.013

is the idea of a principle or a force associated with that internal complexity. In this period from 1806 to 1813 Schelling pushes back matter partly into indistinguishable closeness to the Absolute itself, to the extent that it expresses itself as the identity in totality and totality in identity of the "absolute bond" of the universe (*Über das Verhältnis des Idealen und Realen in der Natur* of 1806, pp. 360–363).[93] The function of the bond is to bring to expression on a determinate level the unity-in-diversity: it is "the unity in the multiplicity of things and to that extent the negation of multiplicity seen only for itself/as such (*für sich betrachtet*)" (*ibid.*, p. 363). The negativity of matter "as such" can certainly be compared with Plotinus' concept of *hyle* and other matter-concepts, although the positivity that matter has as a bond and as indifference to the negated, i.e. the individual forms, and also that it has as the totality of possible forms, in no way allows this. Schelling must, however, separate on the one hand the bond which the soul introduces as active imagination of the ideal, infinite, and rational into the real as the latter's animation and vivifier (see above, *Bond, World-Soul*) from matter on the other hand as a mere intra-physical indifference and as an "imprint" (SW I/2, p. 371): here, in nature, the bond is gravity (*ibid.*, pp. 364–366.).[94] Viewed systematically, matter represents that which is bound in the bond and not that which binds: "that which is bound as such – mere matter – should not be for itself; it is just something as an expression of the bond" (*ibid.,* p. 374 ff.). However, as this expression or imprint, it is the abundance of forms as the presence of the One "in this totality" (*ibid.*, p. 377).[95] From the perspective of Plotinus this would mean that that which binds in the bond is the soul, and that which is bound the materiate forms and processes, matter itself not being the issue at this point.[96]

[93] Schelling (1806c), 360: "for matter expresses no other [!] even more insignificant [!] bond than the one that is in reason, the eternal unity of the infinite with the finite, of the limitless with the limit." From this perspective, matter is moved to the same position as the absolute Reason in the ideal and as the Absolute itself, to the extent that it expresses itself in the totality as the universe, each of these structures of indifference being functional respectively as one "bond."

[94] Schelling (1806b), 61–63: matter is "the bound in its abstraction from the bond," the relative (in relation to being) non-being *(mē on)*; that on the other hand, "through which matter is, and through which it is even visible, is its unity with the bond."

[95] The closeness to Bruno and Spinoza is obvious here: at stake is "the living being-there of a God in the totality of things and in individual things." See Schelling (1806c), 376–377: "God is as the One in this totality; this one in all things is recognizable in every part of matter (i.e. as totality of possible forms), everything lives only in him." This pantheism, this stricter approach to the One/Absolute in the context of physis, stands completely beyond the intentions of Plotinus and the implications of transcendence that are the foundation of his system of hypostases (see *Ennead* V. 1, V. 9, VI. 7–8).

[96] *Ennead* II. 4. 7–8.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:32:00, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.013

REFERENCES

Beierwaltes, W. (1972a) *Platonismus und Idealismus*, Frankfurt am Main.
(1972b) "Hegel und Proklos," in *Platonismus und Idealismus*, 154–187.
(1980a) *Identität und Differenz*, Frankfurt am Main.
(1980b) "Absolute Identität: Neuplatonische Implikationen in Schellings Bruno," in *Identität und Differenz*, Frankfurt am Main, 204–240.
(1998) *Platonismus im Christentum*, Frankfurt am Main.
Berg, F. (1805) *Epikritik der Philosophie*, Arnstadt-Rudolfstadt.
Brucker, J. (1742–1744) *Historia critica philosophiae*, 4 vols., Leipzig [Engl. trans. W. Enfield 1791]
Buchner, H. (ed.) (1994) *F. W. J. Schelling, "Timaeus" (1794)*, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt [with contribution by H. Krings].
Creuzer, F. (ed.) (1814) *Plotini Liber de Pulchritudine*, Heidelberg.
(ed.) (1835) *Plotini Opera omnia*, Oxford 1835.
Daub, C. and Creuzer, F. (eds.) (1805–1811) *Georg Friedrich Creuzer, Studien*, 6 vols., Heidelberg.
Dryhoff, A. (1916) *C. J. Windischmann und sein Kreis*, Cologne.
Ehrhardt, W. E. (ed.) (1989) *Schelling, Lehrstunden der Philosophie*, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt.
(ed.) (1992) *Schelling, Urfassung der Philosophie der Offenbarung*, Hamburg.
Fichte, I. H. (1818) *De philosophiae novae Platonicae origine*, Berlin.
Franz, A. (2007) "Möglichkeit und Wirklichkeit als Grundprinzipien neuzeitlichen Wirklichkeitsständnisses bei Nikolaus von Kues und F. W. J. Schelling," in K. Reinhardt and H. Schwaetzer (eds.) *Nicolaus Cusanus und der deutsche Idealismus*, Regensburg, 41–58.
Franz, M. (1996) *Schellings Tübinger Platon-Studien*, Göttingen.
Fuhrmans, H. (ed.) (1969) *Schelling, Initia philosophiae universae = Erlanger Vorlesung 1820/21*, Bonn.
Halfwassen, J. (1999) *Hegel und der spätantike Neuplatonismus. Untersuchungen zur Metaphysik des Einen und des Nous in Hegels spekulativer und geschichtlicher Deutung*, Bonn.
(2000) "Das Böse in Schellings Freiheitsschrift," in M. Dabag, A. Kapust and B. Waldenfels (eds.) *Gewalt: Strukturen, Formen, Repräsentationen*, Munich, 81–96
Happ, H. (1971) *Hylê: Studien zum aristotelischen Materiebegriff*, Berlin.
Holz, H. (1970) *Spekulation und Faktizität: Zum Freiheitsbegriff des mittleren und späten Schelling*, Bonn,
(1971) "Die Beziehungen zwischen Schellings 'Naturphilosophie' und dem Identitätssystem in den Jahren 1801/2," *Philosophisches Jahrbuch der Görres-gesellschaft* 78: 260–293.
Kasper, W. (1965) *Das Absolute in der Geschichte: Philosophie und Theologie der Geschichte in der Spätphilosophie Schellings*, Mainz.
Leinkauf, T. (1987) *Kunst und Reflexion*, Munich.
(1998) *Schelling als Interpret der philosophischen Tradition: Zur Rezeption und Transformation von Platon, Plotin, Aristoteles und Kant*, Münster.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:32:00, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.013

(2011a) "Implikationen des Begriffs natura naturans in der Frühen Neuzeit," in N. Adamowsky, H. Böhme, and R. Felfe (eds.) *Ludi naturae: Spiele der Natur in Kunst und Wissenschaft*, Munich, 103–118.
(2011b) "Giordano Brunos Schrift 'De la causa, principio et uno' und Schellings Dialog 'Bruno,' in *Bruniana & Campanelliana* 17: 11–25.
(2015) "Schelling, Einheit und Totalität: Zur Struktur des idealistischen Systems mit Blick auf die frühe Naturphilosophie," *Schelling-Studien* 3: 3–24.
(2017) *Philosophie des Humanismus und der Renaissance*, Hamburg.
(2018) "Der Sympathie-Begriff im Denken Plotins," in R. Barton, A. Klaudies, and T. Micklich (eds.) *Poetics of Sympathy*, Berlin.
Limone, V. (2013) *Inizio e Trinità: Il neoplatonismo giovanneo nell'ultimo Schelling*, Pisa.
Narbonne, J.-M. (1993) "Plotin, Descartes et la notion de 'causa sui,'" in *Archives de philosophie* 56: 177–195.
Novalis [Fr. W. von Hardenberg], (1929) *Schriften*, S. Kluckhohn, et al. (eds.), 4 vols., Leipzig.
Peetz, S. (1995) *Die Freiheit im Wissen*, Frankfurt am Main.
Plitt, G. L. (ed.) (1869) *Aus Schellings Leben in Briefen*, 3 vols., Leipzig [repr. Hildesheim 2003].
Preisendanz, K. (ed.) (1912) *Die Liebe der Günderode: Friedrich Creuzers Briefe an Caroline von Günderode*, Munich.
Schelling, F.W.J.
[collected editions]
Schelling, K. F. A. (ed.) (1856–1861) *Sämmtliche Werke*, Abteilung I = 10 vols., Abteilung II = 4 vols., Stuttgart-Augsburg [= SW].
Baumgartner, H.M., Jacobs, W.G., Krings, H., and Zeltner, H. (eds.) (1976–) *Historisch-Kritische Ausgabe im Auftrag der Schelling-Kommission der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften*, Abteilung I: Werke, II: Nachlass, III: Briefe, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt [= AA].
[separate items]
Schelling, F. W. J. (1795) *Vom Ich als Prinzip der Philosophie [On the "I" as Principle of Philosophy]* 1795 [SW 1/1] [Engl. trans. F. Marti (in: *The Unconditional in Human Knowledge*) 1980]. Cf. AA 1/2.
(1796–1797) *Abhandlungen zur Erläuterung des Idealismus der Wissenschaftslehre [Treatises Explicating the Idealism of the "Doctrine of Science"]* [SW I/1].
(1797–1798) *Allgemeine Übersicht der neuesten philosophischen Literatur [General Overview of the latest Philosophical Literature]* [AA I/4].
(1797) *Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Natur [Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature]* [SW I/2] [Engl. trans. E. E. Harris and P. Heath 1988].
(1798) *Von der Weltseele [On the World-Soul]* [SW 1/2].
(1799a) *Erster Entwurf eines Systems der Naturphilosophie [First Outline of a System of the Philosophy of Nature]* [SW 1/3] [Engl. trans. K. R. Peterson 2004].
(1799b) "Einleitung" [Introduction] to the above [SW 1/3].

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:32:00, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.013

(1800) *System des transzendentalen Idealismus [System of Transcendental Idealism]* [SW 1/3] [Engl. trans. P. Heath 1978].
(1801a) *Darstellung meines Systems der Philosophie [Exhibition of my System of Philosophy]* [SW I/4].
(1801b) *Über den wahren Begriff der Naturphilosophie [On the True Concept of Philosophy of Nature]* [SW I/4].
(1802a) *Fernere Darstellungen aus dem System der Philosophie [Further Exhibitions from the System of Philosophy]* [SW 1/4].
(1802b) *Bruno oder über das göttliche und naturliche Prinzip der Dinge [Bruno, or Concerning the Divine and Natural Principle of Things]* [SW I/4] [Engl. trans. M. G. Vater 1984].
(1802–1803a) *Philosophie der Kunst [Philosophy of Art]* [SW I/5] [Engl. trans. D. W. Stott 1989].
(1802–1803b) *Vorlesungen zur Philosophie der Kunst [Lectures on the Philosophy of Art]* [SW I/5].
(1804a) *Philosophie und Religion [Philosophy and Religion]* [SW 1/6] [Engl. trans. K. Ottmann 2010].
(1804b) *System der gesammten Philosophie und der Naturphilosophie insbesondere [System of all Philosophy and of the Philosophy of Nature in particular]* [SW I/6].
(1806a) *Aphorismen zur Einleitung in die Naturphilosophie [Aphorisms Introducing the Philosophy of Nature]* [SW I/7].
(1806b) *Darlegung des wahren Verhältnisses der Naturphilosophie zu der verbesserten Fichteschen Lehre [Exhibition of the True Relation of the Philosophy of Nature to the Improved Fichtean Doctrine]* [SW I/7].
(1806c) *Über das Verhältnis des Idealen und Realen in der Natur [On the Relation between the Ideal and the Real in Nature]* [SW I/7].
(1809) *Über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit [On the Essence of Human Freedom]* [SW I/7] [Engl. trans. J. Gutman 1936].
(1812) *Denkmal der Schrift von den göttlichen Dingen [...] des F. H. Jacobi [Monument to the Piece on Divine things [. . .] by F. H. Jacobi]*, Tübingen.
(1815) *Über die Gottheiten von Samothrake [On the Deities of Samothrace]* [SW I/8].
(1821) *Über die Natur der Philosophie als Wissenschaft* 1821*[On the Nature of Philosophy as Science]* [SW I/9].
(1834) *Über die höchsten Prinzipien (Nachschrift Mittermair) [On the Highest Principles (Mittermair Postscript)]*, ed. F. Tomatis 2016.
(1836) *Darstellung des philosophischen Empirismus [Presentation of Philosophical Empiricism]* [SW I/10].
(1841–1842) *Philosophie der Offenbarung [Philosophy of Revelation]* [SW II/3] [Engl. trans. (part) B. Matthews].
(1842) *Philosophie der Mythologie [Philosophy of Mythology]* [SW II/2] [Engl. trans. (part) M. Richey and M. Zisselsberger 2007].
Schlegel, F. (1964) *Die Entwicklung der Philosophie* (1804/1805), E. Behler (ed.), Munich.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:32:00, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.013

Schröter, M. (ed.) (1946) *Schelling, Die Weltalter: Fragmente in den Urfassungen von 1811 und 1813*, Munich [repr. 1966].
Schulte, C. (1993) "F. W. J. Schelling, Ausleihe von Hand- und Druckschriften aus der Königlichen Hof- und Staatsbibliothek in München," *Zeitschrift für Religions- und Geistesgeshichte* 45: 267–277.
Schulz, W. (1975) *Die Vollendung des deutschen Idealimus in der Spätphilosophic Schellings*, Pfullingen.
Schwaetzer, H. (2005) "Die intellektuale Anschauung als methodisches Prinzip," *Mitteilungen und Forschungsberichte der Cusanus- Gesellschaft* 29: 247–261.
Tennemann, W. G. (1798–1819) *Geschichte der Phlosophie*, 11 vols., Leipzig.
Tiedemann, D. (1791–1797) *Geist der spekulativen Philosophie*, 6 vols., Marburg.
Tilliette, X. (1970) *Schelling: Une philosophie en devenir*, Paris.
Tomatis, F. (1994) *Kenosis des Logos, Raggione e rivelazione nell'ultimo Schelling*, Rome [2nd ed. Milan 2016],
Tomatis, F. (ed.) (2016) *Friedrich Wilhelm Josef Schelling, Sui principi sommi [= Über die höchsten Prinzipien]: Filosofia della rivelazione 1841–42*, Milan.
Wagner, M. F. (1999) "Plotinus on the Nature of Physical Reality," in L. Gerson (ed.) *The Cambridge Companion to Plotinus*, Cambridge, UK, 130–170.
Wirth, J. U. (1845) *Die spekulative Idee Gottes und die damit zusammenhängenden Probleme der Philosophie*, Stuttgart-Tübingen.
(1854) *Philosophische Studien*, Stuttgart.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:32:00, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.013

CHAPTER 9

Hegel's Programmatic Recourse to the Ancient Philosophy of Intellect

Jens Halfwassen
Translated by Carl O'Brien

"The Absolute is the Intellect; this is the highest definition of the Absolute. One can say that to find this definition and to grasp its sense and content was the absolute tendency of all learning and philosophy. All religion and science strove towards this point; from this longing alone the history of the world is to be understood."[1] Hegel's description of the "concept of the Intellect" in the *Enzyklopädie* culminates with these words; Hegel's own philosophy claims to ultimately achieve this in a systematic form which can no longer be surpassed.

Since Hegel conceived of the history of philosophy in terms of historical progression, one could expect the ultimate conception of the highest truth only at the end of philosophy's historical development. It might therefore appear surprising that Hegel ascribes this highest insight to *ancient* philosophy. He not only writes "the word and the conception of Intellect was discovered early on,"[2] he also ends his *Enzyklopädie* with a citation from Aristotle (without comment).[3] Aristotle's statement concerning the highest, most perfect and most divine *nous* as pure activity and thinking of itself clearly represents the ultimate insight of philosophy.

Hegel's own philosophy, then, understands itself programmatically as a recourse to ancient *nous*-metaphysics. Hegel thinks of Intellect and its principle, the logical Idea, not as an individual or transcendental subject, but rather as the *totality of all determinations.* However, such a totality of determinations only allows itself to be grasped *speculatively*; it evades the rationality of understanding, which conceives everything only in its one-sidedness and finitude. That is to say it conceives it in its fixed determinateness in opposition to everything else, without considering its dialectical unity both with its respective opposite and ultimately with *all* other determinations. The essence of Intellect, then, is "the absolute unity of

[1] Hegel (1830), §384 Remark. [2] Hegel (1830), §384 Remark.
[3] Aristotle, *Metaphysics* XII. 7, 1072b 18–30.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:33:18, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.014

contraries in the Concept" according to Hegel in the *Wissenschaft der Logik*.[4] Consequently, according to Hegel, neither the rationalistic metaphysics of modernity nor Kant's criticism of this reorientation of rationality employs a satisfactory concept of "Intellect". Both conceive of Intellect by means of one-sided categories of understanding and for that reason systematically fall short of the infinite and absolute essence of Intellect.[5] "Kant", as Hegel writes, "only had the state of the metaphysics of his own time before him, which mostly reached an impasse at such abstract, one-sided determinations without any dialectic. He never takes heed of and investigates the true, speculative ideas of the older philosophers concerning the concept of Intellect."[6] Kant's criticism of the rationalistic determinations of Intellect as a simple, immaterial, unchangeable substance, identical with itself, consequently had only a highly relative merit for Hegel: as it stands "in its one-sidedness on the same line with them, although they certainly belong to a higher line of thought ... to that extent it appears more insubstantial and emptier... in opposition to the more profound ideas of the older philosophers concerning the concept of the soul or of Thought."[7]

The ancient metaphysics of Intellect offers Hegel a way out of the rationalistic and transcendental-critical inability to conceive the infinite essence of Intellect on two grounds. Firstly, it conceives of Intellect as an absolute self-relation, that is as the Thought and recognition of itself, as *noesis noeseos*, and secondly, it conceives of Intellect as "the absolute conceptual unity of contraries". Both conceptions, however, the infinite unity of opposites and the absolute self-relation of Thought, the Thought of Thought, belong inseparably together, according to Hegel's insight. Thought has the capacity to think itself only when it conceives itself in its all-encompassing essence – that is an essence which incorporates *all* conceivable determinations in itself. As long as it attempts to think itself in terms of understanding by means of one-sided determinations, e.g. only as a simple substance, not as one that is simultaneously differentiated in itself, only as a substance at rest and not simultaneously as an activity etc., it does not yet think of itself *as Thought* (i.e. as the power of *all* determinations), which surpasses every individual determination. By this means, the self-relation of Thought is so substantial that it cannot be set aside in any thought. Kant registered this only as an "inconvenience"; Hegel reproaches him for this with biting mockery.[8] Precisely on the basis of this inability to

[4] Hegel (1981), 192. [5] Hegel (1981), 192–197. [6] Hegel (1981), 194.
[7] Hegel (1981), 195. [8] Hegel (1981), 193 ff.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:33:18, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.014

go beyond its self-relation, Intellect cannot think of itself as a particular, finite determination alongside, and independent of, other particular and finite determinations, but rather only as the *unity* of all determinations, including (and most especially) contrary ones.

Even if he takes Aristotle as an example of a "truly speculative" comprehension of Intellect,[9] Hegel nevertheless does not orientate his metaphysics of the Intellect towards Aristotle, but rather towards Neoplatonism.[10] It is Neoplatonism which first brings together the self-relation of Thought, which Aristotle had highlighted as its characteristic feature, with the totality of all determinations and with the unity of opposites and therefore unfolded an appropriate concept of Intellect according to Hegel's criteria.[11] While Aristotle still thought of the self-thinking divine *nous* as a specific substance alongside other substances, Plotinus was the first to comprehend *nous* as the fullness and the encompassing totality of all Being. Whereas Aristotle still thought of the identity of Thought and Being in the Intellect simultaneously as the distinction of the highest substance, Plotinus comprehends it as the universal essence of Being itself, as the unity of all Ideas. Therefore "the world of intellectuality" first begins with Neoplatonism and not yet with Aristotle.[12] As Hegel says, it is this that is Intellect – not only pure Thought, but rather Thought that makes itself objective and maintains itself in this objectivity and assimilates that objectivity to itself, in which it remains with itself.[13] Therefore, it is only with Neoplatonism that "philosophy . . . reached the standpoint that the self-consciousness knows itself in its thought as the Absolute".[14]

Now I would like to present in detail the significance of Neoplatonism for Hegel's concept of Intellect on the basis of three fundamental insights, which were equally essential for both Hegel and for Plotinus, in order to be able to comprehend the Intellect in its infinite self-referentiality. 1). Intellect is essentially an *outcome* for both. It comes about through the unfolding of the original unity of Being into the totality of its purely eidetic determinations to itself. This unfolding is conceived both as a *self-mediation* of Being, which fulfils itself in Being and returns as Intellect to itself. 2). Both base the self-relation of pure Thought, Thought of itself, on a structure that Hegel terms *concrete totality*, but which was already conceived of by Plotinus. 3). Both conceive of Intellect as a triadic unity,

[9] Hegel (1981), 195. [10] For a full discussion of this topic, see Halfwassen (2005).
[11] On this, cf. Halfwassen (2005), especially 350–385 (on Plotinus) and 432–462 (on Proclus).
[12] Hegel (1986), 413. [13] Hegel (1986), 42.
[14] Hegel (1986), 404. For a comprehensive discussion, see Halfwassen (2005), 118 ff.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:33:18, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.014

the moments of which pass through each other in a dynamic identity and thereby mutually determine each other.

Intellect as the Self-Mediation of Being

Hegel idealistically thinks of Intellect as the identity of subject and object, of what thinks and what is thought. However, this identity is not simplicity and indifference, undifferentiated in itself, but rather the unity-forming activity of self-differentiation that in its *self-differentiation* brings forth all world-forms, which are the content of knowledge. The fulfilled self-relation of Intellect, which in its differentiation is a self-knowing unity with itself, is for that reason the *outcome* of this activity of self-differentiation, which brings forth all pure determinations of Being, of essence and of Concept, but does so in such a manner that it returns to the totality of all differentiations which are brought forth, and simultaneously knows itself as the active *unity* that brings forth all differentiations. Therefore, Intellect is an outcome in a double sense: as the absolute Idea, it is the unity which actively brings forth all logical categories, and as the absolute Intellect, it is the Intellect which actively brings forth all realities in the Idea, as well as in nature and history. Yet this self-mediation of the Idea and of Intellect proceeds from a simple unity, undifferentiated in itself: pure Being, which is the indeterminate immediacy of the pure beginning of all determination, since it itself is completely indeterminate. The dialectical unfolding of all pure determinations from this indeterminate beginning is therefore the *fulfilment* of Being, so that Hegel is able to say: "the absolute Idea alone is Being, unfading life, self-knowing truth and is complete truth".[15] Intellect, however, is "the Idea having achieved Being-for-itself ... the concept of which is its object, as well as its subject".[16]

Just like Hegel, Plotinus too conceives of the self-thinking Intellect as the fulfilment of Being, which is the result of its self-unfolding and its self-mediation. However, Plotinus, unlike Hegel, does not think of Being as an indeterminate immediacy, but rather as the *One-Being* in Plato's sense, which in its twofold nature of unity and Being represents the absolute minimum of determinacy and conceivability, from which the unfolding of all remaining determinations must take its starting point. In doing this, Plotinus orients himself towards the second hypothesis of Plato's *Parmenides*.[17] Now the One-Being brings all Ideas forth to the extent that

[15] Hegel (1981), 236. [16] Hegel (1830), §381. [17] Plato, *Parmenides* 142b ff.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:33:18, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.014

it in itself differentiates itself in a multiplicity of substantial unities, which the Ideas are. This self-differentiation of the One-Being into the different Ideas, however, is carried out in such a way that it simultaneously returns to itself as a unity, so that it remains a unity identical with itself, although it becomes a multiplicity. This self-differentiation and self-fulfilment of the One-Being in the totality of all Ideas is, like the logical development of the categories in Hegel, not a temporal process, but rather takes place non-processionally in an atemporal eternity. Its outcome is *nous*, which eternally contemplates and knows itself as the unity of all Ideas.[18]

Consequently, for Plotinus, the self-knowing *nous* is exactly like the Idea for Hegel, the *movens* of Being's self-unfolding into the totality of Ideas, since Intellect is the coming-to-itself and the being-by-itself of the intelligible totality: "Intellect," so Plotinus writes, "begins as a simple unity, but it does not remain as it began, but rather unnoticed by itself it becomes a multiplicity, it unfolds itself, drowsily as it were, because it wants to have everything in itself."[19] Hegel comments: "the *nous* is the self-finding of itself."[20] The unfolding of Intellect from unfolded unity is based, then, on the Intellect's desire to possess itself and thereby on the self-relation of Thought, which only comes to itself through its self-unfolding. Intellect's coming-to-itself is spontaneous and without design, since Intellect by this means first becomes itself, consequently it cannot precede its own unfolding as a desiring Intellect. Intellect only watches its own self-unfolding into the totality of all Ideas as it were. It thereby knows itself not only as the *telos* of this unfolding, but rather also as its basis, which initiates it and sustains it at each of its levels.

Concrete Totality as the Fundamental Structure of Self-Thinking Intellect

Why is the unfolding of the initially folded Being into the totality of all pure determinations Intellect and *thinking of itself*, self-knowledge or *self-conciousness*? An appropriate understanding of what Intellect actually is depends upon the answer to this question, for both Hegel as well as for Plotinus. Both answer this decisive question in the same way. The principal thought of both is that the self-differentiation of Being, conceived of in its initial unity and totality, is at the same time Being's *return to itself* and,

[18] Cf. Halfwassen (2004), 68–84.
[19] Plotinus, *Ennead* III. 8. 8. 30–34.
[20] Hegel (1986), 448.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:33:18, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.014

indeed, that its self-relation already is Thought – Thought of itself or Thought of Thought itself.[21]

Hegel conceives of this return to itself as the *concrete universality* of the Concept. The Concept determines itself thus, that an original, initially indeterminate unity which is nevertheless conceived of as a *totality*, first divides itself into the particularities enfolded in it. In this way, the particularities, into which the initial unity, the original universality, divides, are firstly set apart by themselves and related to one another as contraries, so that in this opposition they mutually negate each other and by this means determine each other (in accordance with the maxim "*omnis determinatio est negatio*"). As the division of an original whole, which remains immanent in it, the particularities, which in their determination relate to each other negatively, mutually exclude each other – they constitute a "contradiction". By means of this contradiction, however, they are simultaneously sublated in their autonomy, not into a nothingness, but rather into the higher unity of the universality encompassing them, which in this way becomes itself filled with determination, which contains the particularities and their contradictions within itself as sublated and dependant moments. This is the conceptually logical individuation. Consequently, the original universality simultaneously returns to itself by means of its self-differentiation and remains identical with itself in its differentiation. Concrete universality is the principle and encompassing totality of pure thinking self-relation because, by means of the inseparable unity of its moments, it is "that which particularises (specifies) itself and which in its otherness remains by itself in undimmed clarity".[22] Therefore, for Hegel, it is the self-conceiving Concept, which unfolds itself further in speculative judgements and conclusions and at the same time mediates itself with itself in an ever more perfect manner, until in the absolute self-thinking Idea it reaches its highest, completely unfolded and perfectly mediated unity. In this all-encompassing unity all particular determinations are "sublated" in the well-known Hegelian triple-sense. This means they are contained in it in such a manner that their one-sided, finite determination, which merely excludes their respective opposites, is annulled, while through unity with its opposite, its content is simultaneously *conserved* and *delimited* (i.e. enhanced). In this manner, the Idea is the totality of all determinations and as such is truly infinite.

The extent to which Plotinus anticipates the self-referential structure of concrete universality is indicated by an impressive passage, to which Hegel

[21] Cf. also Halfwassen (2002), 243–262. [22] Hegel (1830), §163 Supplement.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:33:18, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.014

already drew attention, where Plotinus discusses in which sense the One-Being is the cause of the Idea: "Perhaps one should not say that the One-Being is the cause (*aition*) of the other Ideas, but rather one should comprehend them as its moments (*merē*) and, as it were, as its elements (*stoicheia*) and the whole as a unitary entity, which only through our conceptual Thought (*epinoia*) can be divided up, so to speak, while through its wondrous power it is one in all and appears as many and becomes many when it is in motion and this multiplicity effects its essence, so that the One is not one. It is as if we mark out sections from it, posit them as special unities and call them Ideas, without knowing that we have not caught sight of the whole for once and for all, but rather have only marked out a section and have then linked the sections together, since we cannot keep hold of them for a long time. After all, they strive to return to themselves. Therefore we let them return to the whole and we let them become one once again, or, what is more, to be one."[23]

The unity of the One-Being in the implementation of its self-unfolding into the multiplicity of the Ideas does not disappear, but is maintained as a unit and returns to itself in the unfolded multiplicity. Plotinus justifies this on the basis that every single Idea contains in itself the entirety of all Ideas, that is it in itself the unity of Being and is only artificially separated from this whole by means of discursive thinking, but not by *nous* itself: "in the Intellect the part is eternally out of the whole, it is part and whole together."[24] The One-Being remains identical with itself even in its differentiation. The Ideas, then, are the articulating moments of *nous* in the very same sense in which Hegel speaks of conceptual moments, each one of which is itself the totality of the Concept.[25]

In this way, then, the identity of Being and Thought, which is *nous*, becomes transparent. The One-Being, the unity of Being, is itself thought and *nous*, since it unfolds itself into the Ideas and through this self-unfolding returns to itself, so that all unfolded multiplicity is, in the Hegelian sense, sublated and conserved in its unity. Thus Being is fulfilled all-unity. The self-unfolding of the One-Being into the totality of the Ideas therefore has in itself the character of *intellective self-relation*. As the self-mediation of Being, it is in itself substantial thinking that is thinking as it is articulated in Being itself – Plotinus calls it *ousiōdēs noēsis*.[26] The fulfilled Being is Thought and Intellect in itself, since only in this

[23] Plotinus, *Ennead* VI. 2. 3. 20–32. Hegel (1986), 451 ff. refers to this passage of Plotinus.
[24] Plotinus, *Ennead* V. 8. 4. 22 ff. [25] Hegel (1830), §160.
[26] Plotinus, *Ennead* V. 3. 5. 37. Cf. Beierwaltes (1991), 197 ff.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:33:18, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.014

manner is it itself, i.e. the plenitude of the Ideas actively mediating themselves with themselves.

Intellect as Triadic Unity

From Plotinus' and Hegel's common determination of intellective Being as an all-unity, which mediates itself to itself in the transitional relationality of its moments, it becomes evident why Thought, in its relationship to its contents, always relates to itself and how the unity of its thinking self-relation, its self-consciousness, arises as a result. For Plotinus, just as for Hegel, Thought is not the act of a subject that initially exists only for itself, which relates to an object that is separated from it and merely stands in opposition to it, so that it must remain inconceivable how it can relate to itself in this relation. Such a view drawn from the model of sense-perception remains fundamentally inappropriate for the self-relational Thought. Pure Thought does not originally orient itself towards a separate object, but rather towards the *unity of noetic Being*. This is the One-Being, which in its self-unfolding returns to itself and which in itself already is thinking self-relation. Thought, for that reason, recognises itself as *Thought* in the grasping of the unity of Ideas – i.e. it recognises itself as pure Thought *of itself*. *Nous* does not stand in opposition to the Ideas, then, as a subject which is different from them, but rather it is identical with the idea-filled Being as the all-unity meditating itself to itself.

This is why Thought of itself, *noesis noeseos*, according to Plotinus does not possess a bipolar structure, but rather a *tripolar* one: "He distinguishes in νοῦς Thought (νοῦς), what is thought (νοητόν) and thinking (νόησις), so that νοῦς is at once one and all; *noēsis* however is the unity of what has been differentiated,"[27] as Hegel paraphrases this "fundamental idea" of Plotinus. The act of thinking, the *noesis*, is the uniting third aspect, since both the thinking Intellect, as well as what is thought, the multiple-unity of the intelligible Being, are each substantially acts of thinking (*noesis*). This is because thinking is nothing other than that very self-active unfolding of unity into a multiplicity in the course of which unity simultaneously returns to itself. For this reason Intellect recognises in the all-unity of Being, which it has thought, itself as a *thinking* Intellect. It does not stand in opposition to the thought all-unity as a different "subject", but rather it is identical with it. *Intellect is the self-actualisation of the concrete totality of Ideas*.[28]

[27] Hegel (1986), 453. Hegel here cites a shortened version of Plotinus, *Ennead* V. 3. 5. 43–48.
[28] On this, cf. Halfwassen (1994).

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:33:18, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.014

Certainly Plotinus emphasises the unity of *nous* to such an extent that he consistently rules out any discursivity on its part. The self-referential knowledge of *nous* has the character of an *intellectual intuition*, an *idein kai aisthanesthai*.[29] For this reason, Plotinus distinguishes *noesis*, just like Plato and Aristotle, from the discursive forms of Thought, such as *dianoia*, *logismos* or *epinoia*.[30] The intellectual self-contemplation of *nous* is simple in the sense that while it does contain distinction – i.e. it contains the entire eidetic differentiation of the noetic cosmos – it is not subject to the dissolution of its differentiations into separation and autonomy like discursive Thought. Plotinus, precisely on account of this separation of its moments, denies to discursive Thought the possibility of fulfilled self-knowledge. In the concrete totality of *nous*, on the other hand, all particular Ideas are the immanent moments of an indivisible unity; faced with this unity they cannot obtain any autonomy. Discursive Thought only separates them from this unity by means of an act of abstraction. Since the fulfilled self-knowledge of Intellect arises by means of the concrete totality of Ideas, it alone is sufficient for Plotinus. It requires no further discursive unfolding and mediation in order to completely come to itself since it is always completely by itself in each of its individual moments, due to the indivisible unity of all moments in *nous.* Consequently, *nous* is "unfolded in such a manner as if it were still folded",[31] according to Plotinus. Unlike Proclus, who just like Hegel understood the unification of discursively separated moments as a self-representation of the self-referential unity of *nous*, Plotinus for that reason does not know any speculative interpretation of syllogism.[32]

In contrast, Hegel conceives his speculative dialectic as the complete unification of *both* forms of Thought's implementation: intellective contemplation and discursive reflection. Both are no longer separated in dialectical method, but rather are completely amalgamated with one another. The completely developed concrete universality must specifically unfold its own content in speculative judgements and conclusions and, for this reason, contains in itself the discursivity of Thought as an essential moment of its self-knowledge. This discursive moment of essence also remains contained in the Idea and in Intellect as the highest and most perfect manner of self-knowledge and self-thought. Consequently, the absolute Idea knows itself as the unfolded and simultaneously simple unity of all logical categories in the absolute method. However, with the

[29] Plotinus, *Ennead* V. 3. 4. 4.
[30] On this cf. Oehler (1985).
[31] Plotinus, *Ennead* VI. 8. 18. 18.
[32] Proclus, *In Parmenidem*, col. 1152. 2–8 Cousin.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:33:18, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.014

analytical and synthetic moment of the method, it contains finite knowledge as a sublated and simultaneously conserved moment in itself. Even the absolute Intellect knows itself perfectly only in the system of three conclusions in which the logical Idea divides into nature and Intellect and, through their development, simultaneously unites with itself. Therefore, it is this polysyllogistic movement which first includes the entire richness of nature and of the real, subjective and objective Intellect in the self-knowledge of the absolute Intellect.[33]

This differentiation notwithstanding, it must be noted that with the triadic structure of the concrete totality, which was first formulated by Plotinus, and which Hegel later adopted, the key has been found that infers why Intellect knows itself if it knows the totality of its contents, and why it – in the unity of its contents and *only* in this unity – knows itself as a unity: consequently it does not lose sight of its own unity amidst the multiplicity of its differentiated contents, while the dividing understanding literally does not see the forest for the trees. Finally, in the thought of a unity that is active in itself, differentiated in itself and, in its differentiation, a self-determining unity, that principle is discovered which guarantees that Thought contains reality in all of its determinations and, in this way, conserves philosophy from the aporia of the modern subject-object divide with its worldless subject on the one hand, which only circles emptily about itself, and on the other the absurdity of an extramental bedrock. It is the self-differentiation of Thought in itself, in which Thought fulfils itself with determination and content, and, what is more, in which Intellect first brings forth all determination and all content. For this reason, it knows itself only as the infinite totality of all contents, as the plenitude of Being.

Summary: Hegel and Plotinus

Let's draw up the final account! The commonality between Hegel and Plotinus in the manner in which both think of Intellect as the totality of all contents, in which they conceive of concrete universality as the generator of determinacy fulfilling itself with all its content, and in which they grasp the self-thinking Thought as a triadic entity, sufficiently demonstrates that Plotinus' metaphysics of *nous* is the decisive historical precursor for Hegel's

[33] For a full discussion of this, see Düsing (1995), especially 251 ff., 266 ff., 313 ff.; see also Düsing, (1986), 15–39. On the difference between Plotinus and Hegel concerning the conception of coming to be and of the structure of thinking self-relation cf. Halfwassen (2005), 378 ff.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:33:18, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.014

concept of Concept, of the Idea and of Intellect.[34] Proclus' systematisation of Plotinus' *nous* doctrine, in which Hegel himself glimpsed the zenith of ancient thought, is based entirely on Plotinus' insights regarding that point which Hegel elevated above all others as decisive: the universal dynamic identity of all moments in the self-referential unity of *nous*.

At the same time, the differences I have indicated show that Hegel's concept of the Intellect also surpasses Plotinus'. The integration of the discursivity of thinking and the integration of the historicity of Intellect into the self-knowledge of the absolute Intellect are incontestably preferable, since they integrate dimensions that Plotinus had already grasped as *manifestations* of Intellect: discursively thinking soul, nature and history are for Plotinus externalisations of *nous*, in which it seeks *itself* without truly finding itself. Hegel grasps them as levels to the fulfilled self-knowledge of the Intellect which contains them. From this perspective, Plotinus' metaphysics of *nous* appears – for all its brilliance – only as a preliminary *prefiguration* of Hegelian metaphysics.

But this is only *half* the truth. The *entire* truth states that Plotinus is not only a *prefiguration*, but also an *alternative* to Hegel. This is related to a difference which we have previously not discussed: namely for Plotinus Intellect is *not* the Absolute. Rather the Absolute is the One itself, beyond Being and beyond Intellect. *For this reason*, Plotinus' *henological* metaphysics cannot be positively sublated to Hegel's absolute idealism. Plotinus justifies the necessity *to go beyond Intellect* precisely on the basis of that decisive insight into the structure of Intellect that he shares with Hegel. It is precisely Intellect's specific *mode of unity*, the dynamic all-unity of the concrete totality, which makes it necessary for Plotinus to go beyond Intellect. Intellect cannot serve as the sole basis for its own unity, precisely *because* it is concrete totality, according to Plotinus. As concrete totality, Thought is the activity of unification and of differentiation in one. Since Thought is just as essentially differentiation as unification it cannot itself be the ultimate principle of its own unity; it is unity only to the extent that it is at the same time a duality.[35]

However, because Thought in its self-differentiation first brings forth *all* contents itself, the Absolute, to which Thought owes its own unity, cannot itself be thinkable content. For this reason the Absolute can only be thought of by means of the *via negationis* as *absolute transcendence*: "it is the Nothing of all things of which it is the origin, in such a manner that

[34] Doz (1987), especially at 178 ff., already came to this conclusion.
[35] On this, see Halfwassen (2004), 84 ff.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:33:18, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.014

nothing can be predicated of it, not Being, not Essence, not Life – it transcends all of these" according to Plotinus.[36] Plotinus bases the unity of Intellect not on Intellect itself, but rather on its relationship to the transcendent One. In this way, Plotinus knows that the self-relation of Thought is ineluctable to all thinking; consequently even in thinking the Absolute it cannot be objectively circumvented. The reference to the transcendent Absolute is for this reason not a reference to a *content* beyond Thought, but rather the absolutely *transobjective* ultimate horizon of unity, which first of all makes it possible to refer both to contents in general and to oneself and which in doing so transcends both of these. This ultimate horizon of unity is discovered precisely *in* the self-relation of Thought.

The task of the historian of philosophy is therefore fulfilled. It consists of demonstrating the affinity between Hegel and Plotinus in the manner that they conceive of Intellect and in the demonstration of their irrevocable differences concerning the question of the Absolute. However, there arises a task for philosophy which as of yet has not been previously tackled: this is the attempt to unite the fundamental thought of Hegel and Plotinus without sublating one in the other.[37]

REFERENCES

Beierwaltes, W. (1991) *Selbsterkenntnis und Erfahrung der Einheit. Plotins Enneade* V 3, Frankfurt am Main.

Doz, A. (1987) *La Logique de Hegel et les problèmes traditionelles de l'ontologie*, Paris.

Düsing, K. (1986) "Syllogistik und Dialektik in Hegels spekulativer Logik," in D. Heinrich (ed.) *Hegels Wissenschaft der Logik*, Bonn.

(1995) *Das Problem der Subjektivität in Hegels Logik*, 3rd ed., Bonn.

Halfwassen, J. (1994) *Geist und Selbstbewußtsein: Studien zu Plotin und Numenios*, Mainz and Stuttgart

(2001) *Hegel und der spätantike Neuplatonismus: Untersuchung zur Metaphysik des Einen und des Nous in Hegels spekulativer und geschichtlicher Deutung*, 2nd ed., Hamburg.

(2002) "Geist und Subjektivität bei Plotin," in D. H. Heidemann (ed.) *Probleme der Subjektivität in Geschichte und Gegenwart*, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt, 243–262.

(2004) *Plotin und der Neuplatonismus*, Munich [English translation *Plotinus and Neoplatonism* (forthcoming)].

[36] Plotinus, *Ennead* III. 8. 10. 28–31. On the Absolute as the absolute transcendence and on the origin of this conception from Plato and Speusippus cf. Halfwassen (2006).

[37] For a discussion of this last topic, see Halfwassen (2015), chapters III and XVIII.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:33:18, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.014

(2006) *Der Aufstieg zum Einen. Untersuchungen zu Platon und Plotin*, 2nd ed., Munich and Leipzig.
(2015) *Auf den Spuren des Einen: Studien zur Metaphysik und ihrer Geschichte*, Tübingen.
Hegel, G. W. F. (1830) *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse*, 3rd ed., Heidelberg.
(1981) *Wissenschaft der Logik*, vol. 2, Hamburg.
(1986) *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie II* (Theorie-Werkausgabe, vol. 19), Frankfurt am Main.
Oehler, K. (1985) *Die Lehre vom noetischen und dianoetischen Denken bei Platon und Aristoteles*, 2nd ed., Hamburg.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:33:18, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.014

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:33:18, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.014

CHAPTER 10

Henri-Louis Bergson and Plotinus

Wayne J. Hankey

Plotinus Redivivus

"Comme s'il reconnaissait en Plotin un autre lui-même"[1]

Philosophers are frequently public figures in France, and widely influential in philosophy outside the Hexagon, but, in the late nineteenth century and the first third of the next, none matched Henri Bergson, and his equal has not been seen since. Étienne Gilson (1884–1978) judged that philosophically, his own period was "L'Âge de Bergson," France possessing in Henry-Louis Bergson (1859–1941) "for the first time since Descartes, one of the rare beings who are great metaphysicians."[2] He was a cult figure. Many, like Gilson, were converted to metaphysics by his teaching, some going on to Catholicism, for example Jacques Maritain (1882–1973). His lectures were mobbed, the social elite sent their servants to hold seats for them. His writings were published in scores of multi-lingual editions. At his apogee, he was "the most widely discussed and published philosopher in the world,"[3] and appealed to opposed perspectives and interests.

Syndicalists co-opted his ideas. Against the Republican materialists, atheists, and natural scientific determinists at the Sorbonne, epitomized in Émile Durkheim's positivism, he was regarded as a reactionary, preaching intuition, spiritual freedom, religion, and mysticism. His philosophy was read and taught in Catholic schools and seminaries.[4] However, to the Thomist ecclesiastical authorities, Bergson was a pantheist radical, naturalizing mysticism and extending process to God. Three of his major books were placed on the Index Librorum Prohibitorum in 1914, the year of his election to the Académie française. Such combined distinctions, his

[1] Bréhier (1949–1955), 108. Translations are mine unless otherwise indicated. Because Bergson's mother was from Britain, he spoke English from childhood, and personally revised English translations of his works; when I have these, I either use them or consult them deferentially.
[2] Gilson (1960), 122. [3] Grogin (1988), 111. [4] Gilson, (1960), 49–53.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:34:42, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.016

distinguished lectureships at the great English, Scottish, and Ivy League universities, secret and public ambassadorial missions to Washington, D.C., the Nobel Prize in Literature (1927), and Grand-Croix de la Legion d'honneur (1930) manifest the degree to which he was a national and international figure in philosophy, science, religion, and politics.

The glory faded even before his death. However, there is a renewed engagement, promisingly diverse and discerning, partly dependent on new understandings of Neoplatonism. It is crucial, both for the modern legacy of Plotinus, and for the future of Bergson's thought, that he was almost uniquely attached to Plotinus among previous philosophers. Émile Bréhier (1876–1952), who heard Bergson's lectures at the Collège de France, commented:

> Plotinus is one the very rare philosophers with whom Bergson felt an affinity which bridged the centuries; and, he always affirmed that sympathy – not, it is true, without reserve. ... I do not speak only of the outstanding gift he had for clarifying the most difficult texts of Plotinus, but above all of the easy familiarity with which he treated him, as if he recognized in Plotinus another self.[5]

Bergson acknowledged the connection and obligation: "I am certain that I owe a profound debt to only two or three philosophers ... Plotinus, Maine de Biran [1766–1824], and somewhat to [Félix] Ravaisson" [1813–1900].[6]

His first *cours* at the Collège de France in 1897–98 was devoted to Plotinus and brought out resemblances between the monads of Leibniz and the Plotinian intelligibles.[7] His philosophy was the subject again in 1902–03. These lectures led the move of Neoplatonic studies from Germany in the nineteenth century to France, and the prominence Bergson gave introspective intuition imprinted the French interpretation of Plotinus. Bergson also inaugurated what particularly characterizes twentieth century Neoplatonism: the immediate connection of the top and the bottom of the system. The ineffable becomes immediately incarnate and intellect is pulled within soul, or life – his postmodern successors will seek to overcome what is for them the reductionist metaphysics of modernity.[8]

Bergson's engagement with Plotinus is philosophical, creatively fecund and rhetorical, serving his own argumentative persuasions. Much in Bergson matches something in Plotinus, gives signs of being derived from the

[5] Bréhier (1949–1955), 107–108. For more, including Bergson's talk of being a reincarnation of Plotinus, see Mossé-Bastide (1959), 1–2.
[6] Gilbert Maire, *Bergson mon maître*, 222, quoted in Janicaud (1969), 6–7.
[7] Bergson (1911), 353 note. [8] Hankey (2006), 110, 119, and 232, and (2008).

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:34:42, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.016

Alexandrian, and the *Enneads* are frequently quoted, not always accurately, and often for polemical purposes.[9] Significantly, recent appropriations of what is Plotinian in Bergson are also free from archeological historicism and illustrate the actuality of both philosophers. The retrievals which involve re-thinkings of Neoplatonism tend to bring Bergson and Plotinus closer at root than the French Professor himself sometimes made them. This fluctuation is enabled and required by a lack.

We have Rose-Marie Mossé-Bastide's (1909–99) highly regarded study of the relation and reports (auditors' notes) of the lectures. The last have a problematic status, because Professor Bergson willed the destruction of all his literary remains except what had been published. As Mossé-Bastide concluded, given the ways Bergson used Plotinus, neither these, nor Bergson's own frequent references to Plotinus in his writings, enable us to determine how he understood Plotinus, what he judged he had taken over from him, and what he did with them. We are forced to interpret Bergson and Plotinus on what seems common between them, whether positively or negatively, and to compare the result. Our views of both will change reciprocally.

We begin, nonetheless, with what Mossé-Bastide took from the notes she had secured from the *cours* of 1902. Bergson confirmed an influence on the formation of his thought from the theories of Plotinus on the *logos* and the soul. The Professor made precise as well what he had taken on "la *procession*, la théorie de la *conscience* et surtout sur la *méthode* philosophique." On the basis of these, Mossé-Bastide determined that Bergson made Plotinus "the inventor of the method of interiorization which penetrates metaphysical reality by means of psychological experience. Whence derives the parallelism Bergson establishes between the process of thought and that of life, and the value he accorded to intuition."[10]

Mossé-Bastide's judgment coincides with that of Jean Trouillard, p.s.s. (Compagnie des prêtres de Saint-Sulpice) (1907–84), to whose living Neoplatonism Bergson's thought contributes penetrating insights. For him, creative intuition is the center of Bergson's system: it proceeds "from the center to the periphery and from the whole to the parts."[11] Bergson's fundamental philosophical method is derived from Plotinus so as both to preserve the Alexandrian's simplicity of vision and the power of the simple,[12] without any pretense to identical reiteration.[13] For example, in

[9] Mossé-Bastide (1959), 2–11. [10] Mossé-Bastide (1959), 2–11. [11] Trouillard (1972), 96.
[12] Trouillard (1961b), 135 [13] For a precise comparison see Trouillard and Mossé-Bastide (2014).

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:34:42, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.016

contrast to Plotinus, the duration that Bergson's intuition created was not circular.[14]

Bergson was persuasive to the positivistic mentality he addressed because of the union between Aristotelian scientific empiricism and Plotinian intuition, which Bergson picked up from Félix Ravaisson. In his tribute to his predecessor in the *Académie des Sciences Morales et Politiques*, Bergson wrote of Ravaisson's Aristotle that he:

> [E]xtend[ed] the vision of the eye by a vision of the mind: without leaving the domain of intuition, that is, the intuition of things real, individual and concrete, to seek an intellectual intuition beneath the sensible intuition. To do that would be to pierce by a powerful effort of mental vision the material wrapping of things and to read the formula, invisible to the eye, which their materiality unrolls and manifests. Then, gathering itself into its own substance, would appear the unity joining beings to one another, the unity of a thought that we see, from inorganic matter to the plant . . . to animal . . . to man, until from concentration to concentration we should end in divine thought, which thinks all things in thinking itself. Such was the doctrine of Aristotle. . . . the founder of metaphysics and the initiator of a certain method of thinking which is philosophy itself.

Bergson went on to draw Aristotle and Plotinus together: "Perhaps Ravaisson looks at Aristotle occasionally through the Alexandrians, themselves so highly colored with Aristotelianism."[15]

With Bergson himself a new metaphysics emerged though Plotinian intellectual intuition asserted against Immanuel Kant (1724–1804): "all the philosophy I have expounded . . . affirms, against Kant, the possibility of a supra-sensible intuition. . . . I would call 'intellectual' the intuition I speak of. But I would prefer to designate it as 'supra-intellectual'."[16] Against Hegel he used it to avoid dialectic.[17] Intuition in continuity with the positivism of modern sciences, as well as beyond and against them, separates Bergson from Plotinus where the Professor was most radical and most persuasive. Many followed him from Kant and scientism to metaphysics, but not to his own metaphysics, mysticism, or philosophy of religion. The parting came especially with those for whom he was philosophical "maître," but who went on to Thomism. Because, among these Étienne Gilson and Jacques Maritain left us well-considered critical reflections, written decades after their lives were transformed by his

[14] Trouillard (1969), 903. [15] Bergson (1946d), 265–266. See Trouillard (2014c), 155–158.
[16] Letter to Jacques Chevalier, 28 April 1920, in Maritain (1944b), 58, note 10.
[17] Deleuze (1991), 44–45.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:34:42, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.016

lectures, but which preserved their excitement as students, I have used their accounts extensively.

Direct Vision of the Mind by Mind and Aquinas' Mystical Conclusion

> Everyone can have noticed that it is more difficult to make progress in the knowledge of oneself than in the knowledge of the external world. . . . Is there not something surprising in this? We are internal to ourselves, and our personality is what we should know best. . . . This direct vision of the mind by the mind is the chief function of intuition, as I understand it.[18]
>
> The truth is that an existence can be given only in an experience. This experience will be called vision or contact, exterior perception in general, if it is a question of a material object; it will take the name of intuition when it has to do with the mind. How far does intuition go? It alone will be able to say. It catches hold of a thread: it is for it to see whether this thread goes as far up as heaven or stops at some distance from the Earth. In the first case, metaphysical experience will be bound up with that of the great mystics: I think I can state for my part that the truth lies there.[19]

Camille de Belloy, o.p. (Order of Preachers), declared it an impertinence to open *Dieu comme soi-même. Connaissance de soi et connaissance de dieu selon Thomas d'Aquin: l'herméneutique d'Ambroise Gardeil*[20] with these two quotations from Henri Bergson. It treats the interpretation of Aquinas' mysticism and immediate self-knowledge by a Dominican born the same year as Bergson. Something of what Aquinas owed to Augustine, Ambroise Gardeil (1859–1931) to Bergson, and of what Bergson, Gardeil, Augustine and Aquinas owed to Plotinus, emerges. Plotinus' introspection enters French Thomism, an important movement in intellectual life in the first half of the twentieth century.

De Belloy leaves to specialists the influence of Plotinus on Augustine. Happily, in Book VII of the *Confessions*, Augustine is explicit that reading "books of the Platonists," i.e. works of Plotinus and Porphyry, led him to introspection, what we may call, with Bergson, "direct vision of mind by mind." Thereon, he built a metaphysical hierarchy which ascended to mystical experience. He rose to contact with true eternal being (*esse*); the

[18] Bergson (1946b), translated in Bergson (1946a), 47–48.
[19] Bergson (1946a), 57.
[20] de Belloy (2014), 13.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:34:42, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.016

ascent and experience are described in language partly borrowed from Plotinus.[21]

Bergson was neither a Thomist, nor a Christian, nor an Aristotelian of Aquinas' kind. Neither de Belloy, nor Gardeil, want to make him these.[22] In the work of Bergson with which de Belloy began, there is a denunciation of the "logic of retrospection," which is, for Bergson, the abstraction of the Aristotelians.[23] For it self-knowledge is a reflection on the mind actualized when conceiving what sensation gives. For Bergson, this "habitual" epistemology retrospectively projects mind's dynamic creation into the past as fixed givens. He describes his alternative:

> Reality is mobility. Not things made but things in the making, not self-maintaining states, but only changing states exist. . . . The consciousness we have of our own self in its continual flux introduces us to the interior of reality, on the model of which we must represent other realities. . . . Our intelligence . . . can place itself within the mobile reality, and adopt its ceaselessly moving direction – in short, can grasp it by means of that intellectual sympathy which we call intuition.[24]

Only exceptionally do de Belloy and Gardeil see Aquinas separating himself from Aristotle for the sake of the immediate Augustinian self-knowledge that he generally opposes. The texts directly at issue between Gardeil and his Thomist critics are from Augustine's *De Trinitate*, and the debate is as to whether the Trinitarian *mens, notitia, amor* in the human soul as habitual or virtual, is deployed prior to all activity which manifests it. Maritain, desperately endeavoring to separate supernatural from natural mysticism, describes, while treating Gardeil, what is at issue. Does Aquinas, following Augustine, posit "the knowledge of the soul through itself, the inner and obscure experience of myself, through myself?" That is, does the soul have "an habitual or latent knowledge of itself?"[25] De Belloy writes:

> Thomas . . . admits for the soul a "perception" of herself, inseparable from the perception of her act, and which would be her source in a "presence" of this soul to itself, presence sufficient, Thomas says again, for a individual knowledge of self, in so far as it is principle of all the acts on the basis of which the soul effectively "actually" perceives herself.[26]

In this debate Gilson's authoritative study of Augustine supports Gardeil's position that self-knowledge has the requisite anteriority.[27]

[21] Crucially Augustine, *Confessions*, VII. 10. 16. See Hankey (2010). [22] de Belloy (2014), 8–12.
[23] Bergson (1946a), 27. [24] Bergson (1946a), 49–51 [25] Maritain (1944a), 236–237.
[26] de Belloy (2014), 12, citing *Summa theologiae*, I^{a}, q. 87 and the parallel places in his works.
[27] Gilson (1929), 56, 286, 288; see de Belloy (2014), 177–178, notes.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:34:42, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.016

For de Belloy and Gardeil this provides the opening for the supreme Augustinian moment of Thomas' *de Deo*, when, in the mission of the Trinity, itself understood through Augustine, there is gracious inhabitation of the human soul by God in this present life. Thomas' mysticism involves possessing the power to enjoy God and is a direct experiential knowledge the Thomistic opponents of Bergson and Gardeil found very dangerous.[28]

The leading opponent was Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, o.p. (1877–1964), embodying the narrow neo-scholastic rationalism Gilson loathed. He probably had a part in getting Bergson's books placed on the Index. He is a leader of the unnamed Thomist theologians in Gilson's *Le philosophe* who criticize Bergson because they confuse the roles and norms of the philosopher and of Christian theology, do not appreciate the necessity and grandeur of Bergson's purely philosophical accomplishment, and fail to recognize how neo-Thomist rationalism has turned Thomas' teaching on its head.[29] As a layman with distinguished positions in institutions of the French state, Professor Gilson was able to stand up to the ecclesiastical tyrannies in a way the censured priests could not.

Nonetheless, both he and Maritain have problems fitting Bergson's treatment of mysticism in his culminating work, *Les Deux sources de la morale et de la religion* (1932), into their Thomist frameworks. First, it is "philosophy of religion," a combination which, for them, impossibly subjects revelation to philosophy. Then, in it, Bergson, who remains Jewish and a philosopher, treats Christian mysticism as "the complete mysticism," "the secret of creation," which "complete[s] the creation of the human species," in a way that transgresses their nature–grace boundary. Bergson's welcome elevation of Christian mysticism comes with the embarrassing problem that, since the union can only be given by supernatural grace (a point with which Bergson concurs: "This effort is of God, if it is not God himself"), only the Christian faithful can experience it.[30]

Embarrassments of the kind Maritain and Gilson had with Bergson's mysticism may help explain why Pierre Hadot, having discovered in Plotinus "the existence of a purely philosophical mysticism,"[31] was discouraged by his ecclesiastical directors from pursuing it.[32] Jean Trouillard, developing Neoplatonic studies which break down former boundaries,

[28] de Belloy (2014), 14, 17, 53–54, 240.
[29] The parties are named and attacked in Gilson (1988), 27–28, 46–47, 73–74, 93–95, with notes pages 101–111.
[30] Bergson (1935), 220, 227, 234. See Gilson (1960), 123–125, 174–175; Maritain (1944a), 74–100.
[31] Hadot (1960), 126. [32] Hankey (2003), 195.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:34:42, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.016

denies that Plotinian mysticism can be "natural" because: "Plotinus tells us, in effect, that 'the end of the journey' does not consist of grasping a new object, but in the metamorphosis of vision itself." Further, Plotinian mysticism can only be philosophical in the sense of being "one of the conditions necessary to a consummation without a common measure with it. . . . This is not a journey originating in philosophy and going to mysticism. It is more a mysticism which makes use of the philosophical circuit."[33] Elsewhere, Trouillard represents Bergson's mysticism as using philosophy in this way.

In Aquinas' *Summa theologiae* the treatment of *Deus in se* concludes with the Trinity; where Thomas' doctrine is fundamentally Augustine's.[34] That God as Trinity is the principle of all else appears first in the question on the divine missions, the focus of the work of de Belloy and Gardeil. With the gift of God Himself by way of the gracious mission of the Holy Spirit, the *Summa* arrives at the human direct participation in God's own knowing and loving. The divine-human fulfilling activities are those of intellect and will. Aquinas writes:

> God is said to be as the known in the knower and the beloved in the lover. And because, by these acts of knowing and loving, the rational creature by its own activity touches God Himself, according to this special mode, God is not only said to be in the rational creature, but to dwell in him as in his own Temple.[35]

By this new mode of the presence of God, humans "possess" the "power of enjoying a divine Person": "It is the Holy Spirit who is possessed and who inhabits humans. Also it is the Holy Spirit itself which is given and sent."[36] De Belloy writes of the soul to whom this gift comes:

> without leaving its temporal and created condition, [it] receives by grace the Son and Holy Spirit according to the immanent mode in which these persons eternally proceed . . . within the uncreated Trinity, and by which each of them does not cease, in a movement without change, to return to the Father, but also to bring back there, in time and as its final end, the rational creature whom they have chosen for a dwelling place.[37]

He then takes us further by way of Aquinas' earlier treatment of this grace: "this knowing and perception of the divine Person in this gift, which is appropriated to Him and by which He accomplishes a true joining to God

[33] Trouillard (1961a), 438–439. [34] See Hankey (2017).
[35] Aquinas, *Summa theologiae,* Iª q. 43 a. 3 co. [36] Aquinas, *Summa theologiae,* Iª q. 43 a. 3 co.
[37] de Belloy (2014), 13.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:34:42, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.016

according to the mode proper to the Person sent, is a knowing of an experiential kind (*cognitio ista est quasi experimentalis*)."[38]

Although Bergson sought a much more complete reduction of ontology to inner experience, it is not hard to see why those who judged his teaching to be dangerous were not keen to have this conclusion of Aquinas' theology uncovered. By hermeneutics of this kind, inspired by Bergson, the defense the Roman church had erected against modern subjectivity seemed betrayed. However, it was not Bergson's treatments of religion, morality, and mysticism which first attracted his huge following.

For Gilson, Professor Bergson was a philosophical father and "the Bergsonian revelation had come to an end in 1907, date of *L'Évolution créatrice,*" twenty-five years before *The Two Sources of Morality and Religion*.[39] He was a student in Paris along with Maritain, and many others who were to be Bergsonian converts, during a time of extraordinary liberal openness in philosophy. Then, the Sorbonne was "le désert du scientism," where, in a cemetery of metaphysics, materialist positivism and mechanist determinism ruled. Crossing Rue Saint-Jacques to the Collège de France, "the sole and unique teaching institution of the state which was at the same time for us a place of free teaching" brought, with Bergson, liberation to metaphysical philosophy.[40]

"Le positivisme était défait par un esprit plus positif encore que le sien"[41]

Bergson's philosophical starting point was the natural sciences, and, very exactly, their actual state, which, especially in the cases of physics and biology, he studied laboriously, discerning what were for him essential advances. His spiritual positivism continued on from natural and psychological empirical sciences, enabling his metaphysics beyond them.

Étienne Gilson recognized what French Thomism and metaphysics generally owed to Professor Bergson:

> A metaphysician . . . who, looking at the world, and telling what he sees, leaves in minds a renewed image . . . by penetrating further into the intimacy of being (l'être). Bergson did it; and he did it under our eyes, in our presence, in a manner so simple that we were astonished that we were

[38] de Belloy (2014), 13, quoting Aquinas, *Scriptum super Sententiis*, lib. 1 d. 14 q. 2 a. 2 ad 3. See de Belloy (2016), 74–79.
[39] Gilson (1960), 122.
[40] Gilson (1960), 27–48, 134. Grogin (1988), 1–35, 69–105, 107–174.
[41] Gilson (1960), 132.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:34:42, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.016

> not able to do it ourselves. He was introducing us into a new world to the degree that he was discovering it himself. No speech will be sufficient to express the admiration, the gratitude, the affection which we felt for him, and which we keep for him.[42]

Metaphysics is necessary. "It is impossible to have 'scholastic' theology without philosophy." But it does not create the diverse philosophies it uses; it finds them ready made.[43] When Christian theology stands on its own ground in revelation, it gives philosophers their proper independence; theology that interferes in what belongs to philosophy is disordered. Celebrating and defending Bergson required keeping the categories straight. This was just what the ecclesiastical authorities, and Maritain initially, had failed to do. Gilson wrote:

> The theologians acted towards Bergson as philosophers when their philosophy was only able to be the philosophy of theologians. But, Bergson was not a Christian. Judging him in the name of Christian philosophy was to impose on him duties which were not his. It was to exact from this philosophical intelligence, perhaps the purest the world had known since Plotinus, tasks which, as with the pagan, it was not able to discharge.[44]

Singling out Plotinus here belongs to Gilson's knowledge of a plurality of philosophies, usually pagan, used by the diverse medieval Catholic theologies, and of a plurality of Christian philosophies. Augustine's Plotinian theology dominated Latin Christendom for 800 years. The Church chose later to elevate Aquinas, and Gilson rejoiced in what seemed to him to be part of its infallible teaching,[45] but, Augustinian and other theologies remained, and even absorbed and modified Thomism. The history Gilson studied, when looked at with his scientific distinctions, prevented the Catholic condemnation of Bergson as a philosopher for what he held in common with Plotinus. In fact, Gilson's Existential Thomism owed much to Bergson's intuition, but without the Augustinian/Plotinian inward turn: "the apprehension of *esse* (*l'être*) by the intellect consists of a direct seeing of the concept of *esse* (*l'être*) in any sensible given."[46]

In many regards, Gilson's relation to his teacher Bergson (whom he classed among his "betters"),[47] his understanding of the difference and connection between philosophy and revealed theology, and, thus, of the jurisdiction of ecclesiastical authority, were the opposite of Maritain's. At a Thomist Congress in Rome in 1950, accosted by Father

[42] Gilson (1960), 122. [43] Gilson (1960), 126. [44] Gilson (1960), 139.
[45] Hankey (1998), 179–181. [46] Gilson (1939), 215. [47] Gilson (1988), 156.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:34:42, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.016

Garrigou-Lagrange, Gilson responded to what seemed to be a threat to put his works on the Index: "If you do that, I'll walk out of the Congress and be back in Paris the same day."[48] In contrast, Maritain, when inappropriately criticizing Bergson's philosophy using the criteria of Catholic theology, is frequently the mouthpiece of Garrigou and other enforcers of Thomist orthodoxy.[49]

In 1901 the metaphysical vacuity of French philosophy provoked a vow of mutual suicide by Maritain and his future wife from which they were saved by Bergson's attacks on positivism, mechanism, and materialism.[50] They passed rapidly from devotion to Bergson to Catholicism and Thomism.[51] By 1913 Maritain had established himself as an intellectual power and the chief public proponent of neo-Thomism in France by lectures critical of Bergson from the standpoint of "Christian philosophy" at the Institut Catholique de Paris. Maritain seemed to feel the need for a support for his religious faith that the philosopher could not give, and lacked the reticence which would have matched Bergson's reserve and courtesy. What Gilson writes about his own relations to their common "maître" contains an implicit criticism of Maritain's. In contrast to the philosopher poet, the historian was not required to apologize for the ways he stood up for the truth (as he supposed it) against him.[52]

In their later years, however, Gilson and Maritain come close to a common judgment of Bergson and they share an appreciation of his empiricism in philosophy. Bergson brought philosophy into accord with the best natural science.[53] Gilson wrote:

> If we speak of Aristotle himself . . . no philosopher will more resemble him than Bergson by his predisposition for empirical knowledge, the care with which he tested so as to assure himself from the first of a hold on reality such as science understands it, and finally, the care which he took to confront his conclusions with the concrete facts on which they were said to be founded. . . . When the moment came for him to take up philosophy of religion, Bergson asked himself first, what does experience say? . . . After the new champion entered the lists, the denial of metaphysics in the name of modern science found itself counterattacked by the contrary affirmations of a metaphysics situated on the exact lines of development of this same science. Positivism was defeated by a mentality more positivist than itself.[54]

[48] Gilson (1988), note 7.
[49] Maritain (1932b), 855–856; Gilson (1960), 108, 139–140, 144–148, 174–178; de Belloy (2014), 54 and 240.
[50] Sweet (2008). [51] Grogin (1988), 142, 158–168. [52] Maritain (1944a), 99–100.
[53] Gilson (1960), 131; see Maritain (1944a), 55–57, and Grogin (1988), 1–35.
[54] Gilson (1960), 128–132. See also Maritain (1944a), 47.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:34:42, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.016

By the interior experience of quality, Bergson smashed the determinism of quantity and all the rest followed:

> Psychological determinism eliminated from mind, liberty restored to its rights . . . and this observed, perceived . . . the soul finding again its proper existence and liberated from matter; mechanical determinism, the first article of faith of scientism, reduced to its right place in nature . . . finally, the world conceived as a work of creative evolution, source of inventions ceaselessly reborn, itself a pure duration, the progress of which leaves behind it matter as a by-product.[55]

Maritain gives the same account of the method also as a result of late and long reflection on his maître. Bergson did not actually produce a metaphysical system: "Bergson revived the worth and dignity of metaphysics in the minds of his listeners . . . when he said, with an unforgettable emphasis . . . 'it is in the *absolute* that we live and move and have our being,' it was enough that he should thus awaken in them a desire for metaphysics."[56] As Gilson also maintained, the point of departure was the intuition of duration. Maritain quotes from a letter of Bergson to Harald Höffding:

> Any summary of my views . . . [must] take as its starting point . . . and continually revert to . . . the very center of the doctrine: the intuition of duration. The representation of a multiplicity of "reciprocal penetration," altogether different from numerical multiplicity – the representation of a heterogeneous, qualitative, creative duration – was my point of departure, and the point to which I have continually returned.[57]

Crucially, this is for Bergson an introspective intuition of our psychic life, which is also life's self-creation.

The Old and the New Metaphysics

Bergson found in Plotinus not only a "dynamic schema"[58] which corresponded to his own understanding of reality, but also what for him comprised the most fundamental error of the metaphysical tradition, viz. the ignorance of the difference between intellect and the fluidity of reality. In consequence, life and movement are misrepresented in the fixity intellect gives its objects and seeks as its goal.

[55] Gilson (1960), 134. [56] Maritain (1944a), 47. [57] Maritain (1944a), 48–49.
[58] Mossé-Bastide (1959), 8.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:34:42, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.016

The old metaphysics originates in the contradictions of intellect:

> Metaphysics dates from the day when Zeno of Elea pointed out the inherent contradictions of movement and change, as our intellect represents them. To surmount these difficulties ... metaphysics was led to seek the reality of things above time ... outside what our senses and consciousness perceive. As a result it could be nothing but a more or less artificial arrangement of concepts, a hypothetical construction. ... [W]hat it did in reality was merely to take a full and mobile experience ... and to substitute for it a fixed extract ... a system of abstract general ideas.[59]

Plotinus gives the concluding result of Greek intellectualism:

> Action was a weakened contemplation, duration a false, deceptive, and mobile image of immobile eternity, the Soul a fall of the Idea. The whole of that philosophy which begins with Plato and ends with Plotinus is the development of a principle that we should formulate thus: "There is more in the immutable than in the moving, and one passes from the stable to the unstable by a simple diminution." Now the contrary is the truth.[60]

None of the Greek philosophers expressed the opposition of speculation and action more forcefully than Plotinus:

> faithful to the spirit of Plato, he thought that the discovery of truth demanded a conversion of the mind ... Correcting one's attention consisted of transporting oneself immediately into a world different from the one we inhabit, in developing other faculties of perception from the senses and consciousness.[61]

In this mistake Kant shared, but, finding that intellectual intuition did not exist, Kant decided that metaphysics itself was impossible.

Because considering the relation of self-knowledge and life requires examining the relation of the momentary to extension, Bergson's new beginning and new metaphysics start from the advances of contemporary science. Modern physics:

> rests altogether on a substitution of time-length for time-invention. ... [P]arallel to this physics, a second kind of knowledge ought to have grown up, which could have retained what physics allowed to escape. ... This second kind of knowledge would have ... called upon the mind to renounce its most cherished habits. It is within becoming that it would have transported us by an effort of sympathy. ... the moments of time,

[59] Bergson (1946a), 16–17, see 166–167; (1972), 716–717; (1995), I, 213–218.
[60] Bergson (1946a), 227–228. [61] Bergson (1946a), 163–164.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:34:42, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.016

> which are only arrests of our attention, would no longer exist . . . it is the very flux of the real that we should be trying to follow.[62]

This metaphysics, which results from the creative intuition complementing and completing modern scientific intelligence, is a different kind of knowing with a profoundly different purpose. Bergson continues:

> The other knowledge, if it is possible, is practically useless, it will not extend our empire over nature, it will even go against certain natural aspirations of the intellect; but, if it succeeds, it is reality itself that it will hold in a firm and final embrace. Not only may we thus complete the intellect and its knowledge of matter by accustoming it to install itself within the moving, but by developing also another faculty, complementary to the intellect, we may open a perspective on the other half of the real.[63]

The relevance of intuition's kind of knowledge to contemporary questions about the environment is evident. Taking up some of these Michael Bennett draws upon the hermeneutics of Bergson's revivifying disciple Gilles Deleuze (1925–95). Deleuze puts strikingly the necessary interconnection of science and the metaphysics it demands for Bergson:

> He thought that the Absolute has two "halves," to which science and metaphysics correspond. Thought divides into two paths in a single impetus, one toward matter, its bodies and movements, the other towards spirit, its qualities and changes. . . . [W]hen movement is related to "any instant whatever": it demands a new metaphysics which now only takes into account immanent and constantly varying durations. For Bergson, duration becomes the metaphysical correlate of modern science.[64]

A virtue of Deleuze's representation of Bergson is the manner the interconnection of the opposed is depicted, not only of these two halves of the Absolute, but also of unity and multiplicity, as well as of cutting up and intersection. The last belongs to the method of intuition which replaces dialectic, most importantly, Hegel's. Deleuze maintains that, in his opposition to dialectic, Bergson is in accord with Plato.[65]

At this point the other side of Bergson's Plotinus emerges. As opposed to the reification of oppositions, Bergson saw also how Plotinus united them in one movement, in the way both Deleuze and Trouillard understand Neoplatonism. Trying to approximate an idea of Spinoza's, Bergson pulls much together when he wrote:

[62] Bergson (1911), 342. [63] Bergson (1911), 343. [64] Deleuze (1991), 116.
[65] Deleuze (1991), 44–45 and 115–117.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:34:42, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.016

> the feeling of a coincidence between the act by which our mind knows truth perfectly, and the operation by which God engenders it; the idea that the conversion of the Alexandrians, when it becomes complete, is indistinguishable from their procession, that when man, sprung from divinity, succeeds in returning to it, he perceives that what he had at first taken to be two opposed movements of coming and going are in fact a single movement.[66]

Henry Duméry (1920–2012), one of the Neoplatonic radicals associated with Trouillard, uses this passage to unite Bergson with the Augustinian philosopher Maurice Blondel (1861–1949). Both draw together conversion and procession, ascent and descent, thought and being, will and knowledge in a Plotinian logic.

Duméry writes of: "this interior reading of the creative plan realised in the thickness of the objective series. It becomes constitutive of being because, in the Plotinian manner, it finds being as the trace of the One."[67] Elsewhere he draws Trouillard in when explaining the two-sided single movement:

> Jean Trouillard gives the true formula: "consciousness realises itself by *detouring* from its origin, thought by *returning* toward it."... The first is procession, the second conversion. But there is no consciousness without thought and no thought without consciousness, at least for the terms that "proceed." Thus, we can understand the solidarity, through the alternate (more profoundly: *simultaneous*) mutual promotion of procession and conversion.[68]

Crucially, with Trouillard, his associates, and interlocutors like Deleuze, we have a reinterpretation of Neoplatonism through an understanding of the First Principle that does not put it on one side of a matter–mind, perception–intellect duality, but sees it as founding and beyond both. By his reduction of intellect Bergson anticipates features of their understanding.

Deleuze sees the transcendence of the One. He writes of Plotinus

> The participated does not in fact enter into what participates in it. What is participated remains in itself; it is participated insofar as it produces, and produces insofar as it gives, but it has no need to leave itself to give or produce. ... [T]he One is necessarily above its gifts ... it gives what does not belong to it, or is not what it gives.[69]

[66] Bergson (1946a), 133–134. [67] Duméry (1948), 113–114.
[68] Duméry (1964), 96, note 35, quoting Trouillard (1955), 96. [69] Deleuze (1990), 170–171.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:34:42, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.016

This transcendent presence enables the mutuality of gathering or conversion and explication or procession we looked at in Bergson, Duméry, and Trouillard. Deleuze explains "*complicare* and *explicare*":

> All things are present to God, who complicates them. God is present to all things, which explicate and implicate him. A co-presence of two correlative movements comes to be substituted for a series of successive subordinate emanations. ... An equality of being is substituted for a hierarchy of hypostases; for things are present to the same Being, which is itself present in things.[70]

With this equality relative to the transcendent–immanent One, the intelligible is relativized. Trouillard writes:

> Plotinus returns to the One through a severe negation, or, better, he gives way to a purifying motion which, springing out of the ecstasy hidden in each of us, detaches it first from the empirical world, and then from intellectual vision. ... If Plotinus ultimately saves nature and the forms, he keeps them at a two-fold distance. He goes to the divinity by night."[71]

This enables us to retrieve Bergson without his opposition to Plotinus as a Platonic idealist. The mystical Plotinus taken up by a mystical Bergson provides the opening to "environmental aesthetic." Before treating this, we must look at where the union of modern science and Bergsonian metaphysics is trending.

When modern physics and evolutionary biology are properly complemented by Bergson's intuition and metaphysics, whereby mind "installs itself with matter, mind will complete itself, and the cosmos will evolve through mind's movement." Developing another faculty, complementary to the intellect, "we may open a perspective on the other half of the real":

> For, as soon as we are confronted with true duration, we see that it means creation, and that, if that which is being unmade endures, it can only be because it is inseparably bound to what is making itself. Thus will appear the necessity of a continual growth of the universe, I should say of a life of the real. And thus will be seen in a new light the life which we find on the surface of our planet, a life directed the same way as that of the universe, and the inverse of materiality.[72]

Creative intuition enables humans to enter and advance the evolutionary process. Together matter descends and life and consciousness ascend. By grasping them in their essence "by adopting their movement, we understand how the rest of reality is derived from them. Evolution

[70] Deleuze (1990), 175. [71] Trouillard (1965), 23–25. [72] Bergson (1911), 343.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:34:42, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.016

appears . . . [W]ithin the evolutionary movement we place ourselves." This is "the true function of philosophy." It is "not only the turning of the mind homeward, the coincidence of human consciousness with the living principle whence it emanates, a contact with the creative effort: it is the study of becoming in general, it is true evolutionism and consequently the true continuation of science."[73]

Part of the inspiration for this vision of a cosmos evolving through mind's advance comes from Bergson's reflection on the Plotinian *logos spermatikos*. In a well-known note in *Creative Evolution,* he wrote: "while the *logos* of this philosopher is a generating and informing power, an aspect or a fragment of the *psuchē*, on the other hand Plotinus sometimes speaks of it as of a discourse." Then, the relation Bergson establishes between "extension" and "detension" resembles Plotinus "when he makes extension not indeed an inversion of original Being, but an enfeeblement of its essence, one of the last stages of the procession."[74] Writing of an article published in 1902, the same year as Bergson's course of lectures on the VIth *Ennead*, Mossé-Bastide notes the exact parallelism drawn between intellectual creations and living ones: both are, as with Plotinian procession, a passage from unity to multiplicity:

> The intellectual creation is, in effect, presented there as the progressive realization of a plan of the whole, called a "dynamic schema" . . . "This operation, which is that of life, consists of a gradual passage from the less to the more realized, from the intensive to the extensive, from a reciprocal implication of the parts to their juxtaposition. Intellectual effort is of this kind."[75]

Another part of the inspiration for Bergson's vision of an evolving cosmos is the Plotinian mystical ascent directed toward the undefined and undefinable. Thus the conclusion of *The Two Sources*, where the human species is made complete in Christian mysticism, is the appropriate completion of *Creative Evolution*.[76] Mysticism is the *raison d'être* of Bergson's system. How does that stand to Plotinian *henosis*?

Mysticism: Opening or Concluding?

Bergson was critical of Plotinian mysticism for the same reason that he criticized the old metaphysics: its absolutizing of intellect. In the work he makes mysticism his own ultimate, he writes: "the philosophy of

[73] Bergson (1911), 369–370. [74] Bergson (1911), 210 note. [75] Mossé-Bastide (1959), 8.
[76] Bergson (1935), 256.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:34:42, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.016

Plotinus . . . is unquestionably mystic."[77] The religious and mystical are elements within the Greek philosophical tradition, and Plotinus thought himself to be "merely condensing all Greek philosophy."[78] Can this final stage of Greek philosophy reach, and does it in fact attain, complete mysticism?

For Bergson, the end of mysticism is "the establishment of a contact, consequently of a partial coincidence, with the creative effort which life itself manifests. This effort is of God, if it is not God himself."[79] The mystic transcends the conditions that materiality imposes on humanity and extends the divine action. Complete mysticism is rare and would be action, creation, and love. Bergson situates Plotinus' mysticism by means of a comparison with Moses at the end of his life:

> It was granted to him to look upon the promised land, but not to set foot upon its soil. He went as far as ecstasy, a state in which the soul feels itself, or thinks it feels itself, in the presence of God, being irradiated with His light . . . he did not reach the point where, as contemplation is engulfed in action, the human will becomes one with the divine will.[80]

What holds Plotinus back is "Greek intellectualism": "Action is a weakening of contemplation."[81] Thus, "In short, mysticism, in the absolute sense in which we have agreed to take the word, was never attained by Greek thought."[82]

I shall come back to these judgments about Plotinus, which Jean Trouillard turns on their head, but, before that we need to have a renewed look at Bergson's own mysticism, which matches and completes his own metaphysics. For this I turn to Michael Bennett's "Bergson's Environmental Aesthetic." With help from Deleuze, who understands Neoplatonism in dialogue with Trouillard, Bennett represents Bergson's mysticism within a more radical understanding of the transcendence of the unparticipated principle than is Bergson's own.

Bennett gives us Bergson's criticism of evolutionary science in *Creative Evolution* for treating "everything, including living organisms, in terms of purely mechanical schema." Intelligence tends "to 'cut up' (*découper*) reality in order to suit its own ends, its own designs and practical interests." *The Two Sources* exposes the closed morality belonging to intelligence: "just as intelligence exploits inert matter to pursue its own ends, 'closed morality' pursues similar goal-directed pragmatic activity" at the level of

[77] Bergson (1935), 219. [78] Bergson (1935), 219. [79] Bergson (1935), 220.
[80] Bergson (1935), 221. [81] Bergson (1935), 221. [82] Bergson (1935), 221.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:34:42, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.016

collectives. Beyond the criticism, Bennett finds Bergson's thought open to an environmental ethic, "an aesthetic one": "a foundation for an enhanced ecological consciousness, a condition for a community between humans and non-humans." Bergson's representation of the mystic individual: "indicates that through an individual's artistic or religious consciousness open morality imitates the creative evolution of life."[83]

Bennett brings us to "the second kind of knowledge" we looked at above: "Bergson seeks a kind of knowledge liberated from the finality of usefulness. And this is explicitly how he characterizes what it means to turn from 'intellect' to 'intuition'."[84] Bergson frees inert matter from its negative characterization as disorderly, the correlative of the assumption of the underived givenness of intellect. To subdue it Bergson aims "to denaturalize intellect."[85] To do this matter and intellect would both need to have their origin in a transcendent principle. We are reminded of Proclus, especially as interpreted by Trouillard. For the Diadochos, reality "is traversed by a series of vertical lines, which like rays diverge from the same universal center and refer back to it the furthermost and the most diverse appearances."[86] This Bergson inaugurates twentieth-century French Neoplatonism by immediately connecting the first and the last.

To advance his argument, Bennett takes up from Deleuze Bergson's demand of philosophy that it overcome the human condition by reinserting us "in the Whole or universal consciousness." This demands a mysticism which shares more with Plotinus' than Bergson allows. The élan vital will play the role of the unparticipated One, transcendently immanent.

Bennett follows Deleuze's isomorphism between *Creative Evolution* and *The Two Sources*. In the former, intuition reinserts us into the Whole, in the latter, reinsertion involves "the shift from 'static' to 'dynamic' morality. The isomorphism of the two . . . first in the context of the discussion of matter, and later in the context of the discussion of morality, opens up the possibility of reading Bergson as advocating an ecological ethic."[87] Moving to this requires a transformation of the mind. The predominance of intelligence in humans produces the forms of Bergson's "closed communities" and "static" religion. These only "combat egoism with a kind of *second-order egoism*," or social intellect. "Bergson portrays the turn from 'static' to 'dynamic' morality as consisting exactly in [a] shift of consciousness, as turning back for fresh

[83] Bennett (2012), 67–68. [84] Bennett (2012), 76. [85] Bennett (2012), 78.
[86] Trouillard (1965), 25. [87] Bennett (2012), 81.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:34:42, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.016

impetus, in the direction whence that impetus came. . . . Not through intelligence . . . [but through] intuition."[88]

The fresh impetus of intuition enables the reinsertion. "Bergson thinks that only *intuitive* individuals can accomplish this change in consciousness."[89] This yields an "Individualist Holism." These individuals are moved by an impulse which Deleuze identifies with the élan vital.[90] Bennett interprets Bergson:

> the privilege of individuals lies in the ability to "get back into" the creative impulse, that is to *participate* in the creative actualization of the virtual whole. In other words, individual humans can become agents of, or as Bergson says, a "ground" for, the élan vital. In so doing, such individuals "impel human nature forward" in the sense that they change it, give it new and unpredictable forms.[91]

For Plotinus, the mystic surpasses the human. He wrote of the good man: "[He] will not live the life of the good man which civic virtue requires. He will leave that beneath him, and will take up instead another life, that of the gods."[92] Having become intellect on the way to the One, a different relation to intellect than the one of which Bergson exposed the limits, the mystic lives in Intellect's procession from and return to its source. Bennett's Bergsonian mystic individual, in unity with the élan vital, is inside an analogous surpassing: "no longer organized along the lines of social groups (families, ethnicities, races, nations), nor even along the lines of *species* (*homo sapiens* vs. the world)."[93]

For Bergson union is completed when human will is united to the impulse with which God is identified: love.[94] I am reluctant to call that feeling. It is not feeling for Plotinus. Bennett rightly points to the texts on God as Love and the union of the mystic with the emotion above intellect.[95] Is this feeling? Bergson speaks of the "simplified, unified, intensified" individual being "charged with thought."[96] Moreover Bergson had written earlier of another *epekeina*. The mystic's love of humanity belongs neither to feeling nor to reason, but to their source – "God's love for His handiwork":

> Coinciding with . . . the source of everything, it would yield up, to anyone who knew how to question it, the secret of creation. It is still more

[88] Bennett (2012), 82–83. [89] Bennett (2012), 83. [90] Bennett (2012), 83
[91] Bennett (2012), 84.
[92] Plotinus, *Ennead*, I. 2. 7. 23–28; see *Ennead*, V. 3. 4. 8–12 (Armstrong, 1966–1988).
[93] Bennett (2012), 85. [94] Bergson (1935), 231. [95] Bergson (1935), 252.
[96] Bergson (1935), 252.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:34:42, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.016

> metaphysical than moral in its essence. What it wants to do, with God's help, is to complete the creation of the human species . . . Or to use words which mean . . . the same thing in different terms: its direction is exactly that of the vital impetus; it is this impetus itself, communicated in its entirety to exceptional men, who in their turn would fain impart it to all humanity, and by a living contradiction change into creative effort that created thing which is a species.[97]

Bennett's use of the language of "affectivity" serves well. Thus "Bergsonian open morality enables us to imagine a biotic community based on affectivity, which draws on the forces of what Bergson calls cosmic life."[98] One with the self-differentiating source of life, the mystic individual is no more a mere human than was Plotinus.

Trouillard judged that the position of Plotinus on the relation of *praxis* and contemplation was not well articulated by Bergson. When comparing Neoplatonic procession with creation, Trouillard writes of the former: "The continuity of the procession rests on a permanent *communication* of the processive power of the One. Every ontological point participates in its fecundity to the point of engendering itself and of engendering beings similar, or inferior, to itself." He asks whether the Christian can conceive of a delegating of the creative power? "One is tempted to respond affirmatively by evoking Bergson's celebrated formula interpreting Christian mysticism: 'Creation will appear [. . .] as an enterprise of God for creating creatures, for joining himself to the beings worthy of his love'."[99]

Trouillard's implicit and explicit criticism of Bergson's representation of Plotinus comes from a difference over the relation of contemplation and action in Plotinus. Trouillard tells us action as *energeia* "is identical to contemplation . . . It is enveloped in perfection and flows from self-presence." In contrast, as *praxis*, action is opposed to thought, as an application of the soul to the things of the sensible world, for the sake of transforming them. This too is also born from contemplation, but "instead of being the tranquil fruit of a superabundant contemplation, this form of action draws the powers back to a thought that is already infirm and divides the soul. It is because of this that it is necessary to say that it is . . . 'a weakening of contemplation'." Trouillard concludes: "This is the paradox of Plotinus, which has not always been articulated well, even by Bergson. The action which is despised is an appearance of action."[100]

[97] Bergson (1935), 252, 234–235. [98] Bennett (2012), 90, 92, and 94.
[99] Trouillard (2014b), 91, translation by Matthew Furlong. Trouillard is quoting Bergson (1935), 255.
[100] Trouillard (1955), 41–42, translation by Elizabeth Curry-King.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:34:42, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.016

Trouillard makes the same point elsewhere, referring again to the comparison between Plotinus and Moses. Bergson "did not arrive at the end of the Alexandrian's thought," who: "does not disdain one who is authentically active, that is, one who creates. He unmasks action that believes itself productive and free, while it is but agitation and servitude, because it does not have its center in spiritual self-collection." He judges that if Plotinus "points to some necessity, it is not to bring the spirit back to nature, but, on the contrary, to discover beneath this necessity a more autonomous spontaneity than calculation and choice."[101]

Of this we may be certain, both the One-Good of Plotinus and the élan vital of Bergson are the autonomous spontaneity of abundant plenitude rather than calculation and choice. What has the closest union with them will share this life.

REFERENCES

Armstrong, A. H. (ed. and trans.) (1966–1988) *Plotinus, The Enneads*, 7 vols., Cambridge, MA.

Bennett, M. J. (2012) "Bergson's Environmental Aesthetic," *Environmental Philosophy* 9: 67–94.

Bergson, H. (1903) *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, authorized trans. T. E. Hulme [2nd ed., 1912] New York.

(1911) *Creative Evolution*, authorized trans. A. Mitchell, New York.

(1935) *The Two Sources of Morality and Religion*, trans. R. A. Audra and C. Brereton, New York.

(1946a) *The Creative Mind*, trans. M. L. Andison, New York.

(1946b) "La Pensée et le Mouvant," translated as "Introduction" in Bergson (1946a), 9–106.

(1946c) "Philosophical Intuition," in Bergson (1946a), 126–152.

(1946d) "The Life and Work of Ravaisson," in Bergson (1946a), 261–300 [Appeared first in *Académie des Sciences Morales et Politiques* 1904].

(1959) *Bergson et nous: Bulletin de la Société française de philosophie, Actes du Xe congrès des sociétés de philosophie de langue française*, num. spéc., 3.

(1972) *Mélanges*, Paris.

(1995) *Cours*, 3 vols., Paris.

Bréhier, É. (1949–1955) "Images plotiniennes, images bergsoniennes," *Les études bergsoniennes* 2: 105–128 [repr. in Bréhier, *Études de philosophie antique*, Paris, 292–307].

de Belloy, C. (2014) *Dieu comme soi-même. Connaissance de soi et connaissance de dieu selon Thomas d'Aquin: l'herméneutique d'Ambroise Gardeil*, Paris.

[101] Trouillard (1969), 899, translation by Philippe Mesly.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:34:42, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.016

(2016) *La visite de Dieu: Essai sur les missions des personnes divines selon saint Thomas d'Aquin*, Geneva.
Deleuze, G. (1990) "Immanence and the Historical Components of Expression," in *Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza*, trans. M. Joughin, New York, 169–186.
(1991) *Bergsonism*, trans. H. Tomlinson and B. Habberjam, New York.
Duméry, H. (1948) *La Philosophie de l'action: essai sur l'intellectualisme blondelien*, Paris.
(1964) *The Problem of God in Philosophy of Religion: A Critical Examination of the Category of The Absolute and the Scheme of Transcendence*, trans. C. Courtney, Evanston, IL.
Gandillac, M. de (1973) "Le Plotin de Bergson," *Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie*, 23: 173–183 [repr. in J. Trouillard, et al., *Études néoplatoniciennes,* Neuchâtel 1973, 97–109]
Gilson, É. (1929) *Introduction à l'étude de saint Augustin*, Paris.
(1939) *Réalisme thomiste et critique de la connaissance*, Paris.
(1960) *Le philosophe et la théologie*, Paris.
(1988) *Letters of Étienne Gilson to Henri de Lubac*, with commentary by H. de Lubac, trans. M.E. Hamilton, San Francisco.
Grogin, R. C. (1988) *The Bergsonian Controversy in France 1900–1914*, Calgary.
Hadot, P. (1960) *Le philosophe et la théologie*, Paris.
(2001) *La philosophie comme manière de vivre: Entretiens avec Jeanne Carlier et Arnold I. Davidson*, Paris.
Hankey, W. J. (1998) "From Metaphysics to History, from Exodus to Neoplatonism, from Scholasticism to Pluralism: the fate of Gilsonian Thomism in English-speaking North America," *Dionysius* 16: 157–188.
(2003) "Philosophy as Way of Life for Christians? Iamblichan and Porphyrian Reflections on Religion, Virtue, and Philosophy in Thomas Aquinas," *Laval Théologique et Philosophique* 59: 193–224.
(2006) *One Hundred Years of Neoplatonism in France: A Brief Philosophical History*, Leuven/Paris/Dudley, MA [published together with *Levinas and the Greek Heritage*, by J.-M. Narbonne].
(2008) "The Ineffable Immediately Incarnate: Interplay between 20th century French Neoplatonism and Heidegger," *Heidegger and Religion: from Neoplatonism to the Posthuman*, Oxford University Research Archive: http://ora.ouls.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid%3A05c4da8d-d3f0-44c2-b29c-12f8392b00e9/.
(2010) *Recurrens in te unum:* Neoplatonic Form and Content in Augustine's *Confessions*," in P. Cary, J. Doody, and K. Paffenroth (eds.) *Augustine and Philosophy, Augustine in Conversation: Tradition and Innovation*, New York, 127–144.
(2017) "The Conversion of God in Aquinas' *Summa theologiae:* Being's Trinitarian and Incarnational Self Disclosure," *Dionysius* 35: 132–70.
Janicaud, Dominique (1969) *Une généalogie du spiritualisme français. Aux sources du bergsonisme: Ravaisson et la métaphysique*, La Haye.
Maritain, J. (1932a) *Distinguer pour unir: ou, les degrès du savoir*, Paris.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:34:42, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.016

(1932b) Annexe V. "Sur un ouvrage du Père A. Gardeil," in Maritain (1932a), 855–867.
(1944a) *Redeeming the Time*, trans. H. L. Binese, London.
(1944b) "The Metaphysics of Bergson," in Maritain (1944a), 46–73.
(1944c) "The Bergsonian Philosophy of Morality and Religion," in Maritain (1944a), 74–100.
(1944d) "The Natural Mystical Experience and the Void," in Maritain (1944a), 225–255.
Mossé-Bastide, R.-M. (1959) *Bergson et Plotin*, Paris.
Sweet, W. (2008) "Jacques Maritain," *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/maritain/ (accessed 19 November 2018).
Trouillard, J. (1955) *La purification plotinienne*, Paris.
(1961a) "Valeur critique de la mystique plotinienne," *Revue Philosophique de Louvain*, 59/63: 431–444.
(1961b) "The Logic of Attribution in Plotinus," *International Philosophical Quarterly* 1: 125–138.
Trouillard, J. (ed. and trans.) (1965) *Proclus, Éléments de Théologie*, Paris.
(1969) "Le néoplatonisme de Plotin à Damascios," *Histoire de la philosophie I, Encyclopédie de la Pléïade*, Paris, 886–935.
(1972) *L'Un et l'Âme selon Proclos*, Paris.
(2014a) *Raison et Mystique, Études néoplatoniciennes*, ed. M. Goy, Paris.
(2014b) "Procession néoplatonicienne et création judéo-chrétienne," in *Néoplatonisme, Mélanges offerts à Jean Trouillard*, Fontenay-aux-Roses 1981 [repr. in Trouillard (2014a), 79–108].
(2014c) "Sagesse bergsonienne sagesse plotinienne," *Bergson et nous*: *Bulletin de la Société française de philosophie*, *Actes du Xe congrès des sociétés de philosophie de langue française*, 1959, numéro spécial. 307–10 [repr. in Trouillard (2014a), 155–158].
Trouillard, J. and Mossé-Bastide, R.-M. (2014) "Sources et histoire du bergonisme," extrait de la discussion, *Bergson et Nous*, repr. in Trouillard (2014a), 159–162.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:34:42, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.016

CHAPTER 11

Plotinus and Modern Scholarship: From Ficino to the Twenty-First Century

Kevin Corrigan

Introduction

The history of modern scholarship on Plotinus has been to a large extent the history of the establishment of a reliable text and of understanding Plotinus on his own terms in the context of the third century CE.[1] But the immediate problem for any modern reader is that to carry out this project, one has to go back to the Presocratics, Plato, Aristotle, Hellenistic thought, the Gnostics, as well as sideways and forward into some of the ground-formations of Christian and later Islamic and Jewish thought, and then further into the Medieval world where Plotinus' direct influence was eclipsed or limited, yet indirectly pervasive, and so, finally, into the Renaissance and modern worlds. "Plotinus" is then a peculiar force of thought and practice that tends to leap across boundaries and to stand outside the parameters of conventional experience.

The deepest impulse of the soul, Plotinus says, is for that which is greater than herself,[2] and the Greek Fathers, Augustine, and Dionysius the Areopagite immediately agree with this most intimate, yet transcendent principle. However, "mysticism," and pagan mysticism in particular,[3] cannot be controlled – especially if the impulse for what is greater than oneself leads not to a secular or religious institution but to an infinite God, an infinite uncreated self and, finally, an infinite cosmos, as it did in the cases of Meister Eckhart, Nicholas of Cusa, and Giordano Bruno (on the basic Plotinian principles that the center of all things is everywhere and nowhere,[4] and that there is something in us that has not descended).[5] "Plotinus" might be an ally to Christianity or Islam against the forces of atheism or reductive materialism, but he could also be an ally for the

[1] For this work see primarily Henry (1935), (1938), (1948); Schwyzer (1951); O'Meara (1992); Saffrey (1996); Narbonne, Achard, and Ferroni (2012), ccli–ccxci.
[2] *Ennead* I. 4 [46] 6, 17–18.
[3] For recent treatment of "Platonic Mysticism," Versluis (2017).
[4] Cf. *Ennead* VI. 4–5 [24–25].
[5] Cf. *Ennead* IV. 8 [6] 8.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:36:05, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.017

establishment of an alternative pagan religion, as in the case of Thomas Taylor, or he could become branded by Christian groups after the Reformation as a decadent, oriental aberration – in much the same way, as in more recent times, Harnack and Barth have emphasized the strong divide between the good sense of the Bible and the supposed irrationalisms of Hellenism, or much as the regulative study of form in Kant and the Neo-Kantians radically expunged the mystical from Plato's Forms in favor of Forms as "limit-concepts," "laws" (Cohen) or "hypotheses" (Natorp).[6] "Plotinus," however, is not a Christian or Muslim, but a pagan; in addition, he is altogether mystical – the Forms are not subject to conceptual analysis. He thinks outside of conventional boundaries, especially insofar as one of his principal paradigms of thought is that everything genuinely intelligible is radically holographic, that is, in each thing, everything is virtually contained[7]; such thought, therefore, may have a radical resonance with very different standpoints.

I therefore trace the beginning of modern scholarship on Plotinus to someone who embraced *all* of the above characteristics: the Florentine priest, Marsilio Ficino, who seems to have understood Plotinus profoundly on his own terms and yet simultaneously saw his thought as a *preparatio evangelica.* As Ficino puts it, however strangely, in his preface to the translation of Plotinus: ". . .you should believe that Plato himself is talking about Plotinus when he exclaims – 'This is my Son, my beloved, on whom my favor rests, listen to him'" (Matthew 17: 5; cf. Matt. 3: 17; Mark 1: 11; Luke 8: 12) (Creuzer [1835], xi).[8]

Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries: Text and Translations

For the purposes of this chapter, then, we can say that modern scholarship on Plotinus began with Ficino, Pico della Mirandola, and others in the Renaissance, and particularly with Ficino's magnificent translation of the *Enneads*, published in 1492 (together, of course, with works on Plato, Porphyry, Iamblichus, Proclus, and many other ancient figures).[9] In the Middle Ages of the Western world before the time of Ficino,[10] Plotinus was virtually unknown. None of his works had been translated, and early translations like that of Marius Victorinus in late antiquity had been lost.

[6] On this see Natorp (2004), 9–43, 453–483.
[7] See especially *Ennead* V. 8. [31] 4.
[8] Saffrey (1996), 496. The writer notes that Creuzer here transfers Ficino's biblical citation to a note and replaces it in the main text with his own more theologically neutral passage [S.G.]
[9] For a list of figures, see Laurens (2012), lxxi–lxxxix.
[10] O'Meara (1992), 58–59.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:36:05, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.017

Whether such figures as John Scotus Eriugena or William of Saint-Thierry were actually familiar with Plotinus, Plotinian resonances in these works could well result from Neoplatonic elements in Augustine, Ambrose, Macrobius, Boethius, Dionysius the Areopagite, Maximus the Confessor, Gregory of Nyssa – and, later still, Proclus through the *Liber de Causis*.[11] Such figures, influenced by these indirect sources, include Albert the Great, Bonaventure, William of Auvergne, Vincent of Beauvais, and Meister Eckhart. Some Plotinus could have been read in either Ambrose's sermons or the commentaries on Dionysius by John of Scythopolis. And at least one medieval writer, Hugh Etherian (c. 1166–82), read Plotinus in some form in Constantinople in the twelfth century.[12] Certainly too the Arabic *Theology of Aristotle* and other collections[13] that contain extracts from the *Enneads* were known to the Islamic tradition (Al Kindī,[14] Al Farabī, Ibn Sina [Avicenna], the Brethren of Purity [Ikhwān al-Ṣafā'], and others) and to medieval Jewish writers (Isaac Israeli, Ibn Gabirol, Ibn Ezra), but they were not translated into Hebrew before the sixteenth century. Otherwise, no direct work of Plotinus was available in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.

So the emergence of two manuscripts of Plotinus in the early fifteenth century in Florence was stunning, one acquired by Palla Strozzi, namely, the *Parisinus graecus 1976*, and the other, the *Laurentianus 87, 3*, brought first from Constantinople by Giovanni Aurispa and, after the death of its first owner, Nicolo Nicoli, purchased by Cosimo who, in turn, gave it to Ficino at Careggi in 1462.[15] On this latter manuscript or on a copy made by Johannes Scutiatores – the *Parisinus graecus 1816* – Ficino began work from 1463. While Ficino may have made a copy of the *Parisinus graecus*

[11] The pseudo-Aristotelian *Liber de Causis*, an adaptation of Proclus' Elements of Theology, as detected by Aquinas (cf. *Super Librum de Causis expositio*, Proem. 3. 3–10, Saffrey), can be traced to the Al Kindī circle (died c 866); D'Ancona (2010), 879.

[12] See O'Meara (1992), 59.

[13] Paraphrases of *Enneads* IV–VI (partially collected in an English translation by G. Lewis in Henry–Schwyzer's edition [see §5], II, 1959) include: 1). the so-called *Theology of Aristotle* (why it is attributed to Aristotle is unknown) in long and short, or vulgate, recensions (whose interconnection is unclear) includes a prologue, 142 chapter headings (for *Ennead* IV. 4) and six books of paraphrase for *Enneads* IV–VI (perhaps Porphyry's lost comments and summaries – see Henry [1937]; Schwyzer [1941]; Thillet [1971]; Goulet-Cazé [1982a], 321–323), traced either to a Syriac original or to the translator of Plotinus into Arabic from Syriac, Al Himsī, (Zimmerman [1986], especially at 131) or to Al Kindī himself (D'Ancona [2010], vol. II, 875 n. 2; 2). The *Letter of Divine Science*, attributed wrongly to Al Farabī, includes paraphrases of parts of *Ennead* V; 3). Materials attributed to the "Greek Old Man," paraphrases of *Enneads* IV–VI and, thus, parallel to the *Theology*.

[14] On Al Kindī, see D'Ancona, (2010), 872–884; Adamson (2016), 26–32.

[15] On this and Ficino's library, see Laurens (2012), lxxi–lxxxix, especially lxxvii–lxxix.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:36:05, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.017

1976 before 1471 in Palla Strozzi's library, only the *Laurentianus 87, 3* and its copy, the *Parisinus graecus 1816,* bear several different annotations in his hand. So although he did use other manuscripts (two collections of excerpts from Plotinus (and Plato) in Greek, *Milan, Bibiotheca Ambrosiana, F 19 sup.*, and in Latin, Florence, *Biblioteca Riccardiana* 92 and *Vatican Library, Borg. gr. 22*,[16] these other manuscripts are all dependent upon the *Laurentianus 87, 3*. Consequently, Ficino did not carry out a critical comparison of manuscripts but had to resort to conjectures – *divinatio*, as Saffrey puts it,[17] however brilliant these conjectures may still have been. Of course, we also owe to Ficino's incisive understanding of Plotinus the division of the text into chapters with titles and headings expressing the development of ideas that we use today. His translation of Plotinus with commentary was published in 1492 and was widely used by scholars in Italy and elsewhere, including Giordano Bruno and others. In the sixteenth century it was reprinted five times, and his commentary separately reprinted three more times.

In 1580, Ficino's 1492 Latin translation was used in the *editio princeps* of the Greek text that appeared in Basle under the editorship of Pietro Perna. The text was prepared for Perna by an unknown editor (according to Henry–Schwyzer [see below]), identified by D. O'Meara, on the basis of Perna's preface, fol. 3v and fol. 203v, as Domenico Montesoro of Padua[18]), who consulted four manuscripts.[19]

In 1519, Plotinus also appeared in disguise through the long version of the *Theology of Aristotle* translated into Latin and then incorporated into editions of Aristotle published by A. Jacobus Martin (Lyons, 1578), Joachim Périon (1580), and Claudius Marnius and Johannes Aubrius (Frankfurt, 1593) and in different ways by others. The authorship of the *Theology* was not rejected until Luther (1483–1546) and Pierre de la Ramée (Petrus Ramus: 1515–72) in the sixteenth century, and not traced to Plotinus' *Enneads* until Thomas Taylor in 1812. No vernacular translations of Plotinus seem to have appeared in these centuries, except perhaps for a missing commentary attributed to Paulus Scalichius (1534–75).[20] So the Perna text, together with "Plotinus" in the guise of "Aristotle" – but with lesser consequence, was to prove seminal for the sixteenth up to the nineteenth centuries, centuries that for many

[16] Saffrey (1996), 491. [17] Saffrey (1996), 505. [18] O'Meara (1992), 59.
[19] See Henry (1948), 295–319; H-S[1], 1, Praefatio xxv–xxvi.
[20] For this see O'Meara (1992), 58–59.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:36:05, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.017

reasons – including the ones we noted in our introduction above – were at times unfavorable to Ficino's revival of Plotinus.

From the Sixteenth to the Seventeenth, Eighteenth, and Nineteenth Centuries

In England, Neoplatonism had a major influence upon literature, not only upon Shakespeare (though this is disputed) and Spenser (see Spenser's adaptation of *Ennead* I. 6 in his *Fowre Hymns: Of Beautie*, reprinted in Wallis [1972], 174), but also in the later metaphysical poets who spanned the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (John Donne, George Herbert, Henry Vaughan, Andrew Marvell, Thomas Traherne, etc.). In the seventeenth century, the group known as the Cambridge Platonists (Ralph Cudworth, Henry More, Anne Conway, and others), influenced by Ficino and Agostino Steucho (the first to use the phrase "perennial philosophy") read Plotinus and ancient philosophy in the kind of open-ended "perennial" way we have noted in Ficino above. They wrote in English, but did not translate Plato and Plotinus into English – a task that was left to Thomas Taylor, born a century later in 1758 (–1835). Taylor's efforts to revive Platonism (through the lens of Neoplatonism) as an alternative pagan religion led to his paraphrasing translations of selections of Plotinus (1817 and 1834) and of the complete works of Plato and Aristotle, among other things, that made Plotinus, together with many other ancient texts, available to Blake, Wordsworth and Keats. Coleridge wrote that Taylor had translated Proclus' "difficult Greek into incomprehensible English,"[21] and such judgments together with Taylor's lack of academic credentials limited his influence in England.

Earlier still, the last of the great British Empiricists, George Berkeley (1685–1753), argued that the logical conclusion of empiricism was not the separate reality of matter, but principally the reality of God, spirit, and idea, and Berkeley demonstrates his profound knowledge of Plotinus in his late work *Siris* (1744), which is dedicated, among other things, to extolling the virtues of tar-water. Taylor, like Berkeley, visited America, but whereas Berkeley failed to get funding for the ideal city he planned to establish in Bermuda, Taylor's translations had a major and near-instantaneous influence upon Emerson, Thoreau, Whitman, Emily Dickinson, and others. In Emerson (1803–82) in particular we can see already how a newly emerging

[21] Hutton (2002).

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:36:05, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.017

evolutionary theory could be integrated into a Plotinian/Neoplatonic schema of procession, conversion, and auto-constitution.[22]

Finally, figures like Emerson and Coleridge, on both sides of the Atlantic, were influenced by powerful currents in German thought, despite the generally unfavorable attitude to Plotinus from the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries in Germany (contrast for example Novalis]1772–1801] and Tiedemann [1748–1803], on the one hand, with the hostility of Brentano [1838–1917] on the other). In the seventeenth century, Spinoza (1632–77) and Leibniz (1646–1716) developed opposite views of substance directly or indirectly related to Plotinian principles – God as single total substance versus God as the Monad of monads. Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) was interested in the relation between the sensible and the super-sensible, even if he wanted to eliminate the mystical aspect of Platonism and establish limits for human thinking, which he did in his three critiques, but especially in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Goethe (1749–1842), Schelling (1775–1854), Hölderlin (1770–1843), and Hegel (1770–1831) – the last three room-mates at the Tübinger Stift – all admired Plotinus and transmitted this to the British Idealists and American Transcendentalists. Goethe's studies (1749–1832) of light and color, of the metamorphosis of plants and insects, and Schelling's emphasis on the array of developmental potencies in creative nature are directly or indirectly related to the dynamism and freedom of nature and *logoi* that we see in *Enneads* III. 8 and V. 8 and that we find later in Emerson's view that procession from the top down is intimately connected with the geological record and the emergence of consciousness from the bottom up. Hegel was, of course, known as the "German Proclus," but his dialectic was inspired initially by Plato in *Republic* VIII and given classic pre-modern formulation by Plotinus and Proclus in the productive/developmental models of abiding-procession-return and procession-conversion-autoconstitution.[23]

From the eighteenth to the twentieth centuries, from Brucker (1696–1770) to Zeller (1814–1908), it became commonplace to think of philosophy in terms of developmental "systems" – as one can see in Hegel's *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* – but it might be argued that the tendency to think of the *Enneads* as a "system" of philosophy is a

[22] For this, see Corrigan (2012), 12, 22, 34–36, 68, 74, 110; and more generally on influence in America, Bregman (1990).

[23] This is my own view based on *Republic* 8 563e–564a, but for the difference between later Neoplatonism and Hegelian dialectic, see Wallis (1995), 130–131.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:36:05, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.017

product of German thought in its own times, and at best problematic, if not simply false in the case of Plotinus.[24]

Generally speaking, the nineteenth century resulted in sharp distinctions between an Ur-Plato and a "mystical" Plotinus, on the one hand, and "science" and "mystical" thought on the other. But neither of these views is supported by the facts. In the first case, Plato's legacy pervades the *Enneads* and some of Plotinus' interpretations of Plato are superior to those of modern scholarship.[25] In the second case, while a materialistic, reductionistic view of science is foreign to Plotinus, it is by no means axiomatic that the development of empirical science through Robert Grosseteste, Roger Bacon, and others in the Medieval world, and the discovery of an infinite cosmos or of modern physics through such figures as Nicholas of Cusa, Giordano Bruno, in the emergence of an infinite cosmos, and Copernicus, Kepler, and Sir Isaac Newton in the discovery of modern physics, should be excluded from the legacy of Plotinus.

Texts and Translations in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries

Let us return, then, to the history of the Greek text of the *Enneads* in the time of Hegel. Hegel's colleague, F. Creuzer, published texts and Latin translations (adapted from Ficino's translations of *Enneads* III. 8 [1805] and I. 6 [1814]), with extensive commentary in the latter, and then, together with G. H. Moser, a new complete edition of Plotinus in 1835 in which the editors tried to establish a scientific basis for approaching the text, based on practically all the available manuscripts, but they did not succeed in establishing any coherent relation among the manuscripts themselves. In addition, they relied too much upon the readings of the manuscript used by Ficino, the *Laurentianus 87, 3*. Victor Cousin, a French contemporary and admirer of Hegel, performed a similar service for the French-speaking world (see M. N. Bouillet's translation and notes, 1857–1861).

The Creuzer–Moser text was followed by a succession of editions: first, A. Kirchhoff (Leipzig, 1856), which, despite his severe criticism of the Creuzer–Moser edition (Praefatio, iii–iv), used fewer manuscripts, and although interestingly he presented the *Enneads* in their chronological order, he was more conjectural, taking considerable liberties to "improve" the text, since, in his view, the manuscript tradition could not be trusted; indeed, because the oldest manuscript dated only to the twelfth century

[24] Cf. Catana (2013). [25] On this see Corrigan (in press, expected 2018).

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:36:05, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.017

(Marcianus Graecus 209, Siglum D), there was for him no question of tracing this tradition back to any archetype. There then followed the editions of H. F. Müller (two volumes, Berlin, 1878–1880) and R. Volkmann (Leipzig, 1883–1884), both indebted to Kirchhoff's judgment that, given manuscript uncertainty, intelligent conjecture was the only recourse available. An edition of 1855 by M. A.-F. Didot (*Les Œuvres de Plotin, avec quelques ouvrages accessoires*, Bibliothèque des écrivains grecs) was virtually a reprint of the Creuzer–Moser edition. And two years later, one of the most influential French translations, that by M. N. Bouillet in 1857, rejects Kirchhoff's text (superior to Creuzer–Moser only because of better punctuation), adopts a lightly corrected version of Creuzer–Moser, and notes the previous absence of attention to Plotinus, who was, in Vacherot's memorable assessment, "le dernier mot de la philosophie grecque." Bouillet, however, also rejects Kirchhoff's espousal of Porphyry's chronological order as "without plausible motive" and "practically useless," and, despite many judgments of good sense about Plotinus, maintains in the title of his work the assessments of Simon (*Histoire de L'École d'Alexandrie*, Paris, 1843–1845) and Vacherot (*L'École d'Alexandrie*, Paris, 1846–1851) that Plotinus was leader of the School of Alexandria. As Vacherot maintained, Neoplatonism is "essentially and radically oriental, having nothing of Greek thought but its language and procedure" (cited in Dodds [1928], 130).

In the next century, there followed new editions by O. Kiefer (German, two vols., Jena and Leipzig, 1905), E. H. Bréhier (French, Paris, 1924–1938), and G. Faggin (Italian, Milan, 1947–1948). As Narbonne, Achard, and Ferroni (2012) observe, Bréhier's apparatus, though aware of the preparatory work for the Henry–Schwyzer edition (see below), is often "only a choice of *variae lectiones* drawn from Creuzer's edition," and Faggin's edition is a reprint of the text established by Bréhier with his translation a "faithful remodelling" for the most part of that of Bréhier (Narbonne et al. [2012], cclxxxv, note 6).

No treatment of text and translation would be complete without mention of Stephen MacKenna's translation (1917–1930), which had an enormous influence in Ireland and England and is still used today, though it has generally been superseded by Armstrong's translation. MacKenna based his own translation on Volkmann's 1883 text, occasionally adopting a reading from the Creuzer edition that he purchased originally in Saint Petersburg, Russia. MacKenna's Creuzer text, with annotations in his own hand, was found recently by P. Kingsley in a London bookstore. In addition, D. O'Brien, the well-known Plotinus scholar, showed me last

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:36:05, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.017

year at his home in France another unpublished translation of the *Enneads* by S. Holliday (London, 1903) that predates that of MacKenna.

Editio Major/Editio Minor: Paul Henry and H-R. Schwyzer

Finally, the first truly reliable scientific Greek edition of the *Enneads* was prepared by P. Henry and H-R. Schwyzer, *Plotini Opera, editio major*, three vols. (Brussels, Paris, and Leiden, 1951–1973) (henceforth H–S) – a stunning achievement, in its own way comparable to that of Ficino in the Renaissance. This was followed, first, by the *editio minor*, 3 vols. (Oxford, 1964–1983, with a revised printing of volume one, 1987) – with significant changes on the basis of suggestions from scholars such as Dodds and others[26] – and, later, corrections after the death of P. Henry (e.g. Schwyzer, "Corrigenda ad Plotini textum," 1987, pp. 191–210). The fruit of nearly 30 years of collaborative work and correspondence between major scholars, the text was based, for the first time, on a thorough examination of all the manuscripts, indirect sources and evidence that traced the four major families of the manuscript tradition (**w**, **x**, **y**, **z**), the single manuscript of a fifth sub-archetype (**D**: *Marcianus Graecus* 209), together with secondary manuscripts, back to a single archetype.[27]

The existence of a single archetype (or single line of transmission, a thesis contested by other possibilities, as we will see below) was shown by the major lacuna in *Ennead* IV 7 [2], present in the entire direct tradition and remedied by the chance testimony of Eusebius' *Preparatio Evangelica* (henceforth *PE*) XV, 10 and 22. In *PE* XV, 10, 1–9, Eusebius provides the text for IV. 7. 8^5 (as numbered by H–S) against the Aristotelian soul-entelechy theory, and in *PE* XI, 22, 1–67, the text for IV. 7. 1. $1–8^4$. 28, against the Stoic corporeal soul theory. In almost all the manuscripts, the lacuna extends from 8. 28, δικαιοσύνη, up to 8^5. 49, τοῦ ὄντος, while in **J**, **M**, **V** (and a copy of **M**, *Barberinus graecus* 275[28]) alone, it extends from 8^4. 28, ἁρμονία up to 8^5. 49, τοῦ ὄντος. The lacuna and its fortunate retrieval through Eusebius, therefore, can only be explained by the loss of several folios in the archetype.

According to the *editio major*, Henry–Schwyzer supposed that there was a second lacuna in *Ennead* VI. 7 [38] 1, lines 48–49, in which all the

[26] Dodds (1956); cf. Narbonne et al. (2012), cclxxxvii, notes 1–3.
[27] For a list of the manuscripts, see H–S[1] *Praefatio* xii–xxii (*De Codicibus primariis*), xxiii–xxv (*De Codicibus secondariis*).
[28] See Narbonne et al. (2012), cclxii, note 2.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:36:05, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.017

manuscripts, even those not containing IV. 7 [2], omitted the words δεῖ τοίνυν καὶ τοῦ ἀεὶ εἶναι attested by John Philoponus, who cites the passage three times in his work *De aeternitate mundi contra Proclum*.[29] But in the *editio minor*, Henry–Schwyzer changed their mind and instead cited Philoponus as a gloss. As Narbonne et al. note, if the Philoponus passage genuinely goes back to Plotinus, then Philoponus' citation constitutes a *terminus post quem* for the date of the archetype – perhaps between the ninth and twelfth centuries.[30]

A Single Archetype: the Enneads of Porphyry or Editions of Eustochius, Amelius, and Longinus?

Once the text was established, however, other possibilities emerged or re-emerged. We should pause here, then, to see if there is evidence to reject the single archetype hypothesis, a hypothesis recent scholarship has problematized. Is there a collection, for instance, going back to the supposed manuscript versions of Eustochius, Amelius, or Longinus (as Porphyry's *Life of Plotinus* [henceforth *VP*] might suggest)? Is there also evidence for an oral tradition in the *Plotiniana arabica*? Do the differences between Eusebius' *Preparatio Evangelica* and the *Enneads* of Porphyry support an independent line of transmission?

The evidence for a Eustochian edition (that is, an edition that can be traced back to the doctor Eustochius who tended Plotinus up to his death in 270)[31] is based on a scholion to *Ennead* IV. 4 [28] 29. 55 transmitted, among the primary manuscripts, only by **A E** (**w**), **R J** (**x**), and **C M** (**y**). The scholion reads:

> Up to this point in the [books] of Eustochius, the second treatise on the soul and the third began. In the [books] of Porphyry, on the other hand, what follows is attached to the second treatise.

The scholiast seems to suggest[31] that it was possible to read a differently arranged "Plotinus" of Eustochius alongside an Enneadic Plotinus of Porphyry. However, there is no evidence here of a different *edition* – perhaps only of a different recension.

[29] *De aeternitate mundi* II. 5, 39, 8.

[30] Narbonne et al. (2012), cclv, and also note 2 on the possibility that the archetype was part of a "philosophical collection" of manuscripts copied in Constantinople in the second half of the ninth century. See also Westerink (1986), lxxiii–lxxx and lxxv, note 2; Goulet (2007), 54–58.

[31] Goulet-Cazé (1982); Brisson (1992), 65–69; Goulet-Cazé (1992).

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:36:05, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.017

The *VP* 20, 5–10 also tells us that Amelius, the pupil and colleague of Plotinus, had excellent copies of the writings of Plotinus transcribed from the originals and that then permitted Longinus himself to make further copies. It has also been argued on the basis of *VP* 4, 12–18 that there might have been a pre-Porphyrian edition by Amelius himself, since the first 21 treatises written by Plotinus before Porphyry's arrival in Rome had already been received by, or issued to, a few people. Although ἐκδεδομένα (4, 14) and the noun ἔκδοσις (4. 15) *can* refer to publication of an edition,[32] this is surely not so here where they refer respectively to books that "few people had received" and "the giving out of copies."[33] In both cases (*VP* 4, 14–15; 20, 5–10), then, there is no necessary evidence of a separate *edition*.

However, if the evidence of Porphyry's *VP* is suggestive but inconclusive, does Eusebius' own testimony provide some further evidence for a Eustochian edition that can be substantiated from the Arabic tradition, namely the so-called *Theology of Aristotle*?[34] In his work on this question,[35] P. Henry divided the text of *Ennead* IV. 7 into four Pericopes:

A. Chapter 1. 1–Chapter 8. 28, supported by all the manuscripts of the *Enneads*, by Eusebius, *PE* XV, 22, and the first half by the *Theology of Aristotle*.
B. Chapter 8. 28–Chapter 8^4. 28, ἁρμονία, supported only by **J M V**, by Eusebius, *PE* XV, 22, and by the *Theology* (that omits the last ten lines).
C. Chapter 8^5. 1–49, τοῦ ὄντος, supported by Eusebius, *PE* XV, 10, and in part by the *Theology*.
D. Chapter 8^5, 49–15, 12, supported by all the manuscripts, by Eusebius up to the end of chapter 8^5, and the final part by the *Theology*.

On this basis, P. Henry argued first, that Eusebius is not using Porphyry's text, but an edition of Eustochius (a proposal first made by Creuzer III, col. 202b; Henry, *Recherches*; H–S^1 II, Praefatio, ix–vii) and second, that in the Arabic tradition it is possible to discern traces of an edition of Amelius. He based these views on the following hypotheses: 1). since *Ennead* IV. 7 is not divided by Porphyry in the way Eusebius divides it, it must be based on a different, non-Enneadic division, namely,

[32] See Goulet-Cazé (1992), 72–73.
[33] See Brisson et al. (1992); for Eustochius-Amelius, Brisson (1992), 69, and opposed, Goulet-Cazé (1992), 75; Narbonne et al. (2012), cclxx, note1.
[34] For the decisive role, perhaps, of Amelius in this transmission, Brisson (1992), 65–69.
[35] Henry (1935).

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:36:05, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.017

that of Eustochius.[36] 2). In Pericope A, the text of the *Praeparatio* differs in 103 places from the text of Porphyry's *Enneads*, which cannot be explained by copyist errors. Concerning Pericope B, Henry thought that manuscripts **J M V** were dependent upon Eustochius, but he was forced to change his view when it became evident that they depended, instead, upon Eusebius himself.[37] 3). Since Eusebius is the only testimony for Pericope C, it is possible that Plotinus asked Eustochius to add this and that Porphyry did not know this passage. 4). The Arabic tradition perhaps retained traces of Plotinus' oral teaching preserved by Amelius: "...Le Livre de la Théologie ... n'est qu' un fragment des notes de cours d'Amélius" (Henry [1937], 310–342 and 326; id. [1938], xiv).[38]

Henry's views, however, were found to be ultimately unconvincing for the following reasons: 1). IV. 7 [2] was not necessarily divided into two parts in the way Eusebius divided it. According to M.-O. Goulet-Cazé,[39] Eusebius could simply have indicated to the copyist two extracts from Plotinus to be inserted; from where these extracts come we cannot completely determine, it is true. But in the Arabic *Theology* there is no division of the treatise: the anti-Stoic chapter precedes the anti-entelechy chapter, as we would expect in IV. 7, where the polemical doxographic section (ending in 8^5) is properly followed by a presentation of Plotinus' own thought (chapters 9–15). 2). In relation to Pericope B, the manuscript tradition of the *Praeparatio* is not as strong as that of the *Enneads*; errors can therefore be attributed either to Eusebius[40] or to his scribes.[41] However, the discovery of a new Eusebian manuscript by Dörrie (**T** *Vaticanus Rossianus 986*) reduces the variant readings from 103 to ten, and so we can attribute the discordances between the direct and indirect tradition of Pericope A to the Eusebian manuscript tradition itself.[42]

In relation to 3). and 4). above concerning Pericope C and a possible edition of Amelius, a question analyzed extensively by Kraus and Schwyzer,[43] the Enneadic Plotinus is the one presupposed by the *Theology*

[36] See the conclusions of Henry (1935), 79–80; H–S[1] II, *Praefatio*, x; Rist (1981, pp. 140–141; 159–164), thought these Plotinian passages were drawn not from Eustochius, but from copies of Amelius or Longinus; see also Goulet-Cazé (1992), 90–96; Kalligas (2001); Narbonne et al. (2012), cclxxiii–iv, note 2.

[37] Schwyzer (1937), 270; Henry (1948), 235; H–S[1] II, 197.

[38] The Arabic pseudo-*Theology of Aristotle* contains the whole of *Ennead IV 7* [2]; see D'Ancona, (2006); Goulet-Cazé (2007). A new edition of the *Theology* will be published by a team directed by Cristina D'Ancona (for information see www.greekintoarabic.eu).

[39] Goulet-Cazé (2007), 70–78. [40] Van der Valk (1956). [41] Dörrie (1964).

[42] Dörrie (1938), 529; Schwyzer (1939).

[43] Kraus (1936), 204; Schwyzer (1941), (1951), 499–508.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:36:05, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.017

of Aristotle that, in fact, cites Porphyry in the title of the first chapter (trans. M. Aouad). An enneadic model, therefore, justifies the *Theology*'s choice of passages; if there were a pre-Porphyrian division of IV. 7, it has left no trace in the *Theology*. So in the ninth century in Baghdad it was possible to read a manuscript of the *Enneads* that contained Pericopes B and C. Eusebius, then, had the possibility of reading Ennead IV. 7 complete, and either Al-Himsī (if there was a Syriac translation of the *Enneads* before an Arabic version) or Al-Kindī, or both, had the entire *Enneads* before their eyes. We need only suppose that the archetype had lost a few folios, not that the *Theology* contains "une stenographie du cours" of Plotinus brought to the East through Amelius.[44] Furthermore, the *Theology* bears the traces of the *kephalaia*, *hypomnēmata* and *epicheirēmata* that Porphyry had added to his own edition (*VP* 26, 28–40, confirmed by Aeneas of Gaza).[45] So it seems necessary on the basis of the available evidence to adopt the single archetype theory – despite the plausibility of other editions.

Subsequent Editions

The edition of Henry–Schwyzer, together with its broader scholarly significance, has provided the context for a remarkable renaissance in Plotinus studies generally, and in particular, for the emergence of new editions, translations, and commentaries. I note some of the most prominent of these as follows:

A German edition, with an often speculative Greek text departing at many places from H–S, with complete translation and notes by R. Harder, revised and with commentary supplied for treatises 22–54 by W. Theiler and R. Beutler (with an extensive survey of Plotinus' philosophy and indices by G. J. P. O' Daly) (*Plotins Schriften*, Hamburg, 1956–1971) (see also W. Beierwaltes, *Plotin: Geist–Ideen–Freiheit*, *Enneade V 9 und VI 8*, introduction and commentary, using text, translation of Harder, Theiler, Beutler, [Hamburg, 1990]; and in the same series, K. Kremer, *Seele-Geist-Eines, Enneade IV 8, V 4, V 1, V3*, 1990);

An Italian translation by V. Cilento (*Plotino: Enneadi*, Bari, 1947–1949);

[44] Henry (1937), 326.

[45] Aeneas of Gaza, *Theophrastus*, 45, 4–9 Colonna; see Goulet-Cazé (1982), 321–323; Narbonne et al. (2012), cclii–cclv and ccliii–iv, notes 1–3; cclv, notes 1–2).

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:36:05, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.017

A revised version of the *editio minor* text published with English translation by A. H. Armstrong, *Plotinus*, 7 vols., in the Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, MA and London, 1966–1988);

A complete translation of the *Enneads* into Spanish by J. Igal (*Porfirio, Vida de Plotino – Plotino, Enéadas* I–II, Madrid 1982; *Plotino, Enéadas* III–IV, Madrid 1985; *Plotino, Enéadas* V–VI, Madrid, 1998), with the introductions and commentary of the third volume separately completed after the death of Igal.

New Editions and Translations: 1984–2018

These works, together with some groundbreaking collections (such as *Les Sources de Plotin*, the famous Fondation Hardt meeting, and *Le Néoplatonisme*, the international CNRS colloquium, whose proceedings were published respectively in 1960 and 1970),[46] the *Lexicon Plotinianum*,[47] and many supplementary projects,[48] continue to form a solid basis for the remarkable expansion of Plotinian scholarship and also for a new paradigm of collaborative work in the humanities of different kinds. Here I note, first, seven editions or translations either completed or underway in recent years on the basis of the H–S^1 and H–S^2 text with ongoing revisions, in order to give a sense of the vitality of contemporary textual scholarship.[49] I then indicate special bibliographies, treatments, collections, and commentaries over the past 100 years and more.

First, under the direction of P. Hadot, starting from 1987 and continued after his death, there has been a new French translation (no Greek text included), with commentary, notes, textual adoptions noted ad loc., that has been massively influential,[50] published by Éditions du Cerf under the general title "Les Écrits de Plotin."

Second, also in French, there emerged the pocket Flammarion edition (no Greek text) under the direction of L. Brisson and J.-F. Pradeau, published by

[46] Dodds et al. (1960); Hadot and Schuhl (1971). [47] Sleeman-Pollet (1980).

[48] Monographs or companion pieces of the past twenty-five years include: O'Meara (1993); Gerson (1994); Fleet (1995); Horn (1995); Corrigan (1996a), (1996b); Gerson (1996); Hadot/Chase (1997); Fattal (1998), (2000); Beierwaltes (2001); Adamson (2002) [Arabic Plotinus]; Nikulin (2002); Pradeau (2003); Ousager (2004); Wilberding (2006); Emilsson (2007); Majumdar (2007); Remes (2007); Eliasson (2008); Chiaradonna (2009); Narbonne (2011); Nyvlt (2012); Mortley (2013); Caluori (2015); Clark (2016); Emilsson (2017).

[49] We also note translations into Romanian, Japanese, Chinese, Hebrew, and Russian.

[50] Hadot himself provided translation, introduction, and commentary for treatises 38, 50 and 9 (most significant was his major commentary on VI. 7 in 1988, arguably Plotinus' greatest treatise).

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:36:05, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.017

Gallimard, with lists of different textual choices posted clearly in the introduction to each treatise and with further explanation added in fairly comprehensive notes (Brisson, L., Pradeau, J.-F., *Plotin Ennéades, Traités* 1–6, 7–21, 22–26, 27–29, 30–37, 38–41, 42–44, 45–50, 51–54, Paris, 2003–2010).

Third, there is the translation of Plotinus into Dutch by R. Ferwerda (no Greek text) (*Enneaden: Over het leven van Plotinus en de indeling van zijn traktaten*, Amsterdam, 1984).

Fourth, the first part of P. Kalligas' Modern Greek translation, initiated in 1994 in Athens, emerged in a new English edition in 2014 (*The Enneads of Plotinus: A Commentary*, Volume 1, E. K. Fowden and N. Pilavachi (trans.), Princeton University Press), on the basis of a new Greek text – a significant moment in post Henry–Schwyzer scholarship. Here, Kalligas takes account of the various corrections and improvements of the Greek text suggested after the publication of the *editio minor*, both by Henry and Schwyzer and by other scholars, and makes considered improvements to the Greek text. He also provides brief synopses of each treatise and detailed notes. The first English volume contains neither text nor translation. Kalligas uses for reference, instead, the English translation by A. H. Armstrong (*Plotinus,* 1966–1988) and provides a list of suggested improvements of the Greek text for *Enneads* I–III (Kalligas [2014], 657–668).

Fifth, also in English, there is the Parmenides Press edition of introductions, translations and notes to the *Enneads* (no Greek text, with all textual variants explained in the commentary), under the direction of J. M. Dillon and A. Smith. To date, eleven volumes have emerged (*The Enneads of Plotinus –with Philosophical Commentaries*, Las Vegas/New York/Zurich, 2012–).

Sixth, a new translation of the *Enneads* (*Plotinus: the Enneads*, from Cambridge University Press, 2018), edited and translated by L. P. Gerson, together with a team including G. Boys-Jones, J. M. Dillon, R. A. H. King, A. Smith and J. Wilberding.

And, finally, the first volume of a new Budé Plotinus, another international collaboration edited by J.-M. Narbonne, with new text established by Lorenzo Ferroni, is intended to replace the edition of É. Bréhier (1924–1938) still in print (J.-M. Narbonne, Martin Achard, Lorenzo Ferroni, *Plotin: Oeuvres complètes, Tome 1, volume I: Introduction; Traité 1 (I 6), Sur le beau. Collection des Universités de France. Série grecque, 482.* Paris, 2012). A second volume comprising the treatises which Harder dubbed the *Großschrift* – III. 8 [30], V. 8 [31], V. 5 [32] and II. 9 [33] – should appear in 2018 with additional team members K. Corrigan,

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:36:05, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.017

J. D. Turner, Z. Mazur, and S. Fortier. Bréhier's text, as noted above, is inadequate, though the introductions preceding individual treatises remain valuable.

Why is there need for a new Greek text and commentary? In Narbonne–Ferroni's view, the text established by H–S^{1} and H–S^{2} is a monumental achievement but not an infallible datum. On the basis, therefore, of a collation of the traditional manuscript readings and the sub-archetypes reconstructed by H–S, together with evidence from the indirect tradition, the series aims to provide an independently established text and three apparatuses (*fontium*, *citationum*, *criticus*), with more detailed notes, linking philological, philosophical, grammatical, linguistic and stylistic perspectives, where appropriate. One of the early criticisms of the H–S text was that it was too conservative. Narbonne–Ferroni emphasize the need to retain the difficulty, indeed idiosyncracy, of Plotinus' Greek and the need for more thorough treatments of Plotinus' style. On the question of commentary, the series will speak for itself, but the relation between Plotinus and the Gnostics is important in the upcoming volume on the *Großschrift*.

Bibliographies, Overviews, Collections

The achievement of these works has been supported by many other projects in the past forty-five years: bibliographies, overall treatments and collections have provided partial snapshots of a larger growth of interest in Plotinus:

1) V. Cilento's *Plotino: Enneadi*, vol. 3 (II), Bari, 1947–1949 contains a bibliography of Plotinus to 1949 by M. Marien (*Bibliografica critica degli studi Plotiniani*).
2) H. J. Blumenthal examines (with bibliography) Plotinus in the light of scholarship from 1951–1971 (*Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt* [henceforth *ANRW*] 36.1, 1987, 528–570) with separate treatments of [I] Porphyry's *Life*; [II] the Text, Eustochius, the Arabic Plotinus tradition; [III] Language; [IV] Sources, e.g. Ammonius Saccas, Alexander of Aphrodisias, Plato, and generally Platonic and Middle Platonic Sources; [V] Plotinus' philosophy and the structure of his thought; [VI] the One; [VII] Nous; and [VIII] Soul and the Sensible World. Blumenthal's observation that the sense world needed more treatment was remedied almost immediately by Emilsson's study of perception in 1988.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:36:05, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.017

3) K. Corrigan and P. O'Cleirigh examine (with bibliography) Plotinian scholarship from 1971 to 1986 (*ANRW* 36.1, 1987, 571–623), with separate treatments of [I] Texts, Dictionaries, Translations, Commentaries, Histories and Themes; [II] Intelligible Matter and Lower Matter-Evil (primarily in relation to Enneads II. 4 [12], II. 5 [25], III. 6 [26], I. 8 [51], and other passages such as III. 4 [15] 1 and IV. 8 [6], 6); [III] The Categories and Genera of Being (primarily in relation to Enneads VI. 1–3 [42–44] and Plotinus' critique of Aristotelian and Stoic categories; [IV] Body, Soul Anthropology, Individual, Self; [V] the problem of Gnosticism; [VI] Intellect in relation to the problem of discursivity and non-discursivity, the structure of Intellect in relation to Plato and Aristotle, and the Generation of Intellect from the One; and [VII] Mystical Thought.
4) R. Dufour has extended these bibliographies to 2009 in *Plotinus: A Bibliography 1950–2000*, Leiden, 2002 (originally published in *Phronesis* (46, 3), 2001) and "Bibliographie Plotinienne: 2000–2009," *Études platoniciennes* VI, Paris, 2009, 295–365.[51]
5) Two recent collections extend the scope further.[52]

First, L. P. Gerson (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Philosophy in Late Antiquity* in two volumes (henceforth *CHOPLA*) (2010) is intended to supplement *The Cambridge History of Late Antiquity and Early Medieval Philosophy*, edited by A. H. Armstrong in 1967, but differs from Armstrong's volume, first, by establishing that late antiquity is not an appendix to earlier ancient thought; and second, by presuming a *terminus a quo* of about 200 CE rather than going back to early antiquity. It contains a chapter on Plotinus by D. J. O'Meara (Volume I, Chapter 17, 301–324) and specialized bibliographies are provided for each chapter. The lack of useful commentaries on individual treatises noted by Blumenthal in *ANRW* 1987 is certainly being remedied (see *CHOPLA* 1051–1052). See also *Enneads* VI. 6 on Numbers (Slaveva-Griffin, 2009); II. 1, *Plotinus' Cosmology* (Wilberding, 2006)[53] throws needed focus on the sensible world (Blumenthal [1987], 560).

[51] For bibliography: *Gnosis: Bibliographie plotinienne* http://gnosis.xooit.fr/t217-Bibliographie-plotinienne.htm; see also Gerson (2014).
[52] To this should be added a series from SUNY Press that has had significant influence: on Neoplatonism generally, Baine Harris (1976), (1982a), (2001); and Indian thought, (1982b); and Islamic thought, Morewedge (1992); and Jewish thought, Goodman (1992).
[53] See also *Ennead* III. 6 [26] by Fleet (2005), and *Ennead* I. 4 [46] by McGroarty (2006).

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:36:05, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.017

Second, the *Routledge Handbook of Neoplatonism*, edited by P. Remes and S. Slaveva-Griffin (2014), contains much on Plotinus, providing special treatments of Plotinus and the Gnostics[54]; Plotinus and the Orient[55]; Plotinus' style and argument[56] (and Porphyry's *VP*)[57]; the influence of Alexander of Aphrodisias and Plotinus[58]; and, more generally, metaphysics (substance,[59] number,[60] matter and evil[61]), language, knowledge,[62] soul and self,[63] nature,[64] ethics,[65] politics,[66] and aesthetics[67]; Neoplatonism and medicine[68]; ecology[69]; and, finally, the legacy of Neoplatonism in the West and East as well as in Islamic and Jewish thought.[70]

There is no independent treatment of Ammonius Saccas,[71] of Origen,[72] or of Plotinus and Aristotle[73] – questions that can change our view of Plotinus.

[54] Turner (2014) (further references, 70, n.1); see also Narbonne (2011); Corrigan-Turner (2017); on the *Tripartite Tractate*, Corrigan and Turner (in press); on the *Anonymous Commentary on the Parmenides*, attributed by Hadot (1968) to Porphyry, but contested (Bechtle [2000]; Corrigan [2000]; Rasimus [2010]); see Turner (2014), 40, 59.

[55] Wolters (1982); Gregorios (2002); Adluri (2014); see also McEvilley (2002), 568–484 (and Vijñānavāda Buddhism).

[56] See X, Conclusion.

[57] On Porphyry's VP, see Brisson et al. (1982–1992); Cox-Miller (1983),143; Goulet (1992); Saffrey (1992); Mazur (2010); Schroeder (2015). For the dating of details in Porphyry's VP see Boyd (1937); Igal (1972); Barnes (1976); Goulet (1982); Edwards (2000), 117–119; Kalligas (2014), 7–9. On Plotinus' final words, Henry, (1953); Schwyzer (1976); Most (2003). For other aspects, Brisson et al. (1982–1992).

[58] Schroeder (1984), 240–242, (2014); Sharples (1987), 1220–1223; Corrigan (1996a).

[59] Wurm (1973); Strange (1987); Lloyd (1990), 85–97; Gerson (1994), 79–103; Corrigan (1996b); Chiaradonna (2002; earlier, and on Plotinus' genera of being [VI. 1–3]). On the category tradition, Strange (1987); Sorabji (2004–2005), vol. 3, 56–127; Bechtle (2012); Van den Berg, (2014). On participation, Pradeau (2003).

[60] Slaveva-Griffin (2009), 200–215.

[61] Narbonne (2014); for extensive bibliography: 242, n.1.

[62] Emilsson (1988), (2007); Aubry (2007); Gerson (2014), 266–279.

[63] Aubry (2014). Cf. Dodds (1960), 385; Trouillard (1955), 26; Himmerich (1959), 92–100; O'Daly (1973); Gerson (1994), 127–163; Beierwaltes (2001), 11–40, 84–122; Ousager (2004); Sorabji (2006); Remes (2007); and Mortley (2013).

[64] Horn (1995); Wagner (1996), (2002); Linguiti (2007); Chiaradonna and Trabattoni (2009); Wilberding and Horn (2012); Linguiti (2014).

[65] Schniewind (2003); Stern-Gillet (2013); Remes and Slaveva-Griffin (2014), 453–470.

[66] O'Meara (2003).

[67] Stern-Gillet (2000); Alexandrakis (2002); Kuisma, (2003); Vassilopoulou (2014).

[68] Wilberding (2014), 357: three doctors, Eustochius, Paulinus and Zethus, in Plotinus' school; 358–359: for Galenic influence on Plotinus' physiological psychology.

[69] Corrigan (2014), 372–390; cf. Corrigan (2009); Clark (2011); Dillon and Clark (2012).

[70] On Jewish and Islamic Neoplatonisms, Pessin (2014); see D' Ancona (2010) (vol. II), 869–893.

[71] See earlier Dörrie (1955); Theiler (1966); Schwyzer (1983); Schroeder (1987b).

[72] See earlier Crouzel (1956), 193–214.

[73] See earlier Szlezák (1979).

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:36:05, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.017

In addition, three recent works provide broader perspectives on these issues: G. Stamatellos (2008) conducts the first book-length study of Plotinus and the Presocratics.

G. Karamanolis (2006) shows how Ammonius, Porphyry (perhaps Plotinus), and others might have viewed the "reconciliation" of Plato and Aristotle not as identity of thought but rather as belonging to the same school or *hairesis*, that is, not *symphonia* or comprehensive agreement, but allowing for differences – though Porphyry, for one, thinks these differences might be a). perspectival or trivial, b), misunderstandings of Plato by Aristotle, or c). misunderstandings of Aristotle by later interpreters (Karamanolis [2006], 322–323; cf. Baltussen [2014], 109).[74]

Finally, L. Gerson (2013) provides a more inclusive framework for understanding the nature of Platonism itself, on the basis of what he calls Ur-Platonism (anti-materialism, anti-mechanism, anti-nominalism, anti-relativism, and anti-skepticism), of which Plato's thought (and Aristotle's) is an example.

To these, we add the recovery of Ficino's commentary on Plotinus from the 1492 edition. Extensive commentaries run up to the third *Ennead* (1487–1489) after which Ficino wrote only shorter commentaries. A new edition and translation together with extensive "Analytical Studies" by S. Gersh (projected in 6 volumes) has begun to appear with *Enneads* III and IV in 2017–2018.

Conclusion

In conclusion, I have space to outline three continuing problems in Plotinus' thought: first, the problem of spontaneous emanation versus free will and loving agency; second, the question of development, and the chronological order versus the *Ennead* order; and third, the character of Plotinus' writing.

Does the One produce or create being automatically or by will in "an essentially deterministic system" (Blumenthal [1987] 552)? Is "emanation" applicable to Plotinus' thought? For a nuanced view of emanation see Dörrie (1976), 70–85; Emilsson (2007), 8–9. Against "creation" see O'Brien (2011–2012), 72–76, and in favor see Zimmerman (2013), 55–105, and (with nuance) Gerson (1994), 28–33. On the question of will, for Henry (1931), Dodds (1965), 88–90 and Blumenthal (1987),

[74] On the non-commentary tradition (*Enneads*, letters, introductions, summaries), Smith (2014), 115–125.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:36:05, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.017

552–560, the One does not will its products. For Trouillard (1955), 74–80; Cilento (1963), 94–101; Kremer (1965), 241–264; Rist (1967), 66–83; Bussanich (1988), 101; Frede (2011), 130–152; Collette-Dučič (2014); and Corrigan-Turner (2017), the One's will is fundamental. In general, whatever illumination means, production cannot be automatic or deterministic; and whatever Plotinus means by the One not caring about its products, this must be situated in the free will of the Good as the ultimate model of all freedom (VI. 8, chapters 13–21), and also the soul's will and love that merge with the self-will and self-love of the Good (VI. 8 [39] 16; VI. 7 [38] 35–36).[75]

Second, a developmental hypothesis has been generally rejected,[76] and some scholars reject the French and German prioritization of the chronological order. However, we surely need to integrate *both* the Enneadic and the chronological orders and recognize that development does not have to be along a simple time-line. One example: a radical theory of free will is only implicit, not developed, before VI. 8 [39]. VI. 8 therefore is a genuine landmark.

Finally, the character of Plotinus' writing that Kirchhoff and others tried to domesticate. Narbonne et al. (2012, p. cclxxxix) note the need for an exhaustive study of language and style that goes beyond the results of Seidel (1886), Schwyzer (1951), Phillips (1980, unpublished), and Kalligas (1991–2004) – a need partially remedied by Dillon (2018, unpublished; cf. O'Brien, [1982], 329–368) and by Brisson (2014, pp. 126–144). Against older views of the *Enneads* as a form of diatribe, O'Meara (2010, pp. 304–305, 320–322) plausibly argues that although not dialogues, they develop as a dialogue of views, echoing discussions in the school, and are at times scholastic, polemical and dialectical or, again, protreptic. Narbonne et al. (2012) see them as analytical essays, instances of the "dissertation philosophique," premeditated and carefully constructed (cf. Porphyry, *VP* 8, 7–12). Certainly, we might say, Plotinus' writing, unlike some Gnostic hierophantic hierarchies, contains a radical, even intimate inclusiveness: in MacKenna's words, "... him alone of authors I understand by inborn sight..." (1936), 114.

[75] On this and other passages related to the generation and return of Intellect, Rist, (1967); Bussanich (1988); O' Meara, (1993), 60–78, 100–110; Rappe (2014), 166–181; Emilsson (2017); and the metaphysics of the One, Halfwassen (2014), 182–199.

[76] For "development," Dodds (1965), 24–26; against, Armstrong (1967), (2018); Blumenthal (1971), 4, n. 10.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:36:05, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.017

REFERENCES

Adamson, P. (2002) *The Arabic Plotinus: A Philosophical Study of the Theology of Aristotle*, London.
(2016) *A History of Philosophy without any Gaps: Philosophy in the Islamic World*, Oxford.
Adluri, V. (2014) "Plotinus and the Orient: aoristos duas," in P. Remes and S. Slaveva-Griffin (eds.) *The Routledge Handbook of Neoplatonism*, Abingdon and New York, 77–99.
Alexandrakis, A. (2002) "Does Modern Art Reflect Plotinus' Notion of Beauty?," in R. Baine Harris (ed.) *Neoplatonism and Contemporary Thought*, Albany, NY, 231–242.
Aouad, M. (1989) "La Théologie d'Aristote et autres textes du Plotinus Arabus," in R. Goulet (ed.) *Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques*, I, Paris, 541–590.
Armstrong, A. H. (1957) "The Background of the Doctrine 'That the intelligibles Are Not Outside Intellect,'" in E. R. Dodds et al. (eds.) *Les Sources de Plotin*, Entretiens sur l'Antiquite Classique 5, Geneva, 393–425.
Armstrong, A. H. (ed.) (1967) *The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Mediaeval Philosophy*, Cambridge, UK.
(1976) "The Apprehension of Divinity in the Self and Cosmos in Plotinus," in R. Baine Harris (ed.) *The Significance of Neoplatonism*, Albany, NY, 187–198.
(1977) "Form, Individual and Person in Plotinus," *Dionysius* 1: 49–68.
(1978) "Gnosis and Greek Philosophy," in B. Aland (ed.) *Gnosis: Festschrift fur Hans Jonas*, Göttingen, 87–124.
(1979) *Plotinian and Christian Studies*, London.
(1990) *Hellenic and Christian Studies*, London.
Aubry, G. (2007) "Conscience, pensée et connaissance de soi selon Plotin: le double héritage de l'*Alcibiade* et du *Charmide*," *Études platoniciennes* 4: 163–181.
(2014) "Metaphysics of Soul and Self in Plotinus," in P. Remes and S. Slaveva-Griffin (eds.) *The Routledge Handbook of Neoplatonism*, Abingdon and New York, 310–322.
Baine Harris, R. (ed.) (1976) *The Significance of Neoplatonism*, Albany, NY.
(ed.) (1982a) *The Structure of Being: A Neoplatonic Approach*, Albany, NY.
(ed.) (1982b) *Neoplatonism and Indian Thought*, Albany, NY.
(ed.) (2001) *Neoplatonism and Contemporary Thought, Parts I and II*, Albany, NY.
Barnes, T.D. (1976) "The Chronology of Plotinus' Life," *Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies* 17, 65–70.
Baltussen, H. (2014) "Aristotelian Commentary Tradition," in P. Remes and S. Slaveva-Griffin (eds.) *The Routledge Handbook of Neooplatonism*, Abingdon and New York, 106–114.
Bechtle, G. (2000) "The Question of Being and the Dating of the Anonymous Parmenides Commentary," *Ancient Philosophy* 20: 393–414.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:36:05, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.017

(2012) "Categories and Conversion," in K. Corrigan and J. D. Turner (eds.) *Religion and Philosophy in the Platonic and Neoplatonic Traditions: From Antiquity to the Early Medieval Period*, Sankt Augustin, 107–120.

Beierwaltes, W. (2001) *Das wahre Selbst: Studien zu Plotins Begriffes Geistes und des Einen*, Frankfurt am Main.

(2002) "The Legacy of Neoplatonism in F. W. J. Schelling's Thought," *International Journal of Philosophical Studies* 10: 393–428.

Blumenthal, H. J. (1966) "Did Plotinus Believe in Ideas of lndividuals?," *Phronesis* 11: 61–80.

(197l) *Plotinus' Psychology: His Doctrines of the Embodied Soul*, The Hague.

(1987) "Plotinus in the Light of Twenty Years' Scholarship, 1951–1971," in W. Haase (ed.) *Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt* 2.36, Berlin, 528–570.

Boyd, M. J. (1937) "The Chronology in Porphyry's Vita Plotini," *Classical Philology* 32, 241–257.

Bregman, J. (1990) "The Neoplatonic Revival in North America," *Hermathena* 149: 99–119.

Bréhier, E. (1928) *La philosophie de Plotin*, [3rd ed. Paris, 1961].

Brisson, L. (1992) "Une edition d'Eustochius?" in L. Brisson, M.-O. Goulet-Cazé, R. Goulet, D. O'Brien et al. (eds.) *Porphyre, La vie de Plotin*, Paris, 65–76.

(2000) "Entre physique et métaphysique: Le terme ogkos chez Plotin, dans ses rapports avec la matière et le corps," in M. Fattal (ed.) *Études sur Plotin*, Paris, 87–111.

(2014) "Plotinus' Style and Argument," in P. Remes and S. Slaveva-Griffin (eds.) *The Routledge Handbook of Neoplatonism*, Abingdon and New York, 126–144.

Brisson, L., Goulet Caze, M.-O., Goulet, R., O'Brien, D., et al. (1982–1992) *Porphyre: La Vie de Plotin*, 2 vols., Paris.

Brucker, J. (1742–1744) *Historia Critica Philosophiae*, 4. vols., Leipzig.

Bussanich, J. (1988) *The One and its Relation to Intellect in Plotinus: A Commentary on Selected Texts*, Leiden.

Caluori, D. (2015) *Plotinus on the Soul*, Cambridge, UK.

Catana, L. (2013) "Changing Interpretations of Plotinus: The 18th-Century Introduction of the Concept of a 'System' of Philosophy," *International Journal of the Platonic Tradition* 7: 50–98.

Chiaradonna, R. (2002) *Sostanza movimento analogia: Plotina critico di Aristotele*, Naples.

(2009) *Plotino*, Rome.

Chiaradonna, R. and Trabattoni, E. (eds.) (2009) *Physics and Philosophy of Nature in Greek Neoplatonism*, Leiden.

Cilento, V. (1961) "Mito e poesia nelle Enneadi di Plotino," in E. R. Dodds et al. (eds.) *Les sources de Plotin*, Vandoeuvres-Geneva, 245–310.

(1963) "La radice metafisica della libertà nell' antignosi Plotiniana," *La Parola del Passato* 18: 94–122.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:36:05, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.017

(1971) "Stile e sentiment tragico nella filosofia di Plotino," in P. Hadot and P.-M. Schuhl (eds.) *Le Néoplatonisme*, Paris, 37–43.
Clark, S. R. L. (2011) "Animals in Classical and Late Antique Philosophy," in T. L. Beauchamp and R. G. Frey (eds.) *The Oxford Handbook of Animal Ethics*, Oxford, 35–60.
(2016) *Plotinus: Myth, Metaphor, and Philosophical Practice*, Chicago.
Cleary, J. J. (ed.) (1997) *The Perennial Tradition of Neoplatonism*, Leuven.
Collette- Dučič, B. (2014) "Plotinus on Founding Freedom in VI 8 [39]," in P. Remes and S. Slaveva-Griffin (eds.) *The Routledge Handbook of Neoplatonism*, Abingdon and New York, 421–436.
Corrigan, J. M. (2012) *American Metempsychosis: Emerson, Whitman, and the New Poetry*, New York.
Corrigan, K. (1996a) *Plotinus' Theory of Matter-Evil and the Question of Substance: Plato, Aristotle, and Alexander of Aphrodisias*, Leuven.
(1996b) "Essence and Existence in the Enneads," in L. P. Gerson (ed.) *The Cambridge Companion to Plotinus*, Cambridge, UK, 105–129.
(2000) "Platonism and Gnosticism. The Anonymous Commentary on the Parmenides: Middle or Neoplatonic?" in J. D. Turner and R. A. Majercik (eds.) *Gnosticism and Later Platonism*, Atlanta, GA, 141–178.
(2009) "Ecology's Future Debt to Plotinus and Neoplatonism," in P. Vassilopoulou and S. R. L. Clark (eds.) *Late Antique Epistemology: Other Ways to Truth*, London, 250–272.
(in press) *Love, Friendship, Beauty and the Good: Plato, Aristotle, and the Later Tradition*, Eugene, OR.
Corrigan, K. and O'Cleirigh, P. (1987) "Plotinian scholarship from 1971 to 1986," *Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt* 36: 571–623.
Corrigan, K. and Turner, J. D. (eds. and trans.) (2017) *Plotinus Ennead VI 8: On the Voluntary and on the Free Will of the One*, Las Vegas/Zurich/Athens.
Corrigan K. and Turner, J. D. (in press) "Plotinus and the Gnostics: the Peculiar Impact of the Tripartite Tractate and Later Works," in M. Marsola and L. Ferroni (eds.) *Estratégias anti-gnósticas nos escritos de Plotino*, Sao Paulo.
Cox-Miller, P. (1983) *Biography in Late Antiquity: A Quest for the Holy Man*, Berkeley/London/Los Angeles.
Crouzel, H. (1956–1989) *Origène et Plotin: Comparaisons Doctrinales*, Paris.
D'Ancona, C. (2001) "Pseudo- 'Theology of Aristotle,' Chapter I: Structure and Composition," *Oriens* 36: 78–112.
(2006) "The Arabic Version of *Enn.* IV 7 (2) and its Greek Model," in J. E. Montgomery (ed.) *Arabic Theology, Arabic Philosophy. From the Many to the One: Essays in Celebration of Richard M. Frank*, Leuven/Paris/Dudley, MA, 128–155.
(2007) "Deux traités plotiniens chez Eusèbe de Césarée," in C. D'Ancona (ed.) *The Libraries of the Neoplatonists*, Leiden, 63–97.
(2010) "The Origins of lslamic Philosophy," in L. Gerson (ed.) *The Cambridge History of Philosophy in Late Antiquity*, vol. 2, Cambridge, UK, 869–894.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:36:05, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.017

D'Ancona, C. and Taylor, R. C. (2003) "Le Liber de Causis," in R. Goulet (ed.) *Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques*, suppl., Paris, 599–647.
Dillon, J. M. (1996) *The Middle Platonists: A Study of Platonism, 80 BC to AD 220*, 2nd ed. Ithaca, NY.
(in press) "Plotinus Orator."
Dillon, J., Russell, D, and Gertz, S. (2012) *Aeneas of Gaza, Theophrastus with Zacharias of Mytiline: Ammonius*, ed. R. Sorabji, London.
Dillon, J. M. and Smith, A. (2012) *The Enneads of Plotinus with Philosophical Commentaries*, Las Vegas/New York/Zurich.
Dillon, J. M. and Clark, S. R. L. (2013) *Towards the Noosphere: Futures Singular and Plural*, Lydney, UK.
Dodds, E. R. (1928) "The Parmenides of Plato and the Origin of the Neoplatonic 'One,'" *Classical Quarterly* 22: 129–42.
(1956) "Notes on Plotinus *Enn* III 8," *Studi italiani di filologia classica*, 27–28: 108–113.
(1960) "Tradition and Personal Achievement in the Philosophy of Plotinus," *Journal of Roman Studies* 50: 1–7.
et al. (1960) *Les sources de Plotin: Entretiens sur l'antiquité classique 5*, Vandoeuvres-Geneva.
(1965) *Pagan and Christian in an Age of Anxiety*, Cambridge, UK.
Dörrie, H. (1938) "Review of Henry *Études plotiniennes I"*, in *Göttingische gelehrte Anzeigen* 200: 526–539.
(1955) "Ammonios, der Lehrer Plotins," *Hermes*, 83: 439–477.
(1964) "Review of P. Henry and H.-R. Schwyzer (eds.) Plotini Enneades," *Gnomon* 36: 461–469.
(1976) "Emanation: Ein unphilosophisches Wort im spätantiken Denken," *Platonica Minora*, Munich, 70–88.
Edwards, M. (2000) *Neoplatonic Saints: The Lives of Plotinus and Proclus by Their Students*, Liverpool.
Eliasson, E. (2008) *The Notion of That Which Depends on Us in Plotinus and its Background*, Leiden.
Emilsson, E. K. (1988) *Plotinus on Sense-Perception: A Philosophical Study*, Cambridge, UK.
(2007) *Plotinus on Intellect*, Oxford.
(2017) *Plotinus*, London and New York.
Fattal, M. (1998) *Logos et image chez Plotin*, Paris.
Fattal, M. (ed.) (2000) *Études sur Plotin*, Paris.
Ferwerda, R. (1965) *La signification des images et des métaphores dans la pensée de Plotin*, Groningen.
Finan, T. and Twomey, V. (eds.) (1992) *The Relationship between Neoplatonism and Christianity*, Dublin.
Fleet, B. (ed. and trans.) (1995) *Plotinus: Ennead III.6. On the Impassivity of the Bodiless*, Oxford.
Frede, M. (2011) *A Free Will: Origins of the Notion in Ancient Thought*, Berkeley, CA.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:36:05, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.017

Gersh, S. (2006) "Platonism, Platonic Tradition," in D. M. Borchert (ed.) *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, 2nd ed., Detroit.
Gersh, S. (ed. and trans.) (2017) *Marsilio Ficino. Commentary on Plotinus, Volume 4: Ennead III, Part I*, Cambridge, MA and London.
Gerson, L. P. (1994) *Plotinus*, London.
Gerson, L. P. (ed.) (1996) *The Cambridge Companion to Plotinus*, Cambridge, UK.
(2005) *Aristotle and Other Platonists*, Ithaca, NY.
Gerson, L. P. (ed.) (2010) *The Cambridge History of Philosophy in Late Antiquity*, 2 vols., Cambridge, UK.
(2013) *From Plato to Platonism*, Ithaca, NY.
(2014) *Oxford Bibliographies Online* www.oxfordbibliographies.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/view/document/obo-9780195396577/obo-9780195396577-0177.xml?rskey=ZD1wPH&result=241
Goodman, L. E. (ed.) (1992) *Neoplatonism and Jewish Thought*, Albany, NY.
Goulet, R. (1982) "Le système chronologique de la Vie de Plotin," in L. Brisson, M.-O. Goulet-Cazé, R. Goulet, D. O'Brien, et al. (eds). *Porphyre, La vie de Plotin*, Paris, 187–228.
Goulet, R. (ed.) (1989–2017) *Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques*, 7 vols., & 1 suppl., Paris.
(1992) "Le Plan de la Vita Plotini," in L. Brisson, M.-O. Goulet-Cazé, R. Goulet, D. O'Brien, et al. (eds.) *Porphyre, La vie de Plotin*, II, Paris, 77–85.
(2007) "La conservation et la transmission des textes philosophiques gecs," in C. D'Ancona (ed.) *The Libraries of the Neoplatonists*, Leiden, 29–61.
Goulet Cazé, M.-O. (1982a) "L'arrière-plan de la Vie de Plotin," in L. Brisson, M.-O. Goulet-Cazé, R. Goulet, D. O'Brien, et al. (eds.) *Porphyre, La vie de Plotin*, I, Paris, 229–328.
(1982b) "L'édition d' Eustochius," in L. Brisson, M.-O. Goulet-Cazé, R. Goulet, D. O'Brien, et al. (eds.) *Porphyre, La vie de Plotin*, I, Paris, 289–294.
Goulet Cazé M.-O. (1992) "Remarques sur l'Édition d'Eustochius," in L. Brisson, M.-O. Goulet-Cazé, R. Goulet, D. O'Brien, et al. (eds.) *Porphyre, La vie de Plotin*, II, Paris, 71–76.
(2007) "Deux Traités plotiniens chez Eusèbe de Césarée," in C. D'Ancona (ed.) *The Libraries of the Neoplatonists*, Leiden, 63–97.
Graeser, A. (1972) *Plotinus and the Stoics: A Preliminary Study*, Leiden.
Gregorios, P. M. (2002) *Neoplatonism and Indian Philosophy*, Albany, NY.
Grmek, M. D. (1992) "Les maladies et la mort de Plotin," In L. Brisson, M.-O. Goulet-Cazé, R. Goulet, D. O'Brien, et al. (eds.) *Porphyre: La Vie de Plotin II*, Paris: 335–353.
Hadot, P. (1968) *Porphyre et Victorinus*, 2 vols., Paris.
(1974) "L'harmonie des philosophies de Plotin et d'Aristote selon Porphyre dans le commentaire de Dexippe sur les Categories," in *Plotino e il Neoplatonismo in Oriente e in Occidente*, Rome, 32–47. [English translation in R. Sorabji (ed.) *Aristotle Transformed: The Ancient Commentators and Their*

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:36:05, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.017

Influence, London 1990, 125–140. Reprinted in P. Hadot, *Plotin, Porphyre: Études neoplatoniciennes*, Paris 1999].
Hadot, P. (ed. and trans.) (1987) *Plotin: Traite 38 (VI. 7)*, Paris.
(1993) *Plotinus, or, The Simplicity of Vision*, trans. M. Chase, Chicago.
(1994) *Plotin: Traité 9 (VI. 9)*, Paris.
(1995) *Philosophy as a Way of Life: Spiritual Exercises from Socrates to Foucault*, trans. M. Chase, Malden, MA [French original 1981].
(1997) *Plotinus or The Simplicity of Vision*, trans. M. Chase, Chicago [French original 1963].
(1999) *Plotin, Porphyre: Études néoplatoniciennes*, Paris.
Hadot, P. and Schuhl, P. M. (eds.) (1971) *Le Néoplatonisme: Actes du Colloque International du C.N.R.S., Royaumont, 9–13 Juin 1969*, Paris.
Halfwassen, J. (2014) "The Metaphysics of the One," in P. Remes and S. Slaveva-Griffin, *The Routledge Handbook of Neoplatonism*, Abingdon and New York, 182–199.
Henry, P. (1931) "La liberté chez Plotin," *Revue néoscolastique de philosophie*, 33: 50–79, 180–215, 318–339.
(1935) *Recherches sur La Préparation Évangelique d'Eusèbe et L'Édition perdue des oeuvres de Plotin publiée par Eustochius*, Paris.
(1937) "Vers la reconstruction de l'enseignement oral de Plotin," *Bulletin de l'Académie Royale de Belgique, Classe des Lettres*, 23: 310–342.
(1938) *Études plotiniennes, vol. 1: Les états du texte de Plotin*, Brussels.
(1948) *Études plotiniennes, vol. 1: Les manuscrits des Ennéades*, Brussels.
(1953) "La dernière parole de Plotin," *Studi classici e orientali* 2: 113–130.
Himmerich, W. (1959) *Eudaimonia: die Lehre des Plotin von der Selbstverwirklichung des Menschen*, Würzburg.
Horn, C. (1995) *Plotin über Sein, Zahl und Einheit*, Stuttgart.
Hutton, S.(2002) "The Cambridge Platonists," in S. Nadler (ed.) *The Blackwell Companion to Early Modern Philosophy*, Oxford, 308–319. [= S. Hutton, The Cambridge Platonists, *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*].
Igal, J. (1972) *La cronologia de la "Vida de Plotino" de Porfirio*, Madrid-Bilbao.
Kalligas, P. (1988) "Some new Plotinian emendations," *Emerita*, 56: 95–102 [eight passages from Enneads II, III, IV, and V].
(1991–2004) *Porphyriou: Peri tou Plôtinou biou, and Plôtinou Enneas prôtē, Plôtinou Enneas deutera, Plôtinou Enneas tritē*, Athens.
(2001) "Traces of Longinus' Library in Eusebius' *Praeparatio Evangelica*," *Classical Quarterly* 51: 584–598.
(2014) *The 'Enneads' of Plotinus, Volume 1: A Commentary*, Princeton.
Karamanolis, G. E. (2006) *Plato and Aristotle in Agreement? Platonists on Aristotle from Antiochus to Porphyry*, Oxford.
Krämer, H. J. (1964) *Der Ursprung der Geistmetaphysik: Untersuchungen zur Geschichte des Platonismus zwischen Platon und Plotin*, Amsterdam.
Kraus, P. (1936) "Un fragment perdu de la recension d'Eustochius des oeuvres de Plotin," *Revue d'histoire des religions* 113: 207–218.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:36:05, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.017

Kremer, K. (1965) "Das Warum der Schopfung: quia bonus vel/et quia voluit? Ein Beitrag zur Verhältnis von Neuplatonismus und Christentum an Hand des Prinzips Bonum est diffusivum sui," in K. Flasch (ed.) *Parusia*, Frankfurt am Main 241–264 [*Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt* 26, 2: 994–1032].

Kuisma, O. (2003) *Art or Experience: A Study on Plotinus' Aesthetics*, Helsinki.

Laurens, P. (2012) *Marsile Ficin: Commentaire sur le Banquet de Platon. Commentarium in Convivium Platonis, De Amore*, Paris.

Linguiti, A. (2007) "La materia dei corpi: sullo pseudoilomorfismo plotinian," *Quaestio* 7: 105–122.

(2014) "Physics and Metaphysics," in P. Remes and S. Slaveva-Griffin (eds.) *The Routledge Handbook of Neoplatonism*, Abingdon and New York, 396–420.

Lloyd, A. C. (1990) *The Anatomy of Neoplatonism*. Oxford.

MacKenna, S. (1936) *Journals and Letters*, ed. E. R. Dodds, with a memoir by Dodds (pp. 1–89) and a preface by Padraic Colum (pp. xi–xvii), London and New York.

Majumdar, D. (2007) *Plotinus on the Appearance of Time and the World of Sense: A Pantomime*, Aldershot.

Mazur, Z. (2010) "Unio Magica, Part II: Plotinus, Theurgy, and the Question of Ritual," *Dionysius* 22: 29–56.

McEvilley, T. (2002) *The Structure of Ancient Thought: Comparative Studies in Greek and Indian Philosophies*, New York.

McGroarty, K. (2006) *Plotinus on Eudaimonia: A Commentary on Ennead I 4*, Oxford.

Morewedge, P. (1992) *Neoplatonism and Islamic Thought*, Albany, NY.

Mortley, R. (2013) *Plotinus, Self and the World*, Cambridge, UK.

Most, G. (2003) "Plotinus' Last Words," *Classical Quarterly* 53:1–12.

Narbonne, J.-M. (2011) *Plotinus in Dialogue with the Gnostics*, Leiden.

(2014) "Matter and Evil in the Neoplatonic Tradition," in P. Remes and S. Slaveva-Griffin (eds.) *The Routledge Handbook of Neoplatonism*, Abingdon and New York, 231–244.

Narbonne, J. M., Achard, M., and Ferroni, L. (ed. and trans.) (2012) *Plotin: Oeuvres Complètes. Introduction, Traité 1 (I 6)*, Paris.

Natorp, P. (2004) *Plato's Theory of Ideas: An Introduction to Idealism*, ed. and trans. V. Politis, Sankt Augustin.

Nikulin, D. (2002) Matter, Imagination and Geometry: Ontology, Natural Philosophy and Mathematics in Plotinus, Proclus and Descartes, Aldershot.

Nyvult, M. J. (2012) *Aristotle and Plotinus on the Intellect: Monism and Dualism Revisited*, Lanham, MD.

O'Brien, D. (1971) "Plotinus on Evil: A Study of Matter and the Soul in Plotinus' Conception of Human Evil," in P. Hadot and P.-M. Schuhl (eds.) *Le Néoplatonisme: Actes du Colloque International du C.N.R.S. Royaumont, 9–13 juin 1969*, Paris, 113–46.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:36:05, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.017

(1982) "Comment écrivait Plotin? Étude sur la Vie de Plotin 8.1–4," in L. Brisson, M.-O. Goulet-Cazé, R. Goulet, D. O'Brien, et al. (eds.) *Porphyre, La vie de Plotin I*, Paris, 329–368.
(2011–2012) "Plotinus on the Making of Matter: The Identity of Darkness Parts I-III," *International Journal of the Platonic Tradition* 5: 6–57; 5: 209–261; 6: 27–80.
O'Daly, G. (1973) *Plotinus' Philosophy of the Self*, Shannon.
O'Meara, D. (1975) *Structures hiérarchiques dans Ia pensée de Plotin*, Leiden.
(1992) "Plotinus," in *Catalogus translationum et commentariorum: Medieval and Renaissance Latin Translations and Commentaries* 7, Washington, D.C.
(1993) *Plotinus: An Introduction to the Enneads*, Oxford.
(1996) "The Hierarchical Ordering of Reality in Plotinus," in L. Gerson (ed.) *The Cambridge Companion to Plotinus*, Cambridge, UK, 66–81.
(2003) *Platonopolis: Platonic Political Philosophy in Late Antiquity*, Oxford.
(2010) "Plotinus," in Gerson (ed.), 301–324.
Ousager, A. (2004) *Plotinus, on Selfhood, Freedom and Politics*. Aarhus.
Pessin, S. (2013) *Ibn Gabirol's Theology of Desire: Matter and Method in Jewish Medieval Neoplatonism*, Cambridge, UK.
(2014) "Islamic and Jewish Neoplatonisms," in P. Remes and S. Slaveva-Griffin (eds.) *The Routledge Handbook of Neoplatonism*, Abingdon and New York, 541–558.
Phillips, J. (1980) *The Prose Style of Plotinus: Rhetoric and Philosophy in the Enneads*. Dissertation, University of Wisconsin.
(2009) "Plotinus on the Generation of Matter," *International Journal of the Platonic Tradition* 3: 103–137.
Pradeau, J. F. (2003) *L'imitation du principe: Plotin et la participation*, Paris.
Puech, H.-C. (1960) "Plotin et les Gnostiques," in E. R. Dodds (ed.) *Les Sources de Plotin: Entretiens Hardt* 5, Vandoeuvres-Geneva, 161–174 ["Discussion," pp. 175–190].
Rappe, S. (1996) "Self-Knowledge and Subjectivity in the Enneads," in L. Gerson (ed.) *The Cambridge Companion to Plotinus*, Cambridge, UK, 250–274.
(2000) *Reading Neoplatonism: Non-Discursive Thinking in the Texts of Plotinus, Proclus, and Damascius*, Cambridge, UK.
Rappe [Ahbel-Rappe], S. (2014) "Metaphysics: The origin of becoming and the resolution of ignorance," in P. Remes and S. Slaveva-Griffin (eds.) *The Routledge Handbook of Neoplatonism*, Abingdon and New York, 166–181.
Rasimus, T. (2010) "Porphyry and the Gnostics: Reassessing Pierre Hadot's Thesis in Light of the Second- and Third-Century Sethian Treatises," in J. D. Turner and K. Corrigan (eds.) *Plato's Parmenides and its Heritage*, Atlanta, GA, 81–110.
Remes, P. (2007) *Plotinus on Self: The Philosophy of the "We,"* Cambridge, UK.
(2008a) "Inwardness and Infinity of Selfhood: From Plotinus to Augustinus," in P. Remes and J. Sihvola (eds.) *Ancient Philosophy of the Self*, New York and Dordrecht,155–176.
(2008b) *Neoplatonism*, Stocksfield, UK.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:36:05, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.017

Remes, P. and Sihvola, J. (eds.) (2008) *Ancient Philosophy of the Self*, Dordrecht.
Remes, P. and Slaveva-Griffin, S. (eds.) (2014) *The Routledge Handbook of Neoplatonism*, Abingdon and New York.
Rist, J. M. (1967) *Plotinus: The Road to Reality*, Cambridge, UK.
(1981) "Basil's 'Neoplatonism," Its Background and Nature," in P. J. Fedwick (ed.) *Basil of Caesarea: Christian Humanist, Ascetic. A Sixteen-Hundredth Anniversary Symposium*, Toronto, 137–220.
Saffrey, H.-D. (1992) "Pourquoi Porphyre a-t-il édité Plotin? Réponse provisoire," in L. Brisson, M.-O. Goulet-Cazé, R. Goulet, D. O'Brien, et al. (eds.) *Porphyre, La vie de Plotin II*, Paris, 31–64.
(1996) "Florence 1492: The Reappearance of Plotinus," *Renaissance Quarterly*, 49: 488–508.
Schniewind, A. (2003) *L'ethique du sage chez Plotin: le paradigme du spoudaios*, Paris.
Schroeder, F. M. (1984) "Light and the Active Intellect in Alexander and Plotinus," *Hermes* 112: 239–248.
(1987a) "Synousia, Synaesthesis, Synesis in Plotinus," *Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt* 36: 677–699.
(1987b) "Ammonius Sacchas," *Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt* 36: 493–526.
(1992) *Form and Transformation: A Study in the Philosophy of Plotinus*, Montreal.
(2014) "From Alexander of Aphrodisias to Plotinus," in P. Remes and S. Slaveva-Griffin (eds.) *The Routledge Handbook of Neoplatonism*, Abingdon and New York, 293–309.
(2015) "Porphyry's *Life of Plotinus* and Academic Power," *Dionysius* 33: 145–178.
Schwyzer, H.-R. (1937) "Der Plotin-Codex 'Vindobonensis Phil. graec. 226'," *Rheinisches Museum*, 86: 270–285.
(1939) "Das Plotin-Excerpt im Codex Rossianus Graecus 986," *Rheinisches Museum*, 88: 367–379.
(1941) "Die pseudoaristotelische *Theologie* und die Plotin-Ausgabe des Porphyrios," *Rheinisches Museum*, 90: 216–236.
(1951) "Plotinos," *Paulys Realenzyklopadie der klassischen Altertumswissenschaft* 21: 471–592. [With supplementary notes in 1978 = *Paulys Realenzyklopadie*, Suppl. 15: 321–323, Munich].
(1960) "Bewusst und Unbewusst bei Plotin," in E. R. Dodds, et al. (eds.) *Les sources de Plotin, Entretiens Hardt* 5, Vandoeuvres-Geneva, 341–390.
(1976) "Plotinus letzte Wort," *Museum Helveticum*, 33: 85–87.
(1983) *Ammonios Sakkas, der Lehrer Plotins*, Opladen, Germany.
(1987) "Corrigenda ad Plotini textum," *Museum Helveticum* 44: 191–210.
Seidel, E. (1886) *De usu praepositionum plotiniano quaestiones*. Dissertation, Neisse.
Sharples, R. W. (1987) "Alexander of Aphrodisias: Scholasticism and Innovation," *Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt* 36: 1176–1243.
Shaw, G. (1995) *Theurgy and the Soul: The Neoplatonism of Iamblichus*, University Park, PA.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:36:05, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.017

Slaveva-Griffin, S. (2009) *Plotinus on Number*, Oxford.
Slaveva-Griffin (2014) "Tracing the Untraceable: Plotinian Motifs in the Pseudo-Galenic *De Spermate*," in J. M. Zamora (ed.) *Neoplatonic Questions*, Berlin, 9–42.
Sleeman, J. H. and Pollet, G. (1980) *Lexicon Plotinianum*, Leiden and Leuven.
Smith, A. (1974) *Porphyry's Place in the Neoplatonic Tradition: A Study in Post-Plotinian Neoplatonism*, The Hague.
(2014) "The non-commentary tradition," in P. Remes and S. Slaveva-Griffin (eds.) *The Routledge Handbook of Neoplatonism*, Abingdon and New York, 115–125.
Sorabji, R. (ed.) (2004–2005) *Four Hundred Years of Transition: The Philosophy of the Commentators, 200–600 AD: A Sourcebook, vol. 1: Psychology; vol. 2: Physics; vol. 3: Logic and Metaphysics*, vols. 1 and 3, Ithaca, NY; vol. 2. London.
Sorabji, R. (2006) *Self: Ancient and Modern Insights about Individuality, Life, and Death*, Oxford.
Stamatellos, G. (2007) *Plotinus and the Presocratics*, Albany, NY.
Steel, C. (1978) *The Changing Self. A Study on the Soul in Later Neoplatonism: Iamblichus, Damascius and Priscianus*, Brussels.
Stern-Gillet, S. (2000) "Le Principe du beau chez Plotin: Reflexions sur Enneas VI. 7.32 et 33," *Phronesis* 45: 38–63.
(2013) "When Virtue Bids Us Abandon Life (Ennead VI 8 [39] 6, 14–26)," F. Karfik and E. Song (eds.) *Plato Revived: Essays on Ancient Platonism in Honour of Dominic J. O'Meara*, Berlin, 182–198.
Stern-Gillet, S. and Corrigan, K. (eds.) (2007) *Reading Ancient Texts. Volume I: Presocratics and Plato; Volume II: Aristotle and Neoplatonism. Essays in Honour of Denis O'Brien*, Leiden.
Strange, S. K. (1987) "Plotinus, Porphyry, and the Neoplatonic Interpretation of the Categories," *Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt 2. 36. 2*, Berlin, 955–974.
Szlezak, T. (1979) *Platon und Aristoteles in der Nuslehre Plotins*, Basel.
Theiler, W. (1934) *Die Vorbereitung des Neuplatonismus*, Berlin.
(1966) "Ammonius und Porphyrios," in *Porphyre, Entretiens Hardt* 12, Vandoeuvres-Geneva, 87–123.
Thillet, P. (1971) "Indices porphyriens dans la Théologie d'Aristote," in P. Hadot and P.-M. Schuhl (eds.) *Le Néoplatonisme*, Paris, 293–302.
Trouillard, J. (1955) *La purification plotinienne*, Paris.
Turner, J. D. and Majercik, R. A. (eds.) (2000) *Gnosticism and Later Platonism: Themes, Figures, and Texts*, Atlanta, GA.
Turner, J. D. (2001) *Sethian Gnosticism and the Platonic Tradition*, Quebec.
Turner, J. D. and Corrigan, K. (eds.) (2010) *Plato's Parmenides and its Heritage*, 2 vols., Atlanta, GA.
(2014) "Plotinus and the Gnostics: opposed heirs of Plato," in P. Remes and S. Slaveva-Griffin (eds.) *The Routledge Handbook of Neoplatonism*, Abingdon and New York, 52–76.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:36:05, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.017

Van den Berg, R. M. (2014) "The Gift of Hermes: The Neoplatonists on Language and Philosophy," in P. Remes and S. Slaveva-Griffin (eds.) *The Routledge Handbook of Neoplatonism*, Abingdon and New York, 251–265.
Van der Valk, M. (1956) "A few Observations on the Text of Plotinus," *Mnemosyne* 9: 114–131.
Vassilopoulou, P. (2014) "Plotinus' Aesthetics: In Defense of the Lifelike," in P. Remes and S. Slaveva-Griffin (eds.) *The Routledge Handbook of Neoplatonism*, Abingdon and New York, 484–501.
Versluis, A. (2017) *Platonic Mysticism: Contemplative Science, Philosophy, Literature, and Art*, Albany, NY.
Wagner, M. F. (1996) "Plotinus on the Nature of Physical Reality," in L. Gerson (ed.) *The Cambridge Companion to Plotinus*, Cambridge, UK, 130–170.
(2002) "Plotinus, Nature, and the Scientific Spirit," in M. F. Wagner (ed.), *Neoplatonism and Nature*, Albany, NY, 277–329.
Wagner, M. F. (ed.) (2002) *Neoplatonism and Nature*, Albany, NY.
Wallis, R. T. (1972) *Neoplatonism*. London [2nd ed. with foreword by L. P. Gerson 1995].
Westerink, L. G. (1986) *Damascius: Traité des premiers principes*, I, Paris.
Wilberding, J. (2006) *Plotinus' Cosmology: A Study of Ennead II.1 (40)*, Oxford.
(2014) "Neoplatonism and Medicine," in P. Remes and S. Slaveva-Griffin (eds.) *The Routledge Handbook of Neoplatonism*, Abingdon and New York, 356–371.
Wilberding, J. and Horn, C. (eds.) (2012) *Neoplatonism and the Philosophy of Nature*, Oxford.
Wolters, A. W. (1982) "A Survey of Modern Scholarly Opinion on Plotinus and Indian Thought," in R. Baine Harris (ed.) *Neoplatonism and Indian Thought*, Albany, NY, 293–308.
Wurm, K. (1973) *Substanz und Qualität. Ein Beitrag zur Interpretation der plotinischen Traktate VI. 1, 2 and 3*, Berlin.
Zimmerman, B. (2013) "Does Plotinus Present a Philosophical Account of Creation?" *Review of Metaphysics* 67: 55–105.
Zimmerman, F. W. (1986) "The Origins of the so-called *Theology of Aristotle*," in J. Kraye, W. F. Ryan, and C.-B. Schmidt (eds.) *Pseudo-Aristotle in the Middle Ages: The 'Theology' and Other Texts*, London, 110–240.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of South Australia, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:36:05, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.017

Appendix: Chronology of Editions and Translations of Plotinus[1]

Latin Translation by Marsilio Ficino

1492 Incipit: *Prohemium Marsilii Ficini Florentini in Plotinum ad magnanimum Laurentium Medicem patriae servatorem.* Colophon: *Magnifico sumptu Laurentii Medicis patriae servatoris impressit ex archetypo Antonius Miscominus Florentiae anno MCCCC.LXXXXII. Nonis maii.* Florence: A. Miscomini, 7 May 1492.

1540 Solingen: J. Soter = reprint of 1492 edition.

1559 *Plotini Divini illius è Platonica familia Philosophi De rebus philosophicis libri LIIII in Enneades sex distributi à Marsilio Ficino Florentino è Graeca Lingua in Latinam versi, et ab eodem doctissimis commentariis illustrati, omnibus cum Graeco exemplari collatis et diligenter castigatis.* Basel: P. Perna. [Revision of 1492 edition by Domenico Montesoro of Verona who consulted a Greek MS for the translation. See fol. 3v and 203v. An excellent edition of the commentary incorporating Ficino's own *corrigenda* to the 1492 edition].

1559 Basel: T. Guarin = Perna's 1559 edition with new title page..

1561 *Marsilii Ficini [. . .] Opera, & quae hactenus extitêre, & quae in lucem nunc primum prodiêre omnia [. . .] in duos Tomos digesta [. . .].* Basel: H. Petri [complete works including *In Plotinum* in vol. II].

1562 Basel: T. Guarin = Perna's 1559 edition with new title page.

1576 Basel: H. Petri [Almost identical to Petri's 1561 edition]. Modern facsimile reprints Turin 1959 and later, and Lucca 2011 (with preface by S. Toussaint). [*In Plotinum* in vol. II]. This edition is markedly inferior to Perna's and contains numerous typographical errors. However, because of its availability in modern reprint form,

[1] List prepared by Stephen Gersh (Latin translation) and Kevin Corrigan (Greek text and translations).

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Sussex Library, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:37:49, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.018

its pagination has been used in most modern scholarship citing the *In Plotinum.*

1580 *Plotini Platonicorum facile coryphaei Operum philosophicorum omnium libri LIV in sex enneades distributi ex amtiquiss. codicum fide nunc primum Graece editi cum Latina Marsilii Ficini interpretatione & commentatione.* Basel: P. Perna = Perna's 1559 edition with some variants together with the Greek text based on four MSS. Modern facsimile reprint with introduction by S. Toussaint. Lucca 2010.

Greek Text and Translations

1580 Basel: Perna, P. [see above].

1615 Basel: impensis Ludovici Regis = reprint of Perna's 1580 bilingual edition.

1787–1830 Taylor, T. [See **1994**]

1835 Creuzer, F. *Plotini Opera Omnia. Porphyrii Liber de vita Plotini cum Marsilii Ficini commentariis et eiusdem interpretatione castigata. Annotationem in unum librum Plotini et in Porphyrium addidit D. Wyttenbach. Apparatum criticum disposuit, indices concinnavit G. H. Moser [. . .] emendavit, indices explevit, prolegomena, introductiones, annotationes[. . .] adiecit F. Creuzer,* I–III, Oxford [includes a corrected version of Ficino's Latin translation and commentary from the Perna edition].

1855 Creuzer, F. and Moser, G. H. Paris [reprint of previous item with additional texts of Porphyry, Proclus, and Priscianus Lydus edited by F. Dübner].

1856 Kirchhoff, A. *Plotini opera,* I–II, Lipsiae.

1857–8 Bouillet, M. N. *Plotin, Les Ennéades*, Paris.

1878–80 Müller, H. F. *Plotini Enneades, Antecedunt Porphyrius, Eunapius, Suidas, Eudocia de vita Plotini*, I–II, Berolini.

1883–4 Volkmann, R. *Plotini Enneades praemisso Porphyrii de vita Plotini deque ordine librorum eius libello,* I–II, Lipsiae.

1896 Reprint of Creuzer, Moser, Dübner edition of 1855.

1917–30 MacKenna, S. *The Enneads*, London [translation only based on Volkmann's text] [see **1969**]

1924–38 Bréhier, É. *Plotin, Ennéades,* texte, traduction, notices, I–VII, Paris.

1947–8 Faggin, G. *Plotino, Le Enneadi, e Porfirio, Vita di Plotino, introduzione, testo critico, traduzione e note*, I–III, Milan.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Sussex Library, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:37:49, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.018

1947–9 Cilento, V. *Plotino*, *Enneadi, versione italiana e commentario critico*, I–III, Bari, 1947–1949.

1951–73 Henry, P. and Schwyzer, H.-R. *Plotini opera*, *Porphyrii Vita Plotini*, I–III, Paris/Bruxelles/Leiden [*editio major*].

1955–67 Miguez, J. A. *Plotino*, *traducción del griego, prólogo y notas*, Buenos Aires.

1956–71 Harder, R., Beutler, R., Theiler, W., with O'Daly, G. J. P. *Plotins Schriften, Neuarbeitung mit griechischem Lesetext und Anmerkungen*, Hamburg.

1959 Kroiewicz, A. *Les Ennéades de Plotin, traduites et précédées d' une introduction* [in Polish], I–II, Warsaw.

1964–82 Henry, P. and Schwyzer, H.-R. *Plotini opera*, *Porphyrii Vita Plotini,* Oxford [*editio minor*].

1966–88 Armstrong, A. H. 1966–1988. *Plotinus*, I–VII Cambridge, MA [Greek text and English translation based on *editio minor* of Henry–Schwyzer].

1969 MacKenna, S. Revised by B. S. Page, London [see **1917–30**].

1978–81 Spiegel, N., *Plotinus' Enneads* [in Hebrew], I–II, Jerusalem.

1982–98 Igal, J. *Plotino, Enéades*, I–III, Madrid.

1984 Ferwerda, R. *Plotinos. Enneaden. Porphyrius: Over het leven van Plotinus en de indeling van zijn traktaten*, Amsterdam.

1986–7 Tanaka, M., Mizuchi, M., and Tanogashira, Y. *Plotinos Zenshū,* I–V, Tokyo.

1987– Hadot, P. (ed.) *Les écrits de Plotin,* Paris [multiple author series].

1991–2004 Kalligas, P. *Porphyriou: Peri tou Plôtinou biou, Plôtinou Enneas prôtē, Plôtinou Enneas deutera, Plôtinou Enneas tritē*, Athens.

1994 Taylor, T. *Collected Writings of Plotinus*, Frome [see **1787–1830**].

1997 Casaglia, M., Guidelli, C., Linguiti, A., and Moriani, F. *Enneadi di Plotino*, prefazione di F. Adorno, I–II, Turin.

2003–09 Cornea, A. *Plotin, Opere*, I–III, Bucurest.

2003–10 Brisson, L. and Pradeau, J.-F. (eds.) *Plotin Ennéades, Traités* 1–6, 7–21, 22–26, 27–29, 30–37, 38–41, 42–44, 45–50, 51–54, Paris [multiple author series].

2004–5 Sēdash, T. G. *Плотин. Эннеады,* I–VI, Saint Petersburg.

2009 Shí Mǐnmǐn, *Pǔluótí'nuò*: *Jiǔzhāng jí*, Běijīng.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Sussex Library, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:37:49, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.018

2012– Narbonne, J., Achard, M., and Ferroni, L. (eds.) *Plotin: Oeuvres Complètes,* Paris [multiple author series].

2012– Dillon, J. and Smith, A. (eds.) *The Enneads of Plotinus with Philosophical Commentaries*, Las Vegas [multiple author series].

2014– Kalligas, P. *The "Enneads" of Plotinus: A Commentary*, Princeton.

2018– Gerson, L. P. (ed.) with Boys-Jones, G., Dillon, J. M., King, R. A. H., Smith, A., and Wilberding, J. *Plotinus: the Enneads*, Cambridge, UK [multiple author series].

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Sussex Library, on 20 Apr 2019 at 13:37:49, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.018

Index

absolute, the, 14, 186–7, 189–203, 209, 217, 246
abstraction, 57
Academy, Medicean, 74
Achard, Martin, 271, 276
Adelandus, 50
Aeneas of Gaza, 269
Aglaophemus, 6, 8, 25
Agrippa, Henry Cornelius, 11
Albertus Magnus, 46, 259
Alcibiades, 73
Alcinous, 102
Alexander of Aphrodisias, 48, 107, 272, 274
Al-Fārābi, 259
Al-Himsī, 259, 269
Al-Kindī, 259, 269
allegoresis, 58, 61, 118
Ambrose, 259
Amelius, 109, 266–8
Ammonius, 46, 275
Ammonius Saccas, 158
Anaxagoras, 211
angel, 4, 30, 59, 62, 64, 82, 104
anthology. *See* Compilation
Aphrodite. *See* Venus
Apollo, 31–2, 103
Aquinas, Thomas, 11, 46, 233, 236–43, 259
archetypes, 56–7, 149, 152, 200
Archytas, 51
argumenta, Ficinian, 20, 56
Aristotle, 2–3, 5, 8, 11, 21–3, 33, 46, 48, 50–1, 61, 73, 75, 77–80, 85, 87, 90, 92, 97, 101–2, 112, 121, 141–2, 153, 166–7, 172, 192, 206, 217, 219, 225, 236, 238, 243, 257, 259–61, 265, 273–5, 281, 287
Armstrong, A. H., 264, 270–1, 273
asceticism, 58, 84, 92
assimilation to God, 48, 50, 55–6, 67
astrology, 46, 120, 168
atheism, 160
atheists, 150, 153, 157
Athenagoras, 74
atomism, 151, 163–5, 167, 175
attunement, 33
Aubrius, Johannes, 260
Augustine of Hippo, Saint, 2, 4–5, 8, 10–11, 13, 24, 30, 33, 38, 49, 52, 82, 84, 86–7, 109, 112, 135, 170, 210, 237–8, 240, 242, 257, 259
Aurispa, Giovanni, 259
Averroes, 22, 46–8, 97, 106–7, 140–1
Avicenna, 46, 48, 97, 105–7, 259

Bacon, Francis, 128
Bacon, Roger, 263
Bade, Josse, 110
bait, 28
Barbaro, Ermolao, 73
Barth, Karl, 258
beauty, 19–20, 60
being, 2, 30, 45, 59, 63, 85, 87, 102, 113, 133, 147, 150–1, 186, 199, 219–20, 242
Being-Life-Intellect, triad of, 50
Belloy, Camille de, 237–40, 243
Benci, Tommaso, 19
Benedetti, Alessandro, 107
Benivieni, Girolamo, 44, 58, 60, 62
Bennett, Michael, 246, 250–2
Berg, Franz, 186
Bergson, Henri-Louis, 233–54
Berkeley, George, 13, 261
Bernard, Saint, 112
Bessarion, 106
Beutler, R., 269
Biran, Maine de, 234
Blake, William, 261
blessedness. *See* happiness
Blondel, Maurice, 247
Blumenthal, H. J., 272–3
Böhme, Jakob, 13–14, 204
Boethius, 76–7, 86, 141, 259
Bonaventure, 259

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Sussex Library, on 25 Apr 2019 at 09:26:12, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.019

bond (Schelling), 207–9, 211–12
Bost, Arnold, 110
Bouillet, M. N., 264
Bovelles, Charles de, 73–92
Boyle, Robert, 152
Boys-Jones, G., 271
Bramhall, J., 153
Bréhier, E. H., 264
Bréhier, Émile, 234, 264, 271
Brentano, F., 262
Brethren of Purity, 259
Brisson, L., 270, 276
Brucker, Johann Jakob, 2, 7, 9, 13, 185–6, 198, 211, 262
Bruno, Giordano, 8, 13, 185, 202, 204, 211–12, 257, 260, 263
Burckhardt, Jacob, 65
Bureau, Laurent, 110

Cabbala. *See* Kabbalah
Caelius, 61
Calcidius, 2, 24
cancellation (*Aufhebung*), 201, 222
Casaubon, Isaac, 11
Cassirer, Ernst, 66, 146–7
categories, Aristotelian and Platonic, 4, 51
categories, mental, 165
Catullus, 60
causa sui, 197
Cebes, 141
Celsus, Cornelius, 106
Chaldaean Oracles, 8, 26, 46, 50, 113, 132
Champier, Symphorien, 73–4, 82, 96–121
Charleton, Walter, 161
Chevalier, Jacques, 236
Christ, 155, 174
Christology, 187, 196
Cicero, 9, 78, 117, 141, 160–2
Cilento, V., 269, 272
Cittadini, Antonio, 63
Clichtove, Josse, 85–7
Coleridge, Samuel Taylor, 261–2
compilation, 98, 108, 119
concept (*Begriff*), Hegelian, 218, 220, 222, 227
concordance, doctrinal, 10, 51, 73–4
concrete universal, 222–3, 225
conjunction of intellect, Averroistic, 48
consciousness, 148–51, 154, 156, 175–6, 245
contemplation, 108, 154, 174, 184, 204–5, 225–6, 245, 250, 253
Conway, Anne, Countess of, 12, 261
Cop, Guillaume, 107
Copernicus, Nicolaus, 263
correspondences, 46, 111
Corrigan, K., 271, 273
Cousin, Victor, 263
Cradock, Samuel, 128
craftsman, the divine, 3, 40, 113–14
Creuzer, Friedrich, 14, 26, 37, 42, 184–6, 203–5, 207, 209, 258, 263–4, 267
Critical Philosophy, Kantian, 14
Cudworth, Damaris, 175
Cudworth, Ralph, 12–13, 128, 138, 146–58, 160, 175–6, 261
Curriculum, University, 75, 81, 84, 86, 96, 107
Cusa, Nicholas of, 11, 75–6, 81, 83, 89–91, 187, 257, 263
Cusanus. *See* Cusa, Nicholas of

d'Estaing, Charles, 102
Daemon, 19, 37, 39, 59, 64–5, 79–81, 83, 92, 96
Dante Alighieri, 24, 58
Daub, Carl, 184–5
Deleuze, Gilles, 236, 246–8, 250–2
Democritus, 153
Descartes, René, 12, 65, 127–43, 149, 151, 163, 167, 170–1, 173, 187, 233
determinism, 244
diagrams, figures, 90
dialogues, platonic, 7
Dickinson, Emily, 261
Didot, M. A.-F., 264
Digby, Kenelm, 160
Dillon, J. M., 271, 276
Diogenes Laërtius, 8
Dion, 73
Dionysus, 28, 40
discursiveness, 226–7
Donne, John, 261
Du Cange, C., 98
Dubois, François, 106
Dufour, R., 273
Duméry, Henry, 247–8
Dupuy, Albert, 108
duration (Bergson), 244–5, 248
Durkheim, Émile, 233

Eckhart, Meister, 187, 257, 259
ecstasy, 158, 172, 186, 188, 197, 199
eidolon of soul (more). *See* vehicle, aetherial
élan vital (Bergson), 251, 254
Elys, Edmund, 127
emanation, 2, 12, 37–8, 134, 143, 249
embryo, 28
Emerson, Ralph Waldo, 261–2
Emilsson, E. K., 272
Empedocles, 141
empiricism, 147, 153, 175, 236, 241
enneadic structure, 31

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Sussex Library, on 25 Apr 2019 at 09:26:12, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.019

Enneads, Plotinus', 1, 5, 12, 52–3, 80, 121, 127, 132–3, 184, 235, 272, 276
Epicharmus, 141
Epicurus, 160–7, 175
Er, Myth of, 118–19
Erasmus, 10, 146
eros. *See* love
eternity, 110, 114, 171–2
Etherian, Hugh, 259
etymologies, 61
Euclid, 76, 141, 170
Euripides, 141
Eusebius, 113–14, 265–8
Eustochius, 266–7, 272
evil, 14, 84
evolution, creative (Bergson), 244

Fabricius, 185
Faggin, G., 264
Fairfax, Nathaniel, 140
faith and reason, 109, 172, 195, 243
fate, 168
Father (Trinitarian), 193, 240
Ferroni, Lorenzo, 271–2, 276
Ferwerda, R., 271
Fichte, Johann Gottlieb, 183, 186, 188, 190, 194, 204
Ficino, Marsilio, 2, 5–13, 19–41, 45–8, 52–67, 69, 73–6, 80, 82–3, 89, 96–7, 99–113, 115–16, 118–21, 131–2, 156, 161, 183, 204, 257–61, 263, 265, 275
fiction, poetic, 25
form, 33, 35, 133, 206–7
forms, platonic, 23, 58, 62–3, 81, 86, 170, 193, 200–1, 209
Fortier, S., 272
freedom, 152–7, 168–9, 196, 275–6

Gale, Theophilus, 7
Galen, 35, 97, 101–9
Galilei, Galileo, 65
Ganay, Germain de, 74, 78, 83
Ganay, Jean de, 74
Gardeil, Ambroise, 237–8, 240
Garin, Eugenio, 66
Garrigou-Lagrange, Reginald, 239, 243
Gassendi, Pierre, 140, 163, 173
Gaza, Theodore, 107
Gentile, Giovanni, 66
Gerlach, G.W., 185
Gersh, S., 275
Gerson, L. P., 271, 273, 275
Giles of Viterbo, 8
Gilson, Étienne, 233, 236, 238–9, 241–4
Giorgi, Francesco, 7–8
Glanvill, Joseph, 127–30, 132, 134–6, 143
Glisson, 151
God, 20, 25, 52, 58–9, 62–3, 86, 89, 91, 104, 152, 156–8, 172, 176, 187, 189–200, 239–40, 248
gods, the, 27, 79
Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von, 203–4, 262
good, the, 2–3, 7, 29, 45, 109, 113–15, 119, 132–3, 153, 172, 174, 254, *See* One, the
grace, 240
Gregory of Nyssa, 259
Grocyn, William, 10
Grosseteste, Robert, 263
Guicciardini, Piero, 39
Günderode, Caroline, 185

Hadot, P., 239, 270
Hansch, Michael, 13
happiness, 47, 49–50, 58, 101, *See* blessedness
Harder, R., 269, 271
harmony, pre-established (Leibniz), 13
harmony, proportion, 28, 34–5, 38, 62, 104–5, 111, 152, 208
Harnack, A., 258
Hegel, G. W. F., 7, 10, 183, 185, 187, 194, 196, 200, 217–28, 236, 246, 262–3
Henry of Ghent, 49
Henry, P., 259, 263–5, 267–71, 274–5
Herbert, George, 261
Hermes Trismegistus, 5–8, 10–12, 23, 25, 37–8, 50–1, 54, 74–5, 82, 85, 102, 109–10, 131–2
Herodotus, 163–4
Hippocrates, 97, 101, 106–7
historical process, 201, 217, 221, 227
Hobbes, Thomas, 65, 146, 152–5, 160
Höffding, Harald, 244
Hölderlin, Friedrich, 262
holenmerism (More), 131–6, 139–40, 143
Holliday, S., 265
Horace, 110
Hugh of Saint Victor, 25
human being, 2–3, 27–8, 133
humanism, 21, 65, 74, 76, 78, 91, 100, 107
humours, 104, 167–8
hylarchic principle (More), 151
hypostases, 2, 19, 113, 132, 248

I, the (Ego), 188, 190, 197–8, 204, 206, 210–11
Iamblichus, 6, 23, 50, 80–1, 83–4, 102, 141, 258
Ibn Ezra, 259
Ibn Gabirol, 259
idea, Hegelian, 217, 220–5, 227
idealism, 146–7, 183, 187, 203
ideas, platonic. *See* forms, platonic

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Sussex Library, on 25 Apr 2019 at 09:26:12, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.019

identity, philosophy of (Schelling), 187–9, 194–7, 201
Igal, J., 270
ignorance, learned, 89
imagination, 23–4, 105, 110, 142
indifference (Schelling), 195, 200–4
ineffability, God's, 81, 114, 158, 234
infinity and finitude, 140, 208, 218–19
Ingelo, Nathaniel, 128
innatism, 80, 86, 165
intellect (mind), 2, 4, 14, 22, 24, 29, 39, 47–8, 50–1, 58–9, 63, 83, 86–9, 91–2, 99, 104, 106, 118, 132–3, 137–9, 141, 143, 146–7, 150–3, 158, 163, 166, 174, 190–1, 200–3, 206, 217–28, 240, 244, 246, 248, 250, 252–3
intellect, agent, 47–8, 57, 67
intuition, 194, 197–8, 200, 235–6, 245–6, 251–2
Israeli, Isaac, 259

Jacobi, Friedrich Heinrich, 185, 204, 211
Jacombe, Samuel, 128
Jerome of Pavia, 73–5
John of Jandun, 47
John of Scythopolis, 259
Judaism, 45
judgment, 165
Juno, 28
Jupiter, 27–8, 40
Justin Martyr, 118

Kabbalah, 44–6, 50, 52, 65, 74, 127
Kalligas, P., 271, 276
Kant, Immanuel, 13–14, 65, 147–8, 163, 186–8, 190, 208, 218, 236, 245, 258, 262
Karamanolis, G., 275
Keats, John, 261
Kepler, Johannes, 263
Kiefer, O., 264
King, R. A. H., 271
Kingsley, P., 264
Kirchhoff, A., 263–4, 276
knowledge, 245, 251
knowledge, self-, 238–9, 245
Kraus, P., 268
Kremer, K., 269
Kristeller, Paul, 66

Lefèvre d'Étaples, Jacques, 11, 73–92
Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, 1, 11, 13, 185, 188–9, 234, 262
Leone of Spoleto, Pier, 52–3
Leoniceno, Niccolò, 107
Lessard, Guichard de, 99
life, 235, 245
life, Ficino's theory of, 97, 99–100, 103, 120
light, physical or divine, 19, 85, 109
Linacre, Thomas, 107
Locke, John, 166, 175–7
logic, 75, 77–80, 117
logoi. *See* reason principles
logos, universal, 4, 132, 200, 235
Longinus, 266–7
love, lover, 19–20, 32, 51, 60–2, 87, 240
Lucretius, 161, 164–5, 168
Luther, Martin, 260

MacKenna, Stephen, 264–5
Macrobius, 2, 24, 26–8, 117, 259
macrocosm-microcosm, 34, 110
magic, 38, 45–6, 63–6, 74, 80, 101, 116
Mantuanus, Baptista, 75, 110
Marien, M., 272
Maritain, Jacques, 233, 236, 238–9, 241–4
Marnius, Claudius, 260
Martin, A. Jacobus, 260
Marvell, Andrew, 261
Masham, Lady. *See* Cudworth, Damaris
materialism, 153, 160–1, 164, 167, 174, 241, 243
mathematics, 46, 50, 76, 90, 111, 166, 169–70
matter, 3, 35, 37, 84, 89, 104, 111, 133, 150, 163, 166, 168, 170, 208–12, 244, 247, 250–1
Maximus the Confessor, 259
Mazur, Z., 272
mechanical philosophy, 12–13, 127, 129–30, 134–5, 149, 151–2, 155, 167–8
mediation, 22–4, 27–8, 33–4, 103, 151, 206, 219–20
medical theology (Champier), 98–102, 105, 108, 118, 121
Medici, Cosimo de', 5, 45, 259
Medici, Lorenzo de', 6, 45
medicine, 97–9, 102, 107–8, 117
Melanchthon, Philip, 9
memory, 141–2, 166, 175–6
Mercurius Trismegistus. *See* Hermes Trismegistus
Mercury, 31–2
metaphysics, 57, 59, 73, 75, 81, 84–7, 89, 97, 127–8, 147, 152, 217–18, 234, 236, 243
mind. *See* intellect
mirror, 37
Mithridates, Flavius, 52–3
monads (Leibniz), 13, 234
Montesoro of Padua, Domenico, 260
More, Henry, 12, 65, 127–43, 147, 153, 160, 163, 174, 261

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Sussex Library, on 25 Apr 2019 at 09:26:12, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.019

Moser, G. H., 263
Moses, 8
Mossé-Bastide, R.-M., 234–5, 244, 249
Muirhead, John, 146–7
Müller, H. F., 264
musician, 32
mysteries, philosophical, 6–7, 22, 25
mystical theology, 158
mysticism, 239–40, 248–51
mythology, 60

names, divine, 102
Narbonne, J.-M., 271–2, 276
natura naturans, 203
natural philosophy, Aristotelian, 111
natural sciences, 241
nature, 14, 28, 38, 63–4, 104, 134, 146, 149, 152, 156, 162, 184, 186–8, 203–7, 220, 246
nature and grace, 239–40
negation, 222, 248
negative theology, 4, 89
Newton, Sir Isaac, 263
Nicoli, Nicolo, 259
Nicomachus, 76
nothingness, 222
Novalis, 203–4, 262
nullibism (More), 139
Numenius of Apamea, 51, 97, 109, 113–15
numerology, 24–5, 29–30, 59, 111

O'Brien, D., 264, 276
O' Cleirigh, P., 273
O' Daly, G. J. P., 269
O'Meara, D. J., 273, 276
occasionalism, 152
Olympiodorus, 26–7, 118
omnipresence, 139
one, the, 2–4, 7, 24, 45, 83, 85, 92, 101–2, 186, 188–200, 209, 247–8, 254, *See* good, the
one-being, 220–1, 223–4
opposites, 195, 217–19, 222
organism, 208
Origen, 2, 81, 102, 109, 114, 155–6, 158, 187
Orpheus, 6–8, 25–8, 109, 113, 132
otherness, 202–4, 211
Otto, Rudolph, 158
Outram, William, 128
Overton, Richard, 161
Ovid, 52

Pan, 152
Pandora, 40
pantheism, 113, 150
paradigm, intelligible, 3
paradise, 111–12, 115
participation, 79, 137
Patrick, Simon, 128
Patrides, C. A., 172
Patrizi da Cherso, Francesco, 8, 13, 140
Paul of Aegina, 107
Périon, Joachim, 260
Perna, Pietro, 260
Perotti, Niccolò, 75
Peter of Spain, 77
Phillips, J., 276
Philo, 109–10, 114, 141
Philolaos the Pythagorean, 26
Philoponus, John, 266
philosopher, 32
philosophia perennis, 1, 13, 261
pia philosophia (Ficino), 6–7, 10–12, 22, 25, 100, 108, 114
Pico della Mirandola, Gianfrancesco, 9, 63
Pico della Mirandola, Giovanni, 5, 10, 44–67, 73–4, 258
Pierre de la Ramée. *See* Ramus, Petrus
plastic nature (Cudworth), 127, 130, 132, 134–5, 143, 149, 151–2
Plato, 2–3, 5–13, 19–20, 22–7, 32, 35, 38, 45–6, 51, 59–63, 66, 73, 75, 79–81, 85, 90, 92, 97, 99, 101–4, 108–12, 114–15, 117–19, 121, 127–9, 132–3, 135, 141, 151, 162, 164, 167, 169–71, 183, 185, 187, 191, 200, 204, 206–9, 211, 220, 225, 228, 245–6, 257–8, 260–3, 272, 275
Platonism, 24
Plethon, Gemistos, 5, 26
Plutarch, 160
pneuma. *See* spirit
politics, 97, 115–17
Poliziano, Angelo, 73
Porphyry, 1–3, 6, 21, 26–7, 29, 31, 35, 44–5, 50, 60, 63–4, 66, 77–9, 81, 83–5, 89, 138, 158, 199, 208, 237, 258–9, 264, 266–7, 269, 272, 274–6
Posidonius, 51
possibility, potentiality, 193
practical thinking (Fichte), 188
Pradeau, J.-F., 270
predicaments. *See* categories
prisca sapientia. *See pia philosophia*
Priscian, 80
procession and reversion, 30, 247
Proclus, 4, 6, 27, 29, 44, 46, 50–1, 59, 63–4, 66, 76, 81, 83, 91, 141, 166, 168, 170, 172, 183–5, 219, 225, 227, 251, 258–9, 261–2, 283
Prometheus, 40
providence, 27, 103, 107, 119, 129, 152

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Sussex Library, on 25 Apr 2019 at 09:26:12, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.019

Psellos, Michael, 26, 141
pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, 4–5, 10–12, 30, 41, 47, 52, 59, 73, 76, 81–4, 86, 89, 91–2, 187, 191, 257, 259
Ptolemy, 76
purification, 109, 115–16
purification-illumination-perfection, triad of, 30
pythagoras, 6–8, 23, 25, 50, 81, 90, 103, 132, 141, 151
Pythagorean, 2, 22, 26, 46, 53, 111

Rabot, Jean, 117
Ramus, Petrus, 9, 260
Ravaisson, Félix, 234, 236
real and ideal, 200, 207
reason, 23–4, 50, 57, 114, 168, 170
reason, absolute (Schelling), 194, 202
reason, seminal, 4, 206, 249
reason-principle, 38–41
reflexivity, 194
Remes, P., 274
res cogitans, res extensa (Descartes), 128, 130, 136–7, 142, 149, 167, 171
Reuchlin, Johann, 65
revelation, 203
Rhenanus, Beatus, 84
rhetoric, 107
Rohan, François de, 100, 109
Ruel, Jean, 107
Runge, Philipp Otto, 203
Rust, George, 128

Saccas, Ammonius, 272
sage (*sapiens*), 88–91
Saint-Thierry, William of, 259
salvation, 116
Saturn, 62
Scalichius, Paulus, 260
Schelling, F. W. J., 13–14, 183–212, 262
Scherzer, Johann Adam, 13
Schlegel, Friedrich, 184–5, 188
Schleiermacher, Friedrich S., 121
Schwyzer, H-R., 259–60, 264–5, 268–72, 274, 276
Scotus Eriugena, John, 46, 259
Scutariotes, Johannes, 259
Seidel, E., 285
sense, 24, 56, 88–90, 164–5, 168
sensus communis, 166
separation (*chōrismos*), 57
Servet, Miguel, 104
Sextus, 186
Shakespeare, William, 261
Sibylline Oracles, 113
Simon, 264
Simplicius, 173
Slaveva-Griffin, S., 274
Smith, A., 271
Smith, John, 12, 128, 160–77
Socrates, 19, 26–7, 61, 66, 73, 115
Son (Trinitarian), 192–3
soul, 2–3, 7, 21–3, 25, 29, 48, 51, 55, 58, 82, 85, 149, 151, 155, 204, 235, 238
soul (mind) and body, 26, 28, 39–40, 86, 100–4, 108, 112, 134, 136, 138, 141, 163–5, 167–8, 171–3
soul, descent of, 39–40, 50, 188, 196, 208
soul, immortality of, 47–8, 51, 105, 112, 117, 141, 160–77
soul, intellectual, 40, 49, 112, 138, 140, 148
soul, pre-existence and afterlife, 129–31, 133
soul, self-motion, 168–73
soul, transmigration of, 32, 50
soul, world-soul and individual soul, 27, 29, 37–41, 51, 55, 62, 96, 119, 127, 129, 134, 151, 196, 207–9
space, 131, 137–40, 164, 209
Spenser, Edmund, 261
Speusippus, 228
Spinoza, Baruch, 13, 146, 151, 154–5, 157, 185, 187, 189, 195, 201, 204, 208, 211–12, 246, 262
spirit, 33–6, 103–4, 127–9, 131–3, 135, 137, 139–40, 150–1, 163, 167–8
Spirit, Holy, 81, 104, 240
statues, 37–9
Steffens, H., 203
Steucho, Agostino, 1, 261
Stillingfleet, Edward, 128
Strozzi, Palla, 259
subject and object, 190, 197–8, 205–6, 226
substance and accident, 3
super-essentiality, 191
swerve, atomic, 168
sympathy, cosmic, 64, 96, 209
Synesius, 6, 37
Syrianus, 51, 63
system, philosophical, 1, 147, 217, 234–5, 244, 262–3

Taylor, Thomas, 258, 260–1
teleology, 152, 155
Tennemann, W. G., 185–6, 210
Tetragrammaton, 102
Theiler, W., 269
Themistius, 23
theogony, 192–3
theology, 46, 51, 59, 97, 99, 103, 108, 110, 156, 239, 242
Theophrastus, 73

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Sussex Library, on 25 Apr 2019 at 09:26:12, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.019

theurgy, 4, 83–4, 92, 101
Thomasius, Jakob, 13
Thoreau, Henry David, 261
thought and being (Hegel), 218–19, 221–7
Tiedemann, Dietrich, 7, 9, 185–6, 198, 210, 262
Tillotson, John, 128
time, 245
timelessness, 202–3
Titans, 28
Traherne, Thomas, 261
transcendence, 52, 57, 99, 150, 156, 187, 191
translatio studiorum, 74
triadicity, 29–31, 47, 110, 113–14, 219, 224–6
trinity, 25
Trinity, the, 20, 30–1, 46, 84, 86, 104, 109, 132, 157, 187, 200, 238, 240
Trouillard, Jean, 235–6, 239–40, 246–8, 250–1, 253–4, 276
truth, 32
Turner, J. D., 272

understanding (*Verstand*), Hegelian, 218
universals, 78–9

Vacherot, 264
Valla, Lorenzo, 10–11
van Limborch, 157
Vaughan, Henry, 261
vehicle, aetherial, 12, 131, 136, 140
Venus, 19, 31–2, 40, 62
Victorinus, Marius, 5, 83–4, 258
Vincent of Beauvais, 259
virgil, 52, 141
virtue, virtues, 3, 50, 54–7, 67, 88, 90, 92, 101, 115, 117
vision, intellectual, 235, 237–8, 248
Vives, Juan Luis, 9
Volkmann, R., 264
Vossius, Gerardus Johannes, 9

Whichcote, Benjamin, 128
Whitman, Walt, 261
Wilberding, J., 271
will, 109, 112, 146, 153–4, 157, 168, 198, 240
William of Auvergne, 259
William of Conches, 24
Windischmann, K. J. H., 14, 183–4, 186, 191, 197, 203, 210–11
wisdom, 85, 92
Wither, George, 161
Wordsworth, William, 261
Worthington, John, 174–5

Zeller, Eduard, 2, 262
Zeno of Elea, 245
Zeus. *See* Jupiter
Zoroaster, 6, 8, 25–6, 85, 103, 109, 141

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Sussex Library, on 25 Apr 2019 at 09:26:12, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233019.019